Against libertarianism

Philosophical Studies 166 (3):475-493 (2013)
Abstract
The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is true. The soundness of this argument entails the falsity of libertarianism, the two-part thesis that agents act freely, and free action and determinism are incompatible. In this paper, I offer a new formulation of the Mind argument. I argue that it is true by definition that if an agent acts freely, either (i) nothing nomologically grounds an agent’s acting freely, or (ii) the consequence argument for incompatibilism is unsound. I define the notion of nomological grounding, and argue that unless an agent’s acting freely is nomologically grounded, unacceptable consequences follow. I then argue that if agents act freely and the consequence argument is sound, a vicious regress ensues. I conclude by considering the libertarian’s dialectical options
Keywords Free will  Libertarianism  Incompatibilism   Mind argument  Consequence argument  Grounding
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,561
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Paul Audi (2012). A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding (Preprint). In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Grounding and Explanation. Cambridge University Press. 101.
Alicia Finch & Michael Rea (2008). Presentism and Ockham's Way Out. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 1:1-17.

View all 18 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Jason Turner (2009). The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.
Michael J. Murray (2005). Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz. In Donald Rutherford & J. A. Cover (eds.), Leibniz: Nature and Freedom. Oxford University Press. 194--216.
John Perry (2004). Compatibilist Options. In David Shier, Michael O'Rourke & Joseph Keim Campbell (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press/Bradford Book. 231.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). The Problem of Enhanced Control. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-11-17

Total downloads

28 ( #60,607 of 1,098,129 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #42,748 of 1,098,129 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.