David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40 (2011)
I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain empty. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend an ontologically minimalist view of the phenomenology of experience that (1) vindicates Aristotelianism about types and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience
|Keywords||Phenomenology Capacities Properties Concepts Sense-Data|
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Gilbert Ryle (1949/2002). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Schellenberg (forthcoming). Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
Susanna Schellenberg (2014). The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Awareness of Abstract Objects. Noûs 47 (4):706-726.
Boyd Millar (2014). The Phenomenological Problem of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
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