David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235 (2005)
§I schematises the evidence for an understanding of ‘know’ and other terms of epistemic appraisal that embodies contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, and distinguishes between those two approaches. §II argues that although the cases for contextualism and sensitive invariantism rely on a principle of charity in the interpretation of epistemic claims, neither approach satisfies charity fully, since both attribute metalinguistic errors to speakers. §III provides an equally charitable anti-sceptical insensitive invariantist explanation of much of the same evidence as the result of psychological bias caused by salience effects. §IV suggests that the explanation appears to have implausible consequences about practical reasoning, but also that applications of contextualism or sensitive invariantism to the problem of scepticism have such consequences. §V argues that the inevitable difference between appropriateness and knowledge of appropriateness in practical reasoning, closely related to the difference between knowledge and knowledge of knowledge, explains the apparent implausibility.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Nagel (2012). Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
Timothy Williamson (2011). Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):215-229.
Declan Smithies (2012). The Normative Role of Knowledge. Noûs 46 (2):265-288.
Michael Hannon (2015). Stabilizing Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):116-139.
Timothy Williamson (2014). Very Improbable Knowing. Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.
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