A bounded monotone sequence of reals without a limit is called a Specker sequence. In Russian constructive analysis, Church's Thesis permits the existence of a Specker sequence. In intuitionisticmathematics, Brouwer's Continuity Principle implies it is false that every bounded monotone sequence of real numbers has a limit. We claim that the existence of Specker sequences crucially depends on the properties of intuitionistic decidable sets. We propose a schema about intuitionistic decidability that asserts “there exists an (...)intuitionistic enumerable set that is not intuitionistic decidable” and show that the existence of a Specker sequence is equivalent to ED. We show that ED is consistent with some certain well known axioms of intuitionistic analysis as Weak Continuity Principle, bar induction, and Kripke Schema. Thus, the assumption of the existence of a Specker sequence is conceivable in intuitionistic analysis. We will also introduce the notion of double Specker sequence and study the existence of them. (shrink)
In this paper, we investigate the logical strength of completeness theorems for intuitionistic logic along the program of reverse mathematics. Among others we show that is equivalent over to the strong completeness theorem for intuitionistic logic: any countable theory of intuitionistic predicate logic can be characterized by a single Kripke model.
We define a system IR of first-order intuitionistic relevant logic. We show that intuitionisticmathematics (on the assumption that it is consistent) can be relevantized, by virtue of the following metatheorem: any intuitionistic proof of A from a setX of premisses can be converted into a proof in IR of eitherA or absurdity from some subset ofX. Thus IR establishes the same inconsistencies and theorems as intuitionistic logic, and allows one to prove every intuitionistic (...) consequence of any consistent set of premisses. (shrink)
The relation between Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics and mathematical Intuitionism has raised a considerable debate. My attempt is to analyse if there is a commitment in Wittgenstein to themes characteristic of the intuitionist movement in Mathematics and if that commitment is one important strain that runs through his Remarks on the foundations of mathematics. The intuitionistic themes to analyse in his philosophy of mathematics are: firstly, his attacks on the unrestricted use of the Law of (...) Excluded Middle; secondly, his distrust of non-constructive proofs; and thirdly, his impatience with the idea that mathematics stands in need of a foundation. These elements are Fogelin's starting point for the systematic reconstruction of Wittgenstein's conception of mathematics. (shrink)
In section 1 we argue that the adoption of a tenseless notion of truth entails a realistic view of propositions and provability. This view, in turn, opens the way to the intelligibility of theclassical meaning of the logical constants, and consequently is incompatible with the antirealism of orthodox intuitionism. In section 2 we show how what we call the potential intuitionistic meaning of the logical constants can be defined, on the one hand, by means of the notion of atemporal (...) provability and, on the other, by means of the operator K of epistemic logic. Intuitionistic logic, as reconstructed within this perspective, turns out to be a part of epistemic logic, so that it loses its traditional foundational role, antithetic to that of classical logic. In section 3 we uphold the view that certain consequences of the adoption of atemporal notion of truth, despite their apparent oddity, are quite acceptable from an antirealist point of view. (shrink)
It is not unreasonable to think that the dispute between classical and intuitionisticmathematics might be unresolvable or 'faultless', in the sense of there being no objective way to settle it. If so, we would have a pretty case of relativism. In this note I argue, however, that there is in fact not even disagreement in any interesting sense, let alone a faultless one, in spite of appearances and claims to the contrary. A position I call classical pluralism (...) is sketched, intended to provide a coherent methodological stance towards the issue. Some reasons to recommend this stance are given, as well as some speculations as to why not everyone might want to follow the recommendation. (shrink)