Essay on concept of human emotions in Javanese mysticism and philosophy.

The term “anti-American” sounds debatable in analyzing the relationship between Islamic world and United States. This term arguably stems from Huntington’s thesis on clash of civilization, which argued that the culture is the main belligerent instead of countries in the conflict. Two main cultures: the contrast between the West and Islam often eventually shapes the rivalry relationship between these two civilizations. Investigating the persistence rivalry between the two through critical literature review method, this article tries to answer the question of (...) why Muslims are still hostile to American culture. It further argues that that media, which are mostly from Middle Eastern countries, have essential in shaping the fluctuated trend of anti-American sentiment among Muslims. This heavily depends on the impact of US foreign policy on Arab that might precipitates anti-American sentiments. (shrink)

The term “Anti-American” sounds debatable in analyzing the relationship between the Islamic world and United States itself. This term arguably came out from Huntington’s Clash of Civilization, which argued the culture is the main belligerent instead of countries in the conflict. Two main cultures westerns versus Islamic culture often eventually shape the way relationships between two cultures going over, particularly Muslims themselves. Following up those arguments, the purpose of this study would like to analyze why Muslims are still hostile to (...) Americans for some reasons. The method here is a critical literature review to investigate the causal link within relevant literatures to understand the reasons behind that sentiments. The findings of this study reveal that media, which mostly from middle eastern countries, shape the fluctuated trend of anti-American sentiment among Muslims. This heavily depends on the impact of US foreign policy on Arab that might precipitate anti-American sentiments. (shrink)

Kajiyama has argued that the basis for the concept of _jāti_ (false rejoinder) as described in the _Nyāyasūtra_ is the concept _xiang ying_ (相応) as found in the _Fangbian xin lun_ (方便心論). Kajiyama has also shown that the sophistic arguments called _xiang ying_ are very similar to the _prasaṅga_ arguments of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka school. It thus seems worthwhile to investigate how later Mādhyamika philosophers treated the concept of _jāti_ that originally appeared as the result of the (...) _Nyāyasūtra’s_ criticism of the concept _xiang ying_ and was later accepted by Buddhist logicians such as Dignāga. This paper shows that there were two entirely opposite Mādhyamika positions regarding the concept of _jāti_. In order to demonstrate this difference, this paper examines in detail statements about _jāti_s that appear in various treatises, especially two works by Bhāviveka and three works by Candrakīrti. As the result, it becomes clear that the differences in the two positions correspond essentially to the differences in how Dignāgaʼs logic was evaluated by the so-called Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika within the Madhyamaka school. (shrink)

The exhaustive explications on jāti-s (sophisticated ripostes) and their seemingly chaotic arrangement in early Indian philosophical texts arouses an expectation for a systematic taxonomy or typology. Such taxonomy would enormously increase the heuristic value of the list of jāti-s. The present article aims to reveal some interpretational problems relevant to the understanding of the jāti-s’ historical development, as well as the theoretical implications of their typology. Focusing historically on the early texts of debate manuals of Nyāya and Buddhist circles, this (...) article will excavate and explicate the vague and the obvious attempts to establish a typology of jāti-s. Given that Diṅnāga was the philosopher who shifted the history of Indian philosophy into the era of macro theory by integrating ontology and epistemology into a general system, the minimal changes of the order of the jāti-s in the list given in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, in contrast to the one found in the Nyāyamukha, will be interpreted as a paradigm shift. The rearrangement of the jāti list in the Pramāṇasamuccaya represents the paradigm shift from the debate (vāda) manual to the epistemological (pramāṇa) treatise, confirming Frauwallner’s ideas regarding the development of Diṅnāga’s thought. (shrink)

Eli Franco has recently suggested to distinguish the two main periods in the history of Indian philosophy, i.e. the older ontological and the new epistemological. In the Vākyapadīya, however, ontology and epistemology are evidently intertwined and interrelated. In this paper ontological and epistemological features of the concepts of paśyantī, pratibhā, sphoţa and jāti are analyzed in order to demonstrate that all these concepts, while being ontologically different, are engaged in similar epistemological processes, i.e. the cognition of a verbal utterance. Thus (...) the identification of sphoţa and jāti as well as of paśyantī and pratibhā met with in some passages of VP and the commentaries implies not the absolute identity of these concepts, but only their overlapping in the sphere of epistemology. Considering concepts of different origin in one epistemological perspective enables to escape controversies in interpretation and provides a kind of consistency in a bit but amorphous work of Bhartŗhari. (shrink)

