Quite frequently, business periodicals feature articles on the importance of building and maintaining a "network" of businessfriends. Typically, these articles offer practical suggestions for "networking." This article is a philosophical investigation of businessfriends, and business friendships. Relying upon Aristotle's classic analysis, I argue that business friendships are instances of"incomplete friendships for utility." Viewed in this way, much is revealed about what business friendships are; even more is revealedabout what business friendships are not. It is perfectly natural to say that business (...) friends use one another; this raises the issue of whether business friendships violate the Kantian "categorical imperative." I argue that they need not, and that-so long as they are truly"friendships"-they do not. What this discussion makes clear, however, is that business friendships are in continuous peril of eroding intorelationships that cannot survive moral scrutiny. I conclude with a few practical suggestions-and philosophical cautions. (shrink)

In an effort to meet the challenge of teaching philosophy to non-majors by both keeping their attention and maintaining philosophical integrity, this paper defends an interpretation of Jean-Paul Sartre’s “No Exit” and articulates a method for teaching key concepts in existentialism, e.g. freedom, bad faith, authenticity, etc. The paper offers a “case study” method of teaching “No Exit” by providing three interpretations of the play: a literal interpretation, a philosophical interpretation that is ultimately regarded untenable, and a third interpretation that (...) is regarded as superior. Finally, drawing on an interview of Sartre, a three-part thesis is defended concerning the existentialist’s view on life, action, and freedom. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Numerous attempts have been made recently to argue from premises about ‘human nature’ to conclusions about social policy. This essay offers a critique of one such attempt, Melvin Konner's argument from the fact that women are more nurturing and less aggressive than men, to the claim that the world would be safer if women rather than men had control over the world's armaments, especially nuclear weapons (and thus they ought to occupy positions of power). I claim that the argument (...) is badly flawed at several points, and that as such, it does not advance but impedes the movement towards equal access to governmental positions. (shrink)

Universal Human Rights brings new clarity to the important and highly contested concept of universal human rights. This collection of essays explores the foundations of universal human rights in four sections devoted to their nature, application, enforcement, and limits, concluding that shared rights help to constitute a universal human community, which supports local customs and separate state sovereignty. The eleven contributors to this volume demonstrate from their very different perspectives how human rights can help to bring moral order to an (...) otherwise divided world. (shrink)

Typically the justification of criminal statutes is based on "liberty-limiting principles" -- e.g., the Harm Principle, the Offense Principle, Legal Paternalism, Legal Moralism, etc. Two philosophers of the criminal law, however -- Richard J. Arneson and Cass R. Sunstein -- take an entirely different tack. Both countenance the use of the criminal law to foreclose one's future options, seeking to preserve one's "true self" from the temptations of one's baser desires. (For reasons which become clear, I call this "community self-paternalism".) (...) In this paper, I take a careful look at "community self paternalism"; scrutiny reveals that this proposed justification of criminalization is quite different from its initial appearance. Revealing its true character dispels much of its initial appeal. I then argue for its rejection; of necessity, "community self-paternalism" treats some individuals as means merely, and not as ends in themselves. (shrink)

Many people have misgivings about the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Some of those misgivings centre on issues of effectiveness: safety depends entirely upon the dissuasion of an adversary. Other misgivings centre on moral concerns: the essence of deterrence is the threat, and the conditional intention, to kill millions of noncombatants. US President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative promised an alternative to deterrence, a strategic posture of interception of an adversary's weapons rather than preclusion of the decision to attack. It is conceived (...) as a means of ‘defending’ the United States that does not threaten anyone. In this essay I examine various SDI proposals. I argue that only one of these could justify the transition to a strategic posture of ‘defence’, and might be a genuine alternative to deterrence—the one that is least feasible technologically. Only that one could plausibly be claimed to be morally superior to deterrence—and for strategic reasons, even its claim is dubious at best. Technologically more feasible proposals are not ‘defences’, but variants of deterrence. Since that is so, the most common and dramatic claim of their moral superiority to deterrence is incoherent. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have found nuclear deterrence morally objectionable due to its violating a cluster of very attractive nonconsequentialist moral principles. And some philosophers who find deterrence morally acceptable are nonetheless deeply troubled by the conflict—or apparent conflict—between nuclear deterrence and these nonconsequentialist moral principles. In this essay I argue that neither set of philosophers has correctly understood the role of these nonconsequentialist principles in the issue of nuclear weapons policies. I shall argue that the “understanding” of the role (...) of these principles in making moral judgements is incorrect, and that the approach to issues of public policy taken by both camps is methodologically defective. In the end, I do not prove that nuclear deterrence is morally acceptable; to establish that, more must be done than is doable in a paper of this length. What I do show, however, is how that matter ought to be decided. I also show that the moral rejections of nuclear deterrence that have been proposed to date are fatally flawed. (shrink)