El presente trabajo hace un acercamiento al concepto de praxis en Ignacio Ellacuría, relacionando la praxis con los principales conceptos que Ellacuría presenta en su obra. La praxis, ejercicio fundamental a la hora de abordar el tema de la realidad histórica, objeto último y absoluto de la filosofía, requiere ser sustentada en una serie de elementos que se rescatan en el presente ensayo. Por ello, haremos referencia a algunos componentes propios de la praxis, las condiciones y el lugar para ella.

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family:CalistoMT;} This paper presents two views regarding democracy and its relationship with liberal thought. Specifically it shows the main features of radical democracy and how this one can make a proper contact between individual and social aspects and respects the minimum guarantees that must be given to all individuals (...) in order to carry out its own conception of good. It fosters adequate conditions of participation and control over public affairs. So, the paper shows the visions of Hayek and Nozick confronted to the conception of radical democracy proposed by other authors. (shrink)

Radical Enactivism rejects representationalism but nonetheless allows the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as supervening on brain bound elements. In this paper, I argue that Radical Enactivism should reject the possibility of wholly brain-bound phenomenal experience. I propose a way of individuating perceptual experiences that does not depend on representationalism and raises a problem to the view defended by Hutto and Myin according to which, with respect to phenomenality, it is possible to adopt a view that partly construes experience in (...) terms of engagement with the environment. I argue that Radical Enactivism should change: either deny that the environment plays any role in an account of the phenomenal character or embrace the view that the phenomenal properties of experiences are at least partly constituted by the environment itself. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to discuss Stanley and Williamson’s take on Ryle’s argument against know-how being know-that. For this, I provide an initial consideration of the possibility of isolating Ryle’s argument from his overall philosophical outlook and Stanley and Williamson’s purpose in their discussion of Ryle. I then examine in detail Stanley and Williamson’s reconstruction of Ryle’s argument with the specific aim of showing where they have introduced extraneous elements: I examine what they take to bes additional assumptions (...) needed for the argument to be valid and how they construct the premises in order to attempt to show that Ryle's argument is not sound. I end the paper showing the limits of Stanley and Williamson’s attack, suggesting how the extraneous elements Stanley and Williamson introduce already bias the discussion against Ryle. The main aim is not to defend a form of Ryle’s regress but rather advocate the need for a deeper discussion of Ryle’s views of mind and action when discussing his views on know-how. (shrink)

Resumen: La influencia de Schopenhauer en la filosofía de la ciencia del siglo XX ha sido poco estudiada. En este artículo defiendo que la teoría del conocimiento de Schopenhauer impulsó históricamente la idea de que al menos un objetivo de la investigación científica estriba en la exploración tenaz y creativa del potencial heurístico de un sistema teórico, de una matriz disciplinar o de un programa de investigación científica. Sostengo que en ella también se origina una ambigüedad en el significado de (...) los conceptos de descubrimiento objetivo e innovación epistémica.: Little research has been done on Schopenhauer’s influence on twentieth-century philosophy of science. This article defends the thesis that Schopenhauer’s epistemology historically promoted the idea that at least one of the objectives of epistemic research is the tenacious and creative exploration of heuristic potential of a theoretical system, a disciplinary matrix and a scientific research program. I further state that his theory of science leads to ambiguity about the meaning of concepts such as objective discovery and epistemic innovation. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle claimed that intelligent actions and activities are not merely the external signs of inner mental workings but rather that such actions and activities are the workings of the mind itself. In this thesis I propose an interpretation and defence of sich claim, against a common an, in my view, mistaken way of understanding Ryle's position. In chapter [1]. I introduce the argumentative thread of this thesis and a more detailed overview of the chapters. In chapter [2], I criticise (...) Stanley and Williamson's understanding of Ryle's argument and position. In chapters [3]-[5] I examine Ryle's position and provide a way of understanding his view against what I take his main opponent, INTELLECTUALISM, to be. Chapter [6] offers an argument against INTELLECTUALISM as a way of motivating a Rylean account intelligent actions and activities. I conclude in chapter [7] with a response to purported counter-examples to the view I propose. (shrink)

This paper approaches the concept of “praxis” as stated by Ignacio Ellacuría, examining it in relation with the main concepts that Ellacuría presents in his work. This concept of “Praxis”, fundamental at the moment of approaching the topic of historical reality, last and absolute object of the philosophy, needs to be supported by a series of elements that are rescued in this paper. For doing that we will consider some components of this “praxis”, its conditions and its place.