All individual terms listed as jāti-s (sophisticated ripostes) in Nyāyasūtra V a 1 have the peculiar uniform ending -sama. The interpretation of this ending here reveals a greater nuance of meaning than the hitherto customary understanding of it. It will be demonstrated that the observable semantic difference is due to a historical shift of signification as a result of an enlarging and systematizing of the thematic group of jāti-s. In this paper, I examine relevant text material, including two very important (...) manuscripts of the Nyāyabhṣya to show this semantic difference. The understanding gained by this analysis will help to trace the historical development of the complex of jāti-s within the larger context of the ancient Indian tradition of debate. (shrink)

Study on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar in Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari.

On traditional spiritual teachings and philosophy of life based on Pustaka Wedha Sasangka, a Javanese classical literature.

This study discusses the teachings of Sunan Gunung Jati as the value of religious humanism in education and history for the people of Cirebon. The teachings of Sunan Gunung Jati are still tightly grasped by the people of Cirebon from ancient times to the present, namely martabat tembung wali because they contain moral teachings and noble cultural values. The teachings of Sunan Gunung Jati have the concept of religious humanism as a form of history. The concept of (...) religious humanism has implications for the educational process, with an orientation to developing human aspects. The purpose of this study is to explore the values of life reflected in the teachings of Sunan Gunung Jati’s life as the value of religious humanism in education and history for the people of Cirebon. This research uses an anthropolinguistic theoretical framework to examine the value of religious humanism in education and history for the people of Cirebon. This study uses a qualitative research paradigm. The results showed that the teachings of Sunan Gunung Jati contained the value of life in social rules. Sunan Gunung Jati has relevance to the process of human development. Humans have a personal side that continues to grow in line with the social side. Human development is also surrounded by spiritual components as a form of emotional intelligence. Contribution: This article contributes to the objective of HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies to investigate the history of religions, as well as phenomenology, psychology, philosophy and sociology of religions. (shrink)

It has become commonplace in introductions to Indian philosophy to construe Plato’s discussion of forms (εἶδος/ἰδέα) and the treatment in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika of universals ( sāmānya/jāti ) as addressing the same philosophical issue, albeit in somewhat different ways. While such a comparison of the similarities and differences has interest and value as an initial reconnaissance of what each says about common properties, an examination of the roles that universals play in the rest of their philosophical enquiries vitiates this commonplace. (...) This paper draws upon the primary texts to identify the following metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and soteriological roles that universals play in the philosophy of Plato and of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika: Metaphysical: causal of the existence of x Metaphysical: constitutive of the identity/essence of x Epistemological: cognitively causal (i.e. of the cognition of one over many) Epistemological: epistemically causal (i.e. of knowledge of x) Semantic: necessary condition of speech and reason Epistemological: vindicatory of induction (Nyāya only) Metaphysical: explanatory of causation (Nyāya only) Soteriological: cathartic contemplation (Plato only) These roles provide us with motivations or reasons to believe that universals exist. As we examine these motivations, we find pressures mounting against our assimilating Platonic forms and the universals of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in the discourse about common properties. It is especially when we appreciate the utterly different contribution that universals make in securing our highest welfare that we realize how Plato and the two sister schools are not so much talking somewhat differently about the same thing, but talking somewhat similarly about different things. This better understanding of this difference in these philosophies opens a route for our better understanding of their unique contributions in the ongoing dialogue of philosophy. (shrink)

The paper concentrates on the most pressing question of Indian philosophy: what is the exact connotation of a word or what sort of entity helps us to identify the meaning of a word? The paper focuses on the clash between Realism (Nyāya) and Apoha vāda (Buddhist) regarding the debate whether the meaning of a word is particular/universal or both. The paper asserts that though Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṁsakas challenged against Buddhist Apoha vāda, yet they realized that to establish an opinion in (...) support of a word that conceptually denotes a negative meaning first would be a very difficult task. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to analyse the teachings of religious moderation contained in the Wawacan Babad Walangsungsang script. This research employs a qualitative method with philology as the main analysis of the data, namely manuscript inventory, script description, script transfer, and language translation. The script shows the story of Prince Walangsungsang’s journey in search of spirituality, specifically Islam. Interestingly, he learned his spirituality through many non-Muslim teachers until he finally met Sheik Datuk Kahfi in Bukit Amparan Jati. (...) The result of this study shows that upon his spiritual journey while gaining knowledge he experienced magical scenery. The conclusion is the willingness of prince Walangsungsang to learn knowledge and ajimat from Budhaprawa teachers, the openness and support of Budhaprawa teachers about the Prophet’s shari’a and the explanation of Sheikh Datuk Kahfi (Muslim) for the religious search conducted by Prince Walangsungsang shows the beauty of speech that is rich with nuances of religious moderation. Contribution: This research is important as a basic reference for religious moderation, which is rooted in the local wisdom of the Sundanese culture and tradition and can be adopted to spread those in our interaction with other religions. (shrink)

