„De incerti aestimatione” („O szacowaniu rzeczy niepewnych”) G.W. Leibniza z 1678-ego roku stanowi próbę wyprowadzenia ogólnej metody dla rozwiązania problemu punktów, czyli podziału puli w dowolnej rundzie gry. Część wyjaśniająca zawiera szereg definicji i pomysłów pojawiających się w pismach Leibniza w poprzednich latach. Wśród nich znajduje się definicja pojęcia prawdopodobieństwa (probabilitas) kojarzonego wówczas z niezakończonym jeszcze sporem o probabilizm moralno-teologiczny. Jest to w tym wypadku skojarzenie uzasadnione faktem, że w korespondencji i późniejszych pismach Leibniz proponuje rozważać prawdopodobieństwo w znaczeniu matematycznym (...) w przeciwieństwie do znaczenia używanego w teologii moralnej. „De incerti aestimatione” jest drugą pracą Leibniza, w której poświęca on uwagę grom, zagadnieniu ich sprawiedliwości i oczekiwanej wartości, którą nazywa nadzieją. W artykule omówiono prawne, moralne i metafizyczne konteksty pojęć probabilitas, jus (prawa) i ratio, jak również ograniczenia moralnego zastosowania pojęcia prawdopodobieństwa. Przedstawiono także rozwiązanie problemu punktów przez Leibniza, które, choć błędne, stanowi niezależną od Pascala propozycję zastosowania do tego problemu metody rekurencyjnej. (shrink)

O szacowaniu rzeczy niepewnych (przekład Grzegorz Słowiński).

The speech act of inquiry is generally treated as a default kind of asking questions. The widespread norm states that one inquires whether p only if one does not know that p. However, the fact that inquiring is just one kind of asking questions has received little to no attention. Just as in the declarative mood we can perform not only assertions, but various other speech acts, like guesses or predictions, so in the interrogative mood we can also make various (...) speech act types. I propose a speech-act-theoretic account of a distinct kind of question that I label exam questions. According to the proposed account, one performs an exam question p only if (i) one has access to the answer to p, and (ii) one does not officially know whether the hearer knows the answer to p. Exam questions satisfy all the necessary requirements of being a distinct kind of speech act. Additionally, my proposal contributes to the recent expansion of the normative approach to a variety of speech acts. (shrink)

Autor omawia ontologię polityczną współczesnego anarchizmu, nawiązujący przy tym do klasycznego anarchizmu oraz do myślicieli postanarchizmu, w szczególności do Saula Newmana. Wskazuje przy tym, jak współcześni filozofowie związani z postanarchizmem pracują nad statyczną ontologią polityczna anarchizmu poprzez myśl poststrukturalną oraz jak za pomocą współczesnych pojęć filozoficznych dekonstruują oświeceniowe podstawy anarchizmu. Zamiarem tekstu jest wskazanie nie tylko na różnice pomiędzy anarchizmem a postanarchizmem, ale raczej dostrzeżenie pomiędzy nimi silnej zależności. Tekst stanowi przegląd i omówienie koncpecji postanarchizmu w kontekście ontologii politycznej, współczesnej (...) filozofii politycznej oraz historii idei. (shrink)

Szkic anarchizmu aktualności. O pojęciu anarchistyczności.

The article reviews the book Elementy etyki lekarskiej [Issues in Physician Ethics], by Tadeusz Biesaga.

The paper presents the main idea of point-free theories of space based on Tarski's system of point-free geometry. First, the general idea of the so-called point-free ontology was discussed, as well as the epistemological and methodological reasons for its adoption. Next, Whitehead's method of extensive abstraction, which is the methodological basis for the construction of point-free theories of space, is presented, and the fundamental concepts of mereology are discussed. The main part of the paper is a discussion of Tarski’s geometry (...) of solids, its postulates and metatheoretical properties. The paper ends with a short description of the contribution of Polish researchers to the development of research on point-free theories of space. (shrink)

According to the normative approach, speech acts are governed by certain norms. Interestingly, the same is true for classes of speech acts. This paper considers the normative treatment of constatives, consisting of such classes as assertives, predictives, suggestives, and more. The classical approach is to treat these classes of illocutions as species of constatives. Recently, however, Simion (Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context, Oxford University Press, 2021) has proposed that all constatives (i) are species of assertion, and (...) (ii) are governed by the knowledge norm. I defend the classical treatment of constatives and show that Simion’s conclusion is untenable. No taxonomy of speech acts can accommodate such a view. More importantly, we can test whether a particular speech act is an assertion or not. I propose five tests of assertion, the passing of which is a necessary condition for being an assertion. Some constative speech acts fail these tests. Thus, contrary to Simion, not all constatives can be regarded as species of assertion. (shrink)

