Dewey’s philosophy of education was heavily criticized by the Chinese Communist Party in the 1950s, which led many to believe that Dewey’s education was in complete opposition to that of the CCP. However, this study intends to prove that Dewey had a tremendous influence on the early CCP members of the 1920s. Dewey’s Chinese visit closely coincided highly with the time of the reception of Marxism in China and the eventual establishment of the CCP. Both founders (...) of the CCP had close personal relationships with Dewey, and Chen even tried to practice Dewey’s educational ideas in Southern China. As a graduate of a normal school, Mao Zedong also read and practiced Dewey’s educational philosophy. Many other CCP members read Dewey in the 1920s and then became left-wing revolutionaries. Though Dewey himself did not stand with Marxism, his idea that education is an agent of social reform paved the way for Marxism in China in theoretical and practical aspects. When an educational theory is spread abroad, it is often not accepted in a fundamentalist way, but rather in a process of collision and integration with the local tradition. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u nd. The article focuses on the study of modern adaptations and modifications of Marxist principles in the context of the practice of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Focusing on the process of modernization, the article explores how Marxism developed and adapted to China's unique socio-political and economic landscape. Through an in-depth analysis of the CCP's policy and ideological changes, the article sheds light on the distinctive features characterizing the modernization (...) of Marxism in the Chinese context. The study covers not only theoretical aspects but also practical aspects, providing a refined understanding of the specifics of the relationship between Marxist ideology and the dynamic realities of Chinese governance. M e t h o d s. The article uses an in-depth analysis of the politics, ideological changes, and practical aspects of the CCP. The research is based on an analysis of primary sources, including official documents, political speeches and ideological narratives. R e s u l t s. The authors found that the ideology of the CCP is based on Marxism, but adapted to the unique historical context of China, often framed in the concept of "socialism with Chinese characteristics". This adaptation reflects the CCP's recognition of China's special conditions, cultural heritage, and development needs. At its core, Marxism provides the theoretical foundation for the ideology of the CCP, emphasizing class struggle, historical materialism, and the ultimate goal of achieving a classless communist society. However, the CCP recognizes that the application of Marxist principles must take into account the specific realities of China, distinguishing its path from the classical Marxist trajectory. C o n c l u s i o n s. The study highlights that the CCP recognizes the importance of adapting Marxist principles to the specific conditions of China. Acceptance of the concept of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" defines a pragmatic approach to the integration of Marxist ideology with the conditions of the country, taking into account its path of economic development and modernization. (shrink)

For quite a long time, “Li Li-san Line” has been the target of criticism as being typical of wrong lines by Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, under the subjective and objective circumstance at that time, it wasn’t by accident that CCP released this line. Regardless of its victory or defect in the history, and only considering behaviors of CCP leaders in the formulation and implementation of the entire line, this was a god-given and independent trial by CCP (...) leaders to resolve revolution in China in its infancy and under the strong controlling force of Comintern. (shrink)

How did revolutions facilitate empires’ transition to nation-states? This article compares the Bolshevik and the Chinese Communist Revolutions. It conceptualizes this Soviet–Sino comparison through three dimensions of nation-building: separating from a universal community, building a national cultural core and overcoming internal ethnopolitics. Both socialist regimes accommodated the nation-state model by fusing centralized control with limited autonomy for ethnic minorities. Yet, whereas the Soviet Union claimed to be a universal union of nation-states, which was supposed to keep accepting new (...) members until it covered the entire globe, the People’s Republic of China resembled a typical nation-state that preserved multiethnicity and enclosed borders under the title of the ‘Chinese Nation’. In analyzing the influence of revolutions, this article probes three relations: inter-revolution, revolution–society and revolution–counterrevolution. Arising after the Bolsheviks as a follower-revolution, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was confined to a national component of the USSR’s global communism project. This shaped the CCP’s enclosed geographical activity space, Han-dominated ethnic composition and the consciousness of national liberation. The CCP’s mobilization covered far wider social strata than the Bolsheviks’ had, which engendered stronger manpower and motivation to transform the traditional culture into a national culture. Being weak at its borderlands, the CCP was cautious about the doctrine of ‘national self-determination’, not daring to make it a geopolitical weapon for revolution export as the Bolsheviks had done in founding the Soviet Union. Owing to each of these differences in revolutionary trajectories, the CCP was more receptive to ‘China’ than the Bolsheviks were to ‘Russia’, and this led to two distinctive ways of reorganizing empires into nation-states. (shrink)

This article critically examines the origins and evolution of China’s unique land institutions and situates land policy in the larger context of China’s reforms and pursuit of economic growth. It argues that the Chinese Communist Party has strengthened the institutions that permit land expropriation—namely, urban/rural dualism, decentralized land ownership, and hierarchical land management—in order to use land as a key instrument of macroeconomic regulation, helping the CCP respond to domestic and international economic trends and manage expansion and (...) contraction. Key episodes of macroeconomic policymaking are analyzed, with the use of local and central documents, to show how the CCP relied on the manipulation and distribution of the national land supply either to stimulate economic growth or to rein in an overheating economy. China’s land institutions, therefore, share “complementarities” with fiscal and financial institutions and benefit powerful political actors while imposing costs on marginal ones. (shrink)

In the week that China's vice-president, Xi Jinping, was reported reaffirming the official status of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a “ruling” rather than a “revolutionary” party,1 I found myself in the Red Classics (Hongse jingdian)2 restaurant in the suburbs of Beijing. Entering through a star-shaped doorway flanked by green-uniformed “soldiers,” customers are faced by a riot of propaganda iconography: revolutionary slogans and posters adorn its walls, facsimile People's Daily headlines cover the ceiling, and in (...) the corner a bright red tractor is bursting through. The year is 1968: our waiters are cap-wearing “workers,” and at the far end…. (shrink)