1. Philosophy, or the nature of philosophical knowledge, is defined as darsana, which means "seeing" or "vision." Seeing is, perhaps, the best instance of what we mean by "direct experience"; in this sense, Indian philosophy is "empirical." Its empiricism is, however, an "empiricism without limits." I shall not discuss here whether "seeing," "hearing," etc., are instances of immediate experience, or of mediate knowledge. If we see with the eyes, or through them, it may be argued that seeing and hearing, etc., (...) are instances of mediate knowledge. But the motive in defining the nature of philosophical knowledge as darsana or "vision" is that Indian philosophy distrusts abstract reasoning or knowledge. Philosophy is not, according to Indian philosophy, primarily a "theory" about reality but an experience of reality: an experience verified or verifiable. The Vedänta is the "end" of knowledge in the sense that knowledge ends in experience: in direct realization. This is the meaning of the Vedäntic statement: we cannot know Brahman but we can be Brahman. The nature of ultimate reality is atarkyam, "non-logical," as the Upanisads say. This does not mean that logic should not be used as a method or that logical knowledge has no use. Logical knowledge gives knowledge of "existence" in some sense, e.g., if I say, "No statement is true," then, this statement is, at least, true: therefore it exists. Whereas philosophy as darsana is an intuition of the existent and not of existence. In a certain sense, there is no problem for Indian philosophy of the reality and proof of the external world. The Katha Upanisad says that the senses are "pierced outwards"; "therefore, they see external objects": tasmät parang pasyati. But why the expression "external world" if there is not another world in some sense? However this may be, it is an historical fact that, in its quest for the Real, Indian thought changed from the objective to the subjective method: its search for the reality of the objective universe was through its search for the inner essence of man's being. The Katha Upanisad speaks of seeing "with eyes turned within": ävratta çaksu. The conception of philosophy as darsana corresponds to Plato's definition of the Dialectic as "the eye of the soul": "not implanting eyes, for they exist already, but giving them a right direction which they have not." Philosophy as darsana is the sight of "those who have eyes to see," though not the sight of "those who see only what they want to see." Darsana as defined is "discovery": there is in it, or through it, an unveiling of Reality. Darsana is a perceptual or "intuitive" situation in which the existent is beheld "face to face"; pratyagätänamaiksat: "beheld the Atman face to face": but this relation of "face to face" cannot properly be described as an "encounter," if this means seeing another. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungSeit Jahren steigt in Indien die Anzahl der spezifisch gegenüber Frauen, hierarchisch tieferstehenden Geburts- (varṇa) und Berufsgruppen (jāti) sowie Kastenlosen (dalits;scheduled castes) und indigenen Gemeinschaften (ādivāsī;scheduled tribes) angezeigten Gewalttaten kontinuierlich an. Diese Gewaltakte und Tötungsdelikte sind aufgrund ihrer Qualität und vor allem aufgrund ihrer quantitativen Größenordnung als systemisch anzusehen. Dass sie in dieser Form noch immer ein akutes Gegenwartsproblem von allerhöchster sozialer und politischer Brisanz im vordergründig säkularisierten Indien darstellen, legt einen gesamtgesellschaftlichen Konsens über deren grundsätzliche Rechtmäßigkeit nahe, der sich (...) anhand tradierter Normen- und Wertvorstellungen sowie prämoderner Denk- und Handlungsmuster legitimiert, die auf traditionell hinduistischen Ideen basieren. Dabei kann der politische Aufstieg der nationalreligiös argumentierenden und agitierenden „Indischen Volkspartei“ (BJP:Bhāratīya Janatā Pārṭī) sowie ihr politisch forcierter Rückgriff auf den Hinduismus als einzelner, aber dennoch entscheidender Einflussfaktor gesehen werden, der die anhaltende Verschärfung innergesellschaftlicher Gegensätze und die kontinuierliche Intensivierung der Gewaltdynamiken ursächlich zu erklären vermag. Um diese Zusammenhänge zu beleuchten, vollzieht der Beitrag die ideengeschichtlichen Grundlagen religiös legitimierter Entmenschlichung und Gewalt sowie latenter wie offener Misogynie im Hinduismus von seinen vedischen Ursprüngen im 2. vorchristlichen Jahrtausend bis zur Gegenwart nach. (shrink)

