In the history of Chinese and European philosophy, metaphysics has played an outstanding role: it is a theoretical framework which provides the basis for a philosophical understanding of the world and the self. A theory of the self is well integrated in a metaphysical understanding of the totality of nature as a dynamic process of continuous changes. According to this view, the purpose of existence can be conceived of as the development and realization of the full potential given to the (...) individual by its nature. In regard to human nature specifically, this idea of self-realization includes the development of all cognitive faculties as well as of the moral character. Metaphysics has, however, suffered a loss of importance in current debates, especially in ethics. As a result, we observe the emergence of such philosophical views as moral skepticism and even nihilism. The consequence of this tendency has been the renunciation of a claim to understanding and to providing a solid ground for ethics. Yet an intercultural dialogue can provide us with some hope as the consolidation of debates on crucial topics of our traditions might indeed serve as the basis for a more powerful philosophy in the future. (shrink)

The central argument of this book is that it is necessary to adopt a naturalistic epistemology in order to overcome the dualism of activity and passivity in the conceptual framework of idealism. The problem, as Hoffman sees it, arises from the old dilemma of idealism. If knowers are active in knowing, that is, if they impose an a priori framework on the objects of sensation, then the objects themselves cannot be given as a reality independent of knowledge. But if knowers (...) are passive, if they merely receive reality in the form of some pre-conceptual intuition, then what are given in experience can never become objects of knowledge. Thus Hoffman contends that the idealistic theory of mental activity implies either that reality is dissolved in an a priori conceptual scheme or that it is unknowable. (shrink)

The central argument of this book is that it is necessary to adopt a naturalistic epistemology in order to overcome the dualism of activity and passivity in the conceptual framework of idealism. The problem, as Hoffman sees it, arises from the old dilemma of idealism. If knowers are active in knowing, that is, if they impose an a priori framework on the objects of sensation, then the objects themselves cannot be given as a reality independent of knowledge. But if knowers (...) are passive, if they merely receive reality in the form of some pre-conceptual intuition, then what are given in experience can never become objects of knowledge. Thus Hoffman contends that the idealistic theory of mental activity implies either that reality is dissolved in an a priori conceptual scheme or that it is unknowable. (shrink)