Hegel: Logic and Metaphysics

While Hegel's metaphysics was long reviled, it has garnered more interest in recent years, with even the so-called non-metaphysical Hegelians starting to explicitly discuss Hegel’s metaphysical commitments. This brings up the old question: what are the social-philosophical implications of Hegel’s metaphysics? This chapter provides a unique answer to this question by contrasting the former non-metaphysical reading (as developed by Robert Pippin) with a traditional way of interpreting Hegel’s metaphysics and social philosophy, whose lineage includes not Wittgenstein, Sellars, or Brandom, but (...) rather Schelling, Marx, and Adorno. After discussing the two varieties of metaphysics (Sections 1–3), I will argue that a traditional metaphysical Hegel is more realist when it comes to assessing the power of social structures (Section 4), focused on structural freedom rather than agency (Sections 5 and 6), and more empowering for and lenient towards individuals who can make their interests count and are free to be irrational and egoist (Section 7). (shrink)

The article reflects on Heidegger’s “metaphysical” interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This interpretation is driven by two theses Heidegger holds: (1) that the Phenomenology is a necessary part of Hegel’s “system of science” and (2) that the Phenomenology is metaphysics. These two theses contrast with Houlgate’s “epistemological” interpretation, which claims that the Phenomenology is not a necessary part of Hegel’s system of science and that it is not metaphysics. The article shows that while Heidegger has an argument that establishes, (...) contra Houlgate, that the Phenomenology is metaphysics, this very argument has consequences that undermine Heidegger’s thesis that the Phenomenology is a necessary part of Hegel’s system of science. (shrink)

I review Alfredo Ferrarin's "Thinking and the I. Hegel and the Critique of Kant" (Northwestern UP 2019) for Hegel Bulletin.

I review Robert Pippin's "Hegel's Realm of Shadows" (University of Chicago Press 2018) for the Hegel Bulletin. A draft can be read on my website (see link below). Pwd-protected. Drop me an email for pwd.

In the last decades, several attempts were made to exploit the relatedness between the early analytic philosophers and Hegel. Some 30 years ago, Peter Hylton and Nicholas Griffin investigated the apprenticeship of Bertrand Russell with neo-Hegelians. 25 years later, the direction of interest changed. Paul Redding and Angelica Nuzzo sought a connection between Hegel and analytic philosophy following hints made by Robert Brandom and John McDowell. According to these authors, Hegel can be seen as a theorist of concepts. Moreover, they (...) found that Hegel’s understanding of concepts is close to that of the early analytic philosophy. The approach we are following in this paper is different. We shall concentrate on the relatedness between the method of the early analytic philosophers and aspects of Hegel’s method. This is an unexplored venue and we hope that our study will open a new perspective both in the history of the early analytic philosophy and in Hegel Studies. To be more explicit, we are not going to specifically investigate the genealogical connection between these two methods. We shall be mainly concerned with their kinship. (shrink)

Review of the Palgrave Hegel Handbook. Although the coverage of the volume is wide-ranging, this review focuses mostly on material relevant to Hegel's logic, epistemology, and metaphysics.

Parmenides plays an important role in the first section of Hegel’s Science of Logic due to his definition of being as a pure thought-determination. This article investigates, first, how Hegel conceives the Parmenidean being. Secondly, by discussing Hegel's logical analysis of pure being and pure nothing, it aims to show why and how such conception of being, according to Hegel, provides a crucial insight into the function of the understanding.

While Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason aims to 'humiliate' reason by declining any possibility of knowledge of things 'in themselves', he does conceive such critique as 'the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics'. In this paper I examine in what sense Hegel's Science of Logic goes beyond that Kantian view without neither relapsing back into dogmatic metaphysics nor turning into a mere pragmatism. I argue that reality in itself is ontologically deficient so that it is (...) already reality itself that makes true knowledge of real things impossible. Nonetheless I contend that there is something in Hegel's Science of Logic that is truly absolute and turns Logic into 'a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics', namely what Hegel calls the Concept or the Absolute Idea. Furthermore I point out the concrete importance of these metaphysical claims for human theoretical and practical knowledge. This finally provides a new reading of Hegel's Logic as a de-ontologised Aristotelian metaphysics that not just claims to regulate empirical knowledge in a Kantian manner, but to also conceptually constitute reality 'in itself'. (shrink)