En la posición de algunos libertarianos, los derechos sociales son inexistentes como "derechos". Quiero ubicar primero los planteamientos principales de algunos libertarianos y posteriormente mostrar las posiciones de Locke. Esto nos permitiría rastrear las condiciones de posibilidad de fundamentación de los derechos económicos y sociales desde los orígenes del pensamiento liberal. Sostengo que existe una contradicción entre los principios teóricos planteados por Locke y las propuestas radicales de los libertarianos y muestro el modo como desde Locke se sustenta la necesidad (...) de la redistribución económica en aras de una mayor igualdad política. In some libertarian's opinion, social rights are inexistent as 'rights'. In this paper, I will first identify some of the main libertarian's approaches to then show Locke's positions. This will allow tracing the conditions for the potential foundations of the economic and social rights back to the beginnings of the liberal thought. I argue that there is a contradiction between Locke's theoretical principles and the libertarian's radical approaches. Finally, I show how the need for an economic redistribution looking toward a greater political equality can be supported based on Locke. (shrink)

The article suggests an ethical-anthropological reading of Thoughts, magna opera of the French mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal, which was published after his death by his relatives and friends. Such a reading is presented in three moments: Firstly, an anthropological description aimed at answering the question ‘who is man?’; secondly, an analysis of Pascal’s erotic condition; and, finally, an ethical proposal as cura amoris. The main argument of the article is that every human being has a motivation in acting, that (...) of love and being loved. Thus, having a happy or unhappy life depends on the care for this erotic condition, and the latter is achieved through thought. (shrink)

Considerando la definición viquiana de "ingenio", se analizan las relaciones entre necesidad, ingenio, lenguaje metafórico y poesía religiosa en la retórica ingeniosa española antes de Vico. Se replantea con ello la capacidad primordial del lenguaje metafórico y el valor propio del filosofar ingenioso frente al saber racional y deductivo, interpretando el ingenio en su justa apreciación humanista de función originaria en la constitución del mundo humano y la historia, del lenguaje y el saber retórico-filosófico.Considering Vico's definition of ingenium, the relationship (...) between necessity, ingenium, metaphor, and religious poetry is analyzed in the ingenious Spanish rhetoric of before Vico. The primordial capacity of metaphor is raised again, along with the real value of the ingenious philosophizing in the face of rational and deductive knowledge, interpreting ingenium through the humanist appreciation of original function in the make-up of the human world and history, of language and rhetorical-philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

¿Qué es un proyecto? - Tipos y modalidades de proyectos - Guía para la presentación y elaboración de proyectos - Esquema para la elaboración de un proyecto - Etapas anteriores a la elaboración del proyecto - Evaluación del proyecto - Actividades, proyectos, programas y planes - Proyectos comunitarios - El método de proyectos en la educación - Proyecto para crear una biblioteca infantil comunitaria y un centro cultural para un barrio de la ciudad de Bogotá.

La tesis principal que aquí se defiende es que, para Popper, la validez del conocimiento estuvo vinculada siempre a la dimensión pragmática del contexto de descubrimiento (e incluso dependía de ella). Constituye, pues, un error afirmar que, para él, 1) dicha validez estaba ligada a un "empirismo encubierto" (opuesto a la tesis sobre la carga teórica de toda observación), según lo ha planteado Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz, y que 2) en sus ideas, los factores pragmáticos carecían de importancia epistemológica, como (...) lo ha afirmado Ambrosio Velasco. Para justificar esta tesis, se examinan tres argumentos expuestos en The Logic of Scientific Discovery, enfatizando el que se refiere al carácter disposicional de los términos con los que, para Popper, se formulan los enunciados descriptivos. The main thesis I assert here is that for Popper validity of knowledge was always linked to (and even supported by) the pragmatic dimension of the context of discovery. I hold it's wrong to claim that for this author 1) validity of knowledge was linked to a "hidden empiricism" (opposed to the theory-laden character of observation), such as Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz had propounded, and 2) pragmatic issues were epistemologically irrelevant in his philosophy, such as Ambrosio Velasco has argued. To justify my thesis I examine three arguments exposed in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, emphasizing especially Popper's argument about the dispositional character of the concepts in which descriptive statements are formulated. (shrink)

Reivindicada la literatura como la más idónea de las vías para registrar las diferencias, para sensibilizarnos hacia el otro, se reconoce su valor filosófico, en particular desde el punto de vista del pluralismo, al tiempo que se toma distancia de algunas teorías rivales: la de Habermas, comprometida con la escisión filosofía-literatura; la de Derrida porque asimila la filosofía a la literatura.---Reinstated literature as the most appropriate way to register differences in order to sympathize with the Other, the A. acknowledges its (...) philosophical value specially from the viewpoint of pluralism. At the same time, he drifts away from some rival theories, such as Habermas’ conception engaged with the gap between philosophy and literature, and Derrida’s, whereby philosophy is assimilated to literature. (shrink)

