This essay evaluates Hegel's claim that the phenomenon of time exhibits a quantitative logic in the context of a paradox concerning temporal presence. On the one hand, in time, the present always is. It seems that the very nature of time, assuming that it is really passing, requires us to assent to the continuous being of the present. If time is always passing, there must always be a present when the passing actually occurs and thus when beings actually exist. On (...) the other hand, any particular moment of presence, as a point or an interval, immediately ceases to be or has not yet come to be. And, because of this, no delineated moment can be purely self-present. Conceived as an unextended point, presence would be nothing enduring of its own against time's passing, while, conceived as an interval, presence contains before and after within itself, meaning as an interval that is not actually present at once. The paradox is therefore that time's passing demands we think being present and presence as being, while being present, strictly speaking, seems impossible due precisely to that passing. Hegel claims to reconcile the self-same form of presence, a presence that always is, with continuous change under the category of quantity. However, I argue that the non-identity between the logical category and the phenomenon of time renders this reconciliation ineffective against the paradox, breaking down, more specifically, as it concerns the formation of a temporal magnitude. I evaluate alternative Hegelian interpretations for determining whether the irresolvability of the paradox proves problematic after all, arguing that the paradox in fact presents a significant problem for the conceivability of temporal existence. (shrink)
For Heidegger, Hegel understands being, ‘the highest actuality’, as the categories which pervade and thereby form all objects and events. Since, Heidegger argues, the categories are, in Hegel, present-at-hand, Hegel conceives of being as presence-at-hand. This is a problem, for Heidegger, because it entails the full transparency and knowability of being, whereas, in his view, being is partially hidden and unknowable. I consider the objection to this Heideggerian critique of Hegel that Hegelian logic understands being not only as the list (...) of categories but also as their derivation and movement from pure being to the absolute idea, which (derivation and movement) establish being not only as presence but also as implication. Since being-as-implication is (a) not presence-at-hand and (b) necessary to being, it cannot be said that Hegel's account of being turns it into full transparency and knowability. Heidegger's critique should, therefore, be rejected. I argue that this objection is unsuccessful because there is strong evidence in the Logic that Hegel ‘subordinates’ being-as-implication to presence-at-hand. Implication's way of being is, in Hegel, only a collapse into presence-at-hand and hence ‘merely a modification of presence’. Consequently, Heidegger's critique of Hegel should not be rejected based on the objection. I conclude the article with a remark on the relation between language and being-as-implication. I argue that Hegel's account of being-as-implication in language disrespects the autonomy of being-as-implication therein and that Haas's argument for such an autonomy based on the phenomenon of the syntactic ellipsis of ‘is’ fails to undermine Hegel's account. (shrink)
James Kreines's Reason in the World (2015) offers an engaging and thought-provoking examination of Hegel's ambitions in the Science of Logic. However, it has gone unnoticed that there are two fundamental misinterpretations in his account of ‘Mechanism’ from the Logic. First, Kreines interprets the chapter as beginning with a ‘pure mechanism’ hypothesis that investigates the coherence of a purely mechanistic explanation of the world that makes no appeal to the immanent concept of things. Thus, according to Kreines, the Concept is (...) absent from the beginning of ‘Mechanism’ and only appears in the final section of the chapter, in ‘C. Absolute Mechanism’ in the subsection on the law, what Kreines conceptualizes as ‘reasonable mechanism’. Second, within his overall interpretation of ‘Mechanism’ as the development from the ‘pure mechanism’ hypothesis to ‘reasonable mechanism’ Kreines claims that there are logical moments that are explanatorily relevant and some that are not. Thus, Kreines will want to claim that Hegel's analysis of ‘pure mechanism’ reveals that ‘pure mechanism’ fails to be explanatorily relevant because, a) the logical moments do not have a concept immanent to them, and b) have ‘indifference’. It is only in the law that mechanistic explanations become explanatorily relevant because of the appearance of the Concept and the disappearance of ‘indifference’. I argue against both these positions. First, I think that there is no textual support for the idea that ‘Mechanism’ begins without the Concept immanent to it. Second, I think that Kreines is mistaken to equate ‘indifference’ with explanatory irrelevance and the absence of the Concept. My approach in this paper is to give my own analysis of the relevant passages from ‘Mechanism’ and, in doing so, to both show the misgivings of Kreines's interpretation and to offer an alternative way of reading the chapter. (shrink)