In Dystopia: A Natural History, Gregory Claeys observes that the collectivist ethos is one of the common features of both utopia and dystopia. The crucial difference is that in utopia cooperation is free and voluntary, whereas in dystopia it takes the form of what Leszek Kołakowski has called compulsory solidarity, that is, solidarity imposed by means of coercion and thus deprived of its actual value.1 And yet, just as dystopia and utopia may well be two sides of the same coin, (...) dystopian compulsory fraternity is often counterbalanced by voluntary cooperation within an actual social system or a textual representation thereof. This is precisely what happens in the social science fiction of Janusz A. Zajdel... (shrink)

I propose an analysis of lying with uninformative speech acts. The orthodox view states that lying is restricted to assertions. However, the growing case for non-assertoric lies made by presuppositions or conventional implicatures challenges this orthodoxy. So far, the only presuppositions to have been considered as lies were informative presuppositions. In fact, uninformative lies were not discussed in the philosophical literature. However, limiting the possibility of lying to informative speech acts is too restrictive. Firstly, I show that standard, uninformative presuppositions (...) can also be lies. Secondly, I extend this picture into uninformative lies made by declarative statements. To implement my proposal, I do not need a new definition of lying. Recently popular commitment-based definitions of lying are able to properly handle uninformative lies. (shrink)

The following article begins with my recollection of the only academic conference on Zdziechowski that was organised still under the communist regime in the autumn of 1984 at the Jagiellonian University and ends with a description of the discussion on the genesis and power of evil, with the participation of Czesław Miłosz and Leszek Kołakowski, which was triggered in Poland immediately after the publication of the last edition of On Cruelty in 1993. On Cruelty was first published in 1928 in (...) the journal Przegla̧d Współczesny [Contemporary Review] in Krakow, a second time in 1938 in the volume of articles In the Face of the End, Krakow 1938, and a third – and so far last – time also in Krakow in 1993. On Cruelty, published three times but so far only in Polish, has never been thoroughly analysed or even discussed, which is why this article focuses on discussing it and related questions about the origins and nature of evil, mainly in Europe and Asia, from the earliest times to the present. Zdziechowski was particularly outraged when the cruelty he condemned was justified by religion, especially Christianity (Catholic and Protestant). From these condemnations, he described the activities of the Inquisition, the witch trials, cruelty to animals, and – in the introduction – the “psychology of cruelty.” At the same time, however, he meticulously listed the names of those political and spiritual leaders in Europe and Asia, theologians and thinkers, who, over many centuries, up to the present day, have resolutely spoken out against evil, including cruelty, within and outside the Church. A separate and important issue is Zdziechowski’s attitude to Tsarist Russia and Bolshevism, as outlined in his work On Cruelty. On the one hand, he pointed out that at least two rulers of Russia before 1917 – Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great – had made major contributions to the history of cruelty in Europe and Asia. But Bolshevism, which Zdziechowski condemned in the strongest terms, was in his eyes not a continuation of pre-1917 Russian despotism, but emanated from the depths of Asia. (shrink)

This paper offers a systematic classification and characterization of speech acts and their norms. Recently, the normative approach has been applied to various speech acts, most notably to constatives. I start by showing how the work on the norms of assertion has influenced various approaches to the norms of other speech acts. I focus on the fact that various norms of assertion have different extensions, i.e., they denote different clusters of illocutions as belonging to an assertion. I argue that this (...) has consequences for theorising about norms of other speech acts and generates certain arbitrary divisions. In the central part, I analyse two groups of speech acts. Firstly, ordinary speech acts, like predictions or retractions. Secondly, I indicate how the normative view can be extended to so-called ancillary speech acts, like presuppositions or implicatures. I end with a discussion of possible extensions of the normative approach, focusing on the debate on lying. (shrink)

