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  1. Yaakov Hoffman & Joseph Tzelgov (2012). Representation of Unattended Material in Memory. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1504-1508.
    The current study addresses how information whose processing was not part of task requirement is represented in memory. Using a novel measure, recognition memory for unattended material was assessed twice, once when it appeared with the same attended study target and once with a new target. The data reveal memory for unattended study information only in the old target condition. Results suggest that the entire study event is encoded and represented in a memory trace, which contains both attended target information (...)
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  2. Joseph Tzelgov & Roi Cohen Kadosh (2009). From Automaticity to Control in Bilinguals. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (11):455.
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  3. Joseph Tzelgov & Michal Pinhas (2009). In Search of Non-Abstract Representation of Numbers: Maybe on the Right Track, but Still Not There. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (3-4):353 - 354.
    We agree that the default numerical representation is best accessed by probing automatic processing. The locus of this representation is apparently at the horizontal intraparietal sulcus (HIPS), the convergence zone of magnitude information. The parietal lobes are the right place to look for non-abstract representation of magnitude, yet the proof for that is still to be found.
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  4. Roi Cohen Kadosh, Joseph Tzelgov & Avishai Henik (2008). A Colorful Walk on the Mental Number Line: Striving for the Right Direction. Cognition 106 (1):564-567.
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  5. Roi Cohen Kadosh, Joseph Tzelgov & Avishai Henik (2008). A Synesthetic Walk on the Mental Number Line: The Size Effect. Cognition 106 (1):548-557.
    Are small and large numbers represented similarly or differently on the mental number line? The size effect was used to argue that numbers are represented differently. However, recently it has been argued that the size effect is due to the comparison task and is not derived from the mental number line per se. Namely, it is due to the way that the mental number line is mapped onto the task-relevant output component. Here synesthesia was used to disentangle these two alternatives. (...)
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  6. Guy Pinku & Joseph Tzelgov (2006). Consciousness of the Self (COS) and Explicit Knowledge. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):655-661.
    Starting with Dienes and Perner’s distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge and the traditional philosophical distinction between COS as an object and COS as a subject, we suggest a triple classification of COS experience into three modes, each corresponding to a different state of consciousness. When one acts automatically COS is totally embedded within the representation of the environment. When one monitors or attends to one’s experience, the self is implied by an explicit representation of one’s attitudes, consistent with Descartes’ (...)
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  7. P. Piolino, M. Hisland, I. Ruffeveille, V. Matuszewski, I. Jambaqué, F. Eustache, Guy Pinku, Joseph Tzelgov, Dermot M. Bowler & John M. Gardiner (2006). Paolo Bartolomeo, Caroline Decaix, Eric Siéroff. The Phenomenology of Endogenous Orienting. Consciousness and Cognition 15:765-766.
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  8. Fred H. Previc, P. Piolino, M. Hisland, I. Ruffeveille, V. Matuszewski, I. Jambaqué, F. Eustache, Guy Pinku, Joseph Tzelgov & Monica Meijsing (2006). Paolo Bartolomeo, Caroline Decaix, Eric Siéroff. The Phenomenology of Endogenous Orienting. Consciousness and Cognition 15:484.
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  9. Joseph Tzelgov (2002). Trading Automatic/Nonautomatic for Unconscious/Conscious. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):356-357.
    In this commentary I show that the SOC framework implies automaticity of both the materialization of phenomenological conscious experience and the application of the primitives resulting from the emergence of consciousness. In addition, SOC implies that cognition refers to conscious experience. Consequently, I propose automatic/nonautomatic instead of unconscious/conscious as the basic contrast characterizing human cognition.
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  10. Joseph Tzelgov, Dana Ganor & Vered Yehene (1999). Automatic Processing Results in Conscious Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):786-787.
    We apply Dienes & Perner's (D&P's) framework to the automatic/nonautomatic processing contrast. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that automatic and nonautomatic processing result in representations that have explicit results. We propose equating consciousness with explicitness of aspects rather than with full explicitness as defined by D&P.
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  11. Joseph Tzelgov (1997). Automatic but Conscious: That is How We Act Most of the Time. In R. Wyer (ed.), The Automaticity of Everyday Life. Lawrence Erlbaum
     
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  12. Joseph Tzelgov (1997). Note. Consciousness and Cognition 6 (2-3):441-451.
    The relations between automatic processing and consciousness are discussed in this paper. It is argued that automatic processing should not be identified with the absence of consciousness. The organism has access to representations resulting from automatic processing, but these representations, in contrast to the representations resulting from nonautomatic processing, are not propositional. Therefore monitoring of the process, the defining feature of nonautomatic processing, is not possible.
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  13. Joseph Tzelgov (1997). Specifying the Relations Between Automaticity and Consciousness: A Theoretical Note. Consciousness and Cognition 6:441-51.
     
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  14. Joseph Tzelgov, Z. Porat & A. Henik (1997). Automaticity and Consciousness: Is Perceiving the Word Necessary for Reading It? American Journal of Psychology 110:429-48.