Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?

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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00432.x
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Jennifer Lackey (2010). Acting on Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):361-382.

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Valerie Tiberius (2002). Practical Reason and the Stability Standard. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):339-354.
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Bart Streumer (2010). Practical Reasoning. In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell
R. Jay Wallace, Practical Reason. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Neil Levy (2004). Epistemic Akrasia and the Subsumption of Evidence. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):149-156.

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