Many biologists still believe in a sort of post-Cartesian foundation of reality wherein objects are independent of subjects which cognize them. Recent research in behaviour, cognition, and psychology, however, provides plenty of evidence to the effect that the perception of an object differs depending on the kind of animal observer, and also its personality, hormonal, and sensorial set-up etc. In the following, I argue that exposed surfaces of organisms interact with other organisms’ perception to form semiautonomous relational entities called semantic (...) organs, which participate in biological reality as discrete heritable evolutionary units. The inner dimensions and potentialities of an organism can enter the senses of another living being when effectively expressed on the outer surfaces of the former and meaningfully perceived by the latter. Semantic organs have three basic sources of variability: intrinsic, i.e., genetic, epigenetic, and developmental processes; extrinsic, meaning the biotic and abiotic environmental conditions which affect the developmental generators of intrinsic variability; and perceptual, stemming from differences in the subject-specific interpretation of a SO’s structural basis. Extrinsic and intrinsic sources of variability are, however, just precursors to semantic organs. SOs are relational entities which always come into existence through an act of perception and their actual form depends both on the physical potentialities of the bearer and the species- or group-specific interpretation of the receiver. (shrink)

In biosemiotics, living beings are not conceived of as the passive result of anonymous selection pressures acted upon through the course of evolution. Rather, organisms are considered active participants that influence, shape and re-shape other organisms, the surrounding environment, and eventually also their own constitutional and functional integrity. The traditional Darwinian division between natural and sexual selection seems insufficient to encompass the richness of these processes, particularly in light of recent knowledge on communicational processes in the realm of life. Here, (...) we introduce the concepts of semiotic selection and semiotic co-option which in part represent a reinterpretation of classical biological terms and, at the same time, keep explanations sensitive to semiosic processes taking place in living nature. We introduce the term ‘semiotic selection’ to emphasize the fact that actions of different semiotic subjects (selectors) will produce qualitatively different selection pressures. Thereafter, ‘semiotic co-option’ explains how semiotic selection may shape appearance in animals through remodelling existing forms and relations. Considering the event of co-option followed by the process of semiotic selection enables us to describe the evolution of semantic organs. (shrink)

Mimicry is often cited as a compelling demonstration of the power of natural selection. By adopting signs of a protected model, mimics usually gain a reproductive advantage by minimising the likelihood of being preyed upon. Yet while natural selection plays a role in the evolution of mimicry, it can be doubted whether it fully explains it. Mimicry is mediated by the emergence of formally analogous patterns between unrelated organisms and by the fact that these patterns are meaningfully perceived as similar. (...) The perception of similarity is always perceiver-dependent. Similarities between for instance colours are psychophysical phenomena, and their existence is conditioned by an intimate interdependence between perceivers and perceptible reality. In this sense, mimicry is by its very nature dualistic. The analogy in form needed to establish a mimicry does not emerge out of the blue. It depends on the ecological context and the morphogenetic potential of a species. In our proposal, we take into account both the developmental generators of formally analogous structures and the perceptual and cognitive processes that lead to the emergence of mimicry. We show that some of the rather controversial and nowadays largely neglected ideas found in non-Anglo-Saxon literature on mimicry deserve closer attention. We suggest that the diversity of mimicry types is due to differences in variational properties of form-generating and perceptual systems among diverse groups of organisms. We also anticipate that processes studied within social psychology and emotion research probably take place, at least in a simplified form, also in non-human animals. Finally, we argue that these meaning-attributive processes underlie the functionality of mimicry. (shrink)

This paper develops the ideas of the Swiss zoologist Adolf Portmann or, more precisely, his concept of organic self-representation, wherein Portmann considered the outer surface of living organisms as a specific organ that serves in a self-representational role. This idea is taken as a starting point from which to elaborate Portman’s ideas, so as to make them compatible with the theoretical framework of biosemiotics. Today, despite the many theories that help us understand aposematism, camouflage, deception and other phenomena related to (...) the category of mimicry, there still is a need for a general theory of self-representation that would re-synthesize evolutionary, morphogenetic and semiotic aspects of the surface of organisms. Here, Adolf Portmann’s concept of self-representation is considered as an important step towards the biosemiotics of animal form. (shrink)

Turtles are among the most intriguing amniotes but their communication and signaling have rarely been studied. Traditionally, they have been seen as basically just silent armored ‘walking stones’ with complex physiology but no altruism, maternal care, or aesthetic perception. Recently, however, we have witnessed a radical change in the perception of turtle behavioral and cognitive skills. In our study, we start by reviewing some recent findings pertaining to various highly developed behavioral and cognitive patterns with special emphasis on turtles. Then (...) we focus on freshwater turtles and use data about their sexual behavior and size sexual dimorphism to test whether conspicuous coloration of the head is in these animals related to sexual processes. We found that absence of aggressive mating behavior is statistically associated with the presence of conspicuous coloration on turtles’ heads. It also seems that while species with female-biased SSD are characterised by conspicuously colored head ornaments, in species with male-biased SSD conspicuous coloration is absent. Unlike large females, males thus seem to be under pressure to develop conspicuous coloration and engage in non-aggressive behavior using signaling to succeed in courtship. And finally, we discuss possible roles of head color patterns in turtle communication during mating. (shrink)

