The aim of this paper is to give an account of the change in Feyerabend's philosophy that made him abandon methodological monism and embrace methodological pluralism. In this paper I offer an explanation in terms of a simple model of 'change of belief through evidence'. My main claim is that the evidence triggering this belief revision can be identified in Feyerabend's technical work in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, in particular his reevaluation of Bohr's contribution to it. This highlights an (...) under-appreciated part of Feyerabend's early work and makes it central to an understanding of the dynamics in his overall philosophy of science. (shrink)

In 1957, Feyerabend delivered a paper titled ‘On the Quantum-Theory of Measurement’ at the Colston Research Symposium in Bristol to sketch a completion of von Neumann's measurement scheme without collapse, using only unitary quantum dynamics and well-motivated statistical assumptions about macroscopic quantum systems. Feyerabend's paper has been recognised as an early contribution to quantum measurement, anticipating certain aspects of decoherence. Our paper reassesses the physical and philosophical content of Feyerabend's contribution, detailing the technical steps as well as its overall philosophical (...) motivations and consequences. Summarising our results, Feyerabend interpreted collapse as a positivist assumption in quantum mechanics leading to a strict distinction between the uninterpreted formalism of unitary evolution in quantum mechanics and the classically interpreted observational language describing post-measurement outcomes. Thus Feyerabend took the no-collapse completion of the von Neumann measurement scheme to show the dispensability of the positivist assumption, leading the way to a realistic interpretation of quantum theory. We note, however, that there are substantial problems with his account of measurement that bring into question its viability as a legitimate foil to the orthodox view. We further argue that his dissatisfaction with the von Neumann measurement scheme is indicative of early views on theoretical pluralism. (shrink)

Paul Feyerabend once made a remark to the effect that his pragmatic theory of observation can be traced back to proposals put forward by leading Logical Empiricists during the height of the protocol sentence debate. In this paper I want to vindicate the systematic side of Feyerabend’s remark and show that a pragmatic theory of observation can in fact be found in Rudolf Carnap’s writings of 1932. I first proceed to dispel a misunderstanding concerning the term “pragmatic” raised by Thomas (...) Oberdan. Following Morris’ and Carnap’s documented usage, I show that the intended meaning of “pragmatic” refers to a specific semiotic relation between users of a language and their environment describable by empirical means. I reconstruct such a pragmatic theory in terms of a detector model that interprets observation sentences as bodily dispositions indicating physical events in the surroundings of the detector. I then proceed to show how Feyerabend’s later theory of observation picks up central features of Carnap’s account and also shares some of the motivations. I conclude by noting how an empirical theory of observation sentences offers a bootstrapping solution to the “basis problem”. (shrink)

