Cognitive dissonance has been studied for more than sixty years and many insightful findings have come from this research. However, some important theoretical and methodological issues are yet to be resolved, particularly regarding dissonance reduction. In this paper, we place dissonance theory in the larger framework of appraisal theories of emotion, emotion regulation, and coping. The basic premise of dissonance theory is that people experience negative affect (to varying degrees) following the detection of cognitive conflict. The individual will be motivated (...) to alleviate these emotional reactions and could do so by reducing dissonance in some manner. We argue that detection of dissonance will follow the same principles as when people interpret any other stimuli as emotionally significant. Thus, appraisal theory of emotion, which argues that emotions are generated via the cognitive evaluation of surrounding stimuli, should be applicable to the dissonance-detection process. In short, we argue that dissonance-reduction strategies (attitude change, trivialization, denial of responsibility, etc.) can be understood as emotion-regulation strategies. We further argue that this perspective contributes to reconciling fragmented (and sometimes contrary) viewpoints present in the literature on dissonance reduction. In addition to proposing the general model of dissonance reduction, we illustrate at the hand of empirical data how research on dissonance reduction can be performed without relying on experimental paradigms that focus on a specific reduction strategy. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive treatment of the classical decision problem of mathematical logic and of the role of the classical decision problem in modern computer science. The text presents a revealing analysis of the natural order of decidable and undecidable cases and includes a number of simple proofs and exercises.

Popper holds to the unity of scientific method: any differences between natural and social science are a product of theory, not a pretheoretical premise. Distin guishing instead pure and applied generalizing sciences, Popper focuses on the different role of laws in each. In generalizing social science, our tools are the logic of the situation, including the rationality principle, and unintended conse quences. Situations contain individuals, but also social entities not reducible to individuals: conspiracy theory is the extreme form of individualism. (...) Action in situations has unintended consequences. Both social and natural laws may be required to explain outcomes. The fate of Popper's ideas is a case study in the logic of the situation. Professional philosophers of social science lean toward individualism and a priorism (either intuitionist or rational choice). There are social and political explanations of this outcome, but little critical engagement with Popper's ideas. (shrink)

This article raises the question of whether standard economics with the general equilibrium model at its core applies situational analysis in a Popperian sense. Contrary to Popper's own view, the authors come to the conclusion that this is not the case. Standard economics fails to represent elements essential to any social situation in an adequate manner. It comprises uncertainty, time and space, social interaction, unintended effects, as well as culture and institutions. The authors suggest, therefore, the socioeconomic context as an (...) alternative approach to analyzing social situations. It consists of four basic elements: (1) dominant worldviews, (2) institutions and technologies, (3) relative prices, and (4) political instruments. The alternative approach was applied with some success to analyzing inter alia problems of unemployment as well as of transformation. (shrink)

There is sufficient evidence from more recent experiments in psychology that equal retinal stimulus-elements do not lead to equal experiences and reactions except under certain rather specific conditions. An unsophisticated observer will find himself surprised to be able to cover with his own finger a person entering the door of his living room. When the finger is moved to the right or left, thus doing away with the precise retinal coincidence with the person, the observer will soon become unable to (...) recognize intuitively the actual retinal stimulus equality of the two distant things. This usually holds even for the case when he is making every inner effort towards an antagonistic, analytic perceptual attitude of the type which is used by painters or draughtsmen in order to represent the environmental situation in a similar way as it would project itself on a photographic plate or on a retina. (shrink)

We capture the principal models of computation and specification in the literature by a uniform set of transparent mathematical descriptions which—starting from scratch—provide the conceptual basis for a comparative study.1.

This paper aims to discuss the production and reproduction of knowledge —such categories, notions, theories, and methodologies that are part of mathematics education research— drawn from an epistemic approach that pursues to disturb the supposed neutrality, objectivity, and order of our field. The paper's premise is shaped by the idea that searching for new ways of doing is plausible to make visible conditions of possibilities, in which new ways of thinking are traced to what we can and can't do in (...) mathematics education. Premise framed in epistemological anarchism, here it argues that scientific progress could be restricted due to prescriptive scientific methods, as well as fixed and universal norms. The acknowledgment of diverse action flows and tools able to mould in order to respond to reality and context, it is understood as potency to think of new possibilities; along with this, to unpack and read the network rhizomatic entangled to look into teaching and learning of mathematics beyond the didactic triangle. In this fashion, diverse authors assert that the research is a political and power issue. The (re)production of knowledge is not neutral or innocent. The non-neutrality and innocent become possible since an aesthetic that circulates and normalizes what is considered as —valid and valuable— research, as well as the ways of doing and producing —valid and valuable— knowledge. This normalization generates events of violence, particularly against —epistemic or ontological— minorities. (shrink)

