1. Pusan lok'ŏllit'i wa lok'ŏl munhwa yulli -- 2. Han'guk lok'ŏllit'i wa lok'ŏl munhwa yulli -- 3. Asia lok'ŏllit'i wa lok'ŏl munhwa yulli.

In this paper I shall first examine an apparent paradox in Confucius? view on whether everyone is perfectible through education: on the one hand, he states that education should be provided to all, on the other hand, he says that common people cannot be made to know things. To understand this apparent paradox, I shall argue that education for Confucius is primarily moral education, as he teaches his students to become virtuous persons. So the apparent paradox is really one about (...) whether virtue can be taught. I shall argue in the last section that while Confucius? answer to the question is affirmative, he does not think that virtue can be taught in the same way as theoretical knowledge or technical skills are taught. For Confucius, the most effective way to teach people to be virtuous is through personal example. (shrink)

[1]. Pyŏngwa Yi Hyŏng-sang, Hosan Pak Mun-ho yŏnʼgu -- 2. Cho Ik yŏnʼgu -- 3. Kwak Chong-sŏk yŏnʼgu.

I would like to start by expressing my gratitude to Chenyang Li for proposing, organizing, and arranging the publication of this symposium discussion of my book, Why Be Moral? Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers. I would also like to thank Jeeloo Liu, Justin Tiwald, and Kam-por Yu for their serious engagements with my work with stimulating and inspiring comments. As they seem to me so persuasive, at the end of the day I would perhaps have to embrace a wholesale (...) acceptance of their constructive criticisms and abandon what I have said to the contrary in the book. In the following, however, I shall try my best to reply to some of the questions raised in their comments.All three commentators raise questions... (shrink)

Ch'aek mŏri e -- 1. Ch'oe Han-gi ŭi sam kwa kŭ ŭi sidae -- 2. Silchŭng kwa siryong ŭi sirhakchŏk hangmun'gwan -- 3. Chujahak pip'an kwa Kihak ŭi hyŏngsŏng -- 4. Sŏyang kwahak kisul ŭi suyong kwa Kihakchŏk pyŏnyong -- 5. Insingnon ŭi chŏnhwan kwa kaekkwan insik ŭi pangbŏmnon -- 6. T'al Chujahakchŏk sayu ŭi chŏn'gae wa segye p'yŏnghwaron -- Kyŏllon : Chosŏn hugi Sirhak kwa Ch'oe Han-gi ŭi ch'ŏrhak.

There is an increasing awareness that we are living in a global village, which demands a global ethics. In this article, I shall explore what contributions Confucianism, particularly its conception of love, can make. It has often been claimed that Confucian love is love with distinction, as a natural feeling, and as merely human love and so it is inferior to the Christian love, which is universal, commanded, and based on divine love. Drawing on the resources of the Cheng brothers' (...) neo-Confucianism, I shall explore how Confucianism can make creative responses to such criticisms and thus make a unique Confucian contribution to the emerging global ethics. (shrink)

There are three results in this study. First, redefinition of "Being". I've classified and redefined the concept of "being" into "Being", "Existence", "Reality" which have been used confusingly. And the definition of God has been also renewed. So we came to understand what "a triangle exists", "a sharp pencil exists", "the God exists" mean. Also I proved that the mean of "I will be who I will be" which is the name of God in Bible equals to the mean of (...) almightiness. Second, trinitarianism. I proved that the essence of God does not belong to the "the world of idea" which the essence of triangle belongs to and also to the "the physical world" which the essence of sharp pencil belongs to. This is the same to physical rules like "E=mc²". And I refer to the world which includes "the God" and"physical rules" as "the world of causes". In this way, a view of world suggested in this study is not dualism but trinitarianism. Third, the new cosmological argument. I've suggested "the new cosmological argument" using modern science's imperfection which inferred from "Werner Karl Heisenberg's uncertainty principle". The conclusion of this proof is that a man who recognizes the reality of "physical rules" should recognize the reality of "God". In other word a rational man who believes causality should recognize the reality of "The cause which is cause of every causes but don't need any cause" "the God". (shrink)

