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John F. Fox [9]John Fox [7]John Francis Fox [2]
  1. John Fox (2011). Arguing About the Evidence : A Logical Approach. In Philip Dawid, William Twining & Mimi Vasilaki (eds.), Evidence, Inference and Enquiry. Oup/British Academy.
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  2. John Fox (2011). Artificial Cognitive Systems: Where Does Argumentation Fit In? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):78-79.
    Mercier and Sperber (M&S) suggest that human reasoning is reflective and has evolved to support social interaction. Cognitive agents benefit from being able to reflect on their beliefs whether they are acting alone or socially. A formal framework for argumentation that has emerged from research on artificial cognitive systems that parallels M&S's proposals may shed light on mental processes that underpin social interactions.
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  3. John F. Fox (2010). Quine's Master Argument. Logique Et Analyse 212:429-447.
     
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  4. John Fox (2008). What is at Issue Between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):407 – 420.
    I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism. (...)
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  5. John Fox (2007). Why We Shouldn't Give Ellis a Dinch. Analysis 67 (296):301–303.
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  6. John Fox (1999). Deductivism Surpassed. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):447 – 464.
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  7. John F. Fox (1996). Towards Metamethodology: For the History and Philosophy of Science. In P. Riggs (ed.), Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 103--121.
    Much philosophy of science is methodology of science. How should one go about doing and evaluating it? The question is one of the methodology of methodology, i.e. of metamethodology. There is a vague thesis common to Descartes and more recent philosophers such as Quine and Lakatos: that what is good methodology, good evidence, good reason for accepting, rejecting or revising beliefs in mathematics and in the sciences properly so called, does not differ in significant kind from what is good methodology, (...)
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  8. John F. Fox (1994). How Must Relativism Be Construed to Be Coherent? Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (1):55-75.
    This essay attempts to clarify certain notions that the author finds useful for the discussion of relativism and then to show what kinds of relativism about values, rationality, and truth are and are not coherent.
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  9. John F. Fox (1990). The Minimal and Semiminimal Motions of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):157 – 167.
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  10. John Fox (1989). Motivation and Demotivation of a Four-Valued Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 31 (1):76-80.
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  11. John F. Fox (1989). What Were Tarski's Truth-Definitions For? History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (2):165-179.
    Tarski's manner of defining truth is generally considered highly significant. About why, there is less consensus. I argue first, that in his truth-definitions Tarski was trying to solve a set of philosophical problems; second, that he solved them successfully; third, that all of these that are simply problems about defining truth are as well or better solved by a simpler account of truth. But one of his crucial problems remains: to give an account of validity, one requires an account not (...)
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  12. John F. Fox (1987). Truthmaker. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (2):188 – 207.
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  13. John F. Fox (1986). A Defence of 'Self-Defeating' Arguments. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (2):213 – 216.
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  14. John F. Fox (1981). Critical Notice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):92 – 103.
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  15. John Fox (1975). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (1):85-87.
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