Abstract Drawing upon evolutionary theory and the work of Daniel Dennett and Nicholas Agar, I offer an argument for broadening discussion of the ethics of disenhancement beyond animal welfare concerns to a consideration of animal “biopreferences”. Short of rendering animals completely unconscious or decerebrate, it is reasonable to suggest that disenhanced animals will continue to have some preferences. To the extent that these preferences can be understood as what Agar refers to as “plausible naturalizations” for familiar moral concepts like (...) beliefs and desires, then they can make moral claims on us and provide support for intuitive opposition to disenhancement. Content Type Journal Article Category Original Paper Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11569-012-0142-6 Authors John Hadley, School of Humanities and Communication Arts, University of Western Sydney, 7.G.10b, Bankstown Campus, Locked Bag 1797, Penrith, NSW 2751, Australia Journal NanoEthics Online ISSN 1871-4765 Print ISSN 1871-4757. (shrink)

In his paper The Opposite of Human Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chicken problem (Nanoethics 2:305–316, 2008) Paul Thompson argues that the possibility of disenhancing animals in order to improve animal welfare poses a philosophical conundrum. Although many people intuitively think such disenhancement would be morally impermissible, it’s difficult to find good arguments to support such intuitions. In this brief response to Thompson, I accept that there’s a conundrum here. But I argue that if we seriously consider whether creating (...) beings can harm or benefit them, and introduce the non-identity problem to discussions of animal disehancement, the conundrum is even deeper than Thompson suggests. (shrink)

To mitigate animal suffering under industrial farming conditions, biotechnology companies are pursuing the development of genetically disenhanced animals. Recent advances in gene editing biotechnology have brought this to reality. In one of the first discussions of the ethics of disenhancement, Thompson argued that it is hard to find compelling reasons to oppose it. We offer an argument against disenhancement that draws upon parallels with human disenhancement, ecofeminism’s concern with the “logic of domination,” and a relational ethic that (...) seeks to preserve a meaningful relationship between farmers and their animals. In addition, we respond to two arguments in favor of animal disenhancement—one grounded in the non-identity problem and one that argues disenhancement is the best we can do to protect animal well-being right now. We argue that animal disenhancement does not address the fundamental issue of oppression of animals in the context of contemporary animal agriculture. Therefore, we conclude that animal disenhancement is not nearly as valuable as it might appear initially. (shrink)

One objection to xenotransplantation is that it will require the large-scale breeding, raising and killing of genetically modified pigs. The pigs will need to be raised in designated pathogen-free facilities and undergo a range of medical tests before having their organs removed and being euthanised. As a result, they will have significantly shortened life expectancies, will experience pain and suffering and be subject to a degree of social and environmental deprivation. To minimise the impact of these factors, we propose the (...) following option for consideration—ethically defensible xenotransplantation should entail the use of genetic disenhancementifit becomes possible to do so and if that pain and suffering cannot be eliminated by other means. Despite not being a morally ideal ‘solution’, itismorally better to prevent unavoidable pain until a viable non-animal alternative becomes available. (shrink)

In this paper I look at moral debates about animal disenhancement. In particular, I propose that given the particular social institutions in which such disenhancement will operate, we ought to reject animal disenhancement. I do this by introducing the issue of animal disenhancement and presenting arguments in support of it, and showing that while these arguments are strong, they are unconvincing when we look at the full picture. Viewing animal disenhancement in a context such as (...) high intensity food production, we see that the arguments in support of it fall short of other ethical considerations, leading me to conclude that the moral and pragmatic reasons weigh against animal disenhancement. (shrink)

This paper discusses the concept of “human disenhancement”, i.e. the worsening of human individual abilities and expectations through technology. The goal is provoking ethical reflection on technological innovation outside the biomedical realm, in particular the substitution of human work with computer-driven automation. According to some widely accepted economic theories, automatization and computerization are responsible for the disappearance of many middle-class jobs. I argue that, if that is the case, a technological innovation can be a cause of “human disenhancement”, (...) globally, and all things considered, even when the local and immediate effect of that technology is to increase the demand of more sophisticated human skills than the ones they substitute. The conclusion is that current innovations in the ICT sector are objectionable from a moral point of view, because they disenhance more people than they enhance. (shrink)

The Disenhancement Problem in Agriculture: A Reply to Thompson Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11569-012-0138-2 Authors Soraj Hongladarom, Department of Philosophy and Center for Ethics of Science and Technology, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand Journal NanoEthics Online ISSN 1871-4765 Print ISSN 1871-4757.

Abstract In his paper “The Opposite of Human Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chicken problem” ( Nanoethics 2: 305-36, 2008) Thompson argued that technological attempts to reduce or eliminate selected non-human animals’ capabilities (animal disenhancements) in order to solve or mitigate animal welfare problems in animals’ use pose a philosophical conundrum, because there is a contradiction between rational arguments in favor of these technological interventions and intuitions against them. In her response “Animal Disenhancement and the Non-Identity Problem: A Response (...) to Thompson” ( Nanoethics 5:43–48, 2011), Palmer maintained that the philosophical conundrum is even deeper if we introduce the non-identity problem into the discussion. In my brief response, I claim that in order to avoid the pitfalls of speculative ethics, empirical facts related to the technologies involved as well as costs for the non-human animals have to be taken into account. Depending on which changes we are referring to, ethical problems can be seen very differently. Widening the consideration to the socio-economic context in which non-human animals are currently used by humans, I challenge the idea of genuine philosophical conundrums from an antispeciesist and abolitionist perspective. Only in a context of exploitation, in which non-human animals are deprived of basic rights and their existence is totally dependent on human exploitation, the contradictions between improvement of welfare and disenhancement of capabilities make sense. Content Type Journal Article Category Critical Discussion Notes Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s11569-012-0139-1 Authors Arianna Ferrari, KIT/ITAS (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology/Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis), Karlsruhe, Germany Journal NanoEthics Online ISSN 1871-4765 Print ISSN 1871-4757. (shrink)