In many crucial passages Hegel attempts to associate his philosophy as a whole with the Absolute and God. Some of the most striking formulations, for instance, appear in the Prefaces to Phenomenology, Science of Logic and in the Introduction to Encyclopaedia, where Hegel states that philosophy shares the same object with religion, namely God (GW 20,§ 1), that the Logic is “the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence” (GW 21,34) or that speculative philosophy has to grasp (...) the Absolute as the whole of the conceptual development, i.e. not just at the beginning of this development but as its genuine “result” (GW 9,19f.). With respect to such assertions we may prima facie not be surprized when we further read at the beginning of the Encyclopaedia Logic (GW 20,§ 85) that “the following determinations (the logical determinations in general, not just those of being), may be looked upon as definitions of the Absolute, as the metaphysical definitions of God”. However, in this paper I argue that this programmatic claim is not self-evident with regard to the Greater Logic, although I do think that it does not contradict it, but rather complements it in a non-speculative way. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to contrast Hegelian insights about the secret with Derrida’s literary account of the secret in the story of Abraham. Derrida outlines two kinds of secret in “Literature in Secret,” one revealable and the other apophatic. I propose that the first kind of secret is Hegelian in nature because a productive concept of contradiction underlies it. On the other hand, the second kind of secret is Derridean because it withdraws from all revelation. Through an analysis (...) of the role of contradiction in Hegel’s Logic and Derrida’s distinction between revealable and unrevealable secrets, I aim to explore the logical and structural components of the concept of the secret. (shrink)

Bubbio’s new book is a synthesis of his earlier interventions in Hegel studies, nourished by his research on the notion of sacrifice. It offers an unabashed defence of the theological moment in Hegel’s idealism that is bound to attract much interest and critical attention. The book situates itself expertly in the current landscape. Aside from the original proposal it presents, it is a lucid introduction to the state of discussions in current Hegel scholarship. Many sections have great informative value, notably (...) the one on figural reading in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the overall thesis defended by the book will be viewed critically by a number of readers. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on Kantian notions of 'idea' and 'system' and the pages that Alfredo Ferrarin dedicates to these topics in his book "The Powers of Pure Reason". In particular, I examine two key texts, namely the Appendix to Transcendental Dialectics and the Architectonics of Pure Reason in the "Critique of Pure Reason". Finally, I try to outline a comparison with Hegel's position and, in so doing, to illustrate two different ways of understanding the relationship between thought and (...) reality. (shrink)

This text aims to contrast the metaphysical beginnings of the philosophies of Hegel and Kierkegaard. For this task, the notion of Being Pure of the Hegel of Logic will be used in relation with the concept of Irony that Kierkegaard expresses in his Concept of irony. The need for this "contrast of beginnings" seeks to clarify, from a “metaphysical awakening”, the evident theoretical courtship that has so far distanced by the dominant historiographical traditions of continental philosophy.

We cannot but begin this volume with Wittgenstein’s famous remark that “Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.” (MDC: p.157) This is, however, a casual remark, and it seems that we should not put too much emphasis on it. (For a discussion of how the remark should properly be understood, see Chapter 20.) In (...) compiling this collection of essays we adopted from this remark the idea that the problem of difference in identity is the common topic between Hegel and Wittgenstein. The remark presents a certain interplay (or, one might say, dialectics) of identity and difference. And it is questions of identity and difference between Hegel and Wittgenstein (with respect to certain aspects of their works, under certain interpretations, etc.) that are addressed by the essays in this volume. (shrink)

Artikkeli käsittelee J. V. Snellmanin (1806–81) varhaisvaiheen filosofiaa ja sen suhdetta hänen 1840-luvun alun filosofiseen pääteokseensa "Persoonallisuuden idean spekulatiivisen kehittelyn yritys" (Versuch einer speculativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit). Varhaisvaiheen filosofia viittaa Snellmanin julkaistuihin kirjoituksiin vuosina 1835–40 sekä luentokäsikirjoituksiin ja muihin muistiinpanoihin. -/- Artikkelin keskiössä on Snellmanin varhainen luenta G. W. F. Hegelin (1770–1831) filosofiasta. Snellmanin filosofian on yleensä katsottu seuraavan Hegelin esikuvaa uskollisesti. Tämä pitää pääasiassa paikkansa, mutta toisaalta Snellman ei missään vaiheessa uraansa epäröinyt poiketa Hegelin viitoittamalta tieltä. Hän (...) ei tosin juuri korostanut eroja itsensä ja saksalaisen esikuvansa välillä. Snellman esitti varhaisfilosofiassaan muun muassa omaperäisen tulkinnan Hegelin subjektiivisen hengen filosofiasta. Hän pyrki myös yhdistämään Hegelin kaksi logiikan pääesitystä yhdeksi kokonaisuudeksi. Snellman myös täydensi joiltain osin Hegelin systeemiä. Hegel ei esimerkiksi koskaan vastannut yksiselitteisesti kysymykseen siitä, tarvitseeko hänen systeeminsä itsenäisen johdannon. Snellman katsoi johdannon tarpeelliseksi ja esitti varhaisfilosofiassaan oman versionsa johdannosta. Snellmanin johdanto keskittyi itsetietoisuuden käsitteeseen, joka oli keskeisessä roolissa myös hänen vuonna 1841 julkaisemassaan teoksessa "Persoonallisuuden idean spekulatiivisen kehittelyn yritys". (shrink)