Philosophers have long analyzed the truth-condition of counterfactual conditionals in terms of the possible-worlds semantics advanced by Lewis [13] and Stalnaker [23]. In this paper, I argue that, from the perspective of philosophical semantics, the causal modeling semantics proposed by Pearl [17] and others (e.g., Briggs [3]) is more plausible than the Lewis-Stalnaker possible-worlds semantics. I offer two reasons. First, the possible-worlds semantics has suffered from a specific type of counterexamples. While the causal modeling semantics can handle such examples with (...) ease, the only way for the possible-worlds semantics to do so seems to cost it its distinctive status as a philosophical semantics. Second, the causal modeling semantics, but not the possible-worlds semantics, has the resources enough for accounting for both forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactual conditionals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mind and Life, Religion and Science: His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Buddhism-Christianity-Science TrialogueAmos YongIn this essay, I explore what happens to the Buddhist-Christian dialogue when another party is introduced into the conversation, in this case, the sciences. My question concerns how the interface between religion and science is related to the Buddhist-Christian encounter and vice versa. I take up this question in four steps, correlating with the (...) four parts of this essay. First, I sketch a brief overview of the Buddhism-science encounter, and then turn my attention more specifically to the recent exchanges in the Mind and Life dialogues involving Western scientists and philosophers and Tibetan Buddhist practitioners, including His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Then, in our lengthiest discussion, I focus on three of the most recent books related to the Mind and Life series in order to flesh out some of the details of how Tibetan Buddhists in general and His Holiness more specifically are interacting with the sciences. Finally, I return to the larger implications that the Buddhism-science conversation has not only for the Buddhist-Christian dialogue but also potentially for the religion-science encounter.The goal of this essay is to identify the promise and the challenges involved for Buddhists and Christians when the sciences are added into the equation. I am led by a threefold hypothesis. First, the religion side of the “religion and science” dialogue needs to be further specified. Whereas it used to be the case that “religion and science” meant “Christianity and science,” no longer can or should this be assumed. Rather, there is an emerging recognition that distinctive shifts occur in the religion and science discussion when Buddhism is factored into the conversation. Second, the interreligious dialogue in general can itself benefit from engaging a third party, in this case, the natural sciences. More specifically, I am convinced that the Buddhist-Christian dialogue has much to gain when the various scientific disciplines are allowed to inform the discussion. To be sure, there will be distinctive challenges that will present themselves, not the least of which are the methodological complexities regarding the interface between religion and science added to the already complicated methodological issues that perennially beset the interreligious encounter. However it is precisely the emergent comparisons and contrasts in dialogical approaches that [End Page 43] may contribute to pushing the discussion forward. Finally, if it is the case that religion does indeed have something to contribute to its dialogue with the sciences, so much more is it the case that science may benefit not only from the separate insights of two religious traditions, but also from the cross-fertilization that occurs in the interreligious dialogue.Two caveats before proceeding with the essay. First, I speak first and foremost as a Christian theologian with academic training in the study of religion, rather than in Buddhist traditions in particular. While my Christian perspectives will inevitably color my understanding of Buddhism, I believe it is possible in this case, given the hypotheses outlined above, that such “biases” can be profitably harnessed to explore what happens when the Buddhist-Christian dialogue is enlarged to become a trialogue between Buddhism, Christianity, and the sciences. In fact, I am convinced that Christian theology for the twenty-first century needs to dialogue both with other faiths and with the sciences, and this essay is an attempt to bring these essential dialogues together.1Second, I approach the following review essay with a certain degree of fear and trembling given that in a very real sense my primary dialogue partners are Tibetan Buddhist adepts as well as His Holiness the Dalai Lama. I do not in any way intend to be presumptuous about claiming to be able to critically interact with his knowledge of Buddhism or the sciences. On the contrary, I am a mere novice and amateur in these fields of inquiry compared to his lifelong study and practice of the Buddhist tradition, and his decades-long engagement with the sciences. Yet I find encouragement from his own openness to interacting with the Christian tradition and from his willing to learn from Christians and the Christian faith.2 Further... