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  1. Anthony Appiah (1986). For Truth in Semantics. B. Blackwell.
  2. Dorit Bar-On (1996). Anti-Realism and Speaker Knowledge. Synthese 106 (2):139 - 166.
    Dummettian anti-realism repudiates the realist's notion of verification-transcendent truth. Perhaps the most crucial element in the Dummettian attack on realist truth is the critique of so-called realist semantics, which assigns verification-transcendent truth-conditions as the meanings of (some) sentences. The Dummettian critique charges that realist semantics cannot serve as an adequate theory of meaning for a natural language, and that, consequently, the realist conception of truth must be rejected as well. In arguing for this, Dummett and his followers have appealed to (...)
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  3. Dorit Bar-On (1992). Semantic Verificationism, Linguistic Behaviorism, and Translation. Philosophical Studies 66 (3):235 - 259.
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  4. James Beebe (2007). Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth. Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
    In order to shed light on the question of whether reliabilism entails or excludes certain kinds of truth theories, I examine two arguments that purport to establish that reliabilism cannot be combined with antirealist and epistemic theories of truth. I take antirealism about truth to be the denial of the recognition-transcendence of truth, and epistemic theories to be those that identify truth with some kind of positive epistemic status. According to one argument, reliabilism and antirealism are incompatible because the former (...)
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  5. Stephen J. Boulter (1998). Could Aquinas Accept Semantic Anti-Realism? Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):504-513.
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  6. Cesare Cozzo (1998). Epistemic Truth and Excluded Middle. Theoria 64 (2-3):243-282.
    Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution.
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  7. Tamás Demeter (2009). Two Kinds of Mental Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):59-71.
    I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component (...)
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  8. Michael Devitt (1991). Realism and Truth. B. Blackwell.
  9. Michael Dummett (2004). Truth and the Past. Columbia University Press.
    In "Truth and the Past, " Dummett, best known as a proponent of antirealism, clarifies his current positions on the metaphysical issue of realism and the ...
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  10. Michael Dummett (1983). Language and Truth. In Roy Harris (ed.), Approaches to Language. Pergamon.
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  11. Michael Dummett (1982). Realism. Synthese 52 (1):145--165.
    Realism concerning a given subject-matter is characterised as a semantic doctrine with metaphysical consequences, namely as the adoption, for the relevant class of statements, of a truth-conditional theory of meaning resting upon the classical two-valued semantics. it is argued that any departure from classical semantics may, though will not necessarily, be seen as in conflict with some variety of realism. a sharp distinction is drawn between the rejection of realism and the acceptance of a reductionist thesis; though intimately related, neither (...)
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  12. Michael Dummett (1959). Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
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  13. Michael A. E. Dummett (1991). The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University Press.
    Such a conception, says Dummett, will form "a base camp for an assault on the metaphysical peaks: I have no greater ambition in this book than to set up a base ...
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  14. Michael A. E. Dummett (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Harvard University Press.
  15. Michael A. E. Dummett (1975). What is a Theory of Meaning? In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press.
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  16. Jim Edwards (1996). Anti-Realist Truth and Concepts of Superassertibility. Synthese 109 (1):103 - 120.
    Crispin Wright offers superassertibility as an anti-realist explication of truth. A statement is superassertible, roughly, if there is a state of information available which warrants it and it is warranted by all achievable enlargements of that state of information. However, it is argued, Wright fails to take account of the fact that many of our test procedures are not sure fire, even when applied under ideal conditions. An alternative conception of superassertibility is constructed to take this feature into account. However, (...)
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  17. Matti Eklund (2005). Book Review. Realism and Antirealism. William Alston. [REVIEW] Dialogue 44:786-88.
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  18. John Fox (2008). What is at Issue Between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):407 – 420.
    I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism. (...)
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  19. Alexander George (1984). On Devitt on Dummett. Journal of Philosophy 81 (9):516-527.
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  20. Patrick Girard & Luca Moretti (2014). Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy: The Semantic Approach. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):761-783.
    The expression conditional fallacy identifies a family of arguments deemed to entail odd and false consequences for notions defined in terms of counterfactuals. The antirealist notion of truth is typically defined in terms of what a rational enquirer or a community of rational enquirers would believe if they were suitably informed. This notion is deemed to entail, via the conditional fallacy, odd and false propositions, for example that there necessarily exists a rational enquirer. If these consequences do indeed follow from (...)
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  21. A. C. Grayling (2007). Truth, Meaning and Realism. Continuum.
