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  1. D. L. Anderson (2002). Why God is Not a Semantic Realist. In William P. Alston (ed.), Realism and Antirealism. Cornell Up. 131--48.
    Traditional theists are, with few exceptions, global semantic realists about the interpretation of external world statement. Realism of this kind is treated by many as a shibboleth of traditional Christianity, a sine qua non of theological orthodoxy. Yet, this love affair between theists and semantic realism is a poor match. I suggest that everyone (theist or no) has compelling evidence drawn from everyday linguistic practice to reject a realist interpretation of most external world statements. But theists have further reason to (...)
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  2. David Leech Anderson (2007). Consciousness and Realism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):1-17.
    There is a long and storied history of debates over 'realism' that has touched literally every academic discipline. Yet realism- antirealism debates play a relatively minor role in the contemporary study of consciousness. In this paper four basic varieties of realism and antirealism are explored and their potential impact on the study of consciousness is considered. Reasons are offered to explain why there is not more debate over these issues, including a discussion of the powerful influence of externalist versions of (...)
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  3. David Leech Anderson (1995). A Dogma of Metaphysical Realism. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1):1 - 11.
    There is a dogma about metaphysical realism that is well nigh universal: "If one is a metaphysical realist about the external world, then one ought to be a semantic realist about (all) external- world statements". I argue that this dogma should be rejected. It is possible for a metaphysical realist to be a "semantic dualist", holding that some middle- sized object statements receive a realist interpretation, but that most such statements require an antirealist interpretation. To show that a semantically dual (...)
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  4. Anthony Appiah (1986). For Truth in Semantics. B. Blackwell.
  5. Dorit Bar-On (1996). Anti-Realism and Speaker Knowledge. Synthese 106 (2):139 - 166.
    Dummettian anti-realism repudiates the realist's notion of verification-transcendent truth. Perhaps the most crucial element in the Dummettian attack on realist truth is the critique of so-called realist semantics, which assigns verification-transcendent truth-conditions as the meanings of (some) sentences. The Dummettian critique charges that realist semantics cannot serve as an adequate theory of meaning for a natural language, and that, consequently, the realist conception of truth must be rejected as well. In arguing for this, Dummett and his followers have appealed to (...)
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  6. Dorit Bar-On (1992). Semantic Verificationism, Linguistic Behaviorism, and Translation. Philosophical Studies 66 (3):235 - 259.
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  7. James Beebe (2007). Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth. Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
    In order to shed light on the question of whether reliabilism entails or excludes certain kinds of truth theories, I examine two arguments that purport to establish that reliabilism cannot be combined with antirealist and epistemic theories of truth. I take antirealism about truth to be the denial of the recognition-transcendence of truth, and epistemic theories to be those that identify truth with some kind of positive epistemic status. According to one argument, reliabilism and antirealism are incompatible because the former (...)
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  8. S. Behera (1998). Dummett on Semantic Anti-Realism: A Critique. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1):67-78.
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  9. Akeel Bilgrami (1994). Dummett, Realism and Other Minds. In Brian McGuiness & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Kluwer. 205--228.
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  10. Stephen J. Boulter (1998). Could Aquinas Accept Semantic Anti-Realism? Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):504-513.
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  11. Darragh Byrne (2004). Gardiner on Anti-Realism: A Defence of Dummett. Dialogue 43 (01):3-.
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  12. Peter Carruthers (1985). Ruling-Out Realism. Philosophia 15 (1-2):61-78.
    The case for anti-realism in the theory of meaning, as presented by Dummen and Wright, 1 is only partly convincing. There is, I shall suggest, a crucial lacuna in the argument, that can only be filled by the later Wittgenstein's following-a-rule considerations. So it is the latter that provides the strongest argument for the rejection of semantic realism.
    By 'realism', throughout, I should be taken as referring to any conception of meaning that leaves open the possibility that a sentence may have (...)
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  13. Quassim Cassam (1989). Realism, Meaning and Truth. Philosophical Books 30 (1):10-16.
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  14. Damian Cox (2001). Realism and Epistemic Theories of Truth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):473-486.
