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Dimitri Landa [4]Dimitri Alexander Landa [1]
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Profile: Dimitri Landa (New York University)
  1. Nicholas Almendares & Dimitri Landa (forthcoming). Mixed Motives in the Equilibrium View of Joint Intention. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    We develop a theory of joint intention in contexts in which participants have mixed motives that can manifest in all-things-considered reasons to deviate from contributing to the desired project, e.g., contexts with collective action problems. Our theory is based on strategic equilibrium-based reasoning, which links the characterization of joint intention in terms of individual intentions with conditions on strategy profiles of the underlying strategic games. We use elements of equilibrium reasoning to construct a counterfactual account of joint intention in the (...)
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  2. Dimitri Landa (2009). On the Possibility of Kantian Retributivism. Utilitas 21 (3):276-296.
    One of the most potent motivations for retributivist approaches to punishment has been their apparent connection to an ethical background shaped by the Kantian notion of morally autonomous and rational human agency. The present article challenges the plausibility of this connection. I argue that retributivism subverts, rather than embodies, the normative consequences of moral autonomy, justifying a social practice that conflicts with the considered judgments that the proper recognition of moral autonomy would authorize. The core of my case is the (...)
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  3. Dimitri Landa (2008). Toleration and Self-Skepticism1. In Russel Hardin, Ingrid Crepell & Stephen Macedo (eds.), Toleration on Trial. Lexington Books 49.
  4. Nicholas Almendares & Dimitri Landa (2007). Strategic Coordination and the Law. Law and Philosophy 26 (5):501-529.
    We re-examine the relationship between coordination, legal sanctions, and free-riding in light of the recent controversy regarding the applicability of the coordination problem paradigm of law-making. We argue that legal sanctions can help solve coordination problems by eliminating socially suboptimal equilibrium outcomes. Once coordination has taken place, however, free-riding can not lead to the breakdown of coordination outcomes, even if sanctions may still be effective at increasing the equity of such outcomes. Finally, we argue that it is the choice of (...)
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