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  1. Frans Svensson (forthcoming). The Role of Virtue in Descartes'ethical Theory, Or: Was Descartes a Virtue Ethicist? History of Philosophy Quarterly.
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  2. Frans Svensson (2011). Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics and Right Action: A Reassessment. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 15 (4):321-339.
    My question in this paper concerns what eudaimonist virtue ethics (EVE) might have to say about what makes right actions right. This is obviously an important question if we want to know what (if anything) distinguishes EVE from various forms of consequentialism and deontology in ethical theorizing. The answer most commonly given is that according to EVE, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances. However, understood as a claim (...)
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  3. Frans Svensson (2011). Happiness, Well-Being, and Their Relation to Virtue in Descartes' Ethics. Theoria 77 (3):238-260.
    My main thesis in this article is that Descartes' ethics should be understood as involving a distinction between happiness and well-being. The distinction I have in mind is never clearly stated or articulated by Descartes himself, but I argue that we nevertheless have good reason to embrace it as an important component in a charitable reconstruction of his ethical thought. In section I, I present Descartes' account of happiness and of how he thinks happiness can (and cannot) be acquired. Then, (...)
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  4. Frans Svensson (2010). Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (3):255 - 271.
    Conceived of as a contender to other theories in substantive ethics, virtue ethics is often associated with, in essence, the following account or criterion of right action: VR: An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous agent would characteristically do A in C. There are serious objections to VR, which take the form of counter-examples. They present us with different scenarios in which less than fully virtuous persons would be acting rightly (...)
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  5. Frans Svensson (2008). Virtue Ethics and Elitism. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):131-155.
    Because of its reliance on a basically Aristotelian conception of virtue, contemporary virtue ethics is often criticised for being inherently elitist. I argue that this objection is mistaken. The core of my argument is that we need to take seriously that virtue, according to Aristotle, is something that we acquire gradually, via a developmental process. People are not just stuck with their characters once and for all, but can always aspire to become better (more virtuous). And that is plausibly the (...)
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  6. Frans Svensson (2007). Does Non-Cognitivism Rest on a Mistake? Utilitas 19 (2):184-200.
    Philippa Foot has recently argued that non-cognitivism rests on a mistake. According to Foot, non-cognitivism cannot properly account for the role of reasons in moral thinking. Furthermore, Foot argues that moral judgements share a conceptual structure with the kind of evaluations that we make about plants and animals, which cannot be couched in non-cognitivist terms. In this article I argue that, in the form of expressivism, non-cognitivism is capable of accommodating most of what Foot says about reasons and morality. I (...)
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  7. Jonas Olson & Frans Svensson (2005). Regimenting Reasons. Theoria 61 (3):203-214.
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  8. Jonas Olson & Frans Svensson (2003). A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism Need Not Conflict. Utilitas 15 (2):194-205.
    Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se, but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be no conflict between moral particularism and consequentialism. We consider and reject a number of challenges holding that there is after all such a conflict. We (...)
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