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhism and Science: Breaking New GroundAmos YongBuddhism and Science: Breaking New Ground. Edited by B. Alan Wallace. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. 444+ xvi pp.Increasingly, the world's religious traditions are making their presence felt in the science and religion dialogue that has been dominated for a long time by Christian voices. The essays collected in this volume not only provide an introductory overview of Buddhist engagements with (...) the natural sciences during the last century, but also leave no doubts about ways in which Buddhist perspectives will be crucial to the future of the science-religion conversation. Wallace, founder and director of the Santa Barbara Institute for the Study of Consciousness ( ), has astutely pulled together fifteen quality essays (by sixteen authors) under three headings—"Historical Context" (three essays), "Buddhism and the Cognitive Sciences" (six essays), and "Buddhism and the Physical Sciences" (six essays)—and has added his own introductory essay to the volume as a whole and prefatory summaries to each of the articles.As in any collection of essays, reviewers find themselves in a catch-22: either mention each author and essay so as not to leave any out, leaving little space to interact critically with any of the material, or single out a handful of essay(ist)s to engage in more detail, risking the impression that there is a hidden agenda at work censoring the others. I have chosen to divide my impressions under four broad categories [End Page 176] within which I hope to mention all of the contributors and their main ideas, even while apologizing up front for focusing on a few more than the rest. My only excuse is that in a book of this much breadth and depth, my limited expertise cannot hope to engage each of the essays to the same degree. Others more competent than I will need to critically interact with the wide range of issues covered in this volume.My first observation regarding the essays under review is how far the Buddhist relationship with the sciences has come during the last century. The first three essays —by editor Wallace, José Cabezón (a scholar of Tibetan Buddhism with background in physics), and Thupten Jinpa (a scholar-practitioner of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition)—provide both historical overviews of the Buddhist engagement with science and models of the Buddhism-science encounter. While Wallace suggests the way of dialogue and collaboration as best suited to chart a via media between the dogma or ideology of scientistic materialism on the one hand and postmodern relativism on the other, Cabezón observes the history of Buddhist-science relations through three models: that of conflict/ambivalence (where either antagonism reigns or, more often, mutual disregard persists between the two traditions), that of compatibility/identity (where each interprets the other tradition in terms that are culturally and intellectually familiar), and that of complementarity (the idea that Buddhism and the sciences together provide a more complete epistemology for knowing a common subject). The validity of these models is confirmed by Jinpa in his overview of the Tibetan Buddhist case, beginning with the work of Gendūn Chōphel in the 1930s, and continuing in the openness of the present His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama to the findings of modern science.My second observation relates to how most of the essays in the volume demonstrate the various ways in which Buddhist perspectives can and do inform scientific inquiry on the one hand and even challenge scientific assumptions on the other. Four essays in part 2 exemplify this tendency. His Holiness shows how Buddhists can think about the mind in naturalistic and empirical terms even while remaining committed to cultivating the mind in order to accomplish mental transformation. David Galin (a neurophysiologist) brings early Buddhist views of the self into dialogue with contemporary neuropsychology and psychiatry, and suggests a new model for distinguishing between the perennially difficult concepts of person (a dynamic multileveled system constituted by a network of relations), self (the present organization of the person), and I (the self's point of view). The late Francisco Valera (a cognitive scientist) and Natalie Depraz (a specialist on... (shrink)