The philosophical question of nothingness has often been controversial. The main core of the question is the use of ‘nothing’ or ‘nothingness’ as a noun phrase rather than a quantifier phrase. This work deals with the question of nothingness and metaphysical nihilism in analytic philosophy. After evaluating an account of nothingness based on the notion of an empty possible world, the present work proposes two original arguments for metaphysical nihilism. With a preface by Graham Priest. -/- “Simionato’s book delivers a (...) welcome deepening of our understanding of nothing.” Graham Priest. (shrink)
I wrote earlier on the difference between the Pippinian and Houlgatian interpretations of Hegel’s Logic. In the current piece, I want to elaborate a bit more on Stephen Houlgate’s take on what he calls ‘sheer being’. It will still be extremely exploratory, without delving into the detail of Hegel’s own text, let alone into the secondary literature on the beginning of the Logic (apart from Houlgate, important work in this area is offered by Robert Pippin, Dieter Henrich, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and (...) more recently Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer in his massive 3-volume commentary on the Logic). The piece is chiefly critical of a particular, sophisticated and influential reading of the Logic, and doesn’t make propositions on how a positive reading of the Logic might look like. These are just some more critical reflections on what I take to be an ultimately unsuccessful way of approaching Hegel’s Logic, one though that seems very influential and intuitively plausible. I am increasingly suspicious of their attempts to defend ontological readings of Hegel’s Being Logic, such as we can find in the work of Houlgate (but also many others). Below I shall comment in turn on various passages I quote from a recent essay by Houlgate (Houlgate 2018) and elaborate on some of the central arguments. (shrink)
Often it is said that Robert Pippin’s Hegel is too Kantian or too Fichtean. By this is meant, not so much that it is wrong per se that Pippin emphasises the Kantian and Fichtean elements, but rather that something crucial is left out by his reading of Hegel. His is, supposedly, a deflationary reading of Hegel, a kind of bowdlerised version of Hegel the thoroughbred metaphysician in the Spinozan sense, say. Too much emphasis is put, by Pippin, on the fact (...) that we can’t know Being without a dependence on the categories in virtue of which Being can first be determined in and through self-determining thought. Despite the fact that Pippin, certainly more recently, insists on a metaphysical reading, and points to the fact that it is Being’s own intelligibility that is at issue, not just our subjective perspective on it, his Hegelian detractors have often taken and still take Pippin’s Hegel to be unappealingly unhegelian in some important sense. So in what sense is Pippin’s Hegel then not sufficiently ‘metaphysical’ or ‘ontological’, not enough of a Hegel, as Pippin’s critics believe? (shrink)
This article develops an interpretation of Hegel that aims to show how a proper understanding of the nature of speculative sentences might achieve what Kant set out to do: to vindicate our most fundamental claims to knowledge as actual knowledge, rather than mere acts of believing. To this end, it develops a conception of speculative geographies (or “maps”) as an interpretive tool and introduces an Hegelian-inspired distinction between empirical, generic, and speculative sentences. On this reading, Kant’s employment of the “boundary (...) concept” of a noumenon is bound to fail as it needs to employ a contrast between our human point of view and that of an omniscient God – which turns out to be an aperspectival “view from nowhere” and thus an incoherent notion. The artcile ends by suggesting ways in which Hegel’s logical analysis can help us to better comprehend the reflective ascent necessary to make our conceptual differentiations and typical ways of understanding intelligible to ourselves. (shrink)
Adorno asocia la concepción hegeliana del espíritu a la concepción en última instancia formal de la subjetividad de Kant y del Fichte de la Grundlage. La subjetividad no puede ser infinita: al sujeto siempre se le opone el objeto. Aunque pretende superar el subjetivismo de la concepción kantiana y fichteana del sujeto, la unidad del sujeto y el objeto que define al "espíritu" de Hegel es todavía un sujeto; fuera de este sujeto resiste siempre algo no-idéntico que le es irreductible; (...) un idealismo absoluto es como tal, pues, imposible. En una línea con esto, Adorno considera que la Lógica hegeliana carece de contenido y permanece, a pesar de sus pretensiones materiales, una teoría puramente formal. Ahora bien, Adorno no ofrece un análisis detallado de la argumentación de Hegel en contra de la concepción formal de la subjetividad que proponen Kant y el primer Fichte. Hegel diferencia la subjetividad vacía obtenida por abstracción a partir del sujeto empírico respecto de la subjetividad absoluta o espíritu. Adorno rastrea la esencia del idealismo absoluto en la relación entre sensibilidad e inteligibilidad; para Hegel, sin embargo, la clave del idealismo absoluto reside en la unidad entre ser y pensar, o, lo que para Hegel es en última instancia lo mismo, entre ser y determinidad. (shrink)