¿Qué es y cómo podemos explicar la culpa que sienten las personas por el hecho de haber sobrevivido a una situación mientras que otros no lo hicieron? ¿Cuáles son las razones y los mecanismos psicológicos que llevan a un individuo a culparse por un hecho en el que, lejos de poder ser considerado victimario, ha sido una víctima? En suma ¿Cómo podemos entender un fenómeno como el de la culpa del sobreviviente? En este libro, los autores Carlos Munoz-Serna y (...) Carlos G. Patarroyo intentan responder estas preguntas. En la primera parte del libro, a partir del análisis de cuatro casos reales, los autores muestran las razones por las cuales la culpa del sobreviviente no encaja con nuestras nociones tradicionales de responsabilidad, ni con la manera como entendemos una emoción como la culpa. En la segunda parte, los autores desarrollan un modelo explicativo que muestra cómo estados psicológicos subyacentes, como la creencia en el mundo justo, el deseo de mantener control sobre nuestra realidad y los vínculos afectivos, pueden llevar a los sobrevivientes a responsabilizarse por un daño que no cometieron y, por ende, sentirse culpables. -/- . (shrink)

Williamson claims that we are cognitive homeless, and for most aspects of our cognitive life it is not the case that if we are in the mental state S we know or are in a position to know that we are in said mental state. In this paper, I critically examine Williamson’s argument, some common misconceptions, and provide a different understanding of the way we relate to our own mental states that shows how we are not always in a condition (...) of cognitive homelessness. (shrink)

Duhem-Quine’s thesis provides plausibility for Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism by showing that the empirical refutation of a theoretical system is as chimerical as its verification. Grünbaum argues against this that such a thesis is untenable. They both agree in the formulation of Duhem’s argument as it was exposed by Quine. However, the exegesis carried out by Quinn, Laudan and Ariew makes it clear that it is a mistake to identify the Duhem-Quine thesis with the Duhem thesis. I argue that, if this (...) is so, then a refutation that can be accepted as such only in retrospect is logically possible. (shrink)

L’article fournit un exemple concret des possibilités qu’ouvre l’exploration des données numérisées, et notamment de la Toile, en matière de morphologie dérivationnelle. Il y a une soixantaine d’années, en se fondant sur un exemple unique (silvio-pelliqueste), Edouard Pichon avançait l’hypothèse qu’en contexte vélaire, le suffixe –esque pouvait, par un phénomène de dissimilation préventive, se voir remplacé par la finale –este. Depuis, aucun argument n’était venu étayer cette hypothèse, sinon peut-être des remarques hésitantes de Zwanenburg (1975) et de Björkman (1984) sur (...) la difficulté de trouver des dérivés en –esque après vélaire. Les données réunies confirment que l’adjonction de –esque à une base dont la dernière syllabe comporte une vélaire engendre des tensions dissimi-latives. Lorsque le contexte s’y prête, ces tensions se manifestent tantôt par l’effacement de certaines vélaires finales, tantôt par le maintien inattendu d’une voyelle finale précédée d’une vélaire. Elles se manifestent aussi, comme l’avaient entrevu nos prédécesseurs, par une moindre productivité de cette suffixation après les radicaux en vélaire. Dans l’établissement de ces résultats, l’utilisation d’un outil permettant de récupérer automatiquement sur la Toile des néologismes en fonction de leur terminaison, s’est révélée déterminante. Les recherches automatisées ont joué aussi un rôle capital quand il s’est agi de trouver des dérivés en ‑este et de montrer que ce suffixe n’était utilisé productivement qu’après vélaire, conformément à la conjecture de Pichon. (shrink)

