Developments in Soviet ethics have been largely, but not exclusively, determined by the official ideology. Since 1917 philosophers have debated four successive models of morality. In the first, morality was regarded as tool of the exploiting classes and thus was superseded by communism. This attitude in fact fostered moral nihilism and anarchism. In the second period of ethical reflection, morality was contrued as a social, class-relative, phenomenon, conceived in utilitarian terms. With respect to Communist morality whatever serves socialism as defined (...) by the Communist Party acquires the force of a moral imperative. It is important to understand whether this perspective is true to Marx''s views. Whereas classical ethics assumed an extraworldy foundation for morality Marx adopted the humanist, immanentist perspective, according to which morality has a pragmatic sense as an ideal, the goal of activity. Soviet ethical theory of the Stalin era did not deviate from this perspective, for which reason ethics as a professional science was entirely subordinated to Party decrees about socialism as an ideal. In the third period beginning in the mid-fifties, a new view came to the fore which was codified in the 1961 Party program: moral values are now regarded as having a specific quality, social development involves a moral dimension, and moral values exhibit an all-human import. During this period the leading issue among philosophers is the question of the essence and specificity of morality as distinct from other forms of social consciousness. Just prior to the era of perestrojka beginning in 1985 a fourth model emerged which in fact prepared in most essential respects the actual new thinking in morality. The matters under consideration had to do with the global dimensions of moral problems given the common experience and fears of humanity. For this reason morality was now seen as superseding politics. Presently, this reorientation has not only enabled abandoning attitudes favoring class morality, but thrown into relief the tragic consequences of this attitude within Soviet history.The new image of morality corresponds to abstract humanism with its stress on the person and universal values. The task before Soviet ethicians is to provide theoretical and methodological foundations for their research by which they can improve the professional quality of their work and provide the discipline with a new identity over and against Marxism. (shrink)

Developments in Soviet ethics have been largely, but not exclusively, determined by the official ideology. Since 1917 philosophers have debated four successive models of morality. In the first, morality was regarded as tool of the exploiting classes and thus was superseded by communism. This attitude in fact fostered moral nihilism and anarchism. In the second period of ethical reflection, morality was contrued as a social, class-relative, phenomenon, conceived in utilitarian terms. With respect to Communist morality whatever serves socialism as defined (...) by the Communist Party acquires the force of a moral imperative. It is important to understand whether this perspective is true to Marx's views. Whereas classical ethics assumed an extra-worldy foundation for morality Marx adopted the humanist, immanentist perspective, according to which morality has a pragmatic sense as an ideal, the goal of activity. Soviet ethical theory of the Stalin era did not deviate from this perspective, for which reason ethics as a professional science was entirely subordinated to Party decrees about socialism as an ideal. In the third period beginning in the mid-fifties, a new view came to the fore which was codified in the 1961 Party program: moral values are now regarded as having a specific quality, social development involves a moral dimension, and moral values exhibit an all-human import. During this period the leading issue among philosophers is the question of the essence and specificity of morality as distinct from other forms of social consciousness. Just prior to the era of perestrojka beginning in 1985 a fourth model emerged which in fact prepared in most essential respects the actual new thinking in morality. The matters under consideration had to do with the 'global' dimensions of moral problems given the common experience and fears of humanity. For this reason morality was now seen as superseding politics. Presently, this reorientation has not only enabled abandoning attitudes favoring class morality, but thrown into relief the tragic consequences of this attitude within Soviet history. The new image of morality corresponds to 'abstract humanism' with its stress on the person and universal values. The task before Soviet ethicians is to provide theoretical and methodological foundations for their research by which they can improve the professional quality of their work and provide the discipline with a new identity over and against Marxism. (shrink)

The article discusses the role and place of the history of philosophy within the philosophical discipline. It shows that the history of philosophy is the main source and the medium of theoretical quests in all the areas of philosophical knowledge, and as such cannot be the exclusive domain for professional historians of philosophy. Being a specialized area of knowledge with its unique subject, it is an intellectual laboratory for all philosophical specialties, a place where, by the study of the philosophy (...) of the past, we discover new ideas and find the solutions to the pressing problems of the day. Thus, this branch of philosophical investigation cannot be merely perceived as philosophical history proper, but should be rather viewed as a contemporary way of philosophizing. (shrink)

This paper sketches an historical outline of philosophy in Russia from the modern era to present time. It describes the main philosophical trends that characterized the ‘Silver Age’ in pre-revolutionary Russia (Cosmism, religious philosophy and early Marxist philosophy), and draws some lines of continuity both with Marxist and pre-Marxist philosophy. It studies the internal evolution and organization of Soviet official philosophical thought, and describes the main features the philosophical Renaissance that took place in the Soviet Union in the second half (...) of the 20th century. It finally describes the main trends, authors and publication of philosophy in Russia today. (shrink)

Alexey Losev's concept of 'personality' was developed in his writings from the 1920s, "The Dialectics of Myth" and "The Philosophy of Name". In his later works Losev also understood the 'personality' outside of the boundaries of philosophy and theology. For him, the mystical dimension of personality in the end dominates logical and cultural structures of the subject. Losev's concept of 'personality' as a myth, a symbol, rather than an abstract theory was an attack on the European individualism seen as a (...) principle of the self-affirmation of the isolated subject. (shrink)

The article stresses the consistency and agreement between Kant's categorical claim about impermissibility of lying and his moral philosophy. Rejecting the case-study approach to Kant's essay, the author treats it as a most appropriate illustration of the ethics of duty, seeing in the forbiddance of lying a necessary consequence of Kant's absolutist ethical. As a solution to some practical situations allegedly allowing ethical dishonesty, the author proposes to consider the norm "Do not lie" as a categorical requirement in the realm (...) of speech, thus giving the individual an ability to maintain his moral integrity and at the same time remain within the bounds of practical prudence. (shrink)

Alexey Losev's concept of 'personality' was developed in his writings from the 1920s, "The Dialectics of Myth" and "The Philosophy of Name". In his later works (e.g. on the aesthetics of the Renaissance and in his book about Vladimir Soloviev) Losev also understood the 'personality' outside of the boundaries of philosophy and theology. For him, the mystical dimension of personality in the end dominates logical and cultural structures of the subject. Losev's concept of 'personality' as a myth, a symbol, rather (...) than an abstract theory was an attack on the European individualism seen as a principle of the self-affirmation of the isolated subject. (shrink)

This article argues that the structure of Nicomachean Ethics reproduces the structure of Aristotle’s ethical theory, consisting of three parts: the doctrine of the highest good, the doctrine of the virtues, and the doctrine of the three types of life. We show that the last four books successively analyze three concepts of happiness: the sensual, the practical, and the contemplative.

Philosophy is often understood in terms of public benefit as being synonymous with its application to other domains of public life such as politics, economics, education etc. The question I would like to raise is of an altogether different nature—namely, it is the question of whether philosophy can be seen as having any public or social value per se, before there is any further thought of application or usage. In particular, it is the question of whether it contains anything universally (...) significant, something that could make it of interest to anyone as seen in the context of one’s personal evolution. And in order to answer that question, first we have to find out what philosophy is to the philosophers themselves and how it benefits them. (shrink)

Review of Tolstoy and Spirituality (Academic Studies Press, 2018), edited by Pedrag Cicovacki and Heidi Nada Grek, with articles by Miran Bozovic, Predrag Cicovacki, Abdusalam A. Guseynov, Robert Holmes, Božidar Kante, Rosamund Bartlett, Diana Dukhanova, Liza Knapp, Inessa Medzhibovskaya, Donna Tussing Orwin, Mikhail Shishkin, and Alexandra Smith.