Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157 (2011)
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2012

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00318205

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10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00432.x

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Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.
Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists.Michael Hannon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):689-704.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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