David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Perspectives 36 (s16):267-97 (2002)
It is often said, metaphorically, that belief "aims" at the truth. This paper proposes a normative interpretation of this metaphor. First, the notion of "epistemic norms" is clarified, and reasons are given for the view that epistemic norms articulate essential features of the beliefs that are subject to them. Then it is argued that all epistemic norms--including those that specify when beliefs count as rational, and when they count as knowledge--are explained by a fundamental norm of correct belief, which requires that, if one considers a proposition at all, one should believe it if and only if it is true.
|Keywords||Aim Belief Knowledge Norm Rational Truth|
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Citations of this work BETA
Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio (2014). Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Declan Smithies (2012). The Normative Role of Knowledge. Noûs 46 (2):265-288.
Jane Friedman (2013). Suspended Judgment. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief in Action (and Reaction). Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010). Unreasonable Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.
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