Con ocasión del centenario del nacimiento de Ernesto Grassi, nacido en Milán el 2 de mayo de 1902, Cuadernos sobre Vico publica a continuación el primer texto donde Grassi interpreta en 1940 el De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, ya dentro de la línea de la tradición del humanismo retórico, a cuyo rescate y estudio dedicaría el autor italo-germano buena parte de su vida. En la reveladora claridad de las páginas de Ernesto Grassi en torno a La crítica de Vico a (...) la supremacía del saber - para nosotros la parte más importante de este amplio trabajo sobre El comienzo del pensamiento moderno. De la pasión y la experiencia de lo originario, publicado en la capital alemana por el editor Helmut Küpper en el año 1940-, el lector de Cuadernos sobre Vico podrá descubrir inmediatamente ese singular humus viquiano que durante más de medio siglo propició la radical circunstancia especulativa y el pensamiento del autor de Vico y el humanismo. Ensayos sobre Vico, Heidegger y la retórica .La dirección de Cuadernos sobre Vico agradece al prof. Emilio Hidalgo-Serna la autorización para publicar la traducción de este importante ensayo de Grassi, inédito hasta ahora en español.On the centenary of Ernesto Grassi's birth, born in Milan on May 2 1902, Cuadernos sobre Vico publishes in Spanish the first text where Grassi interprets De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, already inside the line of the tradition of the rhetorical humanism, that he rescue and study. In the rewatching clarity of Ernesto Grassi's pages concerning Vico's critique to the supremacy of to knowledge -for us the most important part of this wide work The beginning of the modern thought, published in Germany for the editor Helmut Küpper in the year 1940-, the reader of Cuadernos sobre Vico will be able to discover immediately this singular humus vichian that during more than half a century caused the radical speculative circumstance and the thought of the author of Vico and the Humanism. Essays on Vico, Heidegger and the Rhetoric.The Editors of Cuadernos sobre Vico are grateful to prof. Emilio Hidalgo-Serna by the authorization to publish the translation in Spanish of Grassi's essay. (shrink)

The concept of vital force – the immanent energy that promotes the processes of life in the body and in nature – has proved a source of endless fascination and controversy. Indeed, the question of what vitalizes the body has haunted humanity since antiquity, and became even more pressing during the Scientific Revolution and beyond. Examining the complexities and theories about vital force in Spanish modernity, Nicolás Fernández-Medina's Life Embodied offers a novel and provocative assessment of the question of bodily (...) life in Spain. Starting with Juan de Cabriada's landmark Carta filosófica, médico-chymica of 1687 and ending with Ramón Gómez de la Serna's avant-gardism of the 1910s, Fernández-Medina incorporates discussions of anatomy, philosophy, science, critical theory, history of medicine, and literary studies to argue that concepts of vital force served as powerful vehicles to interrogate the possibilities and limits of corporeality. Paying close attention to how the body's capabilities were conceived and strategically woven into critiques of modernity, Fernández-Medina engages the work of Miguel Boix y Moliner, Martín Martínez, Diego de Torres Villarroel, Sebastián Guerrero Herreros, Ignacio María Ruiz de Luzuriaga, Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, Pedro Mata y Fontanet, Ángela Grassi, Julián Sanz del Río, Miguel de Unamuno, and Pío Baroja, among others. Drawing on extensive research and analysis, Life Embodied breaks new ground as the first book to address the question of vital force in Spanish modernity. (shrink)

The outline of modern macroeconomics took shape in Britain in the early nineteenth century thanks, in part, to David Ricardo, one of the most influential economists of the time. Britain was challenged by monetary inflation, industrial unemployment and the loss of jobs abroad. Ricardo pointed the way forward. As a financier and Member of Parliament, he was well versed in politics and commercial affairs. His expertise is shown by the practicality of his proposals, including the resumption of the gold standard, (...) which was essential given the destabilizing policy of the Bank of England. Ricardo's expertise appears also in his debate with T. R. Malthus about whether an industrial economy can suffer a prolonged depression. Say's Law of Markets and the Quantity Theory of Money figure prominently in his works, but not in an extreme form. He was instead a subtle theorist, recognizing the non-neutrality of money, trade depressions and unemployment. (shrink)

This essay argues that Hume's political and historical thought is well read as skeptical and skeptical in a way that roots it deeply in the Hellenistic traditions of both Pyrrhonian and Academical thought. It deploys skeptical instruments to undermine political rationalism as well as theologically and metaphysically political ideologies. Hume's is politics of opinion and appearance. It labors to oppose faction and enthusiasm and generate suspension, balance, tranquility, and moderation. Because Hume advocate the use of reflectively generated but epistemically and (...) metaphysically suspensive general rules, his political thought is not intrinsically conservative. While it valorizes stability and peace, Humean politics accepts a contested and open-ended political order, one that requires continuous maintenance and revision but does not pretend to any ultimate or final progress or end. (shrink)

Bradley and Whitehead certainly deserve a book-length comparison on such topics as experience, internal and external relations, particularly whole-part relations, time, and God. Leemon McHenry has explored these issues soberly and responsibly, and his conclusions are most informative. Yet I sometimes wonder whether the connection would be as firmly made had there not been one remark about Bradley in the preface to Process and Reality.