Volume 27, Issue 6, December 2019, Page 1256-1260.

The course delivered by Heidegger during the Summer semester of 1923, and published later under the title of Ontology – The hermeneutics of facticity, is one of the most important loci in which we can have a glimpse of Kierkegaard’s influence on and importance to Heidegger, as well as of some of his interpretations about the thought of the Dane philosopher. One of them, notwithstanding puts forward a very interesting assessment of the relation between Kierkegaard and Hegel – through F. (...) A. Trendelenburg –, one of hottest topics in the Kierkegaardian scholarship, is not usually analyzed by that scholarship. Hence, this paper aims to show and analyze Heidegger’s theses on the relation between Kierkegaard-Hegel in that work in order to evaluate their correctness. As final remarks, this paper presents some metaphilosophical reflections on the very notions of relation and dependence between philosophers. (shrink)

Esta coletânea reúne, organizados na forma de capítulos, sete artigos que exploraram uma ideia central: a de que, subjacente à Lógica de Hegel, há uma mathesis, isto é, uma estruturação matemática que organiza as ideias dessa Lógica, mathesis de que Hegel faz uso, de modo implícito, ao longo do texto da "Ciência da Lógica".

Embora ser pessoal desempenhe um papel importante na filosofia de G.W.F. Hegel, ele nunca forneceu uma definição compreensiva de personalidade. Dentro do arcabouço de seus trabalhos, é, então, possível formular diferentes definições de pessoa e personalidade e algumas definições conflitantes foram apresentadas entre hegelianos durante as décadas de 1830 e 1840. Nesse artigo, examino o papel da personalidade no sistema de Hegel e discuto a relação entre personalidade e metafísica. A questão deve ser analisada no contexto dos vários trabalhos de (...) Hegel e contrastada com dois precursores importantes de Hegel, I. Kant e J.G. Fichte. Tentarei também por a filosofia do hegeliano finlandês J.V. Snellman sob escrutínio. O artigo também indica a importância da lógica à metafísica hegeliana e a sua concepção de personalidade. (shrink)

Translated into English for the first time in this edition, The Jena System, 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysics is an essential text in the study of the development of Hegel's thought. It is the climax of Hegel's efforts to construct a neutral theory of the categories of finite cognition as the necessary bridge to the theory of infinite, or philosophical, cognition.

On the verge of the 1917 October revolution, Lenin reads and elaborates on the Hegel's Science of Logic, as if he were attempting to outline, from it, specific effects. Theoretical effects, because human activity is never uncoupled from the logic objective, through which the real matter unfolds and to whom each individual indissolubly belongs. Practical effects, because if Hegelian philosophy is good for the Church, for the bourgeoisie, for the capital, by changing the order of some of its factors it (...) may as well turn out good for guiding the practical-cognitive development of an urgent proletarian revolution. (shrink)