I argue that Hegel and Wittgenstein, each in their own specific way, used the idea of God at the beginning of creation as a complex analogy for other kinds of beginning, most notably the beginning of philosophical thought. Hegel’s Logic describes God’s mind before the creation of the world, i.e. God’s pure thinking. For a philosopher, beginning afresh means resolving to consider this kind of abstraction from the existence of the world. Wittgenstein, by contrast, says that the idea of a (...) creator of the world does not explain anything. It marks the terminus ad quem of asking for explanations; we must not ask further who created the creator of the world. Wittgenstein generalizes this for any kind of reasoning: “Explanations come to an end somewhere.” (Philosophical Investigations: §1) Any sort of explanation must eventually arrive at its terminus ad quem, which means only that any kind of reasoning must have its logical beginning. (shrink)
The current debate surrounding Hegel's logical theory of the concept revolves around Hegel's concept of ‘double shine’. After presenting the relevant positions of the discussants and elucidating their differences, the author tries to advance the current discussion by commenting on these differences. In doing so, the author argues that the essence- and concept-logical background of ‘shine’ and ‘double shine’ respectively is crucial for the understanding of the double shine.
Woran liegt es, dass trotz Hegels Behauptung, die spekulative Logik sei die eigentliche Metaphysik, ein Zwiespalt zwischen der metaphysischen Lesart und der nicht-metaphysischen bzw. transzendentalphilosophischen Lesart der Wissenschaft der Logik in der Hegelforschung zum Vorschein gekommen ist? Was für eine systematische Untersuchung der Wissenschaft der Logik wird methodologisch Hegels metaphysischem Anspruch gerecht? Anhand eines Überblicks über Hegels gesamte logische und enzyklopädische Philosophie versucht Zhili Xiong sowohl eine begleitende Lektüre für Hegel-Anfänger als auch eine erweiterte epistemische Lesart der Hegelschen Metaphysik für (...) Hegel-Kenner anzubieten. (shrink)
Recent discussions concerning the beginning problem of Hegel’s Logic have reached the agreement that any promised interpretation of the beginning of the Logic must reject opposition between the immediacy and mediation and embrace their unity instead. It is how this unity is understood that divides interpreters. Either the mediation precedes the immediacy and justifies it first, or a somewhat one-sided immediacy occurs first and waits to be mediated later in a circular justification. However, both concepts are confronted with their own (...) difficulties. To avoid these difficulties, I propose that the pure immediacy or pure being is justified to be the Logic’s beginning in virtue of its alternativelessness. Only it can measure up to the rigorous requirement implied by the nature of the beginning. (shrink)
This article discusses anglophone readings of G. W. F. Hegel against the backdrop of German-language scholarship. The article starts by differentiating types of metaphysics (I). Following a taxonomy introduced by Paul Redding, I then discuss Charles Taylor’s Christian-mystical (II), the so-called »non-metaphysical« (III) and the »revised metaphysical« reading (IV). Terry Pinkard’s work serves as an example of (III) and Stephen Houlgate’s as an example of (IV). I highlight problematic aspects of each reading that concern: the meaning of »reason in the (...) world« (II), the anti-relativist clout of Hegel’s philosophy (III) and the difference between the development of logical concepts and the empirical origin of the world and human thinking (IV). The text ends (V) by pointing to the social implications of each type of reading. (shrink)
This article is concerned with some of the criteria which Hegel believes apply to a scientific treatment of logic. I briefly address criteria which I take Hegel to inherit from German rationalism before focusing on two fairly idiosyncratic criteria: the requirement that a science of logic exhibit a circular structure and that it begin with the concept of pure being. I offer an explanation of these criteria which understands them as motivated by anti-sceptical concerns, before arguing that Hegel’s mature treatment (...) of the latter criterion is problematically ambiguous. (shrink)
Four philosophers, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Dennett, and Hegel, who hold for the most part radically different philosophies, all agree on rejecting the notion of atomic entities, of “things-in-themselves,” and insist that objects only make sense – can only be what they are -- in a context.
