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Maja Spener [8]Maja H. Spener [1]
  1. Introspective Humility.Tim Bayne & Maja Spener - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
    Viewed from a certain perspective, nothing can seem more secure than introspection. Consider an ordinary conscious episode—say, your current visual experience of the colour of this page. You can judge, when reflecting on this experience, that you have a visual experience as of something white with black marks before you. Does it seem reasonable to doubt this introspective judgement? Surely not—such doubt would seem utterly fanciful. The trustworthiness of introspection is not only assumed by commonsense, it is also taken for (...)
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  2.  27
    Disagreement About Cognitive Phenomenology.Maja Spener - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 268.
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    Moderate Scepticism About Introspection.Maja Spener - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1187-1194.
  4.  20
    Mind-Independence and Visual Phenomenology.Maja Spener - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 381.
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  5.  36
    Calibrating Introspection.Maja Spener - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):300-321.
  6.  10
    Expecting Phenomenology.Maja Spener - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):526-527.
    Block's argument against correlationism depends in part on a view about what subjects in certain experiments can be aware of phenomenally. Block's main source of evidence for this view is introspection. I argue that introspection should not be trusted in this respect. This weakens Block's argument and undermines correlationism at the same time.
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    Using First-Person Data About Consciousness.Maja Spener - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):165-179.
    In Describing Inner Experience, Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel explore the proper limits of scepticism about consciousness and the prospect of a scientific investigation of consciousness. Their debate with each other focuses on the question about whether we can trust people's reports about their inner experiences and on Hurlburt's introspective method, DES. I point out that their discussion leaves unclear the crucial question of the aims and objectives of DES. This makes it difficult genuinely to assess DES's merits and the problems for (...)
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  8.  17
    Review of William Robinson, Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness[REVIEW]Maja Spener - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (9).
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  9. Gilding and Staining the Mind: Introspection and the Metaphysics of Visual Phenomenology.Maja H. Spener - 2003 - Dissertation, King's College, University of London
     
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