Adzan Pitu is one form of the legacy of Syarif Hidayatullah in spreading Islam in Cirebon. One of the ways in which Sunan Gunung Jati spread Islam is by building mosques. The construction of the Sang Cipta Rasa mosque aims to centre the spread of Islam in Cirebon and surrounding areas. A Mosque is symbolised not only as a place of worship but also as a place of studying Islam. This is what underlies the construction of the Sang Cipta (...) Rasa mosque by Syarif Hidayatullah which is now in the Kasepuhan palace complex in Cirebon. The noble goal is constrained by the evil intentions of the Mataram envoy who wished to thwart the construction of the mosque. Until today, when the People of Cirebon are affected by an epidemic such as measles, they have to perform Adzan Pitu to repel the outbreak and sacrifices as a condition to purify the spell that was spread by the envoy of Mataram. Adzan Pitu is a call to prayer with seven people at the same time. It is a form of mixing of Islamic and Hindu culture. Adzan Pitu has character values in it, which include religious values, hard work and social care. The values contained in Adzan Pitu are a reflection of Syarif Hidayatullah’s struggle in spreading Islam in Cirebon. In addition, these values are also a legacy of Sunan Gunung Jati in an effort to increase the value of character for the nation’s next generation.Contribution: This article contributes from a multidisplinary theological perspective to hermeneutical studies behind philosophies related to the Abrahamic religions as expressed in the Qur’an. (shrink)

Peran dunia pendidikan menjadi penting dalam membangun peradaban bangsa yang didasarkan atas jati diri dan karakter bangsa. Tema Hari Pendidikan Nasional Tahun 2012 ini adalah “Bangkitnya Generasi Emas Indonesia”. Tema ini sejalan dengan hakikat pendidikan yang telah ditekankan oleh Bapak Pendidikan Nasional yaitu Ki Hajar Dewantoro. Melalui pembangunan karakter bangsa, diharapkan dapat menciptakan manusia Indonesia yang unggul. Dalam penelitian ini, mengembangkan 6 (enam) nilai karakteristik yang wajib tertanam pada setiap diri mahasiswa. Karakteristik tersebut ditanamkan melalui proses perkuliahan yang diselenggarakan (...) selama 1 semester pada Mata Kuliah Matematika 1 di Jurusan PGMI Fakultas Tarbiyah Tahun Pelajaran 2011-2012. Pada mata kuliah ini, pendidikan karakter didekati melalui pemecahan masalah, yang merupakan bagian penting yang harus diajarkan kepada peserta didik. Pendekatan yang dilakukan adalah dengan metode inkulkasi (penanaman), yang ditempuh dengan memperhatikan perbedaan pada masing-masing peserta didik. Di sinilah penggolongan tipe kepribadian akan bermanfaat untuk menghargai perbedaan, sehingga bermanfaat bagi penunjang keberhasilan pembelajaran. Hasil yang diharapkan dari pembelajaran ini adalah peserta didik mampu memecahkan masalah dalam kehidupannya, dengan didasari oleh nilai yang sekaligus akan dapat mendukung pembangunan karakternya, sehingga pada akhirnya pendidikan karakter dapat tertanam. (shrink)

According to the Buddhist concept of ‘dependent origination’ (pratītyasamutpāda), discrete factors come into existence because of a combination of causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya). Such discrete factors, further, are combinations of five aggregates (pañ caskandha) that, themselves, are subject to constant change. Discrete factors, therefore, lack a self-nature (ātman). The passing through time of discrete factors is characterized by the ‘characteristic marks of the conditioned’: birth (utpāda), change in continuance (sthityanyathātva), and passing away (vyaya); or, alternatively: birth (jāti), duration (sthiti), (...) decay (jarā), and impermanence (anityatā). In the interpretation of the precise nature of these characteristic marks of the conditioned, and their relation to the discrete factor they characterize, different opinions were prevalent within the Sarvāstivāda School of Buddhist philosophy, with, judging from later scholastic literature, the views of the Dārṣṭāntika/sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika sub-schools as most prominent ones. The Indian and Chinese Madhyamaka philosophers pointed to the fallacies in the Sarvāstivāda interpretations of the nature of the characteristic marks of the conditioned and their relation to the discrete factors they characterize, and, hence, to the fallacies in the Sarvāstivāda interpretations of the concepts ‘time’ and ‘temporality’. (shrink)

