Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):74–85 (2008)

Authors
Robert Schroer
University of Minnesota, Duluth
Abstract
According to memory foundationalism, seeming to remember that P is prima facie justification for believing that P. There is a common objection to this theory: If I previously believed that P carelessly (i.e. without justification) and later seem to remember that P, then (according to memory foundationalism) I have somehow acquired justification for a previously unjustified belief. In this paper, I explore this objection. I begin by distinguishing between two versions of it: One where I seem to remember that P while also seeming to remember being careless in my original believing that P and the other where I seem to remember that P while not seeming to remember my past carelessness. I argue that the former case is the real challenge for memory foundationalism. After establishing the case of unforgotten carelessness as objection to memory foundationalism, I recast memory foundationalism in way that allows it to escape this objection.
Keywords memory  foundationalism  internalism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00310.x
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References found in this work BETA

Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
The Analysis of Mind.Bertrand Russell - 1921 - Duke University Press.
Epistemic Dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge From Forgetting.Sven Bernecker & Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-540.
Epistemological Problems of Memory.Thomas D. Senor - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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