Bruno Liebrucks hat eine eigenständige, an Vico, Herder, Hamann, Humboldt und Cassirer anknüpfende Philosophie von der Sprache her“ entwickelt, welche Sprache als Medium der Welterschließung begreift. Zu dieser gelangt er durch eine fundamentalphilosophische Auseinandersetzung mit jenen drei Revolutionierungen im Denken des Denkens, die mit den Namen Platon, Kant und Hegel verknüpft sind. Die Beiträge des Bandes gehen diesen „Revolutionen der Denkart“ nach und entfalten grundlegende Perspektiven, die sich von Liebrucks her für das Verständnis der Logik, der Philosophischen Anthropologie, der Ethik (...) und Politischen Philosophie, der Kunstphilosophie sowie der Philosophischen Theologie ergeben. Die Autoren sind: Leo Dorner, Max Gottschlich, Thomas Sören Hoffmann, Klaus Honrath, Simone Liedtke, Theodoros Penolidis, Brigitte Scheer, Werner Schmitt, Josef Simon, Maria Woschnak, Werner Woschnak und Fritz Zimbrich. (shrink)

This paper presents a challenge to conciliationist views of disagreement. I argue that conciliationists cannot satisfactorily explain why we need not revise our beliefs in response to certain moral disagreements. Conciliationists can attempt to meet this challenge in one of two ways. First, they can individuate disputes narrowly. This allows them to argue that we have dispute-independent reason to distrust our opponents’ moral judgment. This approach threatens to license objectionable dogmatism. It also inappropriately gives deep epistemic significance to superficial questions (...) about how to think about the subject matter of a dispute. Second, conciliationists can individuate disputes widely. This allows them to argue that we lack dispute-independent reason to trust our opponents’ moral judgment. But such arguments fail; our background of generally shared moral beliefs gives us good reason to trust the moral judgment of our opponents, even after we set quite a bit of our reasoning aside. On either approach, then, conciliationists should acknowledge that we have dispute-independent reason to trust the judgment of those who reject our moral beliefs. Given a conciliationist view of disagreement’s epistemic role, this has the unattractive result that we are epistemically required to revise some of our most intuitively secure moral beliefs. (shrink)

We are currently seeing a revival of interest in Aquinas's moral thought among Christian ethicists, both Protestant and Catholic. Although recent studies of his moral thought have touched on a number of topics, the majority of these have focused on his account of the virtues and their place in the Christian life. Probing the questions of the relation of virtue and law, the role of reason and will, and the place of the passions in Aquinas's moral theology, I will examine (...) recent studies by Diana Cates, Pamela Hall, Simon Harak, James Keenan, Daniel Nelson, Daniel Westberg, and Paul Waddell. In different ways these studies return us repeatedly to the vexed and unresolved question of the scope of human freedom. (shrink)

This paper discusses how we are to understand claims to the effect that something is good relative to a person. It is argued that goodness relative to should not be equated with good for as the latter is a relational value notion and the former is a value theoretical notion. It is argued further that good relative to a person should be understood as good from the perspective or the point of view of the person. But this analysis of the (...) notion ‘good relative to’ leaves open questions about the full nature of relative goodness. For that, a positive proposal about what it is for something to be good relative to a person’s point of view is needed. One such proposal is put forward on which the relevant perspective is determined or fixed in terms of the pro and con attitudes of the individual person. (shrink)

The thesis examines a specific way of understanding the subjectivist position in value theory according to which subjectivism is the view that value is grounded on attitudes. It is argued that this should be seen as a second-order claim about the nature of value although with pluralistic implications on the substantial, first-order level. Subjectivist analyses of final and intrinsic value and of relational value are offered. Further, the implications of subjectivism are considered with respect to, among other things, situations in (...) which we would have different attitudes than those that we actually have, the relation between value and motivation, and value relativism and egoism. The thesis also contains discussions of value projection and the nature of evaluative language. (shrink)