The 13 essays, most previously published, discuss his logical theory, his applications in general, and his applications to Christianity. Paper edition (unseen), $14.95. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Seldom does human reasoning fit the standards of deduction. Yet logicians have tended to use the strict standards of deductive validity for assessing all inferences. _Within Reason_ develops instead a way of assessing arguments and inferences that is directly appropriate to the non-deductive forms people regularly use. It uses analogy, and argument from analogy, to provide a thread that unites various forms: raising objections, inductions of various sorts, arguments to explanation, and arguments to action. The discussion is developed progressively, at (...) each stage building on the skills learned previously. And at each stage the book suggetss ways of assessing the strength of reasoning. Most of the examples are taken from the great texts of the Western tradition. In the exercises that form an integral part of each chapter an even broader range of writing is presented, offering instructors an extraordinary variety of texts at various levels ot assign to their students. The thesis implicit in the book is that induction, arguments to explanation and arguments to action are all sophisticated forms of arguments from analogy. Burbidge is concerned not simply to warn against the misuse of non-deductive reasoning but also to develop a more positive theory that allows us both to better udnerstand the workings of non-deductive reasoning, and to better employ it. (shrink)

George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel has seldom been considered a major figure in the history of logic. His two texts on logic, both called The Science of Logic, both written in Hegel's characteristically dense and obscure language, are often considered more as works of metaphysics than logic. But in this highly readable book, John Burbidge sets out to reclaim Hegel's Science of Logic as logic and to get right at the heart of Hegel's thought. Burbidge examines the way Hegel moves from (...) concept to concept through every chapter of his work, and traces the origins of Hegel's effort to "think through the way thought thinks" to Plato, Kant, and Fichte. Having established the framework of Hegel's logical thought, Burbidge demonstrates how Hegel organized the rest of his system, including the Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Spirit and his Lectures on World History, Art, Religion and Philosophy. A final section discusses English-language interpretations of Hegel's logic from the nineteenth through twentieth centuries. Burbidge's The Logic of Hegel's 'Logic' is written with an eye to the reader of general interests, avoiding as much as possible the use of Hegel's technical vocabulary. It is an excellent introduction to an otherwise very difficult text, and has recently appeared in an Iranian translation. (shrink)

John Burbidge shows that, far from incorporating everything into an all-consuming necessity, Hegel's philosophy requires the novelty of unexpected contingencies to maintain its systematic pretensions. To know without fear of failure is to expect that experience will confound our confident claims to knowledge. And the universal character of all life involves acting, discovering what happens as a result, and incorporating both intention and result into a new comprehensive understanding. Burbidge explores how Hegel applied this approach when he turned from his (...) logic to chemistry, biology, psychology and history, and suggests how a Hegelian might function within the changed circumstances of contemporary science. (shrink)

In order to answer the debate whether Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature is just an extension of his logic (Halper and Winfield) or combines thought with its other (Maker), this paper considers what Hegel writes about chemism (in the logic) and about chemical process (in the philosophy of nature). The logical argument can be constructed without reference to experience, from paradoxes that emerge within an original concept. In the philosophy of nature, however, an initial concept is analyzed, but its instantiation reflects (...) nature’s “impotence”: unrelated processes, fours and twos rather than threes, and so on. The singular conclusion combines universal conceptual framework and particular natural processes into a new, non-logical concept. (shrink)

"Hegel's Philosophy of Nature was for a long time regarded as an outdated historical curiosity. Yet if systematic completeness is given up, the value of Hegelian arguments and of Hegelian logic generally becomes uncertain. In this book, John Burbidge reveals the abiding significance of the Philosophy of Nature as the intermediate movement in Hegel's system." "Burbidge looks at three specific texts in Hegel's work: the two chapters of the Science of Logic that deal with the concept of chemism, and the (...) section on chemical process in the Philosophy of Nature. Through his detailed commentary, he clarifies Hegel's distinction between a strictly theoretical philosophy and one that understands the natural world. He shows that Hegel does not presume to derive natural data a priori, nor is he simply dependent on the explanatory theories arrived at by chemists themselves. Experience provides the data, but thought sets the parameters. Burbidge sets Hegel's thought in context with sketches of what Kant, Fichte, and Schelling had to say about chemistry, and with background outlining the stage chemistry had reached at the time Hegel was writing. He also reveals how Hegel changed his mind as he revised each section for succeeding editions of his work, thus providing a fascinating case study of the development of Hegel's ideas."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

All the essays gathered here are concerned with the radical singularity of history and existence on the one hand and the demands of philosophical truth on the other.

The second edition of the Historical Dictionary of Hegelian Philosophy covers all aspects of Hegel's thought. It discusses his students and colleagues, as well as key figures who either adopted his thought or attempted to explicate it for later generations. This is done through a chronology, an introductory essay, a glossary of German terms, a bibliography, and over 500 cross-referenced dictionary entries.

A significant disagreement has punctuated my conversations with Henry Harris for over thirty years. Harris maintains that Hegel does not need an actual historical Jesus to achieve his philosophical ends; all he requires is a Paul who believed there to be a historical Jesus. I, on the other hand, hold that a historical Jesus is critical, and without it, Hegel’s system falls apart.

In 1976 The Hegel Society of America chose as a theme for its biennial meeting “Hegel’s Social and Political Thought.” At a meeting held during the United States’ bicentennial year in the subterm that included Watergate and a few days after the election of President Carter, the abstractions of philosophy could not help but be associated with concrete reflection. What is the relation between political theory and political action?

