David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40 (2011)
I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain empty. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend an ontologically minimalist view of the phenomenology of experience that (1) vindicates Aristotelianism about types and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience.
|Keywords||Phenomenology Capacities Properties Concepts Sense-Data|
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References found in this work BETA
J. Campbell (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Schellenberg (2016). Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
Indrek Reiland (2015). Experience, Seemings, and Evidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.
Susanna Schellenberg (2014). The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Awareness of Abstract Objects. Noûs 47 (4):706-726.
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