This chapter examines and assesses the purported “neo-Hegelianism” of a version of pragmatism that developed within analytic philosophy, a context otherwise generally antipathetic to the philosophy of Hegel. In particular, it looks to the work of Robert Brandom and John McDowell who were influenced by the Pittsburgh philosopher Wilfrid Sellars and it examines the mediating role played by Richard Rorty in the development of this “Pittsburgh” neo-Hegelianism. In particular, Rorty believed that Sellars’s approach had to be freed from the scientific-realist (...) assumptions common to analytic philosophy that had limited the pragmatist and Hegelian dimensions of his work. (shrink)
The primary focus of this project is the silent and subvocal speech-recognition interface unveiled in 2018 as an ambulatory device wearable on the neck that detects a myoelectrical signature by electrodes worn on the surface of the face, throat, and neck. These emerge from an alleged “intending to speak” by the wearer silently-saying-something-to-oneself. This inner voice is believed to occur while one reads in silence or mentally talks to oneself. The artifice does not require spoken sounds, opening the mouth, or (...) any explicit or external movement of the lips. The essay then considers such subvocal “speech” as a mode of writing or saying and the interior of the mouth or oral cavity as its writing surface. It briefly revisits discussions of telepathy to recontextualize Heidegger’s warning against enframing language exclusively within calculative technics and physiology, which he suggests is detrimental to Mundarten (mouth-modes of regional dialects). It closes in reconsideration of Husserl’s phenomenology of language and meaning in Ideas as it might apply to subvocal speech-recognition interfaces. It suggests ways by which the electrophysiology that the device detects and deciphers (as an alleged intention of a presumed natural language unspoken vocally or aloud) might supplement Husserl’s insinuation of the Leiblichkeit of language through a self-stamping extraction of an extension of meaning. (shrink)
Hegel often says that his "logic" is meant to replace metaphysics. Since Hegel's Science of Logic is so different from a standard logic, most commentators have not treated the portion of that work devoted to logical forms as relevant to this claim. This paper argues that Hegel's discussion of logical forms of judgment and syllogism is meant to be the foundation of his reformation of metaphysics. Implicit in Hegel's discussion of the logical forms is the view that the metaphysical concepts (...) discussed in Books I and II of the Science of Logic supervene on the role of subject and predicate terms in the logical forms discussed in Book III. Hegel thus has an explanation for the nature and significance of metaphysical concepts that resembles Kant's "metaphysical deduction," according to which the categories can be derived from the table of judgments. Though Hegel's metaphysics is often supposed to be influenced by Kant, prevailing interpretations do not show how Hegel's fine-grained treatment of logical forms is relevant to his critical view of metaphysics. The present interpretation provides a model for Hegel's explanation of metaphysical concepts, as well as a new picture of the structure of his Science of Logic that emphasizes the priority of its Doctrine of the Concept. (shrink)
While Hegel's metaphysics was long reviled, it has garnered more interest in recent years, with even the so-called non-metaphysical Hegelians starting to explicitly discuss Hegel’s metaphysical commitments. This brings up the old question: what are the social-philosophical implications of Hegel’s metaphysics? This chapter provides a unique answer to this question by contrasting the former non-metaphysical reading (as developed by Robert Pippin) with a traditional way of interpreting Hegel’s metaphysics and social philosophy, whose lineage includes not Wittgenstein, Sellars, or Brandom, but (...) rather Schelling, Marx, and Adorno. After discussing the two varieties of metaphysics (Sections 1–3), I will argue that a traditional metaphysical Hegel is more realist when it comes to assessing the power of social structures (Section 4), focused on structural freedom rather than agency (Sections 5 and 6), and more empowering for and lenient towards individuals who can make their interests count and are free to be irrational and egoist (Section 7). (shrink)
The article reflects on Heidegger’s “metaphysical” interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This interpretation is driven by two theses Heidegger holds: (1) that the Phenomenology is a necessary part of Hegel’s “system of science” and (2) that the Phenomenology is metaphysics. These two theses contrast with Houlgate’s “epistemological” interpretation, which claims that the Phenomenology is not a necessary part of Hegel’s system of science and that it is not metaphysics. The article shows that while Heidegger has an argument that establishes, (...) contra Houlgate, that the Phenomenology is metaphysics, this very argument has consequences that undermine Heidegger’s thesis that the Phenomenology is a necessary part of Hegel’s system of science. (shrink)
I review Robert Pippin's "Hegel's Realm of Shadows" (University of Chicago Press 2018) for the Hegel Bulletin. A draft can be read on my website (see link below). Or download below. See also the appendix (philpapers link below).
