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  1. Gordon Prescott Barnes (2007). Necessity and Apriority. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):495 - 523.
    The classical view of the relationship between necessity and apriority, defended by Leibniz and Kant, is that all necessary truths are known a priori. The classical view is now almost universally rejected, ever since Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam discovered that there are necessary truths that are known only a posteriori. However, in recent years a new debate has emerged over the epistemology of these necessary a posteriori truths. According to one view – call it the neo-classical view – knowledge (...)
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  2. J. A. Brook (1992). Kant's A Priori Methods for Recognizing Necessary Truths. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (sup1):215-252.
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  3. Albert Casullo, Counterfactuals and Modal Knowledge.
    One infl uential argument in support of the existence of a priori knowledge is due to Kant, who claimed that necessity is a criterion of the a priori—that is, that all knowledge of necessary propositions is a priori. Th at claim, together with two others that Kant took to be evident—we know some mathematical propositions and such propositions are necessary—led directly to the conclusion that some knowledge is a priori. Kripke ( 1971 , 1980 ) challenged Kant’s central claim by (...)
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  4. Walter Del-Negro (1925). Zum Wahrheitsproblem. Kant-Studien 30 (1-2):115-134.
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  5. Jeffrey Brian Downard (2004). Nietzsche and Kant on the Pure Impulse to Truth. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 27 (1):18-41.
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  6. Martha I. Gibson (2011). A Revolution in Method, Kant's “Copernican Hypothesis”, and the Necessity of Natural Laws. Kant-Studien 102 (1):1-21.
    In an effort to account for our a priori knowledge of synthetic necessary truths, Kant proposes to extend the successful method used in mathematics and the natural sciences to metaphysics. In this paper, a uniform account of that method is proposed and the particular contribution of the ‘Copernican hypothesis’ to our knowledge of necessary truths is explained. It is argued that, though the necessity of the truths is in a way owing to the object's relation to our cognition, the truths (...)
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  7. Robert Hanna (2011). The Myth of the Given and the Grip of the Given. Diametros 27:25-46.
    In this paper I argue that the Sellarsian Myth of the Given does not apply to all forms of Non-Conceptualism; that Kant is in fact a non-conceptualist of the right-thinking kind and not a Conceptualist, as most Kant-interpreters think; and that an intelligible and defensible Kantian Non-Conceptualism can be developed which supports the thesis that true perceptual beliefs are non-inferentially justified and also normatively funded by direct, embodied, intentional interactions with the manifest world (a.k.a. the Grip of the Given).
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  8. Robert Hanna (2006). Review: Underwood, Kant's Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Analysis and Critique of Anglo-American Alternatives. [REVIEW] Kantian Review 11 (1):136-138.
  9. Robert Hanna (2000). Kant, Truth and Human Nature. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2):225 – 250.
  10. Robert Hanna (1998). A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):497-528.
    According to Kant in the Prolegomena, the natural kind proposition (GYM) "Gold is a yellow metal" is analytically true, necessary, and a priori. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam have argued that on the contrary propositions such as (GYM) are neither analytic, nor necessary, nor a priori. The Kripke-Putnam view is based on the doctrine of "scientific essentialism" (SE). It is a direct consequence of SE that propositions such as (GE) "Gold is the element with atomic number number 79" are metaphysically (...)
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  11. Robert Hanna (1993). The Trouble with Truth in Kant's Theory of Meaning. History of Philosophy Quarterly 10 (1):1 - 20.
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  12. Paul Healy (1988). Kant, Blanshard, and the Coherence Theory of Truth. Idealistic Studies 18 (3):266-274.
    Against blanshard's classic argument for coherence, i maintain that coherence is neither the sole criterion nor nature of truth. in the face of blanshard's insistence that, since truth cannot be a matter of correspondence it must necessarily be a matter of coherence, i propose and defend a third option which combines the two polar positions. i develop this option through analysis of kant's writings on truth.
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  13. Ingeborg Heidemann (1966). Prinzip und wirklichkeit in der kantischen ethik. Kant-Studien 57 (1-4):230-250.
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  14. R. Hiltscher (1993). Kant Proof-Structure of the Theory of Adequation of Truth in Die 'Transzendentale Deduktion (B)'. Kant-Studien 84 (4):426-447.
  15. Reinhard Hiltscher (1993). Kants Begründung der Adäquationstheorie der Wahrheit in der transzendentalen Deduktion der Ausgabe B. Kant-Studien 84 (4):426-447.