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  22. Karen Green (2005). The Context Principle and Dummett's Argument for Anti-Realism. Theoria 71 (2):92-117.
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  23. John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.) (1993). Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press.
    This book is an important collection of new essays on various topics relating to realism and its rivals in metaphysics, logic, metaethics, and epistemology. The contributors include some of the leading authors in these fields and in several cases their essays constitute definitive statements of their views. In some cases authors write in response to the essays of other contributors, in other cases they proceed independently. Although not primarily historical this collection includes discussions of philosophers from the middle ages to (...)
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  24. Steven D. Hales (2001). Lynch's Metaphysical Pluralism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):699–709.
  25. M. Hand (2003). Knowability and Epistemic Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):216 – 228.
    The so-called knowability paradox results from Fitch's argument that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This threatens recent versions of semantical antirealism, the central thesis of which is that truth is epistemic. When this is taken to mean that all truths are knowable, antirealism is thus committed to the conclusion that no truths are unknown. The correct antirealistic response to the paradox should be to deny that the fundamental thesis of the epistemic nature of truth (...)
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  26. Luca Incurvati & Julien Murzi (2008). How Basic is the Basic Revisionary Argument? Analysis 68 (4):303-309.
    Anti-realists typically contend that truth is epistemically constrained. Truth, they say, cannot outstrip our capacity to know. Some anti-realists are also willing to make a further claim: if truth is epistemically constrained, classical logic is to be given up in favour of intuitionistic logic. Here we shall be concerned with one argument in support of this thesis - Crispin Wright's Basic Revisionary Argument, first presented in his Truth and Objectivity. We argue that the reasoning involved in the argument, if correct, (...)
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  27. Mark Jago (2010). Closure on Knowability. Analysis 70 (4):648-659.
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  28. Wolfgang Künne (1993). Truth, Rightness, and Permanent Acceptability. Synthese 95 (1):107 - 117.
    Goodman and Elgin want truth to be demoted and rightness to be promoted. In the first part of this paper the main reasons they offer for this reorientation are discussed. Goodman once suggestedthat one construe truth as acceptability that is not subsequently lost, but later he quietly dropped this proposal. In the second part of this paper it is argued that ultimate acceptability is indeed neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for truth.
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  29. Nils Kürbis (2012). How Fundamental is the Fundamental Assumption? Teorema 2 (2):5-19.
    The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of (...)
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  30. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). ``Truth and Superassertibility&Quot. Philosophical Studies 93:1-19.
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  31. John McDowell (1976). Truth-Conditions, Bivalence, and Verification. In G. Evans & J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning. Clarendon Press.
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  32. Alexander Miller, Semantic Realism and the Argument From Motivational Internalism.
    In his 1982 book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke develops a famous argument that purports to show that there are no facts about what we mean by the expressions of our language: ascriptions of meaning, such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” or Smith means green by ‘green’”, are according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein neither true nor false. Kripke’s Wittgenstein thus argues for a form of non-factualism about ascriptions of meaning: ascriptions of meaning do not purport to state (...)
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  33. Alexander Miller, Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  34. Alexander Miller (2003). The Significance of Semantic Realism. Synthese 136 (2):191 - 217.
    This paper is concerned with the relationship between the metaphysical doctrine of realism about the external world and semantic realism, as characterised by Michael Dummett. I argue that Dummett's conception of the relationship is flawed, and that Crispin Wright's account of the relationship, although designed to avoid the problems which beset Dummett's, nevertheless fails for similar reasons. I then aim to show that despite the fact that Dummett and Wright both fail to give a plausible account of the relationship between (...)
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  35. Alexander Miller (2002). What is the Manifestation Argument? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):352–383.
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  36. A. W. Moore (1987). Points of View. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (146):1-20.
    A. W. Moore argues in this bold, unusual, and ambitious book that it is possible to think about the world from no point of view. His argument involves discussion of a very wide range of fundamental philosophical issues, including the nature of persons, the subject-matter of mathematics, realism and anti-realism, value, the inexpressible, and God. The result is a powerful critique of our own finitude.
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  37. Luca Moretti (2008). Brogaard and Salerno on Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):229 - 246.
    Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno's argument relies on a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, "Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association", 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, "Nous," 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting (...)
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  38. Luca Moretti (2008). Dummett and the Problem of the Vanishing Past. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 7:37-47.