In the last decades, several attempts were made to exploit the relatedness between the early analytic philosophers and Hegel. Some 30 years ago, Peter Hylton and Nicholas Griffin investigated the apprenticeship of Bertrand Russell with neo-Hegelians. 25 years later, the direction of interest changed. Paul Redding and Angelica Nuzzo sought a connection between Hegel and analytic philosophy following hints made by Robert Brandom and John McDowell. According to these authors, Hegel can be seen as a theorist of concepts. Moreover, they (...) found that Hegel’s understanding of concepts is close to that of the early analytic philosophy. The approach we are following in this paper is different. We shall concentrate on the relatedness between the method of the early analytic philosophers and aspects of Hegel’s method. This is an unexplored venue and we hope that our study will open a new perspective both in the history of the early analytic philosophy and in Hegel Studies. To be more explicit, we are not going to specifically investigate the genealogical connection between these two methods. We shall be mainly concerned with their kinship. (shrink)
Parmenides plays an important role in the first section of Hegel’s Science of Logic due to his definition of being as a pure thought-determination. This article investigates, first, how Hegel conceives the Parmenidean being. Secondly, by discussing Hegel's logical analysis of pure being and pure nothing, it aims to show why and how such conception of being, according to Hegel, provides a crucial insight into the function of the understanding.
While Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason aims to 'humiliate' reason by declining any possibility of knowledge of things 'in themselves', he does conceive such critique as 'the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics'. In this paper I examine in what sense Hegel's Science of Logic goes beyond that Kantian view without neither relapsing back into dogmatic metaphysics nor turning into a mere pragmatism. I argue that reality in itself is ontologically deficient so that it is (...) already reality itself that makes true knowledge of real things impossible. Nonetheless I contend that there is something in Hegel's Science of Logic that is truly absolute and turns Logic into 'a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics', namely what Hegel calls the Concept or the Absolute Idea. Furthermore I point out the concrete importance of these metaphysical claims for human theoretical and practical knowledge. This finally provides a new reading of Hegel's Logic as a de-ontologised Aristotelian metaphysics that not just claims to regulate empirical knowledge in a Kantian manner, but to also conceptually constitute reality 'in itself'. (shrink)
The aim of this article is to contrast Hegelian insights about the secret with Derrida’s literary account of the secret in the story of Abraham. Derrida outlines two kinds of secret in “Literature in Secret,” one revealable and the other apophatic. I propose that the first kind of secret is Hegelian in nature because a productive concept of contradiction underlies it. On the other hand, the second kind of secret is Derridean because it withdraws from all revelation. Through an analysis (...) of the role of contradiction in Hegel’s Logic and Derrida’s distinction between revealable and unrevealable secrets, I aim to explore the logical and structural components of the concept of the secret. (shrink)
Bubbio’s new book is a synthesis of his earlier interventions in Hegel studies, nourished by his research on the notion of sacrifice. It offers an unabashed defence of the theological moment in Hegel’s idealism that is bound to attract much interest and critical attention. The book situates itself expertly in the current landscape. Aside from the original proposal it presents, it is a lucid introduction to the state of discussions in current Hegel scholarship. Many sections have great informative value, notably (...) the one on figural reading in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the overall thesis defended by the book will be viewed critically by a number of readers. (shrink)
In this paper I focus on Kantian notions of 'idea' and 'system' and the pages that Alfredo Ferrarin dedicates to these topics in his book "The Powers of Pure Reason". In particular, I examine two key texts, namely the Appendix to Transcendental Dialectics and the Architectonics of Pure Reason in the "Critique of Pure Reason". Finally, I try to outline a comparison with Hegel's position and, in so doing, to illustrate two different ways of understanding the relationship between thought and (...) reality. (shrink)
One of the strongest arguments that ethical non-cognitivism uses in its own defense is that according to which knowledge and will structure themselves as different “directions of fit”: while knowledge, in order to be correct, implies that the mind has to fit the world, the will, in order to be effective, requires that the world has to fit the mind. Non-cognitivists thus believe that moral judgments are expression of will alone, and not of knowledge, and cannot therefore be considered true (...) or justifiable. At the end of the Science of Logic, in the pages devoted to the idea of the true and the idea of the good, Hegel analyzes in details this kind of argument and shows its groundlessness: for Hegel it is not possible to separate will from knowledge without falling into complex aporias. Aim of the contribution is to shed light on those pages, still little studied today, and thus outline a possible alternative to the non-cognitivist ethical model. (shrink)
This text aims to contrast the metaphysical beginnings of the philosophies of Hegel and Kierkegaard. For this task, the notion of Being Pure of the Hegel of Logic will be used in relation with the concept of Irony that Kierkegaard expresses in his Concept of irony. The need for this "contrast of beginnings" seeks to clarify, from a “metaphysical awakening”, the evident theoretical courtship that has so far distanced by the dominant historiographical traditions of continental philosophy.