"You have to come to my wedding," Kavita told me, turning to face me where I sat next to her on the couch. "You can come with the other people from the street. You will get everything you need for your *research* there." "I will come, I will come!" I replied enthusiastically. I had only met Kavita and her two younger sisters, Arthi and Deepti (see Figure 2.1), mere minutes before this invitation was extended. I had initially come to Pulan (...) that day in October 2012 to meet another woman, Heena, whose family rents a room on the third story of Kavita's family's home. Heena and I had been sitting in the furniture refurbishing store she operates with her husband on the main street of Pulan when Deepti, Kavita's youngest sister, passed by. Heena introduced us and told me to go with Deepti to meet her family. When we reached the family's three-story house-the largest in the gali-Deepti led me past the empty rooms on the ground floor, which I would eventually begin renting, to the second-story living room. There, we found Kavita and Arthi organizing clothing and jewelry they had purchased earlier in the day for the upcoming wedding festivities. Kavita made room for me to sit next to her on the couch and began asking me about myself. I immediately warmed to her because of her open, friendly smile and sharp, staccato Hindi, which I delighted in being able to understand. I explained that I had come to India to study how women's lives are different in rural and urban areas, and Kavita assured me that she and her family could help. She noted that her parents had come to Udaipur from Ram Nagar, a large village thirty-five kilometers north of the city, and that the family would be returning for her and her older brother Krishna's weddings the following month. Their weddings would be held five days apart to help reduce the difficulties of family members traveling from outside Udaipur. Prompted by the description of my research, Kavita commented on differences that she recognized between the village and the city. The biggest difference, she suggested, was the experience of caste, namely that in the village, people from different jatis live separately, whereas in the city, people are "mixed." As I would come to learn when visiting Ram Nagar for various functions, there is a fair amount of caste and religious diversity in the village. Although spatial and ritual segregation was rather strictly maintained during religious observances, it is likely more flexible in everyday life. The segregation during ritual functions-the occasions for which Kavita also traveled to the village-likely informed her sense of a lack of "mixing" in the village as. The majority of residents in the area of Ram Nagar where the family maintains a home were also from the Mali (lit: gardener) jati, although Mali was not a majority jati in Pulan. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 46, no. 2. © 2020 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 403 Gyanendra Pandey Men in the Home: Everyday Practices of Gender in Twentieth-Century India This article responds to a call by feminist historians of South Asia to attend to the “complex experience of family” as conditioned by age, gender, and class, and the ordinary “daily practices of gender” in the domestic arena.1 My essay focuses on the comparatively (...) neglected aspect of men’s domesticity—their performance of life in the home—as revealed in the writings and practices of prominent nationalist thinkers and activists who lived and worked in an era of militant anticolonial agitation in India. The domestic sphere, with its assigned gender roles and routines, was at the heart of major debates between the colonizers and the colonized about the meaning of culture and enlightenment. “Among rude people, the women are generally degraded; among civilized people they are exalted,” James Mill declared, in his classic statement on domestic manners.2 From Mill, writing in the second decade of the nineteenth century, to Katherine Mayo in the third decade of the twentieth, colonialist 1. Indrani Chatterjee, introduction to Unfamiliar Relations: Family and History in South Asia, ed. Indrani Chatterjee (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004), 4; Mrinalini Sinha, “A Global Perspective on Gender: What’s South Asia Got to Do with It?” in South Asian Feminisms, ed. Ania Loomba and Ritty A. Lukose (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 359. 2. James Mill, The History of British India, 4th ed. (1817), edited by H. H. Wilson, vol. 1 (London: James Madden, 1848), 309. 404 Gyanendra Pandey writers dredged up the condition of women, familial relations, and domestic life in India to demonstrate the necessity of colonialist-initiated improvement and reform.3 Colonial rule thus provided the impetus for “a thoroughgoing re-evaluation of Indian ‘tradition’ along lines more consonant with [a] ‘modern’ economy and society.”4 Faced with insistent colonial critique, nationalist reformers and thinkers set out to controvert suppositions about the fallen state of Indian women and the oppressiveness of Indian homes. They also further sought to ameliorate conditions where these had deviated from their version of a glorious past. The Hindi/Urdu writer Premchand sums up the nationalist rebuttal in a 1931 essay entitled “Nari-jati ke adhikar” (“The Rights of Women”): “In fact, the Indian woman has always been considered the goddess of the home, and she has a higher status than men in the society.” For a variety of reasons, Premchand suggests, women fell from this preeminent position over time and men began to appropriate the established rights of women. “But,” he concludes, “the [new] wave of nationalism and enlightenment that has arrived now will obliterate all these [gender] distinctions, and our mothers [sic] will be re-installed in the exalted place that is their right.”5 It was in this way that early nationalist thinkers and spokespersons produced an argument about the existence of a sacred and relatively uncolonized “inner” space of Indian society, as contrasted with a more quickly changing, compromised, and negotiated “outer” space. In what is now a familiar precept in South Asian gender history, women were cast as the (predominant) custodians of “tradition” in private and in public life; men were (predominantly) the instruments of national, social, and cultural transformation in the wider, public domain. With this framing came propositions about the need for rapid progress in the “outer” realms of science, industry, and voluntary association as well as the later goals of welfare and development, secularism, and socialism. The push 3. Ibid.; Katherine Mayo, Mother India (London: Jonathan Cape, 1927). 4. Lata Mani, “Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India,” in Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History, ed. Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid (Delhi: Kali for Women, 1989), 88. Mani makes a powerful critique of the so-called “Indian tradition” and of claimed colonial efforts to improve Indian society. 5. Premchand, “Nari-jati ke adhikar,” in Vividh Prasang, vol. 3, ed. Amrit Rai (Allahabad, India: Hans Prakashan, 1980) 249. Gyanendra Pandey 405 for such advancements developed alongside a more guarded approach to change in the “inner” world and its inherited store of spiritual resources— symbolized above all... (shrink)