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  16. Paulo Jesus (2010). Le Je Pense Comme Facteur de Vérité: Adéquation, Cohérence Et Communauté Sémantique. Kant-Studien 101 (2):167-188.
  17. Béla Juhos (1968). Die empirische wahrheit und ihre überprüfung. Kant-Studien 59 (1-4):435-447.
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  18. Béla Juhos (1967). Die „intensionale“ wahrheit und die zwei arten Des aussagengebrauchs. Kant-Studien 58 (1-4):173-186.
  19. F. Kaulbach (1985). Kant Conception of the Scientific-Nature of Philosophy-Sensory Truth. Kant-Studien 76 (1):1-13.
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  20. Srećko Kovač (2008). In What Sense is Kantian Principle of Contradiction Non-Classical? Logic and Logical Philosophy 17 (3):251-274.
    On the ground of Kant’s reformulation of the principle of con- tradiction, a non-classical logic KC and its extension KC+ are constructed. In KC and KC+, \neg(\phi \wedge \neg\phi),  \phi \rightarrow (\neg\phi \rightarrow \phi), and  \phi \vee \neg\phi are not valid due to specific changes in the meaning of connectives and quantifiers, although there is the explosion of derivable consequences from {\phi, ¬\phi} (the deduc- tion theorem lacking). KC and KC+ are interpreted as fragments of an S5-based first-order (...)
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  21. Rebecca Kukla (2005). The Antinomies of Impure Reason: Rousseau and Kant on the Metaphysics of Truth-Telling. Inquiry 48 (3):203 – 231.
    Truth-telling is a project that is both gripping and problematic for Rousseau, as he is both captured by an ideal of telling as complete, undistorted discernment, documentation and communication, and also haunted by the fear that telling can never be this innocent. For Rousseau, as for Kant, telling does not leave the told untouched; rather, telling gives us a type of contact with objects that is marked and mediated by the process of telling itself, and hence the possibility of immediately (...)
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  22. Harold Langsam (2000). Kant's Compatibilism and His Two Conceptions of Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):164–188.
    In this paper, I explain how Kant's views can be reconciled, and I argue that the relevance of transcendental idealism here is that it shows that determinism is known to be true, not in accordance with the familiar correspondence notion of truth, but only in accordance with a weaker notion of truth, Kant's empirical notion of truth, which is a kind of coherence notion of truth. (edited).
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  23. Nectarios G. Limnatis (2006). The Canon and the Organon of Thought. Idealistic Studies 36 (2):123-139.
    This paper looks at the Kantian background in the development of the views on formal logic and contradiction in German Idealism. Assuming the post-Kantian view, I examine what Kant advanced and what he left unsettled, provoking thus the subsequent debate. I start by showing (§1) that already the pre-critical Kant questions the effectiveness of formal logic in philosophical discourse andclaims that the laws of identity and non-contradiction fall short of explaining change, opposition, and contradiction, all these being parts of reality. (...)
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  24. Douglas McDermid (1998). Putnam on Kant on Truth. Idealistic Studies 28 (1/2):17-34.
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  25. Jennifer Mensch (2004). Kant on Truth. Idealistic Studies 34 (2):163-172.
    This essay discusses Kant’s account of truth, arguing that he offers us a weak coherence theory: weak for his insistence on an independent, sensuous content for intuition, coherentist for the transcendental apparatus supporting experience. While Kant is free to use the language of correspondence within experience, “empirical truth” will always be limited by the formative requirements set by “transcendental truth.” The difficulty, for Kant, is the role played by sensuous content since the sameness of this content in intersubjective experience seems (...)
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  26. Chong-Hyon Paek (2005). Kant’s Theory of Transcendental Truth as Ontology. Kant-Studien 96 (2):147-160.
    I. The Problem of ‘Truth’ in the Logic of Truth.
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  27. Alexis Philonenko (2011). Kant Et l'Île de la Vérité: Néant, Chose En Soi, Sujet Transcendantal, Causalité, Grandeur Intensive, Temps, Substance. Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin.
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  28. Gerold Prauss (1969). Zum wahrheitsproblem bei Kant. Kant-Studien 60 (2):166-182.
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  29. Timothy Rosenkoetter (2009). Truth Criteria and the Very Project of a Transcendental Logic. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91 (2):193-236.