We cannot but begin this volume with Wittgenstein’s famous remark that “Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.” (MDC: p.157) This is, however, a casual remark, and it seems that we should not put too much emphasis on it. (For a discussion of how the remark should properly be understood, see Chapter 20.) In (...) compiling this collection of essays we adopted from this remark the idea that the problem of difference in identity is the common topic between Hegel and Wittgenstein. The remark presents a certain interplay (or, one might say, dialectics) of identity and difference. And it is questions of identity and difference between Hegel and Wittgenstein (with respect to certain aspects of their works, under certain interpretations, etc.) that are addressed by the essays in this volume. (shrink)
Artikkeli käsittelee J. V. Snellmanin (1806–81) varhaisvaiheen filosofiaa ja sen suhdetta hänen 1840-luvun alun filosofiseen pääteokseensa "Persoonallisuuden idean spekulatiivisen kehittelyn yritys" (Versuch einer speculativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit). Varhaisvaiheen filosofia viittaa Snellmanin julkaistuihin kirjoituksiin vuosina 1835–40 sekä luentokäsikirjoituksiin ja muihin muistiinpanoihin. -/- Artikkelin keskiössä on Snellmanin varhainen luenta G. W. F. Hegelin (1770–1831) filosofiasta. Snellmanin filosofian on yleensä katsottu seuraavan Hegelin esikuvaa uskollisesti. Tämä pitää pääasiassa paikkansa, mutta toisaalta Snellman ei missään vaiheessa uraansa epäröinyt poiketa Hegelin viitoittamalta tieltä. Hän (...) ei tosin juuri korostanut eroja itsensä ja saksalaisen esikuvansa välillä. Snellman esitti varhaisfilosofiassaan muun muassa omaperäisen tulkinnan Hegelin subjektiivisen hengen filosofiasta. Hän pyrki myös yhdistämään Hegelin kaksi logiikan pääesitystä yhdeksi kokonaisuudeksi. Snellman myös täydensi joiltain osin Hegelin systeemiä. Hegel ei esimerkiksi koskaan vastannut yksiselitteisesti kysymykseen siitä, tarvitseeko hänen systeeminsä itsenäisen johdannon. Snellman katsoi johdannon tarpeelliseksi ja esitti varhaisfilosofiassaan oman versionsa johdannosta. Snellmanin johdanto keskittyi itsetietoisuuden käsitteeseen, joka oli keskeisessä roolissa myös hänen vuonna 1841 julkaisemassaan teoksessa "Persoonallisuuden idean spekulatiivisen kehittelyn yritys". (shrink)
The course delivered by Heidegger during the Summer semester of 1923, and published later under the title of Ontology – The hermeneutics of facticity, is one of the most important loci in which we can have a glimpse of Kierkegaard’s influence on and importance to Heidegger, as well as of some of his interpretations about the thought of the Dane philosopher. One of them, notwithstanding puts forward a very interesting assessment of the relation between Kierkegaard and Hegel – through F. (...) A. Trendelenburg –, one of hottest topics in the Kierkegaardian scholarship, is not usually analyzed by that scholarship. Hence, this paper aims to show and analyze Heidegger’s theses on the relation between Kierkegaard-Hegel in that work in order to evaluate their correctness. As final remarks, this paper presents some metaphilosophical reflections on the very notions of relation and dependence between philosophers. (shrink)
Esta coletânea reúne, organizados na forma de capítulos, sete artigos que exploraram uma ideia central: a de que, subjacente à Lógica de Hegel, há uma mathesis, isto é, uma estruturação matemática que organiza as ideias dessa Lógica, mathesis de que Hegel faz uso, de modo implícito, ao longo do texto da "Ciência da Lógica".