This paper in an elementary level expresses the inevitable relation between the word and meaning from the prominent Indian philosophical trends by giving stress on Vyakti-śakti-vāda and Jāti-śakti-vāda, the two contender doctrines. The first one puts emphasis on the semantic value of a predicate whereas the latter draws attention to the generic uses of nouns. The second part of the writing underpins Navya Nyāya and Kumārila’s positions on the word-meaning reliance and the debate initiate when we look back to the (...) question whether the word-meaning relation sounds conventional or eternal. I propose a position (śabda-vivarta-vāda) on these issues derived from the works of Patan᷈jali and Bhartṛharị, two grammarians of classical Indian tradition. They defend eternal verbum as the material cause of the word and objects. This doctrine advocates uniforism by giving up bifurcation between the word and the world. (shrink)

Lima gagasan yang dapat mengubah Indonesia itu tentu Pancasila. Sebagaimana ditulis Jakob Oetama dalam kata pengantar buku Profesor Sastrapratedja, sudah sangat mendesak untuk mengaktualisasikan kembali Pancasila. Pancasila sudah lama berada dalam bahaya, bukan karena masih ada kekuatan politik yang mempersoalkannya, melainkan karena dukungan terhadap Pancasila cenderung menguapkan maknanya. Di masa Demokrasi Terpimpin Pancasila semakin dikesampingkan oleh semboyan-semboyan lain di mana yang paling tragis adalah NASAKOM. Di masa Orde Baru Pancasila dinyatakan sakti dan sesudahnya jutaan saudara dan saudari sebangsa dibunuh, dikucilkan, (...) dan dihancurkan eksistensinya; Pancasila menjadi payung salah satu kejahatan terbesar dalam sejarah umat manusia. Dan kemudian, melalui manipulasi, seperti dalam Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Pancasila di-jawa-kan—dalam pidatonya di Pekanbaru Suharto mengatakan bahwa untuk memahami Pancasila orang perlu tahu falsafah honocaroko—dan dibonsai menjadi anjuran untuk bersikap baik-baik, bebas bertanggungjawab di bawah naungan pemerintah. Pancasila bonsai itu diindoktrinasikan melalui kursus-kursus BP7 kepada masyarakat. Maka waktu Suharto meninggalkan tahta kekuasaannya, Pancasila seakan sudah masuk kotak, orang sepertinya malu berbicara mengenai Pancasila. Panggung ideologis yang kosong segera mulai diisi oleh ideologi-ideologi picik-agamis-eksklusivis yang betul-betul mau membersihkan Indonesia dari sisa Pancasila. Maka pada 2006 AIPI (Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia) menyerukan kepada Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono agar Pancasila kembali dijadikan acuan akhir eksplisit segala kebijakan kenegaraan. Karena itu, pemahaman kembali tentang arti Pancasila sangat mendesak. Itulah aktualitas buku Professor Sastrapratedja. Judulnya bukan sekedar kata keren. Sastrapratedja menunjukkan bahwa Pancasila bukan sebuah dokumen sejarah saja—seperti Declaration of Independence Amerika Serikat—atau sebuah pilar di atasnya bangsa Indonesia meneruskan perjalanannya. Sastrapratedja memperlihatkan bahwa Pancasila mempunyai gigi; artinya, Pancasila merupakan petunjuk tajam tentang kebijakan mana yang boleh dan tidak boleh diambil oleh negara yang mewujudkan bangsa Indonesia. Sastrapratedja menunjukkan dengan rinci bahwa kalau kita mengaku mendasarkan kehidupan bangsa pada lima sila Pancasila maka ada