    Dummett has recently presented his most mature and sophisticated version of justificationism, i.e. the view that meaning and truth are to be analysed in terms of justifiability. In this paper, I argue that this conception does not resolve a difficulty that also affected Dummett’s earlier version of justificationism: the problem that large tracts of the past continuously vanish as their traces in the present dissipate. Since Dummett’s justificationism is essentially based on the assumption that the speaker has limited (i.e. non-idealized) (...)
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  39. Luca Moretti (2003). Putnam's Internal Realism. Dissertation, King's College London
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  40. Alan Musgrave (1997). The T-Scheme Plus Epistemic Truth Equals Idealism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4):490 – 496.
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  41. Mark Platts (ed.) (1980). Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    4 Moral reality and the end of desire* Mark Platts i The moral realist view I want to examine takes off from a semantic thesis, a thesis about the proper ...
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  42. Panu Raatikainen (2014). Realism: Metaphysical, Scientific, and Semantic. In Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.), Realism, Science, and Pragmatism. Routledge. 139-158.
    Three influential forms of realism are distinguished and interrelated: realism about the external world, construed as a metaphysical doctrine; scientific realism about non-observable entities postulated in science; and semantic realism as defined by Dummett. Metaphysical realism about everyday physical objects is contrasted with idealism and phenomenalism, and several potent arguments against these latter views are reviewed. -/- Three forms of scientific realism are then distinguished: (i) scientific theories and their existence postulates should be taken literally; (ii) the existence of unobservable (...)
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  43. Panu Raatikainen (2010). The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1):1-13.
    Here the relationship between understanding and knowledge of meaning is discussed from two different perspectives: that of Dummettian semantic anti-realism and that of the semantic externalism of Putnam and others. The question addressed is whether or not the truth of semantic externalism would undermine a central premise in one of Dummetts key arguments for anti-realism, insofar as Dummetts premise involves an assumption about the transparency of meaning and semantic externalism is often taken to undermine such transparency. Several notions of transparency (...)
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  44. Paul Redding (2010). Two Directions for Analytic Kantianism : Naturalism and Idealism. In Mario de Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism and Normativity. Columbia University Press.
    Usually, analytic philosophy is thought of as standing firmly within the tradition of empiricism, but recently attention has been drawn to the strongly Kantian features that have characterized this philosophical movement throughout a considerable part of its history. Those charting the history of early analytic philosophy sometimes point to a more Kantian stream of thought feeding it from both Frege and Wittgenstein, and as countering a quite different stream flowing from the early Russell and Moore. In line with this general (...)
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  45. Helge Rückert (2004). A SOLUTION TO FITCH'S PARADOX OF KNOWABILITY. In S. Rahman J. Symons (ed.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Kluwer Academic Publisher. 351--380.
    There is an argument (first presented by Fitch), which tries to show by formal means that the anti-realistic thesis that every truth might possibly be known, is equivalent to the unacceptable thesis that every truth is actually known (at some time in the past, present or future). First, the argument is presented and some proposals for the solution of Fitch's Paradox are briefly discussed. Then, by using Wehmeier's modal logic with subjunctive marks (S5*), it is shown how the derivation can (...)
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  46. Frederick F. Schmitt (1998). Realism, Antirealism and Epistemic Truth. Social Epistemology 12 (3):267 – 287.
  47. Stewart Shapiro & William W. Taschek (1996). ``Intuitionism, Pluralism, and Cognitive Command&Quot;. Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):74-88.
  48. Sanford Shieh (2008). The Anti-Realist's Past. History and Theory 47 (2):270–278.
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  49. Sanford Shieh (1998). Undecidability in Anti-Realism. Philosophia Mathematica 6 (3):324-333.
    In this paper I attempt to clarify a relatively little-studied aspect of Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism: its use of the notion of ‘undecidable’ sentence. I give a new analysis of this concept in epistemic terms, with which I resolve some puzzles and questions about how it works in the anti-realist critique of classical logic.
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  50. Sanford Shieh (1998). On the Conceptual Foundations of Anti-Realism. Synthese 115 (1):33-70.
    The central premise of Michael Dummett's global argument for anti-realism is the thesis that a speaker's grasp of the meaning of a declarative, indexical-free sentence must be manifested in her uses of that sentence. This enigmatic thesis has been the subject of a great deal of discussion, and something of a consensus has emerged about its content and justification. The received view is that the manifestation thesis expresses a behaviorist and reductive theory of meaning, essentially in agreement with Quine's view (...)
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