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Profile: Cristina Borgoni (Karl Franzens University)
Profile: Cristina Borgoni (University of Graz)
  1.  8
    Cristina Borgoni & Yannig Luthra (forthcoming). Epistemic Akrasia and the Fallibility of Critical Reasoning. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    There is widespread disagreement about whether epistemic akrasia is possible. This paper argues that the possibility of epistemic akrasia follows from a traditional rationalist conception of epistemic critical reasoning, together with considerations about the fallibility of our capacities for reasoning. In addition to defending the view that epistemic akrasia is possible, we aim to shed light on why it is possible. By focusing on critical epistemic reasoning, we show how traditional rationalist assumptions about our core cognitive capacities help to explain (...)
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  2.  24
    Cristina Borgoni (2016). Dissonance and Irrationality: A Criticism of The In‐Between Account of Dissonance Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):48-57.
    In a dissonance case, a person sincerely and with conviction asserts that P, while his/her overall automatic behavior suggests that he/she believes that not-P. According to Schwitzgebel, this is a case of in-between believing. This article raises several concerns about Schwitzgebel's account and proposes an alternative view. I argue that the in-between approach yields incorrect results in belief self-ascriptions and does not capture the psychological conflict underlying the individual's dissonance. I advance the view that in relevant cases the dissonant individual (...)
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  3.  7
    Cristina Borgoni (2015). Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):827-842.
    In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia. I propose two different types of epistemic akrasia involving different kinds of evidence on which the subject bases her evaluation of her akratic belief. I examine three (...)
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  4.  9
    Cristina Borgoni (2015). Dissonance and Doxastic Resistance. Erkenntnis 80 (5):957-974.
    This paper focuses on the puzzling situation of having beliefs that are resistant to one’s own critical reasoning. This phenomenon happens, for example, when an individual does not succeed in eliminating a belief by evaluating it as false. I argue that this situation involves a specific type of irrationality—not yet properly identified in the literature—which I call ‘critical doxastic resistance’. The aim of this paper is to characterize this type of irrationality. Understanding such a phenomenon sheds light on the type (...)
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  5.  53
    Cristina Borgoni (2015). Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):827-842.
    In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia. I propose two different types of epistemic akrasia involving different kinds of evidence on which the subject bases her evaluation of her akratic belief. I examine three (...)
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  6.  23
    Cristina Borgoni (2014). Debating Self-Knowledge, by Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):204-204.
  7.  9
    Cristina Borgoni (2015). On Knowing One's Own Resistant Beliefs. Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):212-225.
    Influential views on self-knowledge presuppose that we cannot come to know a resistant belief in a first-personal way. Two theses support this supposition: if a belief self-ascription is grounded in the evidence of the person holding the belief, it is third-personal and we cannot have first-personal knowledge of beliefs we do not control. I object to both of these theses and argue that we can introspect on beliefs of which we lack control even though we cannot assent to their content.
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  8.  10
    Cristina Borgoni (2015). Dissonance and Moorean Propositions. Dialectica 69 (1):107-127.
    In a dissonance case, a person sincerely and with conviction asserts that P, while her overall automatic behaviour suggests that she believes that not-P. In contrast with several mainstream views, this paper defends the contradictory-belief view of some relevant dissonance cases and explores its consequences regarding Moorean propositions. The paper argues that in relevant cases, the dissonant person is justified in asserting a Moorean proposition on the grounds of her explicit view on the subject matter and the recognition of her (...)
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  9.  16
    Cristina Borgoni (2008). Interpretando la Paradoja de Moore (Interpreting Moore's Paradox). Theoria 23 (2):145-161.
    RESUMEN: Este trabajo ofrece una lectura de la Paradoja de Moore que pone énfasis en su relevancia para nuestra comprensión de la racionalidad y de la interpretación lingüística. Mantiene que las oraciones que dan origen a la paradoja no necesitan entenderse en términos de ausencia de una contradicción, sino más bien en términos de ausencia de racionalidad, entendida esta como un término más amplio que el de coherencia y consistencia lógica. Se defenderá tal posición por medio de tres tesis, dos (...)
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  10.  15
    Cristina Borgoni & Herivelto Souza (2009). Davidson's Externalisms. Universitas Philosophica 53:65-87.
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  11. Cristina Borgoni (2011). El origen de lo mental: la percepción como género psicológico. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):135-148.
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  12. Cristina Borgoni (2009). En casa, en el mundo: el externismo global constitutivo. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):151-172.
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  13. Cristina Borgoni (2009). Cuando el externalismo y el auto-conocimiento privilegiado son compartibles o no. Episteme 29 (1):1-34.
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  14. Cristina Borgoni (2009). In the House, in the World: Constitutive Global Externalism. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):151-171.
     
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