konsekuensinya. Ada kebijakan yang wajib diambil dan ada kebijakan yang wajib ditolak. Kalau negara kita mengikuti petunjuk Pancasila maka negara kita akan berubah. Buku ini terdiri dari dua puluh tiga makalah yang ditulis penulis dalam lima belas tahun terakhir. Bentuk itu menguntungkan karena pembaca tidak perlu membaca 393 halaman teks ini dari permulaan sampai akhir. Daftar isi yang cukup jelas, sebuah indeks nama dan sebuah indeks analitis rinci membantu pembaca untuk menemukan persis apa yang dicarinya. Sastrapratedja tentu tidak hanya membicarakan Pancasila. Di antara sekian masalah yang dibicarakan ada, misalnya, ”etika ilmu pengetahuan“—yang menurut Sastrapratedja memuat lima prinsip: harus menghormati martabat manusia sebagai pribadi, berpegang pada prinsip ”tidak merugikan,” terarah pada kesejahteraan bagi manusia dan masyarakat seluruhnya, pada pengurangan penderitaan, serta pada pemerataan hasil-hasilnya—, ”nasionalisme,“ ”jati diri manusia Indonesia,“ ”globalisasi“ dan tantangannya, pelbagai arti kata ”ideologi,“ ”etika politik,“ arti ”budaya politik,“ ”multikulturalisme,“ ”krisis modernitas“ sampai ”keamanan pangan“ sebagai tantangan etis........ Satu muatan Pancasila yang diangkat oleh Sastrapratedja adalah bahwa ”Pancasila menjadikan kehidupan masyarakat dan negara lebih manusiawi.” Mempancasilakan Indonesia berarti membuat bangsa Indonesia hidup bersama dengan lebih manusiawi. Hal itu eksplisit dituntut dalam sila kedua, tetapi memancar ke semua sila. Lebih manusiawi berarti penolakan terhadap kekerasan sebagai sarana untuk menyelesaikan masalah. Pancasila mendorong untuk mengusahakan “penghalusan perasaan” dan “transformasi keagresifan” manusia Indonesia. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa memanusiakan manusia dengan mengajak menghormati perbedaan, mengakui identitas semua warga dan komunitas masyarakat, dan dengan menjamin kebebasan beragama dan ”toleransi” terhadap kemajemukan. Menjunjung tinggi Pancasila membawa kewajiban untuk menjamin hak-hak asasi manusia. Demokrasi membawa ”komitmen pada kesamaan.” Usaha mewujudkan keadilan sosial berakar dalam solidaritas. Bahwa Pancasila merupakan suatu etika politik, menurut Sastrapratedja, tidak berarti bahwa Pancasila tidak menyangkut sikap etis manusia Indonesia masing-masing. Pancasila dapat menjadi etika politik apabila nilai-nilai Pancasila dihayati oleh masyarakat masing-masing. Sesuai dengan lima silanya karakter manusia Pancasilais ditandai oleh lima kemampuan: kemampuan untuk menghargai perbedaan, untuk membawa diri secara manusiawi dan santun, untuk mencintai tanah airnya, untuk bersikap demokratis, serta bersikap adil dan solider. Pendidikan Pancasila dengan demikian adalah pendidikan yang mendukung perkembangan sikap-sikap Pancasilais itu. Sesuatu yang masih dapat dimasukkan ke dalam edisi berikut buku ”Lima Gagasan…” adalah tanggapan terhadap pelbagai paham tentang Pancasila yang selama ini muncul di Indonesia. Ada sebuah koreksi kecil. Catatan Delanty, yang dikutip Sastrapratedja, yang mengatakan bahwa Ayatullah Khomeini dulu menyebarkan gagasannya lewat internet (hlm. 85) tentu keliru. Waktu Khomeini di Paris—dan sampai ia meninggal dunia—belum ada internet. (Franz Magnis-Suseno, Guru Besar Ilmu Filsafat Emeritus, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat, Driyarakra, Jakarta ). (shrink)