Objective: Present research examined children’s behavioural and cognitive functioning by using data from a screening study based on reports given by parents and teachers, and investigated the strongest predictors of children’s fluid intelligence. Method: Scales: Conners Early Childhood Behaviour Scale and Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function-Preschool were filled out by parents and teachers of preschool children. Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices was used to measure fluid intelligence among preschool children. Results: Parent-teacher concordance was low to moderate. Working memory in BRIEF-P (...) estimated by teachers and parents mediated the relationship between inattention/hyperactivity in CEC BEH [S] and fluid intelligence among preschoolers. The difficulties with working memory assessed by teachers and parents were significant predictors of Raven scores; however, predictions based on teachers’ assessments were stronger. Conclusion: Clinicians should collect reports from various observers in order to implement prevention programs and optimize clinical diagnoses for children. Information from both parents and teachers give significant and complementary contribution to understanding difficulties with cognitive and behavioural functioning of preschoolers. (shrink)

We define a σ-ideal J D on the set of functions ω ω with the property that a real x ∈ ω ω is a Hechler real over V if and only if x omits all Borel sets in J D . In fact we define a topology D on ω ω related to Hechler forcing such that J D is the family of first category sets in D. We study cardinal invariants of the ideal J D.

The widely accepted view states that an intention to deceive is not necessary for lying. Proponents of this view, the so-called non-deceptionists, argue that lies are simply insincere assertions. We conducted three experimental studies with false explanations, the results of which put some pressure on non-deceptionist analyses. We present cases of explanations that one knows are false and compare them with analogical explanations that differ only in having a deceptive intention. The results show that lay people distinguish between such false (...) explanations and to a higher degree classify as lies those explanations that are made with the intention to deceive. Non-deceptionists fail to distinguish between such cases and wrongly classify both as lies. This novel empirical finding indicates the need for supplementing non-deceptionist definitions of lying, at least in some cases, with an additional condition, such as an intention to deceive. (shrink)

The essay presents some gnoseological themes with reference to the intellect of the separated soul according to John Duns Scotus. Four questions of the Ordinatio IV, d. 45 deal with these themes. In this concret cognitive situation is possible, according to Doctor Subtilis, to get to know the new quiddities of things, in spite of a lack of the empiric cognition. It means leaving behind the conception of generic empiricism and moving to the recognition of more cognitive abilities, as in (...) Aristoteles’s conception. In a post death state intellect continues to have the memory of the quiddities of things known while still connected with the body and can remember concret things and events known by the senses during earthly life. Such a gnoseological notion evidences the cognitive continuity of the human intellect after death, its incorruptibility and cognitive ability at least as such as one had during earthly life. We can see here the connection of philosophic and theological questions, which mutually condition and penetrate each other. According to Scotus it is possible for the intellect of the separated soul to remember the past and to acquire new cognition. Moreover, it is also possible for such an intellect to know the prayers we refer to the blessed in heaven. Such an intellectual approach evidences a strong Augustinian influence on John Duns Scotus’ epistemic conception. (shrink)

Although assertions are often characterised as essentially informative speech acts, there is a widespread disagreement concerning how the informativeness of assertions should be understood. This paper proposes the informativeness norm of assertion, which posits that assertions are speech acts that essentially deliver new information. As a result, if one asserts something that is already commonly known, one’s assertion is improper. The norm is motivated by appealing to unique conversational patterns associated with informative and uninformative uses of assertions, an analogy between (...) assertions and inquiries, and a distinction between assertions and uninformative speech acts. By focusing on the normative approach to speech acts, the paper discusses how particular norms of assertion deal with the data supporting the norm of informativeness. To be informative, the speaker must consider the epistemic position of the audience. Since the majority of norms proposed in the literature are speaker-centred, they fail to explain the submitted data. Looking more broadly, focusing on the informativeness of assertions underscores the crucial role of the audience in construing adequate speech act accounts. (shrink)

Let Γn be a formula of LPA meaning “there is a proof of φ from PA-axioms, in which ω-rule is iterated no more than n times”. We examine relations over pairs of natural numbers of the kind. ≦H iff PA + RFNn' ⊩ RFNn .Where H denotes one of the hierarchies ∑ or Π and RFNn is the scheme of the reflection principle for Γn restricted to formulas from the class C implies “φ is true”, for every φ ∈ C). (...) Our main result is that. ≦H if n ≦ n' and k ≦ max. (shrink)

We show that that every countable model of PA has a conservative extension M with a subset Y such that a certain Σ1(Y)-formula defines in M a subset which is not r. e. relative to Y.