Traditional epistemological interpretations have portrayed Hegel as offering a coherentist solution to the problem of the criterion in the introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit. In this paper, I criticize the coherentist interpretation and present an alternative reading that emphasizes the central role of conscious experience in Hegel's argument. In the first part of the paper, I show how the passages commonly used to support the coherentist interpretation ultimately fail to do so and argue that coherence by itself cannot be (...) the lynchpin for an adequate solution to the problem of the criterion. In the second part, I then develop a novel interpretation of Hegel's argument by drawing attention to the fact that Hegel formulates both the problem of the criterion and his solution to it in terms of consciousness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ignorance, Knowledge, and Omniscience: At and Beyond the Limits of Faith and Reason after Shinran:Reflections on The Boundaries of Knowledge in Buddhism, Christianity, and Science, with Special Attention to Dennis HirotaAmos YongAlthough published in the series Religion, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft, Paul Numrich's edited volume is really about epistemology in religion and science, in particular about human knowing in Buddhist and Christian traditions shaped by the world of science on (...) the one hand, and how such knowing might also inform scientific knowledge on the other hand.1 The panoply of positions is presented by both Buddhist and Christian thinkers.From the Buddhist side, the following arguments are sketched:• that religion and science are complementary modes of knowing and that "understanding the true nature of the physical world" opens up "the way to enlightenment" (Trinh Xuan Thuan).2• that Buddhism is both continuous with (and hence deserving of serious consideration amidst) the epistemic discourses of modernity in many respects and yet also discontinuous with (and hence capable for critically interrogating) modernity's epistemology in other respects as well (David L. McMahan).3• that a Shin Buddhist approach to human knowledge—which in this chapter is brought into dialogue with Martin Heidegger's (1889-1976) notion of truth—opens up to a Kuhnian philosophy of science that emphasizes how paradigmatic shifts occur when new perspectives replace older frameworks (Dennis Hirota).4• that the questions raised by theoretical and quantum physics provide a scientific framework for discussing fundamental epistemological, ontological, and metaphysical questions that Buddhists and Christians might otherwise disagree about (Mark T. Unno).5From the Christian side, the following theses are explored: [End Page 201]• that boundary constraints confront not only working scientists but also Buddhists and Christians, and that these constraints can thus serve as a springboard for a science and religion "trilogue" (Paul O. Ingram).6• that the mystery of creative becoming (God, in traditional Christian terms) is the dynamic backdrop to the ongoing human quest for knowledge (Gordon D. Kaufman).7• that it is at the boundaries of knowledge that genuine creativity occurs (not only scientific creativity but also theological creativity emerges, i.e., the apophatic tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy or the theory of coincidentia oppositorum of Nicholas of Cusa [1401-1464]), and where, as a result of such creative approaches, distinct fields of inquiry open up and different domains of knowledge emerge (Antje Jackelén).8• that theological discourse is paradoxical precisely because such discourse marks the fluid boundaries demarcating sense and nonsense (Tom Christenson).9And, befitting a volume on the encounter between religion (i.e., Buddhism and Christianity) and science, there is a concluding chapter from a physicist on the limits of scientific knowledge that both is encouraged by the gains made by science (presuming a critical realist approach to science's modeling of reality) and yet also is honest about there being much more to learn on small and big questions (John R. Albright).10The foregoing summaries do not do justice to the complexity and sophistication of the chapters in the book. However, they provide a broader context for my interactions with Dennis Hirota's chapter on Shinran's (1173-1263) epistemology and its implications for both religious and scientific knowledge. As an evangelical Christian, I am particularly intrigued by the challenges confronting a Shin Buddhist approach to the sciences, even as I am hopeful that such a consideration will precipitate creative insights both for the Buddhist-Christian encounter and for the religion-science dialogue. I am all the more motivated since I have long been convinced that the religion-science dialogue has been dominated by generically religious approaches and that it is time for more particularistic or even confessional positions to be registered in the discussion.11 I am optimistic that the specificity of the Shin tradition will provide both complementary and contrasting perspectives to the contemporary Buddhist encounter with science that has so far been dominated by the broadly Tibetan approaches of His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama (1935-) and those in his circle of dialogue partners,12 and that this will in turn open up new trajectories—even initiate new paradigms, as Hirota suggests—for the Buddhist... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Holy Spirit and the World Religions:On the Christian Discernment of Spirit(s) "after" BuddhismAmos YongIntroductionArguably, recent Christian theological reflection on religious pluralism and the world religious traditions has taken what might be called "a pneumatological turn."1 This emerging conversation is itself an outgrowth of focused attention on both pneumatology and trinitarian theology during the last generation. Applied to the world of the religions, the turn to pneumatology has furthered (...) discussion on theology of religious pluralism by introducing new categories and shifting directions of inquiry. So whereas previous thinking about the religions focused on whether or not they were or are salvific, a pneumatological theology of religions asks whether or not and how, if so, the religions are divinely providential instruments designed for various purposes. Further, while earlier debates focused on whether or not the religions were or are the results of common grace or natural revelation, a pneumatological theologiareligionum asks other kinds of questions, such as, what is the relationship of religion and culture, or of religion and language? How does religion function to sustain life and community? What role does religion play via-à-vis the other dimensions and domains of life, whether it be the arts, politics, economics, etc.? Finally, previous theologies of religion bogged down on abstract intra-Christian issues as evident in the dominant categories of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism; a pneumatological theology of religions, on the other hand, attempts to push