Following Freud’s analysis of the fragile line between the uncanny double and its comic redoubling, I identify the doubling of the double found in critical moments of Hegelian dialectic as producing a kind of comic effect. It almost goes without saying that two provides greater pleasure than one, the loneliest number. Many also find two to be preferable to three, the tired trope of dialectic as a teleological waltz. Two seems to offer lightness, relieving one from her loneliness and lacking (...) the complications of a third who comes in between. And yet, we learn through Marx and Freud that the double (even the double of tragedy and farce) borders on something closer to horror than comedy. -/- In the following, I would like to explore why four is funnier than two in my staging of dialectic as the doubling of the double or, to borrow a movie title from Laurel and Hardy, “Twice Two” (Roach et al. 1933a). I will begin by exploring the formulations of the double in the form of a pair of opposites and in the form of a pair of twins. The literary tropes of the double as the odd couple, on one side, and the twins, on the other, appear to serve very different narrative functions, which incite different kinds of affective responses from the audience. However, the form of the opposed double sometimes conceals the realization that the empty or fragmented content of the first is only reduplicated in the second. The “straight man” of the odd couple cannot see himself in his counterpart “the comic.” The redoubling of the double, however, forces not only the audience, but the original double on stage to confront what was already present, but unrealized, from the beginning. To illustrate this redoubling of the double within the opening of Hegel’s Science of Logic, I consider two short films by Laurel and Hardy in which the comic duo redoubles itself. The formula (2 x 2) produces a comic excess through the dialectical redoubling of there uncanny double. (shrink)

At the turn of the century Bertrand Russell advocated an absolutist theory of space and time, and scornfully rejected Leibniz’s relational theory in his Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. But by the time of the second edition, he had proposed highly influential relational theories of space and time that had much in common with Leibniz’s own views. Ironically, he never acknowledges this. In trying to get to the bottom of this enigma, I looked further at contemporary texts by (...) Russell, and also those he might have relied on, especially that of Robert Latta. I found that, like Latta’s, Russell’s interpretation of Leibniz was heavily conditioned by his immersion in neo-Hegelian and neo-Kantian philosophy prior to 1898, and that the doctrine of internal relations he attributes to Leibniz was more nearly the view of Lotze. (shrink)

Hegel frequently claimed that the heart of his entire system was a book widely regarded as among the most difficult in the history of philosophy, The Science of Logic. This is the book that presents his metaphysics, an enterprise that he insists can only be properly understood as a “logic,” or a “science of pure thinking.” Since he also wrote that the proper object of any such logic is pure thinking itself, it has always been unclear in just what sense (...) such a science could be a “metaphysics.” -/- Robert B. Pippin offers here a bold, original interpretation of Hegel’s claim that only now, after Kant’s critical breakthrough in philosophy, can we understand how logic can be a metaphysics. Pippin addresses Hegel’s deep, constant reliance on Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics, the difference between Hegel’s project and modern rationalist metaphysics, and the links between the “logic as metaphysics” claim and modern developments in the philosophy of logic. Pippin goes on to explore many other facets of Hegel’s thought, including the significance for a philosophical logic of the self-conscious character of thought, the dynamism of reason in Kant and Hegel, life as a logical category, and what Hegel might mean by the unity of the idea of the true and the idea of the good in the “Absolute Idea.” The culmination of Pippin’s work on Hegel and German idealism, no Hegel scholar or historian of philosophy will want to miss this book. (shrink)

Logiikan ja reaalifilosofian suhde on keskeisimpiä Hegelin filosofian herättämiä kysymyksiä. Hegelin mukaan hänen systeeminsä ensimmäinen osa eli logiikka ja toisen ja kolmannen osan muodostava reaalifilosofia vastaavat toisiaan. Hegelin tuotannossa on kuitenkin aineksia monenlaisille tulkinnoille tästä vastaavuudesta. -/- Yleensä ajatellaan, ettei Hegel ei tarjonnut tyydyttävää selitystä logiikan ja reaalifilosofian suhteesta. Jos otamme tämän tulkinnan lähtökohdaksi, on kysyttävä, miltä osin Hegelin lupaama vastaavuus ei toteudu. Toiseksi on kysyttävä vastaavuusvaatimuksen merkitystä Hegelin filosofialle ylipäänsä. Johtaako luopuminen logiikan ja reaalifilosofian vastaavuudesta absoluuttisen idealismin hylkäämiseen?

ABSTRACTHegel's Phenomenology of Spirit provides a fascinating picture of individual minds caught up in “recognitive” relations so as to constitute a realm—“spirit”—which, while necessarily embedded in nature, is not reducible to it. In this essay I suggest a contemporary path for developing Hegel's suggestive ideas in a way that broadly conforms to the demands of his own system, such that one moves from logic to a philosophy of mind. Hence I draw on Hegel's “subjective logic”, understood in the light of (...) modern modal logic, in an attempt to model the way minds might be thought as connected by way of shared intentional contents. Here, we should not be surprised at some of the parallels that emerge between the approaches of Hegel and the modal logician Arthur Prior, as Prior had testified to the influence of his teacher, John N. Findlay, who himself had strong Hegelian leanings. In the final section, Robert Stalnaker's version of possible-world semantics is suggested as a framework within which Hegel's recognitive account of the mind might be understood. (shrink)