    This paper argues that Kant's idea for a new kind of logic is bound up with a very specific strategy for obtaining truth criteria, where he takes Christian Wolff to have failed. While the First Critique 's argument against any universal criterion for empirical truth has almost always been treated as extraneous to the main concerns of the Transcendental Analytic, I argue that Kant inserted it at an important juncture in the text to illustrate a signal difference between traditional logics (...)
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  30. Paul Rusnock (2011). Kant and Bolzano on Logical Form. Kant-Studien 102 (4):477-491.
    In the works of Kant and his followers, the notion of form plays an important role in explaining the apriority, necessity and certainty of logic. Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848), an important early critic of Kant, found the Kantians' definitions of form imprecise and their explanations of the special status of logic deeply unsatisfying. Proposing his own conception of form, Bolzano developed radically different views on logic, truth in virtue of form, and other matters. This essay presents Bolzano's views in the light (...)
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  31. Mark Textor (2013). Bolzano on Conceptual and Intuitive Truth: The Point and Purpose of the Distinction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):13-36.
    Bolzano incorporated Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts into the doctrine of propositions by distinguishing between conceptual (Begriffssätze an sich) and intuitive propositions (Anschauungssätze an sich). An intuitive proposition contains at least one objective intuition, that is, a simple idea that represents exactly one object; a conceptual proposition contains no objective intuition. After Bolzano, philosophers dispensed with the distinction between conceptual and intuitive propositions. So why did Bolzano attach philosophical importance to it? I will argue that, ultimately, the value of (...)
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  32. Clinton Tolley (2012). Kant on the Content of Cognition. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):200-228.
    I present an argument for an interpretation of Kant's views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of Kant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to Kant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of Kant put forward by McDowell and others, according to which Kant embraces a version of Russellianism, I argue that Kant's views on this topic (...)
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  33. Alberto Vanzo (2012). Kant on Truth-Aptness. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.
    Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans (...)
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  34. Alberto Vanzo (2010). Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth. Kant-Studien 101 (2):147-166.
    Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: “Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object”. In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth. I conclude that Kant's claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of truth. Kant's claim is not (...)
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  35. Alberto Vanzo (2010). Kant, Skepticism, and the Comparison Argument. In Pablo Muchnick (ed.), Rethinking Kant, vol. 2. Cambridge Scholars Publishers.
    Kant's writings on logic illustrate the comparison argument about truth, which goes as follows. A truth-bearer p is true if and only if it corresponds, or it agrees, with a portion of reality: the object(s), state(s) of affairs, or event(s) p is about. In order to know whether p agrees with that portion of reality, one must check if that portion of reality is as p states. Using the terms of the comparison argument, one must compare p with that portion (...)
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  36. Alberto Vanzo (2008). A Correspondence Theory of Objects? On Kant's Notions of Truth, Object, and Actuality. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):259-275.
    Ernst Cassirer claimed that Kant's notion of actual object presupposes the notion of truth. Therefore, Kant cannot define truth as the correspondence of a judgement with an actual object. In this paper, I discuss the relations between Kant's notions of truth, object, and actuality. I argue that's notion of actual object does not presuppose the notion of truth. I conclude that Kant can define truth as the correspondence of a judgement with an actual object.
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  37. Alberto Vanzo (2008). Sull'interpretazione coerentista della concezione kantiana della verità. Studi Kantiani 21:77-95.
    This paper argues that Kant, in his Critical period, did not have a coherence theory of truth. The paper outlines three coherence theories of truth and two coherence theories of empirical truth that Kant might have adopted. The three theories of truth are incompatible with Kant's texts. The two theories of empirical truth are compatible with the texts. However, there are no convincing reasons to hold that Kant adopted those theories.
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  38. Robert Wicks (1993). Schopenhauer's Naturalization of Kant's a Priori Forms of Empirical Knowledge. History of Philosophy Quarterly 10 (2):181 - 196.
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  39. Jan Woleński (2003). Against Truth as Coherence. Logic and Logical Philosophy 4:41-51.
    Traces of the coherence theory are to be found in rationalistic epistemological systems of Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Fichte. However, the first fully advanced coherence theory was proposed by Bradley in XIX century. He was followed by Joachim, McTaggart, and particularly Blanshard and Ewing. The coherence theory later became popular among philosophers of the Vienna Circle, notably in Neurath and Hempel.2 Recently, Rescher tried to combine various proposals of coherentists into one fully unified view.
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