The subjective view of experience and its objective commitments

In the first part of the paper I try to explain why the disjunctive theory of perception can seem so counterintuitive by focusing on two of the standard arguments against the view-the argument from subjective indiscriminability and the causal argument. I suggest that by focusing on these arguments, and in particular the intuitions that lie behind them, we gain a clearer view of what the disjunctive theory is committed to and why. In light of this understanding, I then present an argument for the disjunctive theory based on the claim that the content of experience is particular and not general
Keywords Disjunction  Epistemology  Experience  Objective  Perception  Subjective
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DOI 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00110.x
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Mark Eli Kalderon (2011). Before the Law. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):219-244.
Gordon Knight (2013). Disjunctivism Unmotivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2):1-18.

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