The old ritual word macte was only vaguely understood even in Republican times. As is well known, the ancient critics connected the word with magis, magnus, and explained it as magis auctus. A glance at Walde's Wörterbuch reveals that many attempts have been made in modern times to solve the mystery; but the formidable equipment of the modern philologist has yielded little better results than the popular etymology of the ancients, the most favoured view to-day seeing in mactus the PPP (...) of a verb mago with macto as the frequentative which replaces it. The supposed semantic development of this verb, originally meaning ‘to increase’, has been set forth by Warde Fowler in a well-known passage, to which recent authorities have accorded their assent and praise: ‘the vitality of the deity … was really increased by placing on the altar the organs of life of the victim’. But this is a solution which ignores half the problem: macte and mactare are used not only of the deities but also of the victim. One can perhaps understand lovem mactare as ‘to magnify J.’, but not even by the most superficial analogy can we find a transition from here to the meaning typified in mactare vinum. Yet this is one of the most frequent usages of the word. So deep a gulf lies between the two semantic spheres of the verb that some scholars have sought to find in it two different verbs. But this is a counsel of despair which the editor of the Thesaurus dismisses with a non recte. We must agree, then, with Hey that the modern explanation is ‘sicher eine unrichtige’ and with Meillet-Ernout that there exists ‘aucune étymologie claire’. It is, therefore, surprising that so ill-founded a preconception should lead investigators to ignore or even dismiss important evidence which the ancient authorities offer for the solution of this problem. (shrink)

Whether any apology is possible for the form of this paper is doubtful; but perhaps a few words are allowable. The miscellaneous notes, of which it consists, are fairly well described by the title: at all events, the proposals contained in them—with, I fear, many others—have been pencilled at one time or another in one margin or another. Their age varies widely: two or three must go back to days when my only complete Euripides was Kirchhoff's editio minor and my (...) only Sophocles a copy of Tournier; the most date from middle age or ‘quidquid est illud inter iuvenem et senem medium in utriusque confinio positum’; but, whenever they were made, they were not made by a student of the Greek dramatists commanding the equipment that such a student ought to have. The equipment, in any case, was out of my reach; but, though I have read the plays often, I have read them only because the ancients have a way of enabling one to forget the moderns—as I was informed in my youth by an excellent scholar who has now forgotten both. I hope, therefore, that anyone who may happen to read the paper will overlook some errors and ignorances of the amateur; and, above all, if I may borrow a sentence from Markland's preface to his emendations on Lysias, ‘si quando dictatoria ista, Lege, vel Scribe, occurrent, scito me nihil aliud velle quam Forte legendum vel scribendum’. (shrink)

In a recent note Mr. T. B. Allen had corrected a reading of J. B. Cramer βρβειος ορ to προβτειος., but in a footnote he adds ‘When I made this correction I was not aware of the word πρβειος. Liddell and Scott and Sophocles share my ignorance. I found it in the Anecdota of Boissonade III 408: κ δ τν κρεν ρνιθας σθειν κα πρβεια κα περιστερς sim. 410, 412, 419. Boissonade quotes the word from a similar treatise by Hierophilus, (...) and the 1851 edition of Stephanus reproduces his note.’ This trisyllabic word πρβειος is obviously a ‘Reimbildung’ to ρνειος, μσχειος, ταρειος etc., and its occurrence clears up a papyrus reading which has long puzzled me. In P. Lond. 113, 10, 13 [VII] we read πρωβαων δερμτων, which Preisigke lists as ‘πρβαιος=προβτειος’ Until reading Allen's note I had supposed that the loss of the syllable -ατ- in προβτ-ειος, was a haplography induced by the following δερμ-τ-ων but there are now grounds for regarding the formation as genuine. Only the variation of the adjectival suffix -ειος × -αιος presents a difficulty. In clearing this up we shall be able to lay a number of ghost-words which have spooked in the second edition of Mayser's Grammatik der ptolemäischen Papyri. (shrink)

With the exception of Anthony Manser’s recent treatise on Bradley’s logic, nothing noteworthy has been written on the British idealist since the studies of Wollheim and Vander Veer. This dearth of scholarship on one of the most powerful critics of empiricism and naturalism is surprising especially today when we witness a strong revival of interest in metaphysics and phenomenology. Hence Dario Sacchi’s monograph on Bradley’s Unity and Relation is particularly welcome. In addition, this study promises some interesting insights into how (...) an Italian scholar presumably familiar with various forms of continental idealism treats the British metaphysician. Unfortunately, students of Bradley’s thought will be disappointed. (shrink)