    This paper explores the relation between epistemic conceptions of truth and different kinds of commitment to realism and antirealism. It argues that all epistemic conceptions of truth are versions of antirealism. Although epistemic conceptions of truth can make various concessions to realist intuition, these remain concessions only. One cannot concede all claims to antirealism and remain within the orbit of a genuinely epistemic conception of truth.
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  15. Cesare Cozzo (1998). Epistemic Truth and Excluded Middle. Theoria 64 (2-3):243-282.
    Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution.
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  16. David Davies (1987). Horwich on 'Semantic' and 'Metaphysical' Realism. Philosophy of Science 54 (4):539-557.
    Horwich argues that we should reject metaphysical realism, but that we can preserve semantic realism by adhering to a redundancy theory of truth and a confirmationist account of linguistic understanding. But the latter will give us semantic realism only if it allows that the truth-values of sentences may transcend our recognitional capacities, and this is possible only insofar as we covertly reintroduce metaphysical realism. In spite of its intuitive appeal, we should not endorse semantic realism, but this need not bear (...)
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  17. Tamás Demeter (2009). Two Kinds of Mental Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):59-71.
    I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component (...)
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  18. Florian Demont, Against Crude Semantic Realism? ILLC Technical Notes (X) Series.
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  19. Michael Devitt (1991). Realism and Truth. B. Blackwell.
  20. Michael Devitt (1983). Dummett's Anti-Realism. Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):73-99.
    Devitt (1983) "Dummett's Anti-Realism".
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  21. Michael Dummett (2004). Truth and the Past. Columbia University Press.
    In "Truth and the Past, " Dummett, best known as a proponent of antirealism, clarifies his current positions on the metaphysical issue of realism and the ...
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  22. Michael Dummett (1983). Language and Truth. In Roy Harris (ed.), Approaches to Language. Pergamon.
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  23. Michael Dummett (1982). Realism. Synthese 52 (1):145--165.
    Realism concerning a given subject-matter is characterised as a semantic doctrine with metaphysical consequences, namely as the adoption, for the relevant class of statements, of a truth-conditional theory of meaning resting upon the classical two-valued semantics. it is argued that any departure from classical semantics may, though will not necessarily, be seen as in conflict with some variety of realism. a sharp distinction is drawn between the rejection of realism and the acceptance of a reductionist thesis; though intimately related, neither (...)
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  24. Michael Dummett (1959). Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
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  25. Michael A. E. Dummett (1991). The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University Press.
    Such a conception, says Dummett, will form "a base camp for an assault on the metaphysical peaks: I have no greater ambition in this book than to set up a base ...
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  26. Michael A. E. Dummett (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Harvard University Press.
  27. Michael A. E. Dummett (1975). What is a Theory of Meaning? In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press.
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  28. Jim Edwards (1996). Anti-Realist Truth and Concepts of Superassertibility. Synthese 109 (1):103 - 120.
    Crispin Wright offers superassertibility as an anti-realist explication of truth. A statement is superassertible, roughly, if there is a state of information available which warrants it and it is warranted by all achievable enlargements of that state of information. However, it is argued, Wright fails to take account of the fact that many of our test procedures are not sure fire, even when applied under ideal conditions. An alternative conception of superassertibility is constructed to take this feature into account. However, (...)
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  29. Matti Eklund (2005). Book Review. Realism and Antirealism. William Alston. [REVIEW] Dialogue 44:786-88.
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  30. John Fox (2008). What is at Issue Between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):407 – 420.
    I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism. (...)
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  31. D. Gamble, Defending Semantic Realism.
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  32. Denise Gamble (2003). Manifestability and Semantic Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):1–23.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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  33. Alexander George (1984). On Devitt on Dummett. Journal of Philosophy 81 (9):516-527.
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  34. Patrick Girard & Luca Moretti (2014). Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy: The Semantic Approach. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):761-783.
