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Profile: Stefan Wintein (Tilburg University)
  1. Stefan Wintein & Reinhard A. Muskens (forthcoming). From Bi-Facial Truth to Bi-Facial Proofs. Studia Logica:1-14.
    In their recent paper Bi-facial truth: a case for generalized truth values Zaitsev and Shramko [7] distinguish between an ontological and an epistemic interpretation of classical truth values. By taking the Cartesian product of the two disjoint sets of values thus obtained, they arrive at four generalized truth values and consider two “semi-classical negations” on them. The resulting semantics is used to define three novel logics which are closely related to Belnap’s well-known four valued logic. A syntactic characterization of these (...)
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  2. Stefan Wintein (2014). Alternative Ways for Truth to Behave When There's No Vicious Reference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):665-690.
    In a recent paper, Philip Kremer proposes a formal and theory-relative desideratum for theories of truth that is spelled out in terms of the notion of ‘no vicious reference’. Kremer’s Modified Gupta-Belnap Desideratum (MGBD) reads as follows: if theory of truth T dictates that there is no vicious reference in ground model M, then T should dictate that truth behaves like a classical concept in M. In this paper, we suggest an alternative desideratum (AD): if theory of truth T dictates (...)
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  3. Stefan Wintein (2013). On the Strict–Tolerant Conception of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):1-20.
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  4. Stefan Wintein (2012). Assertoric Semantics and the Computational Power of Self-Referential Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):317-345.
    There is no consensus as to whether a Liar sentence is meaningful or not. Still, a widespread conviction with respect to Liar sentences (and other ungrounded sentences) is that, whether or not they are meaningful, they are useless . The philosophical contribution of this paper is to put this conviction into question. Using the framework of assertoric semantics , which is a semantic valuation method for languages of self-referential truth that has been developed by the author, we show that certain (...)
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  5. Stefan Wintein (2012). On the Behavior of True and False. Minds and Machines 22 (1):1-24.
    Uzquiano (Analysis 70:39–44, 2010 ) showed that the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever ( HLPE ) [in its amended form due to Rabern and Rabern (Analysis 68:105–112, 2008 )] has a solution in only two questions. Uzquiano concludes his paper by noting that his solution strategy naturally suggests a harder variation of the puzzle which, as he remarks, he does not know how to solve in two questions. Wheeler and Barahona (J Philos Logic, to appear, 2011 ) formulated a three question (...)
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  6. Stefan Wintein & Reinhard Muskens (2012). A Calculus for Belnap's Logic in Which Each Proof Consists of Two Trees. Logique Et Analyse 220:643-656.
     
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  7. Stefan Wintein (2011). A Framework for Riddles About Truth That Do Not Involve Self-Reference. Studia Logica 98 (3):445-482.
    In this paper, we present a framework in which we analyze three riddles about truth that are all (originally) due to Smullyan. We start with the riddle of the yes-no brothers and then the somewhat more complicated riddle of the da-ja brothers is studied. Finally, we study the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever (HLPE). We present the respective riddles as sets of sentences of quotational languages , which are interpreted by sentence-structures. Using a revision-process the consistency of these sets is established. (...)
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  8. Stefan Wintein (2010). What Makes a Knight? In T. Icard & R. Muskens (eds.), Interfaces: Explorations in Logic, Language and Computation. Springer Berlin. 25--37.
    In Smullyan’s well known logic puzzles, the notion of a knight, which is a creature that always speaks the truth, plays an important role. Rabern and Rabern (2008) made the following observation with respect to knights. They noted that when a knight is asked (1), he gets into serious trouble.
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