With the exception of Anthony Manser’s recent treatise on Bradley’s logic, nothing noteworthy has been written on the British idealist since the studies of Wollheim and Vander Veer. This dearth of scholarship on one of the most powerful critics of empiricism and naturalism is surprising especially today when we witness a strong revival of interest in metaphysics and phenomenology. Hence Dario Sacchi’s monograph on Bradley’s Unity and Relation is particularly welcome. In addition, this study promises some interesting insights into how (...) an Italian scholar presumably familiar with various forms of continental idealism treats the British metaphysician. Unfortunately, students of Bradley’s thought will be disappointed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 133 of its time and nothing beyond that, while in classical historicism every philosophy was a step in the progressive manifestation of truth not only a historical phenomenon. As a result it iustified not only a historicist treatment but also a speculative discussion of its truth-content. These genuine philosophies may be nonetheless rooted in their own time as we all are, but in philosophy as in life (...) everybody is confronted with a decision whether he wants to be merely a part of history or whether he wants to have history, i.e. also to have the link with true being. Pareyson's theory of interpretation is specially tailored to the reconciliation of the multiplicity of philosophies and of the unity of philosophical thought, aiming at ontological truth. All philosophies are personal interpretations of the world, yet they have an indestructible content of ontological truth that surpasses their own time. We shall not err if we compare Pareyson's interpretation with what Joseph Scbelling called "intelektuelle Anschauung," i.e. the intuitive penetration of what he called the Absolute. Pareyson protests also against the claims of the humanistic sciences, such as sociology, anthropology and cultural history, to replace philosophy. All these sciences canhot replace the function of philosophy as described above. Pareyson uses a very illuminating metaphor: interpreting truth is like interpreting a musical score. While any such interpretation may be legitimate, all may be different and all are personal. But the musical score is always the same. The musical score is compared here with the ontological truth of philosophical thought, while the various readings of the score are the various historical philosophies. By so doing Pareyson avoids the error of Heidegger who rejected all historical philosophies from Parmenides to Nietzsche. MAx RINSER New York Ctty Moser, Shia. Absolutism and Relativism in Ethics. (Springfield, Ill., Thomas, 1968) In the last twenty years our ethics textbooks have been modeled upon the topics of normative and critical ethics. Eventually one finds appended to these main subjects discussions on moral determinism and relativism. While the former problem continues to foster much rigorous scholarship, both substantive and analytic, the germane issue of relativism has been seldom set forth today in a clear and convincing fashion. The fleeting recognition the problem receives in our textbooks renders homage to the curiosity of the student rather than encourages research in the origin, variability and validity of moral ideas,x The several articles 2 of any philosophical impact written after A. Edel essayed refutation of Westermarck's relativity thesis by appealing to invariant factors in the social sciences, fare no better. Although it is true that this recent literature has opened An exception is Maria Ossowska's, Social Determinants of Moral Ideas (Philadelphia, 1970); this book belongs to the tradition of A. Edel and is an excellent example of fruitful research in the sociology of morals. 2 C. Wellman, "The Ethical Implications of Cultural Relativity," Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963): 169-184; J. Ladd, "The Issue of Relativism," The Monist 47 (1963): 585-609; T. L. McClintoek, "The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals," The Monist 47 (1963): 528-544; G. B. Wall, "Primitive Cultures and Ethical Universals," International Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1967): 471-482; V. A. Howard, "Do Anthropologists Become Moral Relativists by Mistake?" Inquiry 11 (1968): 175-189. 134 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY new avenues of conceptual investigation, the diversity of definitions offered and propounded theses make it difficult to ascertain precisely where these new avenues are planned to lead. It seems to me that if one construes relativism in terms of one component of J. Ladd's thesis,3 i.e., moral ideas are causally dependent on socio-cultural determinants of some kind, there is substantially no difference between the alleged moral implications of relativism and those of determinism. Indeed relativism so interpreted becomes entangled in one of the problems peculiar to determinism, which is the difficulty of ascribing responsibility to societies and individuals. Thus the determinist's avowed impotence to blame and praise coincides with the relafivist's virtue of tolerance.4 By the same token one could exploit the determinist's model and speak of hard relativism, soft relativism and... (shrink)