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  1.  40
    Social Choice and the Arrow Conditions.Allan F. Gibbard - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):269-284.
  2. Rule-Utilitarianism: Merely an Illusory Alternative?Allan F. Gibbard - 1965 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):211 – 220.
  3. Normative and Recognitional Concepts.Allan F. Gibbard - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):151-167.
    I can ask myself what to do, and I can ask myself what I ought to do. Are these the same question? We can imagine conjuring up a distinction, I’m sure. Suppose, though, I just told you this: “I have figured out what I ought to do, and I have figured out what to do.” Would you understand immediately what distinction I was making? To do so, you would have to exercise ingenuity. I have in mind here an “all things (...)
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  4.  59
    Reply to Sinnott-Armstrong.Allan F. Gibbard - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):315 - 327.
    I conclude that Gibbard fails to solve several of the traditional problems for expressivism. He solves some of these problems, but his solutions to them in effect give up expressivism. Of course, one might respond that it does not really matter whether his theory is expressivist. In some ways, I agree. Gibbard says many fascinating things about morality which have at most indirect connections to his expressivist analysis. I am thinking especially of his later discussions of hyperscepticism, parochialism, and indirect (...)
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  5.  94
    Disparate Goods and Rawls' Difference Principle: A Social Choice Theoretic Treatment.Allan F. Gibbard - unknown
    Rawls' Difference Principle asserts that a basic economic structure is just if it makes the worst off people as well off as is feasible. How well off someone is is to be measured by an ‘index’ of ‘primary social goods’. It is this index that gives content to the principle, and Rawls gives no adequate directions for constructing it. In this essay a version of the difference principle is proposed that fits much of what Rawls says, but that makes use (...)
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  6.  10
    Normative and Recognitional Concepts.Allan F. Gibbard - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):151-167.
    I can ask myself what to do, and I can ask myself what I ought to do. Are these the same question? We can imagine conjuring up a distinction, I’m sure. Suppose, though, I just told you this: “I have figured out what I ought to do, and I have figured out what to do.” Would you understand immediately what distinction I was making? To do so, you would have to exercise ingenuity. I have in mind here an “all things (...)
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  7.  80
    Reply to Critics. [REVIEW]Allan F. Gibbard - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):729 - 744.
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  8.  54
    Reply to Hawthorne.Allan F. Gibbard - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):179-183.
    Goodness, rational permissibility, and the like might be gruesome properties. That is to say, they might not well suit causal-explanatory purposes. Or at least, these properties are gruesome for all their normative concepts tell us by themselves. Perhaps hedonists are right and such properties are anything but gruesome, but perhaps instead, the most gruesome-minded ethical pluralists are right—normative concepts by themselves don’t settle the issue. At the end of his marvelous commentary, John Hawthorne depicts the morass of dank possibilities that (...)
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  9.  51
    Weakly Self-Ratifying Strategies: Comments on McClennen.Allan F. Gibbard - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):217 - 225.
  10.  68
    Précis of Thinking How to Live. [REVIEW]Allan F. Gibbard - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):687 - 698.
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  11.  24
    Arrow's Theorem with a Fixed Feasible Alternative.John A. Weymark, Aanund Hylland & Allan F. Gibbard - unknown
    Arrow's Theorem, in its social choice function formulation, assumes that all nonempty finite subsets of the universal set of alternatives is potentially a feasible set. We demonstrate that the axioms in Arrow's Theorem, with weak Pareto strengthened to strong Pareto, are consistent if it is assumed that there is a prespecified alternative which is in every feasible set. We further show that if the collection of feasible sets consists of all subsets of alternatives containing a prespecified list of alternatives and (...)
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  12.  16
    Reasons to Reject Allowing.Allan F. Gibbard - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):169-175.
    On my own view likewise, if we look for a straight analysis of the concept of a reason, we will find none that works. I mean the concept of a reason to do something, as when I say that the health effects and addictiveness of smoking are reasons not to take it up. I don't mean the psychological concept of an “operative reason”, as Scanlon calls it, a person's reason for doing what she does, as in “Her reason for taking (...)
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  13.  33
    Reasons to Reject Allowing. [REVIEW]Allan F. Gibbard - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):169–175.
    On my own view likewise, if we look for a straight analysis of the concept of a reason, we will find none that works. I mean the concept of a reason to do something, as when I say that the health effects and addictiveness of smoking are reasons not to take it up. I don't mean the psychological concept of an “operative reason”, as Scanlon calls it, a person's reason for doing what she does, as in “Her reason for taking (...)
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  14.  30
    Preference Strength and Two Kinds of Ordinalism.Allan F. Gibbard - 1978 - Philosophia 7 (2):255-264.
  15.  82
    Normative Explanations: Invoking Rationality to Explain Happenings.Allan F. Gibbard - 2002 - In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon Press.
  16.  8
    Précis of Thinking How to Live.Allan F. Gibbard - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):687-698.
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