Intuitive-automatic processes are crucial for making judgements and decisions. The fascinating complexity of these processes has attracted many decision researchers, prompting them to start investigating intuition empirically and to develop numerous models. Dual-process models assume a clear distinction between intuitive and deliberate processes but provide no further differentiation within both categories. We go beyond these models and argue that intuition is not a homogeneous concept, but a label used for different cognitive mechanisms. We suggest that these mechanisms have to be (...) distinguished to allow for fruitful investigations of intuition. Specifically, we argue that researchers should concentrate on investigating the processes underlying intuition before making strong claims about its performance. We summarise current models for intuition and propose a categorisation according to the underlying cognitive processes: (a) associative intuition based on simple learning-retrieval processes, (b) matching intuition based on comparisons with prototypes/exemplars, (c) accumulative intuition based on automatic evidence accumulation, and (d) constructive intuition based on construction of mental representations. We discuss how this differentiation might help to clarify the relationship between affect and intuition and we derive a very general hypothesis as to when intuition will lead to good decisions and when it will go astray. (shrink)

Intuitive-automatic processes are crucial for making judgements and decisions. The fascinating complexity of these processes has attracted many decision researchers, prompting them to start investigating intuition empirically and to develop numerous models. Dual-process models assume a clear distinction between intuitive and deliberate processes but provide no further differentiation within both categories. We go beyond these models and argue that intuition is not a homogeneous concept, but a label used for different cognitive mechanisms. We suggest that these mechanisms have to be (...) distinguished to allow for fruitful investigations of intuition. Specifically, we argue that researchers should concentrate on investigating the processes underlying intuition before making strong claims about its performance. We summarise current models for intuition and propose a categorisation according to the underlying cognitive processes: (a) associative intuition based on simple learning-retrieval processes, (b) matching intuition based on comparisons with prototypes/exemplars, (c) accumulative intuition based on automatic evidence accumulation, and (d) constructive intuition based on construction of mental representations. We discuss how this differentiation might help to clarify the relationship between affect and intuition and we derive a very general hypothesis as to when intuition will lead to good decisions and when it will go astray. (shrink)

The Netherlands is currently the only country in the world in which euthanasia is legally permissible. More specifically, Dutch law (briefly explained) allows that a doctor terminates the life of a patient of hers on his voluntary, well‐considered and sustained request, if he is suffering unbearably and hopelessly. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the Dutch debate on the moral permissibility of euthanasia so as to clarify and strengthen the various views that can be advanced in support of (...) euthanasia. On the one view, The Pure Autonomy View (TPAV), the justification of euthanasia rests solely on the principle of respect for autonomy. That is, the reason for performing and permitting euthanasia is the patient’s voluntary, well‐considered and sustained, in one word: autonomous, request for euthanasia. On the alternative view, The Joint View (TJV), the principle of respect for autonomy and the principle of beneficence morally justify euthanasia together. That is, euthanasia is ethical if and partly because, since the patient is suffering unbearably and hopelessly, euthanasia is in his interest. According to this paper, there is no easy argument for one of these views rather than the other. Instead, as yet both TPAV and TJV seem inherently problematic. TPAV is unable to give a doctor a reason for performing euthanasia that appeals to her in her capacity as a doctor, such as relief of suffering. And TJV begs the question – for example, if a state were to legalize euthanasia on grounds of TJV, it would force the view upon its citizens that it may be in a person’s interest to die. (shrink)

The present study investigated whether individual differences between psychologists in thinking styles are associated with accuracy in diagnostic classification. We asked novice and experienced clinicians to classify two clinical cases of clients with two co-occurring psychological disorders. No significant difference in diagnostic accuracy was found between the two groups, but when combining the data from novices and experienced psychologists accuracy was found to be negatively associated with certain decision making strategies and with a higher self-assessed ability and preference for a (...) rational thinking style. Our results underscore the idea that it might be fruitful to look for explanations of differences in the accuracy of diagnostic judgments in individual differences between psychologists (such as in thinking styles or decision making strategies used), rather than in experience level. (shrink)

Within current debates about the future impact of Artificial Intelligence on human society, roughly three different perspectives can be recognised: the technology-centric perspective, claiming that AI will soon outperform humankind in all areas, and that the primary threat for humankind is superintelligence; the human-centric perspective, claiming that humans will always remain superior to AI when it comes to social and societal aspects, and that the main threat of AI is that humankind’s social nature is overlooked in technological designs; and the (...) collective intelligence-centric perspective, claiming that true intelligence lies in the collective of intelligent agents, both human and artificial, and that the main threat for humankind is that technological designs create problems at the collective, systemic level that are hard to oversee and control. The current paper offers the following contributions: a clear description for each of the three perspectives, along with their history and background; an analysis and interpretation of current applications of AI in human society according to each of the three perspectives, thereby disentangling miscommunication in the debate concerning threats of AI; and a new integrated and comprehensive research design framework that addresses all aspects of the above three perspectives, and includes principles that support developers to reflect and anticipate upon potential effects of AI in society. (shrink)

This paper concerns one of the undecided disputes of modern moral philosophy: the possibility of moral dilemmas. Whereas proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas often appeal to moral experience, many opponents refer to ethical theory and deontic logic. My aim in this paper is to clarify some of the tension between moral experience and ethical theory with respect to moral dilemmas. In Part One I try to show that a number of logical arguments against the possibility of moral dilemmas, (...) though apparently very different, turn out to be basically the same, as they are all based on the following concept of ought: if A ought to be done, doing B is impermissible and doing A itself is permissible. In Part Two I present an overview of several definitions of moral dilemmas that have been given by proponents of moral dilemmas: definitions that define moral dilemmas in terms of oughts and definitions that define them in terms of reasons. I conclude that, while reason is to weak, ought is too strong a concept to define moral dilemmas with. In this way, the arguments from Part One create a logical problem for proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas to define moral dilemmas. (shrink)

We investigated the influence of the compatibility between mood and decision strategies on the subjective value of a decision outcome. Several studies have provided evidence for the idea that a sad mood induces people to analyse information carefully, probably fitting well with a deliberative decision strategy. In a happy mood, people tend to act more strongly on their feelings, probably fitting well with an intuitive decision strategy. However, sometimes the situation demands the use of decision strategies that seem incompatible with (...) mood states. We expected that decision makers would value a decision outcome higher in the case of a fit between mood and decision strategy than in the case of a non-fit. After a mood manipulation, participants were instructed to decide either based on their first affective reaction or after deliberation. Results confirmed our expectations: fitting decisions enhanced the subjective value of a decision outcome. (shrink)

This discussion note deals with Jurriaan de Haan's paper The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4(3), 2001, pp. 267–284). In the first, critical part I will point out a confusion in the logical analysis of the paper in question. In the second, constructive part I will indicate how the analysis of moral dilemmas should proceed within the framework of a possible world semantics.