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Maja Spener [11]Maja H. Spener [1]
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Maja Spener
University of Birmingham
  1. Introspective Humility.Tim Bayne & Maja Spener - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
    Viewed from a certain perspective, nothing can seem more secure than introspection. Consider an ordinary conscious episode—say, your current visual experience of the colour of this page. You can judge, when reflecting on this experience, that you have a visual experience as of something white with black marks before you. Does it seem reasonable to doubt this introspective judgement? Surely not—such doubt would seem utterly fanciful. The trustworthiness of introspection is not only assumed by commonsense, it is also taken for (...)
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  2.  61
    Disagreement About Cognitive Phenomenology.Maja Spener - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 268.
  3.  98
    Calibrating Introspection.Maja Spener - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):300-321.
  4. Introspecting in the 20th Century.Maja Spener - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries. London: Rutledge. pp. 148-174.
  5. Moderate Scepticism About Introspection.Maja Spener - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1187-1194.
  6.  47
    Mind-Independence and Visual Phenomenology.Maja Spener - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 381.
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  7.  18
    Expecting Phenomenology.Maja Spener - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):526-527.
    Block's argument against correlationism depends in part on a view about what subjects in certain experiments can be aware of phenomenally. Block's main source of evidence for this view is introspection. I argue that introspection should not be trusted in this respect. This weakens Block's argument and undermines correlationism at the same time.
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  8.  34
    Using First-Person Data About Consciousness.Maja Spener - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):165-179.
    In Describing Inner Experience, Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel explore the proper limits of scepticism about consciousness and the prospect of a scientific investigation of consciousness. Their debate with each other focuses on the question about whether we can trust people's reports about their inner experiences and on Hurlburt's introspective method, DES. I point out that their discussion leaves unclear the crucial question of the aims and objectives of DES. This makes it difficult genuinely to assess DES's merits and the problems for (...)
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  9. Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures.Maja Spener - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter discusses the main types of so-called ’subjective measures of consciousness’ used in current-day science of consciousness. After explaining the key worry about such measures, namely the problem of an ever-present response bias, I discuss the question of whether subjective measures of consciousness are introspective. I show that there is no clear answer to this question, as proponents of subjective measures do not employ a worked-out notion of subjective access. In turn, this makes the problem of response bias less (...)
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  10.  41
    Experiential Pluralism and Mental Kinds.Maja Spener - forthcoming - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception.
    This paper offers a new argument in favour of experiential pluralism about visual experience – the view that the nature of successful visual experience is different from the nature of unsuccessful visual experience. The argument appeals to the role of experience in explaining possession of ordinary abilities. In addition, the paper makes a methodological point about philosophical debates concerning the nature of perceptual experience: whether a given view about the nature of experience amounts to an interesting and substantive thesis about (...)
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  11. Gilding and Staining the Mind: Introspection and the Metaphysics of Visual Phenomenology.Maja H. Spener - 2003 - Dissertation, King's College, University of London
  12.  26
    Review of William Robinson, Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness[REVIEW]Maja Spener - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (9).
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