Homology is among the most important comparative concepts in biology. Today, the evolutionary reinterpretation of homology is usually conceived of as the most important event in the development of the concept. This paradigmatic turning point, however important for the historical explanation of life, is not of crucial importance for the development of the concept of homology itself. In the broadest sense, homology can be understood as sameness in reference to the universal guarantor so that in this sense the different concepts (...) of homology show a certain kind of “metahomology”. This holds in the old morphological conception, as well as in the evolutionary usage of homology. Depending on what is (or was) taken as a guarantor, different types of homology may be distinguished (as idealistic, historical, developmental etc.). This study represents a historical overview of the development of the homology concept followed by some clues on how to navigate the pluralistic terminology of modern approaches to homology. (shrink)

The independent emergence of similar features in phylogenetically non-allied groups of organisms has usually been explained as the result of similar selection pressures particular to specific environments. This explanation has been more or less helpful in elucidating convergent resemblances among organisms since the times of Darwin. Nevertheless, intensive research has brought new knowledge on the emergence of structural similarity among organisms, especially during the last two decades. We now have manifold evidence of the phenomena of evolutionary re-entries or re-evolution, which (...) happens when a particular character present in one organic taxon also appears in another taxon which does not share an immediate ancestry. This is not the re-appearance of the same character, but rather of a similar one. Here I propose a model of threefold origin of similar phenotypic features in unrelated organisms stemming from intrinsic, extrinsic and semiosic causation. It is suggested that neither externalist nor internalist explanations per se, nor any combination thereof, are sufficient to cover all the manifold instances of character re-evolution. There is also a special group of resemblances that consists of what is originated, shaped, and retained in evolution due to meaning attributed to them by particular organic subjects. These cases cannot be fully understood without inviting a biosemiotic approach. Integrating Uexkull’s theory of meaning with the recent evolutionary developmental perspective could complete our understanding of phenotypic re-evolution. (shrink)

Modern biology gives many casuistic descriptions of mutual informational interconnections between organisms. Semiotic and hermeneutic processes in biosphere require a set of “sentient” community of players who optimize their living strategies to be able to stay in game. Perceptible surfaces of the animals, semantic organs, represent a special communicative interface that serves as an organ of self-representation of organic inwardness. This means that theinnermost dimensions and potentialities of an organism may enter the senses of other living being when effectively expressed (...) on the outermost surfaces of theformer and meaningfully interpreted by the later. Moreover, semantic organs do not exist as objectively describable entities. They are always born via interpretative act and their actual form depends on both the potentialities of body plan of a bearer and the species-specific interpretation of a receiver. As such the semantic organs represent an important part of biological reality and thus deserve to be contextualized within existing comparative vocabulary. Here we argue that the study of the organic self-representation has a key importance for deeper insight into the evolution of communicative coupling among living beings. (shrink)

Creatures living under the rule of domestication form a communicative union based on shared morphological, behavioural, cognitive, and immunologicalresemblances. Domestic animals live under particular conditions that substantially differ from the original (natural) settings of their wild relatives. Here we focus on the fact that many parallel characters have appeared in various domestic forms that had been selected for different purposes. These characters are often unique for domestic animals and do not exist in wild forms. We argue that parallel similarities appear (...) in different groups in response to their interaction with theumwelt of a particular host. In zoosemiotic sense, the process of domestication represents a kind of interaction in which both sides are affected and eventuallytransformed in such a way that one is more integrated with the other than in the time of initial encounter. (shrink)

The aim of this contribution is to investigate certain selected parts of the extended evolutionary synthesis which all have a common denominator, namely evolution by meaning attribution. We start by arguing that living organisms can manipulate and interpret their genetic script via epigenetic modifications in a semiotic manner, that is, by meaning attribution. Genes do not build living beings to be transmitted to future generations. Genes have been shaped by evolution as a memory medium that is transmitted from one generation (...) to the next, but the actual reading of such scripts is modified by momentary contexts. Secondly, we show that phenotypic evolution variously re-uses already existing homologies which in evolving systems acquire a new meaning. We also suggest that the ways in which organisms perceive their environment and other living beings is an important but still largely neglected evolutionary force. Variations in perception influence the direction and intensity of sexual selection and some behaviourally mediated regimes of natural selection. Thirdly, we point out that especially if we want to study their evolution, living beings should not be considered in isolation but in their mutual coexistence, in their historically established being together. Recent attempts to view living beings as constructors of niches and holobionts seem compatible with the classical Umwelt theory. This approach seems capable of accounting for both competitiveness and cooperation, thus making the overall image of evolution more comprehensive. And finally, we argue that if we want to expand our understanding of biological evolution, in addition to variation, selection, and inheritance we also need to take into account processes which participate in meaning attribution. (shrink)

This study focuses on the origin of life as presented in the thought of Anaximander of Miletus but also points to some parallel motifs found in much later conceptions of both the pre-Darwinian German romantic science and post-Darwinian biology. According to Anaximander, life originated in the moisture associated with earth (mud). This moist environment hosted the first living creatures that later populated the dry land. In these descriptions, one can trace the earliest hints of the notion of environmental adaptation. The (...) origin of humans was seen as connected in some way with fish: ancient humans were supposed to have developed inside fish-like animals. Anaximander took into account changes in the development of living creatures (adaptations) and speculated on the origins of humans. Similar ideas are found also in the writings of much later, eighteenth and nineteenth century authors who were close to the tradition of German romantic science. We do not argue that these later concepts are in any way directly linked with those of the pre-Socratics, but they show surprising parallels in, e.g., the hypothesis that life originated in a moist environment or the supposition that human developed from fish-like ancestors. These transformations are seen as a consequence of timeless logic rather than as evolution in historical terms. Despite the accent on the origin of living things, both Anaximander and the later Naturphilosophen lack in their notions the element most characteristic of Darwin’s thought, that is, the emphasis on historicity and uniqueness of all that comes into being. (shrink)