    The expression conditional fallacy identifies a family of arguments deemed to entail odd and false consequences for notions defined in terms of counterfactuals. The antirealist notion of truth is typically defined in terms of what a rational enquirer or a community of rational enquirers would believe if they were suitably informed. This notion is deemed to entail, via the conditional fallacy, odd and false propositions, for example that there necessarily exists a rational enquirer. If these consequences do indeed follow from (...)
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  35. A. C. Grayling (2007). Truth, Meaning and Realism. Continuum.
    The ten essays gathered together in this book treat of truth, meaning, realism, natural kind terms, and related topics. Almost all began life as invited contributions to conferences. From the Preface we learn that Grayling, in contrast to those colleagues whose perfectionism leads them to publish too little, preferred to ‘venture ideas as if they were letters to friends’. The style could hardly be called epistolary, however; a high level of generality is maintained throughout, and there is much plotting of (...)
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  36. Karen Green (2005). The Context Principle and Dummett's Argument for Anti-Realism. Theoria 71 (2):92-117.
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  37. John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.) (1993). Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press.
    This book is an important collection of new essays on various topics relating to realism and its rivals in metaphysics, logic, metaethics, and epistemology. The contributors include some of the leading authors in these fields and in several cases their essays constitute definitive statements of their views. In some cases authors write in response to the essays of other contributors, in other cases they proceed independently. Although not primarily historical this collection includes discussions of philosophers from the middle ages to (...)
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  38. Steven D. Hales (2001). Lynch's Metaphysical Pluralism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):699–709.
  39. M. Hand (2003). Knowability and Epistemic Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):216 – 228.
    The so-called knowability paradox results from Fitch's argument that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This threatens recent versions of semantical antirealism, the central thesis of which is that truth is epistemic. When this is taken to mean that all truths are knowable, antirealism is thus committed to the conclusion that no truths are unknown. The correct antirealistic response to the paradox should be to deny that the fundamental thesis of the epistemic nature of truth (...)
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  40. Carl G. Hempel (1950). A Note on Semantic Realism. Philosophy of Science 17 (2):169-173.
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  41. Herbert Hochberg (2003). Chapter 3 Meaning, Truth and Anti-Realism. In , Introducing Analytic Philosophy: Ts Sense and its Nonsense. 1879 - 2002. De Gruyter. 147-218.
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  42. M. Hymers (2001). Mark Quentin Gardiner, Semantic Challenges to Realism. Philosophy in Review 21 (3):175-177.
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  43. Michael Hyrners (2001). Mark Quentin Gardiner, Semantic Challenges to Realism Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 21 (3):175-177.
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  44. Luca Incurvati & Julien Murzi (2008). How Basic is the Basic Revisionary Argument? Analysis 68 (4):303-309.
    Anti-realists typically contend that truth is epistemically constrained. Truth, they say, cannot outstrip our capacity to know. Some anti-realists are also willing to make a further claim: if truth is epistemically constrained, classical logic is to be given up in favour of intuitionistic logic. Here we shall be concerned with one argument in support of this thesis - Crispin Wright's Basic Revisionary Argument, first presented in his Truth and Objectivity. We argue that the reasoning involved in the argument, if correct, (...)
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  45. Mark Jago (2010). Closure on Knowability. Analysis 70 (4):648-659.
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  46. Drew Khlentzos, Semantic Challenges to Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  47. Wolfgang Künne (1993). Truth, Rightness, and Permanent Acceptability. Synthese 95 (1):107 - 117.
    Goodman and Elgin want truth to be demoted and rightness to be promoted. In the first part of this paper the main reasons they offer for this reorientation are discussed. Goodman once suggestedthat one construe truth as acceptability that is not subsequently lost, but later he quietly dropped this proposal. In the second part of this paper it is argued that ultimate acceptability is indeed neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for truth.
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  48. Nils Kürbis (2012). How Fundamental is the Fundamental Assumption? Teorema 2 (2):5-19.
    The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of (...)
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  49. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). ``Truth and Superassertibility&Quot. Philosophical Studies 93:1-19.
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  50. Michael J. Loux (2005). Dummett on Realism and Anti-Realism. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oup Oxford.
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