Hegel defines his Logic as the science that thinks about thinking.nbsp; But when we interpret that work as outlining what happens when we reason we are vulnerable to Fregersquo;s charge of psychologism.nbsp; I use Hegelrsquo;s tripartite distinction among understanding, dialectical and speculative reason as operations of pure thought to suggest how thinking can work with objective concepts.nbsp; In the last analysis, however, our ability to move from the subjective contingency of representations and ideas to the pure concepts we think develops (...) from mechanical memory, which separates sign from sense so hat we can focus simply on the latter.nbsp; By becoming aware of the connections that underlie our thinking processes we may be able to both move beyond the abstractions of symbolic logic and clarify what informal logicians call relevance. (shrink)

Does the fact that everything has a cause imply that all events are causally determined? Drawing on discussions from the history of philosophy, John Burbidge's Cause for Thought captures the diverse dynamics found in physics, chemistry, biology, animal psychology, and rational action. At each level, forms of activity emerge that cannot be reduced to the functioning of simpler, more elementary components. By exploring the logic of what happens when two causal conditions reciprocally interact, Burbidge develops a concept of complex cause (...) in which an agent generates effects not simply because of the action of its constituent components, but also because of the way those components mutually supplement and reinforce one another. By extending this to the interaction of agents with their environment, Burbidge throws light on the structure of organisms, on the distinctive contributions of consciousness and rationality, and on the quest for a comprehensive explanation of the cosmos. Recovering the force and legitimacy of metaphysical inquiry by focusing on the concept of cause and causality, Cause for Thought offers a new way of understanding natural processes, the role of consciousness and free will, and the significance of rational explanation. (shrink)

Do concepts exist independently of the mind? Where does objective reality diverge from subjective experience? John Burbidge calls upon the work of some of the foremost thinkers in philosophy to address these questions, developing a nuanced account of the relationship between the mind and the external world. In Ideas, Concepts, and Reality John Burbidge adopts, as a starting point, Gottlob Frege's distinction between "ideas," which are subjective recollections of past sensations, and "concepts," which are shared by many and make communication (...) possible. Engaging with Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and many others, the book argues that concepts are not eternal and unchanging, as Frege suggested, but open to revision. We can move from ideas to thoughts, Burbidge suggests, that can be refined to the point where they acquire independent and objective status as concepts. At the same time, they are radically connected to other concepts which either complement or are differentiated from them. Ideas, Concepts, and Reality offers a fresh perspective on the ways in which rigorous thought differs from other operations of the mind. Daringly inventive and accessibly written, the book will appeal to philosophers at all levels of interest. (shrink)

The A to Z of Hegelian Philosophy covers all aspects of Hegel's thought. It discusses his students and colleagues, as well as key figures who either adopted his thought or attempted to explicate it for later generations. This is done through a chronology, an introductory essay, a glossary of German terms, a bibliography, and over 500 cross-referenced dictionary entries.

In an attempt to make sense of the argument in Hegel'sScience of Logic, I have suggested that, when we focus our attention on a concept, we find that our thought moves to other, related concepts. We can then turn our thoughts not only to those other concepts, but also to the movement itself: the transitions, ‘becomings’, or processes that lead from one to the other. Reflection can in its turn look back over these processes, along with their beginnings and endings, (...) to consider them as synthetic wholes. Finally, thought can collapse those syntheses into simple unities that become new conceptual starting points. The whole dynamic described in theLogicis something that takes place in the realm of thought as a result of the activity of thinking.One of the earliest and most penetrating reviews of myOn Hegel's Logic by George di Giovanni took exception to this approach because it committed the fallacy of psychologism. Rather than basing logic on the concepts as objective entities that have a life of their own, I was subordinating it to the subjective processes that occur in the minds of thinkers — and as subjective, logic was amenable to contingencies and distractions that would betray its strict objectivity.The fallacy of psychologism was first identified by Gottlob Frege. Once I examined his arguments, I found it quite relevant to my study of Hegel. Initially, Frege draws a sharp contrast between ideas and concepts — at least that is how the English translators have rendered his German. (shrink)

Pippin has assembled a number of independent pieces into a volume to complement his Modernism as a Philosophical Problem. His primary thesis is that Hegel and German Idealism generally offer an approach to modernism which both avoids the subjectivism and mentalism of Descartes and is strong enough to resist the attacks of Habermas, Strauss, Blumenberg, Nietzsche, and Heidegger.

In his introduction to this collection of essays, Warren Steinkraus acknowledges the diversity of approaches used by the contributors. It reflects “the richness and suggestive power” of Hegel’s philosophy. Such a range has the strength of providing a window into the complex world of Hegelian scholarship. Unfortunately, it also has the weakness of including work which is cavalier in its treatment of themes, or which shows a limited awareness of more recent scholarship.

The author's claim is that Hegel was the first to develop a fully comprehensive theology of Spirit. Prior to Luther there was no clear appreciation of the way spirit fulfills and completes Christian life. While Luther's formulations remain at the level of exhortation and practical instruction, pietism recognized that immediate experience was a grounding authority not only for personal conviction but also for the life of the community.

Topp undertakes a difficult task. In preparation for a study of the logic inherent in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, he explores in a wide-ranging discussion the systematic character of Hegel's philosophy as a whole. Thus no single question structures the book. Its argument is developed under three themes.

"In this study," Zammito writes at one point, "the philological-historical question takes precedence over the epistemological one". Zammito's primary task is not to discuss the contemporary relevance of Kant's thought, but to identify what Kant himself was trying to do within his own context. Yet the result is not just a commentary on Kant's third Critique. It is an intricate, subtle, and exciting explanation of how Kant's thinking developed and adjusted to new challenges over the decade from the first edition (...) of the Critique of Pure Reason to the appearance of the Critique of Judgment. (shrink)