The idea to work on this topic was come to my mind when I came across Masaaki Hattori’s comment that Dinnaga has accepted Bhartrhari’s views regarding the meaning of a sentence although their theories of word meaning are completely different from each other. According to Bhartrhari, in all phenomenal entities there are two elements viz. jati and vyakti; jati refers to the real element and vyakti to the unreal. Vyakti suffer changes, whereas jati remains constant. Again according (...) to him the real unit of language is a sentence, and not words or letters, because only a sentence conveys one full idea of the speaker. It’s meaning is also an instantaneous flash of pratibha or intuition, which has no parts. Dinnaga, on the other hand did not accept the reality of word‐ meaning (samanya),but maintained that words deal directly with conceptual images or vikalpas, which are purely subjective constructions of the mind, and therefore there can be no direct connection between words and external objects. The function of a word in a sentence is similar to the function of an inferential mark (linga) in the process of inference and it indicates its object through the exclusion of other things (apoha). Thus, there seems to be some contradictions in Dinnaga’s views on sentence meaning. But I think Dinnaga did not accept Bhartrhari’s views in toto. He could not possibly have done so. There is, however, a resemblance between Dinnaga and Bhartrhari in that each accepted that the primary unit of linguistic meaning is the entire sentence; the meaning of an individual word is abstracted from the whole meaning of the sentence. It is only in that respect that the two philosophers can be said to have roughly the same theory of sentential meaning. (shrink)

Supercommentary on Anuvyākhyāna, verse commentary by Madhva, 13th cent., on Brahmasūtra by Bādarāyaṇa, representing Dvaita point of view; with twenty five supercommentaries : Nyāyasudhābindu by Vijayindratīrtha ; Parimaḷa by Rāghavendratīrtha ; Vāgvajra by Pādarājatīrtha ; Gurvarthadīpikā by Vādirājatīrtha ; Ṭippaṇī by Yadupatyācārya ; Vākyārthavivr̥ti by Vaṃśapallī Śrīnivāsācārya ; Ānanda by Galagalī Narasiṃhācārya ; Vivr̥ti by Kambālūru Rāmacandratīrtha ; Ṭippaṇī by Śrīnidhitīrtha ; Vākyārthacandrikā by Vidyādhīsatīrtha ; Śeṣavākyārthacandrikā by Pāṇḍuraṅgī Keśavācārya ; Vākyārtharatnamālā by Pāṇḍuraṅganarasiṃhācārya ; Sudhāvivr̥tti by Satyavrtatīrtha ; Rasakūlaṅkaṣa by (...) Kuṇḍalagiriācārya ; Durghaṭavākyārthavicāra by Satyanāthatīrtha ; Ṭippaṇī by Viṭṭhalabhaṭṭa ; Rasarañjanī by Viṣṇutīrtha ; Laghurasarañjanī by Aḍavī Kr̥ṣṇācārya ; Caṣaka by Mannārī Kr̥ṣṇācārya ; Upasparśa by Erī Bālācārya ; Kāśī ṭippaṇī by Kāśī Ācārya ; Guḍhakar̥trkā by Gudhakaratr̥kācārya ; Pradīpa by Pradīpakāra ; Ṭippaṇī by Pāndhrī Śrīnivāsācārya ; Huggi by Kallāpūra Satyādhirājācārya. (shrink)

In a rare book published in Trivandrum (1927), entitled Sphoṭasiddhiḥ Bharatamiśrapranītā , we find an interesting argument in defense of sphoṭa -theory, based on āgamic quotations, especially RV X, 71, 4 (the stanza where the poet describes his own activity in perceiving the essence of Speech as like a beloved woman naked). The main idea is that the numerous word sphoṭas , as an atemporal multiplicity, free from any sensuous quality, were the objects of the Ṛṣis’ primordial intuition. So the (...) internal diversity of the Veda is not a mere subjective convention in order to adapt the highest truth to limited human minds. The absolute brahman has an objective cosmogonical power of which the temporal mutiplicity is only the very last result. There is also an intermediate ideal multiplicity, which the Veda, as eternal and transcending the guru-śiṣya transmission, consists in. (shrink)