I argue against Milić's (2017) proposal of analyzing “selfless assertions” (Lackey 2007) as proper, i.e., as assertions which satisfy the norm of assertion. In his view, selfless assertions are hedged assertions governed by the knowledge norm. In my critique, I show that Milić does not make a case that selfless assertions constitute such a special class of assertions. Moreover, he does not deliver a clear criterion for differentiating between flat-out assertions and hedged ones. What is more, his proposal leaves some (...) cases of selfless assertions unexplained. The outcome is that we are still left without a satisfactory account of selfless assertions as proper assertions. (shrink)

The aim of this article is an attempt to diagnose the current condition of the philosophy of history, as well as to show its potential in explaining contemporary phenomena and constructing a rational image of the world. Two recent works by Steven Pinker (The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined and Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress) and the methodological work of Karl Raimund Popper provide a point of reference. And although the works (...) mentioned are not classed as historiosophical (even by Pinker himself), it is the author’s opinion that they fully deserve this title by showing that philosophical reflection on history is something that is sorely needed today, in an age of multiple contradictory diagnoses and radical prophecies. (shrink)

The KK-principle can be defined as follows: “For any subject x : if x knows that p, then she is always in a position to know that she knows that p ”. This principle has been widely accepted in the history of philosophy. However, in contemporary epistemology it is considered controversial and regarded as an important part of the debate concerning the nature of knowledge. One of the arguments against the KK-principle has been presented by Timothy Williamson and it involves (...) the so-called “safety principle”. In this paper, I argue against this account. My argument consists of two parts: in the first part, it is argued that the safety principle presented by Williamson contradicts Dretske’s account of knowledge. In the second part, I claim that the safety principle, as defined by Williamson, is not precise enough, which enables one to argue that it does not contradict the KK-principle. (shrink)

Interpretations of the tax law, issued by tax authorities, are a fairly new institution in Poland. They were introduced into the legal system by the Tax Ordinance Act of 29 October 1997. From that time these regulations were deeply changed three times. Now it seems that Polish legislator has finally succeeded in elaborating an appropriate model for binding interpretation of tax law that protects the interests of taxpayers. However, discussed regulations seem to need some other amendments. The objective of this (...) article is to present the evolution of the provisions pertaining to the issuing of the so-called official interpretations of tax law and to point at certain shortcomings of the present regulations. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to draw comparisons between the major normative rules of distributive justice. This comparison is based on a kind of distribution of goods which is sometimes called the problem of pure distribution, i.e. the distribution of a homogeneous, infinitely distributable good in a situation when claims of different persons on the distributed good were in no way differentiated. This problem is defined against the background of typology of problems of goods distribution. Normative rules of distributive (...) Justice are defined formally as social welfare functionals. Eight rules of justice are distinguished: the rule of the utilitarian, Rawls’s maximin rule, Rawls’s lexicographical maximin rule, the maximax rule of the conservatives, the rule of lexicographical maximax of the conservatives, Nash’s rule, and two rules advanced by egalitarianists which differ by the meaning attributed to equality of distribution. Premises underlying the construction of these rules of justice and which indicate the measurement of preferences and possibilities of interpersonal comparisons are discussed. The same justice rules are also presented graphically. The method of the comparison amounts to examining if a certain set of ethical postulates is fulfilled by the rules under consideration. Several ethical postulates concerning the distribution of goods are formulated. Some of them define conditions any method of evaluating inequality of distribution of goods should fulfil. The remaining postulates involve more general requirements put to methods of making social decisions. Theorems about the fulfilment or nonfulfilment by individual rules of distributive justice of the considered ethical postulates are presented in a recapitulating table. The author demonstrates that almost a1l justice rules fulfil general postulates put to methods of social decision making. Nash’s rule and the two rules of the egalitarians are the exceptions, as they do not fulfil the postulate of separability with respect to unconcerned individuals. Besides, the two rules of the egalitarians do not fulfil the Pareto optimality principle. Significant differences between rules of distributive justice become manifest only when you compare way they fulfil ethical postulates concerning the manner of evaluating the inequality of the distribution. With regard to this set of postulates, they can be arranged along a definite continuum, with Rawls’s lexicographical maximin — the radical egalitarian rule, and the lexicographical maximax of the conservatives – the radical conservative rule as the extreme points of this continuum. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to apply a general methodology for constructing statistical methods, which is based on decision theory, to give a statistical description of preferential rankings, with a focus on the rankings’ dependence on categorical variables. In the paper, I use functions of description errors that are based on the Kemeny and Hamming distances between preferential orderings, but the proposed methodology can also be applied to other methods of estimating description errors.