This essay introduces the transcription and translation of Paul Feyerabend's "Der Begriff der Verständlichkeit in der modernen Physik" [The concept of intelligibility in modern physics] (1948), which is an early essay written by Paul Feyerabend in 1948 on the topic of intelligibility (Verständlichkeit) and visualizability (Anschaulichkeit) of physical theories. The existence of such essay was likely. It is listed in his bibliography as his first publication. Yet the content of the essay was unknown, as no original or copy is extant (...) in Feyerabend's Nachlass and no known published version was available to the community—until now. The essay has both historical and philosophical interest: it is, as far as our current knowledge goes, Feyerabend's earliest extant publication. It documents Feyerabend's philosophical interest as a physicist-to-be, in what he himself called his “positivist” phase; and it gives a rare if fragmentary insight into the early discussions of the ‘Third Vienna Circle’ and, more generally, the philosophical culture of discussion in Vienna. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the claim that Paul Feyerabend held a robust metaphilosophical position for most of his philosophical career. This position I call Decision-Based Epistemology and reconstruct it in terms of three key components: a form of epistemic voluntarism concerning the justification of philosophical positions and a behaviorist account of philosophical beliefs, which allows him to cast normative arguments concerning philosophical beliefs in scientific methodology, such as realism, in terms of means-ends relations. I then introduce non-naturalist and naturalist (...) variants of his conception of normativity, which I trace back to his mentors Viktor Kraft and Karl Popper, respectively. This distinction, introduced on the metaphilosophical level, can can be put to use to explain key changes in Feyerabend’s philosophical proposals, such as the viability of his methodological argument for realism. I conclude that this Decision-Based Epistemology should be further explored by historically embedding Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy in a voluntarist tradition of scientific philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I apply the concept of _inter-Model Inconsistency in Set Theory_ (MIST), introduced by Carolin Antos (this volume), to select positions in the current universe-multiverse debate in philosophy of set theory: I reinterpret H. Woodin’s _Ultimate L_, J. D. Hamkins’ multiverse, S.-D. Friedman’s hyperuniverse and the algebraic multiverse as normative strategies to deal with the situation of de facto inconsistency toleration in set theory as described by MIST. In particular, my aim is to situate these positions on the (...) spectrum from inconsistency avoidance to inconsistency toleration. By doing so, I connect a debate in philosophy of set theory with a debate in philosophy of science about the role of inconsistencies in the natural sciences. While there are important differences, like the lack of threatening explosive inferences, I show how specific philosophical positions in the philosophy of set theory can be interpreted as reactions to a state of inconsistency similar to analogous reactions studied in the philosophy of science literature. My hope is that this transfer operation from philosophy of science to mathematics sheds a new light on the current discussion in philosophy of set theory; and that it can help to bring philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science closer together. (shrink)

The present article-based dissertation is a contribution to a historical and systematic recon- struction of Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy. Building on previous work on the same subject, this thesis continues a research effort exploring Feyerabend’s early ties to scientific philoso- phy, in particular Logical Empiricism and the Vienna Circle, as well as its continued effects on Feyerabend’s later philosophy. The main claim is that Feyerabend’s formative years in Vienna (1946-1955) happened in the context of scientific philosophy and that his early philosophi- (...) cal proposals should be interpreted as a critical contribution within this tradition. Secondly, it proposes a framework to connect Feyerabend’s early and later philosophy and explain the theoretical change involved. -/- The first article gives the reader an overview of Feyerabend’s philosophy, introducing key themes of Feyerabend’s writings. -/- The second article deals with the context and interpretation of Feyerabend’s earliest extant essay (1948) and identifies an early stage of Feyerabend’s philosophical formation, possibly preceding his acquaintance with Logical Empiricism, in which positivism as a concept of ”philosophy of physicists” is his primary interest. This helps to build a very fine-grained time sequence of his early philosophical interests and helps to disentangle the notion of scientific philosophy. -/- The third article deals with an objection by Thomas Oberdan to the claim that Feyerabend’s pragmatic theory of observation is a development of earlier proposals by Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath and Karl Popper in the early 1930s. In particular, Oberdan denies that Carnap ever proposed such a theory about protocol sentences. The article argues that Oberdan’s objection fails by reconstructing how such a theory can be found in Carnap’s 1932 writings. Feyerabend’s pragmatic theory of observation is indeed one major point of contact between Logical Empiricism, Feyerabend’s early philosophy and his later ’post-positivist’ philosophy. This completes one main interpretative claim in previous work, namely, that Feyerabend’s pragmatic theory of observation should be seen as a contribution to the project of a ”behavioristics of scholars”. -/- The fourth and last article is dedicated to Feyerabend’s role as a protagonist in the so-called historical turn in the philosophy of science in the 1960s. His early strong opposition and his later adherence to the turn is discussed and an explanation of the change involved is given. To this end I introduce a reconstruction of Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy, a framework called Decision-based Epistemology, and claim that specific changes on the metaphilosophical level can account for prominent changes on the level of Feyerabend’s philosophical contributions. -/- An introduction at the beginning of the collection of articles gives a rationale of the outline, the overall research project and provides more informations on how these articles fit in the overall research project. (shrink)