When it comes to social criticism of the economy, Critical Theory has thus far failed to discover specific immanent norms in that sphere of activity. In response, we propose that what is needed is to double down on the idealism of Critical Theory by taking seriously the sophisticated structure of agency developed in Hegel’s own account of freedom as self-determination. When we do so, we will see that the anti-metaphysical gestures of recent Critical Theory work in opposition to its attempts (...) to develop immanent critique. In this paper we first briefly reconsider Axel Honneth’s project as it concerns economic institutions and then respond by returning to the problem of freedom and articulating a view according to which the problem of individual self-determination and the problem of social production are the same problem seen from different angles. Then we present briefly Hegel’s own social theory from this perspective before moving on to trace the outlines of such a critical theory of contemporary capitalism. (shrink)

This thesis investigates the development of ontology as a philosophical discipline in the German philosophical tradition. It starts from what can be considered the invention of ontology and proceeds to the way it was received in the philosophy of Hegel. It is separated into two parts. The first part argues that what can be called the ‘traditional’ form of ontology is developed by Christian Wolff in his 1730 monograph Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, and it traces both the history of the (...) name ‘ontology’, as well as the history of the conception which led to Wolff’s formulation of it. The history of the name tracks the use of the concept ‘ontology’ from its first occurrence in 1606 up to Wolff. The history of the conception tracks the conceptions of various philosophical disciplines, found in thinkers such as Aristotle, Aquinas, and Spinoza, that ultimately give rise to Wolff’s conception of ontology as a science of an entity qua entity. The second part traces the development of this Wolffian conception through the philosophical systems of Kant and Hegel. The aim of this thesis is to argue that Wolff’s philosophy should be seen as the original formulation of the philosophical discipline of ontology and that the Wolffian conception of ontology is the one shared by subsequent German thinkers up to, and including, Hegel. I refer to this shared understanding of what ontology is as ‘the German ontological tradition’. The title of the thesis, The Possibility of Ontology, refers to the way in which this traditional understanding of what ontology is, is treated throughout the German ontological tradition. Specifically, Kant argues that the traditional conception is effectively impossible, while in Hegel one can find arguments that are intended to show that some aspects of this traditional discipline are in fact possible. Besides focusing on a fairly under-researched topic of the early history of ontology as a philosophical discipline, this thesis attempts to utilise its historical findings in order to provide novel ways in which the systems of the thinkers such as Kant and Hegel can be understood. There is a serious disregard for, or underplaying of, the Wolffian influence on the philosophical thought of Kant and Hegel, and it is my aim to contribute to the rectification of this situation by demonstrating the frequently overlooked dialogue these thinkers had with Wolff’s conception of ontology. (shrink)

In Reason in the World: Hegel’s Metaphysics and its Philosophical Appeal legt Kreines eine Interpretation vor, die Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik als eine systematisch um metaphysischeProbleme herum organisierte Theorie ausweist. Im Ausgang von Kants Nachweis in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, die Metaphysik verstricke sich in unvermeidliche Widersprüche, zeigt Kreines die Gründe auf, die Hegel dazu bewegen, den metaphysischen Fundamentalismus in jedweder Form zurückzuweisen – einschließlich eines oft mit Hegel in Verbindung gebrachten metaphysischen Monismus. Bowman, Pinkard und Tolley diskutieren in (...) diesem Kontext zentrale Argumente, werfen Fragen auf und artikulieren Sorgen u. a. in Bezug auf Themen wie Kants Argumentation in der ersten Kritik, das Wesen von Hegels Dialektik, das Verhältnis von Kant und Hegel im Hinblick auf die Frage der Teleologie sowie Hegels Konzeption der absoluten Idee. Kreines antwortet auf seine Gesprächspartner und verteidigt seine Interpretation. (shrink)

Hegel aims to defend a system of philosophy. So interpreters should consider what is required to interpret this specifically as a system. Once we are clear about this, I argue, we can see what would be involved in reading Hegel’s philosophy as a kind of metatheory. This allows discerning the strongest way of developing a reading of Hegel’s philosophy as a metatheory. But it also brings out reasons to avoid even the strongest version of that approach, or reasons to read (...) Hegel’s philosophy as metaphysics rather than metatheory. (shrink)