beyond these in-house categories by engaging religious others on their own terms.In explorations of a pneumatological theology of religions, however, one set of problematic questions repeatedly arises. Simply put, it has to do with how Christians can discern the Holy Spirit in the world of the religions and do so nonimperialistically in our postcolonial world. The Christian assumption is that besides the Holy Spirit of God, there are other spirits, perhaps unholy ones—human, institutional, even demonic—that are operative in the world in general and in the religions particularly. The biblical injunction to "test the spirits to see whether they are from [End Page 191] God" (1 John 4:1) is especially crucial for a pneumatological theology of religions. The Johannine account presents a criterion for discerning the Spirit that is christological: "every spirit that does not confess Jesus is not from God. And this is the spirit of the antichrist" (1 John 4:3). The immediate goal in the Johannine context is to provide tools to discern Gnostic deformations of Christian faith within the community. In the present situation of encountering religious pluralism, however, the context is interreligious rather than intra-Christian, and the task is complicated by the fact that other religious traditions may well have different definitions of the good, beautiful, true, and holy, and different criteria to discern such.The dilemma is this: If we discern the Spirit using Christian (e.g., biblical) criteria, we end up either "christianizing" the other insofar as we find the Spirit to be present, or "demonizing" the other insofar as we find the Spirit absent. In the former case, we appear to have allied ourselves with Rahner's idea of "anonymous Christianity," and thus opened ourselves up to all the difficult counterquestions generated by such a position, not the least of which is that we have imposed our own categories on religious others who are distinct from ourselves and have their own self-understandings. In the latter case, not only have we arrived at theologically charged rhetoric liable to be abused socially and politically, but we have also done so by declaring religious others void of certain goods and values as determined by criteria external to them. In fact, even to ask if the Spirit is present and active in other religions is to stand within a Christian framework—the Holy Spirit always being the Spirit of Jesus and the Spirit of Christ, which is not assumed by other faiths. What is the alternative? Can Christians even attempt to discern the Holy Spirit using non-Christian (i.e., non-biblical) criteria or criteria derived from other faiths? Does not to do so result either in relativizing Christian norms alongside those of other faiths or in reverse... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002) 244-248 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism. By Steve Odin. SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought. Albany: SUNY, 1996. xvi + 482 pp. Better late than never! As one of the few volumes—only two to date, actually—in the SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought to address a perennial philosophical (...) problem by drawing seriously upon both the Eastern (Zen Buddhism) and Western (American pragmatism) philosophical traditions, this book should have been reviewed in the pages of this journal a long time ago. Odin's thesis is that both traditions evidence a paradigm shift during the twentieth century from a monological and subjectivistic concept of an individualized self toward a dialogical and intersubjective concept of social self. He explores this hypothesis in the three parts of the book devoted to the social self in modern Japanese philosophy, the social self in Mead and American pragmatism, and a comparative analysis.Part 1 consists of three chapters focused on the philosophical thought of Watsuji Tetsuro (1885-1962) and Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), and on the psychological investigations of Doi Takeo (dates not given, but whose primary works were published in the 1970s and 1980s). Watsuji's central idea is a Zen and Confucian ningenmodel of personhood whereby the self emerges in "the betweenness of person and person" as the individual (nin), understood primarily in temporal categories, and society (gen), understood primarily in the spatial categories of nature, community and family, mutually empty themselves into the other. (In a later chapter, Odin draws parallels between the yi-li—spontaneous, novel reaction-ritual action—dialectic of Confucianism and the I-me dialectic of George Herbert Mead.) This notion of self as ningen subsequently served, at least in part, the development of nihonjinron scholarship—"studies of Japanese identity"—as advanced by thinkers like Kimura Bin, Hamaguchi Eshun, and Kumon Shumpei. The goal has been to steer the middle way between individualistic (Western) and collectivistic (Confucian) conceptions of the self toward what Hamaguchi and Kumon call a contextualist (kanjin), and thereby truly Japanese, understanding.Odin's exposition of Nishida focuses on his idea of the true self—the perennial quest of the Zen tradition—as a "social self" (shakaiteki jiko) that emerges from the I-thou, self-other, and individual-environment dialectics that take "place" in the absolutely empty spatial "field" of basho.(Here, Odin suggests that rather than drawing from Martin Buber's philosophy, both Nishida and Buber drew common inspiration from Ludwig Feuerbach's Principles of the Philosophy of the Future [Grundsatze der Philosophie der Zukunft, 1843]). The true self is therefore the no-self in the locus of absolute Nothingness. As such, the true self is also the empty self. This leads Nishida to draw analogies in his last few essays between the Buddhist idea of sunyata, or "emptiness," with the Christian notion of kenosis, or "self-emptiness." In [End Page 244] keeping with the Zen insistence against reifying emptiness, however, the true self is that which overcomes nihilism but yet resists eternalism. Buddhist sunyatais now symbolized by the bodhisattva's self-negating vow of compassion for all sentient beings, even as Christian kenosis is symbolized by Christ's self-emptying love for the world. This leads to the true self conceptualized as the intersubjective self. Odin suggests that this insight of Nishida is latent in the Chan/Zen tradition as captured in the famous Ten Oxherding Pictures. He also briefly portrays how later Kyoto school thinkers like Ueda Shizuteru, Nishitani Keiji, Abe Masao, Tanabe Hajime, and MutoKazuo have extended Nishida's insights and contributed to the Buddhist-Christian dialogue.Meanwhile, Doi Takeo, a distinguished Japanese psychiatrist, has suggested that human intrapsychic drives are not limited to sexual and aggressive instincts as hypothesized by Freud. Rather, there is an amae or dependency drive that explains the human need for love, intimacy, warmth, protection, nurturing, and so forth. This other-reliance and relational aspect of the human being explains, at least from a psychoanalytical perspective, the... (shrink)