Within cognitive science, narratives are regarded as crucial and fundamental cognitive instruments or tools. As Roger Schank suggests, the identity of (sub-)cultures is to a considerable extent based upon the sharing of narrative structures (Schank. 1995.Tell me a story: Narrative and intelligence. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.). According to Schank, culturally shared stories, as do many other stories, occur frequently in highly abbreviated form, as “skeleton stories” or “gists.” Collective identities are conveyed in and between cultures not only through verbal (...) discourse, but also by pictorial means. Many pictures and visual artworks have indeed been produced in order to establish and to consolidate a home-culture and to demarcate it from conceived extra-cultural counterparts.Some of my previous work on these lines has been concerned with demarcation efforts in visual media of “Jews” as extra-cultural, since the Middle Ages onwards, in the Third Reich’s iconography, as well as in modern, radicalized forms of anti-Semitic picturing in Arab media (Ranta. 2016. The (pictorial) construction of collective identities in the Third Reich.Language and Semiotic Studies2(3). 107–124, Ranta. 2017. Master narratives and the (pictorial) construction of otherness: Anti-semitic images in the Third Reich and beyond.Contemporary Aesthetics15.https://contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=765(accessed 17 November 2019.). In building upon and extending this work, I shall focus in the current paper upon attempts of creating cultural and political cohesion by means of pictorial propaganda in post-war China from the early 1950’s onwards, as promoted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the leadership by Mao Zedong. Some concrete pictorial examples indicating these attempts will be discussed from a narratological and cultural semiotic perspective. (shrink)

Since its founding, the Chinese Communist Party has consistently employed as a guide for all its work the integration of the general principles of Marxism with the concrete realities of the Chinese revolution. To achieve this, however, is by no means an easy task. It was not until the Seventh Congress of the CCP held in 1945 that this guiding principle of "integration" was accepted by the whole Party and put into practice. From that time, (...) China's New Democratic revolution was guided by a correct line and correct policies, and the result was a great victory. Mao Zedong Thought is the main reflection of this "integration". (shrink)

Michurinist biology was introduced to China in 1948; granted a state supported monopoly in 1952; and reduced to parity with western genetics from 1956. The Soviets exported it through the propaganda agencies Sino Soviet Friendship Association (SSFA) and VOKS (Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries). China's Ministry of Agriculture achieved broad public awareness and acceptance of Michurinist biology through a translation, publication, and Soviet guest speakers campaign – all managed by a team of agriculturalists led by Luo Tianyu, a veteran CCP (...) (Communist Party) cadre. The campaign grew exponentially, but did not affect university or Chinese Academy of Sciences biology. Luo Tianyu's failed attempt to force Michurinist biology on a Beijing university triggered its second stage: monopoly status and a ban on "Mendelist-Morganist" biology in teaching, research, and publication. The CCP Central Committee supported this policy believing that Michurinst biology would increase agricultural production for the forthcoming first Five Year Plan; whereas, western genetics had no practical value. Michurinist biology flourished at all levels of education, research, and science literature; Western genetics was completely shut down. This only began to change when the CCP Central Committee became wary of China's dependency on Soviet technical expertise and failure to fully utilize that of China. Change was further promoted by significant attacks on Michurinist biology by Soviet and East German biologists. Soon, these developments informed China's "genetics question," which became a test case for larger questions about the definition of science and the relationship between scientists and the state. Under the guidance of Lu Dingyi's Central Committee Propaganda Department, the CCP eventually decided that, henceforth, science controversies would only be resolved by the science community; and that monopolies or ideological orthodoxies would not be imposed on science. At the same time, the CCP rescinded Michurinist biology's monopoly and the ban on western genetics. By the mid-1960s western genetics had successfully restored itself, largely due to the leadership of C. C. Tan, a former student of Dobzhansky. Michurinist biology's presence shrank and it became marginalized. (shrink)

This study examined the relationship between job involvement and the five dimensions of organizational citizenship behaviors, using a sample of 1,110 from the People Republic of China. Results showed that job involvement related positively to all dimensions of OCBs. In addition, gender moderated the relationship between job involvement and three dimensions of OCBs, with males having a stronger, positive relationship between these constructs than females. The results further showed that party affiliation moderated the relationship between job involvement and three (...) dimensions of OCBs, with party members having a strong, positive relationship between these constructs than non-party members. The results are interpreted in light of the literature both on job involvement and OCBs, and limitations of this study are discussed. (shrink)

Zhou Fohai helped found the Chinese Communist Party but left the party in 1924 and aligned himself with the Guomindang . He then became one of the GMD's leading theoretical writers and was the editor of the monthly Xin shengming. Zhou had earlier contributed to Xin qingnian, and, in an article published in 1922, voiced the opinion that freedom of speech and association should not be given to the bourgeoisie since they then could use these freedoms (...) to thwart the revolution. Although Zhou in 1922 was a supporter of the CCP, and by 1928, when the article excerpted here was published, a theoretician of the GMD, his opinion on the need to restrict certain people's rights and freedoms did not change. Zhou argued against the idea of natural rights because it implied that all people, by virtue of their being human, would enjoy rights. The idea of "revolutionary people's rights" as advocated by the GMD, on the other hand, ensured that only those loyal to the revolution could exercise political rights. (shrink)