Stoic disagreement and belief retention

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):243-262 (2011)
Abstract
Propositions are generally thought to have a truth-value only relative to some parameter or sequence of parameters. Many apparently straightforward notions, like what it is to disagree or retain a belief, become harder to explain once propositional truth is thus relativized. An account of disagreement within a framework involving such ‘stoic’ propositions is here presented. Some resources developed in that account are then used to respond to the eternalist charge that temporalist propositions can't function as belief contents because they don't allow us to make adequate sense of what belief retention amounts to
Keywords philpapers: relativism about truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,999
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Mark Aronszajn (1996). A Defense of Temporalism. Philosophical Studies 81 (1):71 - 95.
David Lewis (1980). Index, Context, and Content. In Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel. 79-100.

View all 9 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Franz Huber (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Sebastiano Moruzzi (2008). Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth-Relativism. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 207.
Daniel Whiting (2012). Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Alasdair MacIntyre (1999). Moral Pluralism Without Moral Relativism. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:1-8.
Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2007). Against Relativism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):313-348.
Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
John MacFarlane (2008). Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths. In Max K”Obel & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 81--102.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-05-12

Total downloads

32 ( #54,003 of 1,101,076 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #290,337 of 1,101,076 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.