v. Chʻamdoen na chʻatki -- v. 2 Sesang paro pogi.

1. Sŏron -- 2. Kŭndae wa chonggyo, kŭrigo sinjonggyo -- 3. Han'guk kŭndae sinjonggyo ŭi t'ansaeng -- 4. Han'guk kŭndae sinjonggyo ŭi kyŏngjŏn kwa ŭirye -- 5. Kaebyŏk sasang kwa chisang ch'ŏn'guk -- 6. Kaebyŏk sasang ŭi chonggyobyŏl chŏn'gae -- 7. Kaebyŏk chonggyodŭl ŭi sahoesachŏk chŏn'gae -- 8. Kyŏllon kwa kŭndae ihu.

1. Tan'gun sinhwa ŭi wŏnhyŏngjŏk segyegwan kwa p'ungnyu chŏngsin -- 2. Wŏnhyo ŭi hwajaeng sasang kwa muaehaeng ŭi silch'ŏn -- 3. Ŭisang ŭi 'Hwaŏm ilsŭng pŏpkyedo' e nat'anan Hwaŏm sasang -- 4. Chinul ŭi Tono chŏmsu wa Chŏnghye ssangsu sasang -- 5. Sambong Chŏng To-jŏn ŭi Pulgyo paech'ŏk ŭi naeyong kwa sŏngkyŏk -- 6. T'oegye Yi Hwang ŭi ch'ŏrhakchŏk ipchang kwa 'Kyŏng' sasang -- 7. Kobong Ki Tae-sŭng ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa ch'ŏrhak sasang -- 8. Ugye Sŏng Hon ŭi Tohakchŏk (...) sam kwa hangmun yŏnwŏn -- 9. Yulgok Yi I ŭi Taedong sahoeron kwa ch'ŏrhakchŏk chihyang -- 10. Sŏgye Pak Se-dang ŭi Sirhakchŏk sayu ŭi kich'o -- 11. Namdang Han Wŏn-jin ŭi yŏksa insik kwa Chosŏn chunghwajuŭi -- 12. Sŏngdam Song Hwan-gi ŭi 'T'aegŭk tosŏl' haesŏk ŭi kibon ipchang -- 13. Kanjŏng Yi Nŭng-hwa 'Chosŏn Togyosa' ŭi haksulsachŏk ŭiŭi wa han'gye -- 14. Manhae Han Yong-un i pon chuch'e ŭi munje wa minjok chagyŏl ŭi wŏnch'ik -- purok. T'algyŏnggye sidae ŭi Han'guk ch'ŏrhak ŭi inmunhakchŏk ŭiŭi wa chŏnmang: Yulgok ŭi ch'ŏrhak. (shrink)

1. Sŏron -- 2. Ŭisik ŭi chonggyojŏk ch'ŭngmyŏn -- 3. Yŏng : Chŏng Yag-yong ŭi simnon -- 4. Yŏngch'e : Chŏng Yag-yong ŭi insŏngnon -- 5. 'Yŏngch'e' insŏngnon esŏ pon ch'ŏnin kwan'gye -- 6. Kyŏllon.

이데올로기 문제, 상업주의적 평화사상, 인간의 소중 함을 피력한 저자의 글 모음.