The editor of this Journal has asked me to comment on the preceding paper by Professor Hammond in which certain parallels are drawn between relativity physics and my own suggestions concerning the establishment of “representative design” in psychological experimentation. Since I find little basis for criticism of Dr. Hammond's major line of reasoning, I shall concentrate on anticipating possible objections to Hammond's comparison as well as on elucidating my point of view by means of examples, both old and new, that (...) seem pertinent in the present context. (shrink)

A través de una reconstrucción sistemática de la concepción de unificación religiosa concebida por Hegel durante su estancia en Frankfurt, se busca poner de relieve tanto los aspectos peculiares y diferenciadores de ésta, como los elementos que anticipan el rumbo que adquirirá el pensamiento hegeliano desde Jena. La reconstrucción procede en tres pasos: tematización de la vida inmediata, de la reflexión y de su acción sobre la vida; caracterización de la religión como una elevación por sobre la finitud y acceso (...) a la vida infinita en cuanto espíritu; determinación de la función crítico-negativa de la filosofía, subordinada a la religión. Se concluye estableciendo que, en estos textos tempranos, Hegel llega a una estructura sistemática central para su pensamiento ulterior, a saber, la estructura vida-conocer-espíritu. Además se ofrece una consideración relativa al potencial liberador que para Hegel tienen tanto la religión como la filosofía, dado que ambas escapan a una forma específica de racionalidad hegemónica en la cultura. (shrink)

Resumen Se sostiene que la operación general de la silogística en la Lógica cumple con un programa trazado tempranamente por Hegel, consistente en concebir la unidad de la forma racional del silogismo y el contenido absoluto de la idea como resultado de una dialéctica inmanente a la propia forma del silogismo, mediante la cual éste abandona su carácter meramente formal y alcanza su propio concepto: ser forma objetiva o racional. Para esto se acude a la sección Subjetividad de la Doctrina (...) del Concepto, procurando reconstruir los antecedentes sistemáticos del capítulo sobre el silogismo, así como la operación específica que éste realiza en vista del tránsito a la sección Objetividad. El sentido de dicha operación consiste en la superación de un exceso que, al comienzo, la necesidad de la sustancia tiene por sobre la libertad del concepto, de lo cual resulta un exceso del concepto por sobre la sustancia. Para verificar esta operación se examinan los silogismos del estar y la necesidad, concluyendo con la determinación del tipo de objeto y de conocimiento que resulta del silogismo, y con la proyección del problema a estadios ulteriores de la Lógica, en los cuales el problema avistado adquiere un cariz marcadamente práctico.In this paper I argue that the general operation of syllogistic in the Logic fulfills a philosophical program that was early outlined by Hegel. This program conceives the unity of the rational form of the syllogism and the absolute content of the idea as a result of an immanent dialectic to the syllogism's form, by which it abandons its merely formal character and attains its own concept: being an objective or rational form. For the purposes of this argument, I analyze the Subjectivity section of the Doctrine of the Concept and reconstruct the systematic background of the chapter on syllogism, as well as the specific operation it performs in view of the transit to the Objectivity section. This operation consists in overcoming a certain excess that the necessity of the substance has, first, over the freedom of the concept, which results in an excess of the concept over the substance. To clarify this operation, I examine the syllogisms of qualitative existence and necessity. Finally, I show the determination of the type of object and knowledge that results from the syllogism and explain how this problem projects to later stages of Logic, in which the analyzed problem acquires a relevant practical aspect. (shrink)

A genome of a living organism consists of a long string of symbols over a finite alphabet carrying critical information for the organism. This includes its ability to control post natal growth, homeostasis, adaptation to changes in the surrounding environment, or to biochemically respond at the cellular level to various specific regulatory signals. In this sense, a genome represents a symbolic encoding of a highly organized system of information whose functioning may be revealed as a natural multilayer structure in terms (...) of complexity and prominence. In this paper we use the mathematical theory of symbolic extensions as a framework to shed light onto how this multilayer organization is reflected in the symbolic coding of the genome. The distribution of data in an element of a standard symbolic extension of a dynamical system has a specific form: the symbolic sequence is divided into several subsequences (which we call layers) encoding the dynamics on various “scales”. We propose that a similar structure resides within the genomes, building our analogy on some of the most recent findings in the field of regulation of genomic DNA functioning. (shrink)