Embora ser pessoal desempenhe um papel importante na filosofia de G.W.F. Hegel, ele nunca forneceu uma definição compreensiva de personalidade. Dentro do arcabouço de seus trabalhos, é, então, possível formular diferentes definições de pessoa e personalidade e algumas definições conflitantes foram apresentadas entre hegelianos durante as décadas de 1830 e 1840. Nesse artigo, examino o papel da personalidade no sistema de Hegel e discuto a relação entre personalidade e metafísica. A questão deve ser analisada no contexto dos vários trabalhos de (...) Hegel e contrastada com dois precursores importantes de Hegel, I. Kant e J.G. Fichte. Tentarei também por a filosofia do hegeliano finlandês J.V. Snellman sob escrutínio. O artigo também indica a importância da lógica à metafísica hegeliana e a sua concepção de personalidade. (shrink)
Die mit einem Vergleichsapparat zur ersten und zweiten Auflage der Seinslogik versehene Fassung des Textes der historisch-kritischen Ausgabe bildet die Grundlage für diese Studienausgabe. Der Band enthält die Anmerkungen der historisch-kritischen Ausgabe; altsprachlichen Zitaten sind Übersetzungen beigegeben. Erstmalig bietet diese Ausgabe einen Seitenvergleich der ersten (1812) und der zweiten Auflage (1832) im Überblick, so daß Modifikationen und Erweiterungen sich erkennen lassen. Mit Einleitung, Literaturverzeichnis und Personenregister.
Translated into English for the first time in this edition, The Jena System, 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysics is an essential text in the study of the development of Hegel's thought. It is the climax of Hegel's efforts to construct a neutral theory of the categories of finite cognition as the necessary bridge to the theory of infinite, or philosophical, cognition.
On the verge of the 1917 October revolution, Lenin reads and elaborates on the Hegel's Science of Logic, as if he were attempting to outline, from it, specific effects. Theoretical effects, because human activity is never uncoupled from the logic objective, through which the real matter unfolds and to whom each individual indissolubly belongs. Practical effects, because if Hegelian philosophy is good for the Church, for the bourgeoisie, for the capital, by changing the order of some of its factors it (...) may as well turn out good for guiding the practical-cognitive development of an urgent proletarian revolution. (shrink)
Following Freud’s analysis of the fragile line between the uncanny double and its comic redoubling, I identify the doubling of the double found in critical moments of Hegelian dialectic as producing a kind of comic effect. It almost goes without saying that two provides greater pleasure than one, the loneliest number. Many also find two to be preferable to three, the tired trope of dialectic as a teleological waltz. Two seems to offer lightness, relieving one from her loneliness and lacking (...) the complications of a third who comes in between. And yet, we learn through Marx and Freud that the double (even the double of tragedy and farce) borders on something closer to horror than comedy. -/- In the following, I would like to explore why four is funnier than two in my staging of dialectic as the doubling of the double or, to borrow a movie title from Laurel and Hardy, “Twice Two” (Roach et al. 1933a). I will begin by exploring the formulations of the double in the form of a pair of opposites and in the form of a pair of twins. The literary tropes of the double as the odd couple, on one side, and the twins, on the other, appear to serve very different narrative functions, which incite different kinds of affective responses from the audience. However, the form of the opposed double sometimes conceals the realization that the empty or fragmented content of the first is only reduplicated in the second. The “straight man” of the odd couple cannot see himself in his counterpart “the comic.” The redoubling of the double, however, forces not only the audience, but the original double on stage to confront what was already present, but unrealized, from the beginning. To illustrate this redoubling of the double within the opening of Hegel’s Science of Logic, I consider two short films by Laurel and Hardy in which the comic duo redoubles itself. The formula (2 x 2) produces a comic excess through the dialectical redoubling of there uncanny double. (shrink)