David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):177-190 (2005)
In the first part of the paper I try to explain why the disjunctive theory of perception can seem so counterintuitive by focusing on two of the standard arguments against the view-the argument from subjective indiscriminability and the causal argument. I suggest that by focusing on these arguments, and in particular the intuitions that lie behind them, we gain a clearer view of what the disjunctive theory is committed to and why. In light of this understanding, I then present an argument for the disjunctive theory based on the claim that the content of experience is particular and not general
|Keywords||Disjunction Epistemology Experience Objective Perception Subjective|
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Citations of this work BETA
Mark Eli Kalderon (2011). Before the Law. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):219-244.
Gordon Knight (2013). Disjunctivism Unmotivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2):1-18.
Charlie Pelling (2011). Characterizing Hallucination Epistemically. Synthese 178 (3):437 - 459.
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