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Profile: Jens Johansson (Stockholm University)
  1. Jens Johansson (forthcoming). Review of LR Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly.
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  2. Jens Johansson (forthcoming). Review of Nils Holtug, Persons, Interests, and Justice. [REVIEW] Theoria.
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  3. Jens Johansson (forthcoming). Review of Robert E. Goodin, On Settling (Princeton UP, 2012). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  4. Jens Johansson (2015). The Importance of a Good Ending: Some Reflections on Samuel Scheffler’s Death and the Afterlife. Journal of Ethics 19 (2):185-195.
    In his recent book, Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler argues that it matters greatly to us that there be other human beings long after our own deaths. In support of this “Afterlife Thesis,” as I call it, he provides a thought experiment—the “doomsday scenario”—in which we learn that, although we ourselves will live a normal life span, 30 days after our death the earth will be completely destroyed. In this paper I question this “doomsday scenario” support for Scheffler’s Afterlife (...)
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  5. Jens Johansson & Simon Rosenqvist (2015). Pure Time Preference’: Reply to Lowry and Peterson. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):n/a-n/a.
    A pure time preference is a preference for something to occur at one point in time rather than another, merely because of when it occurs in time. Such preferences are widely regarded as paradigm examples of irrational preferences. However, Rosemary Lowry and Martin Peterson have recently argued that, for instance, a pure time preference to go to the opera tonight rather than next month may be rationally permissible, even if the amounts of intrinsic value realized in both cases are identical. (...)
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  6. Jens Johansson (2014). Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Brueckner and Fischer. Journal of Ethics 18 (1):11-18.
    In a recent article, I criticized Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s influential argument—appealing to the rationality of our asymmetric attitudes towards past and future pleasures—against the Lucretian claim that death and prenatal non-existence are relevantly similar. Brueckner and Fischer have replied, however, that my critique involves an unjustified shift in temporal perspectives. In this paper, I respond to this charge and also argue that even if it were correct, it would fail to defend Brueckner and Fischer’s proposal against (...)
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  7. Jens Johansson (2014). More on the Mirror: Reply to Fischer and Brueckner. Journal of Ethics 18 (4):341-351.
    John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have argued that a person’s death is, in many cases, bad for him, whereas a person’s prenatal non-existence is not bad for him. Their suggestion relies on the idea that death deprives the person of pleasant experiences that it is rational for him to care about, whereas prenatal non-existence only deprives him of pleasant experiences that it is not rational for him to care about. In two recent articles in The Journal of Ethics, (...)
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  8. Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.) (2013). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. OUP USA.
    This Handbook consists of 21 new essays on the nature and value of death, the relevance of the metaphysics of time and personal identity for questions about death, the desirability of immortality, and the wrongness of killing.
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  9. Jens Johansson (2013). On Settling by Goodin, Robert E. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):192-194.
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  10. Jens Johansson (2013). On Settling by Goodin, Robert E. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012, Pp. Viii+ 114, US $24.95 (Hardback). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-2.
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  11. Jens Johansson (2013). Past and Future Non-Existence. Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):51-64.
    According to the “deprivation approach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman (inspired by Thomas Nagel) and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly (...)
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  12. Jens Johansson (2013). The Benefits and Harms of Existence and Non-Existence: Guest Editor's Introduction. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):1-4.
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  13. Jens Johansson & Karl Ekendahl (2013). Dead and Gone? Reply to Jenkins. Utilitas 26 (2):1-3.
    In a recent article, Joyce L. Jenkins challenges the common belief that desire satisfactionists are committed to the view that a person's welfare can be affected by posthumous events. Jenkins argues that desire satisfactionists can and should say that posthumous events only play an epistemic role: though such events cannot harm me, they can reveal that I have already been harmed by something else. In this response, however, we show that Jenkins's approach collapses into the view she aims to avoid.
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  14. Jens Johansson (2011). Persons, Interests, and Justice - By Nils Holtug. [REVIEW] Theoria 77 (3):284-287.
  15. Jens Johansson (2011). Roache's Argument Against the Cohabitation View. Philosophia 39 (2):309-310.
    Rebecca Roache’s recent critique of David Lewis’s cohabitation view assumes that a person cannot be properly concerned about something that rules out that she ever exists. In this brief response, I argue against this assumption.
