Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):74–85 (2008)
AbstractAccording to memory foundationalism, seeming to remember that P is prima facie justification for believing that P. There is a common objection to this theory: If I previously believed that P carelessly (i.e. without justification) and later seem to remember that P, then (according to memory foundationalism) I have somehow acquired justification for a previously unjustified belief. In this paper, I explore this objection. I begin by distinguishing between two versions of it: One where I seem to remember that P while also seeming to remember being careless in my original believing that P and the other where I seem to remember that P while not seeming to remember my past carelessness. I argue that the former case is the real challenge for memory foundationalism. After establishing the case of unforgotten carelessness as objection to memory foundationalism, I recast memory foundationalism in way that allows it to escape this objection.
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Citations of this work
The Justification of Reconstructive and Reproductive Memory Beliefs.Mary Salvaggio - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):649-663.
Knowledge From Forgetting.Sven Bernecker & Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-540.
Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.
Epistemic Internalism, Justification, and Memory.B. J. C. Madison - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (1):33-62.
References found in this work
Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity.David Owens - 2000 - Routledge.