In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:85, LEGAL OBLIGATION IN HUME There is one aspect of the thought of David Hume that seems to me to be important and topical, especially if considered in relation to two reductionist and dogmatic tendencies that are still noticeable in the general theory of law. By dogmatic I understand conceptions that are insufficiently founded on experience. The first of these two dogmatic tendencies is the emphasis placed on the (...) notion of sanction which is viewed by some as prevailing over the concept of obligation to the point of absorbing it within itself. Law is that which the superior bodies of the dominant class impose. This doctrine has been affirmed even recently. But the master example is given by Bentham. To say that a man has the obligation to behave in a certain way is equivalent to saying that if he does not behave so, he will experience pain (or the absence of pleasure). Legal sanction is the source from which this pain comes. Thus Bentham goes so far as to say that pain is constitutive of 2 obligation in all its forms. This seems to be contrary to experience and common sense. In fact, one can observe a legal obligation independently of the consideration of the consequences inherent in its violation. For this and other reasons the doctrinal tendency to give prevalence to the notion of sanction over the notion of obligation does not take account of experience and is dogmatic. Against this dogmatism one observes even today that the concept of an obligation that arises from a constriction, the concept 3 of Zwangspflicht, is a contradictio in adjecto. Nevertheless, in order to avoid the contradiction inherent in the prevalence of sanction over obligation and the dependence of law on political power and on the power of those who command, it is easy to fall into a second and opposite dogmatism. This second dogmatism consists in affirming the existence of fundamental legal obligations deducible from a priori principles understood platonically 86. as Ol·(fO- T"*) WVXt\S and as vision of the mind. But demonstrative reason, so understood, is determined exclusively through relations of ideas which, in Hume's opinion, cannot themselves constitute legal obligation. A legal system requires modifications and limitations to the passions and interests of individuals. As is well known, Hume argues that a passion and an interest cannot be modified by selfevident rational principles. No criterion that is deducible from demonstrative reason can function as a guide to human behaviour. Now between the two dogmatisms to which I have referred, Hume represents a third way on the basis of experience and of common sense. The advantage offered by Hume's thought is that of showing both the distinction between and the complementary nature of legal obligation and sanction. In what follows I shall discuss what I consider to be the kernel of Hume's legal theory as contained in his conception of human nature, setting aside secondary elements that do not directly concern the subject proposed. First: A legal system is not conceivable without setting up fundamental legal rules which, in Hume's opinion are the rules of justice. Consequently, the discussion of law implies the discussion of justice. And the discussion of justice is part of legal theory. Here I restrict my consideration to the obligations that are expressed by fundamental legal rules which are: stability of possession transference of possession by consent, and performance of promises. We know that, according to Hume, such rules cannot be derived from demonstrative or a_ priori reason but are revealed to empirical knowledge. Second: Hume distinguishes between the setting up of legal obligation and the moral evaluation of the legal obligation. In order to grasp the peculiarity of legal obligation as compared with moral evaluation, I refer here to the constitution of legal obligation. In order to understand the third book of the Treatise, it is in my 87. opinion absolutely necessary to take into account the distinction between the setting up of the legal obligation and its moral evaluation. Third: The obligations expressed in fundamental legal rules do not arise through a natural inclination but by artifice or by convention. The concept of artifice implies in Hume... (shrink)

Rotating shifts are common among nurses to ensure continuity of care. This scheduling system encompasses several adverse health and performance consequences. One of the most injurious effects of night-time shift work is the deterioration of sleep patterns due to both circadian rhythm disruption and increased sleep homeostatic pressure. Sleep problems lead to secondary effects on other aspects of wellbeing and cognitive functioning, increasing the risk of errors and workplace accidents. A wide range of interventions has been proposed to improve the (...) sleep quality of nurses and promote an increase in attention levels. In recent years, particular attention has been paid to individual and environmental factors mediating the subjective ability to cope with sleep deprivation during the night shift. Given the predictive role of these factors on the negative impact of a night shift, an individualized intervention could represent an effective countermeasure by ensuring suitable management of shift schedules. Therefore, the aims of this mini-review are to: provide an updated overview of the literature on sleep problems in night shift nurses and their adverse consequences; and critically analyze the psychosocial factors that mediate the negative impact of shift work with the ultimate goal of defining an effective countermeasure based on an individualized approach. (shrink)

This book presents a critical reconsideration of the Kantian cognitive and practical subject. Special attention is devoted to highlight the complex relation between subjectivity as it is presented in the three critiques and the way in which it is construed in other writings, in particular the Anthropology. While for Kant our cognitive apparatus and the structure of our will are common to all humans, the anthropological subject reveals degrees of variation, depending on a myriad of external circumstances that pose a (...) challenge to the unity of Kant's account and await theoretical solutions. The essays collected in the volume delve into how the different shapes of human nature are not unrelated. They explore how and why different "Kantian subjects" are closely connected and at their core, if not entirely unified. The notions of personality, humanity, and citizenship will serve as leading threads for the reconstruction of this possible underlying unity. An engaging read that promises to deepen our understanding of human nature, the volume will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of philosophy, politics, psychology, social anthropology, ethics, and epistemology. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate ignorance in relation to our capacity to justify our beliefs. To achieve this aim we specifically address scientific misconceptions, i.e. beliefs that are considered to be false in light of accepted scientific knowledge. The hypothesis we put forward is that misconceptions are not isolated false beliefs, but rather form part of a system of inferences—an explanation—which does not match current scientific theory. We further argue that, because misconceptions are embedded in a system, they cannot be (...) rectified simply by replacing false beliefs with true ones. To address our misconceptions, we must rather act on the system of beliefs that supports them. In the first step of our analysis, we distinguish between misconceptions that are easy to dispel because they represent simple errors that occur against the background of a correct explanatory apparatus and misconceptions that are, on the contrary, very difficult to dispel because they are the product of pseudo explanations. We show that, in the latter case, misconceptions constitute an integral part of an incorrect explanation and the reasons that support such misconceptions are deeply misleading. In the second step, we discuss various approaches that have been adopted to address the problem of misconceptions. Challenging the notion that directly addressing and criticizing specific misconceptions is an effective approach, we propose that critical thinking is the most fruitful means to deal with misconceptions. We define the core competences and knowledge relevant for the practice of critical thinking and discuss how they help us avoid misconceptions that arise from accepting beliefs that form part of a mistaken explanation. (shrink)