Memory foundationalism and the problem of unforgotten carelessness

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):74–85 (2008)
Abstract
According to memory foundationalism, seeming to remember that P is prima facie justification for believing that P. There is a common objection to this theory: If I previously believed that P carelessly (i.e. without justification) and later seem to remember that P, then (according to memory foundationalism) I have somehow acquired justification for a previously unjustified belief. In this paper, I explore this objection. I begin by distinguishing between two versions of it: One where I seem to remember that P while also seeming to remember being careless in my original believing that P and the other where I seem to remember that P while not seeming to remember my past carelessness. I argue that the former case is the real challenge for memory foundationalism. After establishing the case of unforgotten carelessness as objection to memory foundationalism, I recast memory foundationalism in way that allows it to escape this objection.
Keywords memory  foundationalism  internalism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00310.x
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References found in this work BETA
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Internalism Exposed.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):271-293.
Epistemic Dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.

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Citations of this work BETA
Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.
Justification and Forgetting.Andrew Naylor - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):372-391.

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