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  16. Jens Johansson (2010). Being and Betterness. Utilitas 22 (3):285-302.
    In this article I discuss the question of whether a person’s existence can be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence. Recently, Nils Holtug and Melinda A. Roberts have defended an affirmative answer. These defenses, I shall argue, do not succeed. In different ways, Holtug and Roberts have got the metaphysics and axiology wrong. However, I also argue that a person’s existence can after all be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence, though for reasons other than those (...)
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  17. Jens Johansson (2010). Parfit on Fission. Philosophical Studies 2010 (150):21 - 35.
    Derek Parfit famously defends a number of surprising views about "fission." One is that, in such a scenario, it is indeterminate whether I have survived or not. Another is that the fission case shows that it does not matter, in itself, whether I survive or not. Most critics of the first view contend that fission makes me cease to exist. Most opponents of the second view contend that fission does not preserve everything that matters in ordinary survival. In this paper (...)
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  18. Jens Johansson (2009). Am I a Series? Theoria 75 (3):196-205.
    Scott Campbell has recently defended the psychological approach to personal identity over time by arguing that a person is literally a series of mental events. Rejecting four-dimensionalism about the persistence of physical objects, Campbell regards constitutionalism as the main rival version of the psychological approach. He argues that his "series view" has two clear advantages over constitutionalism: it avoids the "two thinkers" objection and it allows a person to change bodies. In addition, Campbell suggests a reply to the objection, often (...)
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  19. Jens Johansson (2009). Constituted Simples? Philosophia 37 (1):87-89.
    Many philosophers maintain that artworks, such as statues, are constituted by other material objects, such as lumps of marble. I give an argument against this view, an argument which appeals to mereological simples.
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  20. Jens Johansson (2009). Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):247 - 256.
    Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic value for a person —can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long (...)
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  21. Jens Johansson (2009). Francescotti on Fission. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):476-481.
    Most versions of the psychological-continuity approach to personal identity (PCA) contain a 'non-branching' requirement. Recently, Robert Francescotti has argued that while such versions of PCA handle Parfit's standard fission case well, they deliver the wrong result in the case of an intact human brain. To solve this problem, he says, PCA-adherents need to add a clause that runs contrary to the spirit of their theory. In this response, I argue that Francescotti's counterexample fails. As a result, the revision he suggests (...)
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  22. Jens Johansson (2009). The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism – Lynne Rudder Baker. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):365-368.
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  23. Jens Johansson (2008). 8 Filosofiska Texter Red. Kristian Löfgren & Dan Munter Notiser. [REVIEW] Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 4.
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  24. Jens Johansson (2008). Kaufman's Response to Lucretius. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):470-485.
    Abstract: The symmetry argument is an objection to the 'deprivation approach'– the account of badness favored by nearly all philosophers who take death to be bad for the one who dies. Frederik Kaufman's recent response to the symmetry argument is a development of Thomas Nagel's suggestion that we could not have come into existence substantially earlier than we in fact did. In this paper, I aim to show that Kaufman's suggestion fails. I also consider several possible modifications of his theory, (...)
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  25. Jens Johansson (2007). Non-Reductionism and Special Concern. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657.
    The so-called 'Extreme Claim' asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.
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  26. Jens Johansson (2007). What is Animalism? Ratio 20 (2):194–205.
  27. Jens Johansson (2005). Recension av Ulf Jonssons Med tanke på Gud. [REVIEW] Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 3.
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  28. Jens Johansson (2003). Recension av tre nya böcker om Ingemar Hedenius. [REVIEW] Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 2.
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  29. Jens Johansson (2002). Nagels argument för asymmetri. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 2.
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  30. Jens Johansson (2002). Recension av Torbjörn Tännsjös Konservatiosm. [REVIEW] Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 4.
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  31. Jens Johansson (2002). Recension av T. H. Eriksen & D. O. Hessen, Egoism. [REVIEW] Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 1.
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  32. Jens Johansson (2001). Recension av Åsa Nordéns Har nutida fysik religiös betydelse? [REVIEW] Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 3.
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