In recent years, some ethicists have defended that we should genetically engineer farmed animals to diminish or eliminate their capacity to experience negative affective states, a process known as disenhancement that would, according to these authors, result in a situation that is better than the status quo. While we agree with this overall assessment, we believe that it is a mistake to defend disenhancement as a good solution to farmed animals’ plight. This is because disenhancement entails some (...) generally unseen harms that arise from the fact that negative affective states, despite feeling bad, support the access to a number of intrinsic goods, such as individuality, social relationships, meaning, and political participation. Though farmed animals currently have few opportunities to enjoy these goods, we argue that this is a reason to change the environment in which they are kept, not the animals. If we truly care about improving farmed animals’ lives, we should aim to enrich their environment, rather than impoverish their mental lives. (shrink)

In "Making Sense of Animal Disenhancement" Adam Henschke provides a framework for fully understanding and evaluating animal disenhancement. His conclusion is that animal disenhancement is neither morally nor pragmatically justified. In this paper I argue that Henschke misapplies his own framework for understanding disenhancement, resulting in a stronger conclusion than is justified. In diagnosing his misstep, I argue that the resources he has provided us, combined with my refinements, result in two new avenues for inquiry: an (...) application of concepts from political theory to disenhancement, and an inquiry in to the mode of valuation that underlies industrial animal agriculture and disenhancement proposals. (shrink)

Symposium on Animal Disenhancement: Introduction Content Type Journal Article Category Introduction Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s11569-012-0145-3 Authors John Weckert, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Canberra, ACT, Australia Journal NanoEthics Online ISSN 1871-4765 Print ISSN 1871-4757.

abstract John Robertson has famously argued that the right to reproductive autonomy is exceedingly broad in scope. That is, as long as a particular reproductive preference such as having a deaf child is “determinative” of the decision to reproduce then such preferences fall under the protective rubric of reproductive autonomy rights. Importantly, the deafness in question does not constitute a harm to the child thereby wrought since unless the child could be born deaf he or she would otherwise never have (...) existed— his or her prospective parents would simply have chosen to abort. As such, for this child, being born deaf counts as a benefit, albeit of the “backhanded” variety, since the only other practical alternative is nonexistence. In what follows, I want to investigate this argument in detail. The target of my investigation will be the possible future use of gene therapy technology to “disenhance” one's offspring. I intend to show that the apparently unlimited right to reproductive autonomy, that is, the right to choose both the quantity and qualities of future offspring, entailed by the argument from backhanded benefit can in fact be “sidestepped” through considering what sorts of reproductive practices we as a society ought to allow. (shrink)

Animal ethicists have recently debated the ethical questions raised by disenhancing animals to improve their welfare. Here, we focus on the particular case of breeding hens for commercial egg-laying systems to become blind, in order to benefit their welfare. Many people find breeding blind hens intuitively repellent, yet ‘welfare-only’ positions appear to be committed to endorsing this possibility if it produces welfare gains. We call this the ‘Blind Hens’ Challenge’. In this paper, we argue that there are both empirical and (...) theoretical reasons why even those adopting ‘welfare-only’ views should be concerned about breeding blind hens. But we also argue that alternative views, which (for example) claim that it is important to respect the telos or rights of an animal, do not offer a more convincing solution to questions raised by the possibility of disenhancing animals for their own benefit. (shrink)

Nanotechnologies that have been linked to the possibility of enhancing cognitive capabilities of human beings might also be deployed to reduce or eliminate such capabilities in non-human vertebrate animals. A surprisingly large literature on the ethics of such disenhancement has been developed in response to the suggestion that it would be an ethically defensible response to animal suffering both in medical experimentation and in industrial livestock production. However, review of this literature illustrates the difficulty of formulating a coherent ethical (...) debate. Well structured arguments for disenhancement can be made on the basis of mainstream views on the basis of ethical obligations to animals, but these arguments have not been persuasive against the moral intuition that disenhancements are unethical. At the same time, attempts to ground these intuitions in a coherent philosophical doctrine have been plagued by logical fallacies and question begging assertions. As such, the debate over animal disenhancement forecasts an enduring conundrum with respect to the core question of transforming the nature of sentient beings, and this conundrum is logically independent of claims that relate either to the distinctive of human beings or to issues deriving from the emphasis on enhancement. (shrink)

A growing number of animal ethicists defend new omnivorism--the view that it's permissible, if not obligatory, to consume certain kinds of animal flesh and products. This book puts defenders of new omnivorism and advocates of strict veganism into conversation with one another to further debates in food ethics in novel and meaningful ways. The book includes six chapters that defend distinct versions of new omnivorism and six critical responses from scholars who are sympathetic to strict veganism. The contributors debate whether (...) it's ethically permissible to eat the following: "freegan" meat, roadkill, cultured meat, genetically disenhanced animals, possibly insentient animals such as insects, and fish. The volume concludes with two chapters that examine strict vegan and new omnivore policy. Presenting readers with clear defenses and criticisms of the various dietary proposals, this book draws attention to the most important ethical challenges facing traditional animal agriculture and alternative systems of food production. New Omnivorism and Strict Veganism will appeal to scholars and students interested in food ethics, animal ethics, and agricultural ethics. (shrink)