Practical wisdom is a necessary virtue for social workers. We explore the nature of this virtue and one possible element of facilitating its development in social work students who are seen as beginning learners of virtue. The pertinent ethical reflections can be stimulated by employing practically feasible guidelines which are Aristotelian in structure and which are not predominantly outcome oriented. We emphasize the need for slowing down the decision-making process. Creating ‘meticulous thoughtfulness’ is the first step on the path of (...) facilitating the cultivation of practical wisdom. The beginning learner of virtue struggles to figure out the core aspects of a situation and good judgements seem rather fragile. Developing practical wisdom entails that one understands increasingly the gravity of social work situations and the role that ethics plays in them. Therefore, we emphasize the need to deliberate a case thoroughly. Failing to do so could imply damages to clients and to social workers. We will consider the contents and systematic order of the guidelines with which a deep reflection process could be initiated, one which through repeated use can result in practical wisdom. The main focus is on the process of reflection not on the outcome. (shrink)

Political theorist Jeremy Waldron makes a bracing case against identifying rule of law with predictability. Seeing the rule of law as just one value to which democracies aspire, he embraces thoughtfulness rather than rote rule-following, flexibility even at the cost of vagueness, and emphasizing procedure and argument over predictable outcomes.

This paper argues that we ought to conceive of normativity as a matter of the exercise of fallible abilities that make a fragile pact with the future. To conceive normativity in this fashion we also need to change our image and practice of thinking, i.e., we need to endorse thoughtfulness, which consists in the ability and willingness to widen the scope (or, sometimes, change) that which we find insightful. This approach to normativity, and this image and practice of thinking, is (...) at odds with the dominant contemporary approach to normativity, which, it is argued here, is characterised by an attempt to play god, i.e., to create and play in artificial, fantasy worlds where we can know and master all there is to know, such that we can read off, or determine in advance, the appropriateness or correctness of future actions (or events, beliefs, etc). As long as we continue to play gods in our approach to normativity, we will continue to hide away from our limitations, including, most importantly, our fallibility, animality and mortality. When we hide away from our limitations in this way we radically underestimate the demands of moral and political life. (shrink)