In this paper, I study one aspect of the philosophical encounter between Spinoza and Hegel: the question of the reality of time. The precise reconstruction of the debate will require a close examination of Spinoza's concept of tempus (time) and duratio (duration), and Hegel's understanding of these notions. Following a presentation of Hegel's perception of Spinoza as a modern Eleatic, who denies the reality of time, change and plurality, I turn, in the second part, to look closely at Spinoza's text (...) and show that Hegel was wrong in reading Spinoza as denying the reality of duration and change. Ironically, Hegel's misreading of Spinoza as denying the reality of duration and change has been compensated for by a reading of Hegel as denying the reality of time by one of Hegel's most prominent followers, John Ellis McTaggart. I discuss McTaggart's reading of Hegel's Logic in the final part of the paper. (shrink)

Hegel’s “Science of Logic” presents logical form as a self-relating and self-individuating form, thereby rendering superfluous the traditional question concerning a principle of individuation. The magnum opus of the Viennese philosopher Franz Ungler demonstrates this. Furthermore, a close reading of Hegel’s doctrine of the concept (“Begriffslogik”) elucidates the way in which the fundamental achievements of both ontology and transcendental philosophy are logically justified. Thus, Ungler provides an account of Hegel’s thought that is both fascinating and demanding. -/- The Author: Franz (...) Ungler (1945-2003) studied philosophy, pedagogy and ancient history at the University of Vienna. In 1972, he received his doctorate with a dissertation on “Organismus und Selbstbewußtsein. Untersuchungen zur ‘Naturbeobachtenden Vernunft’ bei Hegel” [„Organism and Self-consciousness. Investigations concerning the ‚Observation of Nature by Reason’ in Hegel“]. In 1977, Ungler became assistant to Erich Heintel and in 1983, following his habilitation with the thesis presented here, he became Assistant Professor and finally Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. He enjoyed an excellent reputation for his profound systematical interpretation of the philosophical tradition as a whole, notably as a distinguished Kant and Hegel scholar. (shrink)

This essay discerns in Nishida’s later work lines of thought that could constitute a project of overcoming modernity, and explores its potentials and problems. My guiding thread is a comparison between Nishida’s philosophy and that of Hegel, who, according to Habermas, first developed a clear concept of modernity through his idea of dialectic. Nishida perceived the Hegelian dialectic as conceptually endorsing Western colonialism, one of the ill effects of modernity. I argue Nishida’s philosophy, which puts forward another dialectic based on (...) absolute nothingness, had the potential to undermine the justification of colonialism and propose a worldview in which different peoples could coexist free from subjugation. I also argue that Nishida nevertheless ruined this very potential by essentializing his own nation as the privileged embodiment of absolute nothingness. This essay thus emphasizes the necessity to tackle ethnocentrism that lurks in philosophical thinking and sabotages its creativity. (shrink)

Hegel defines his Logic as the science that thinks about thinking.nbsp; But when we interpret that work as outlining what happens when we reason we are vulnerable to Fregersquo;s charge of psychologism.nbsp; I use Hegelrsquo;s tripartite distinction among understanding, dialectical and speculative reason as operations of pure thought to suggest how thinking can work with objective concepts.nbsp; In the last analysis, however, our ability to move from the subjective contingency of representations and ideas to the pure concepts we think develops (...) from mechanical memory, which separates sign from sense so hat we can focus simply on the latter.nbsp; By becoming aware of the connections that underlie our thinking processes we may be able to both move beyond the abstractions of symbolic logic and clarify what informal logicians call relevance. (shrink)

What I think remains sustainable and valid in Hegel's thought is the attempt to regard the ongoing crisis of reason as itself constitutive of self-consciousness. |s Revue Internationale de Philosophie |d 01/10/1996.

Hegel presents two very different accounts of the initial categorization of essence in his Science of Logic and his later Encyclopedia Logic, thereby raising the question of whether this discrepancy undermines the univocal necessity of systematic logic. A close examination of these arguments reveals that the Science of Logic account captures a necessary ordering that is incompletely presented in the Encyclopedia. The details are provided for comprehending why the logic of essence must begin with a contrast of the essential and (...) the unessential, how this reverts to illusory being, and why identity depends upon the transformation of refl ection from being positing to being external to being determining in character. Significantly, the self-developing nature of these logical developments calls into question the foundationalism entailed by any privileging of the categories of essence. (shrink)