S'il est vrai qu'aucune passion, aucun souci ne résistent à la sérénité qu'apporte à l'esprit la discipline mathématique, c'est faire une cure de sérénité que lire le nouvel ouvrage d'Émile Borel, qui s'est proposé de raconter, dans ses traits essentiels, l'histoire des relations entre les mathématiciens et la notion d'infini. La première partie du livre relate les circonstances où s'est produite la rencontre des mathématiciens et de l'infini, en Grèce, quelques siècles avant l'ère chrétienne (Zénon, cruel Zénon!). La deuxième (...) partie expose la conquête et l'organisation de l'infini par les mathématiciens modernes, du XVIe au XIXe siècle. La troisième partie, enfin, étudie les plus importantes des difficultés et les divergences de vues qui se sont présentées dans les temps actuels lorsqu'on a cherché à préciser et à approfondir les résultats acquis sur l'infini mathématique. (shrink)

[688/2197] In many economic matters there arises a paradox that may be related to what in logic courses is called the “sophism of the heap of wheat”. Among the sophisms bequeathed to us by the Greeks, none is worthier to have come down through the centuries than this “sophism of the heap of wheat”; indeed this no mere puzzle, but a topical example of a frequent difficulty, as much in practical life as in pure speculation.One grain of wheat does not (...) make a heap; neither do two grains; nor do three grains; \(\ldots \) on the other hand, if a million grains are gathered, we can agree that they constitute a heap. What is the exact limit? Should we say that 2,342 grains, for instance, do not make a heap, whereas 2,343 grains do? This is obviously ridiculous. There appears no logical way out of this dead-end; it is therefore not possible to know what a heap of wheat is.The expression of the sophism can be varied in many ways; a classification of these expressions will not be unhelpful. (shrink)

We have, however, as the title of the book would suggest, dealt mainly with space and time, introducing mechanical and electromagnetic considerations only when ...

Unsurpassed among books on space and time in terms of its insights and clarity, this volume by a world-famous mathematician can be appreciated by lay readers as ...

ArgumentThe Germans occupying Paris arrested Emile Borel and three other members of the Académie des Sciences in October 1941 and released them about five weeks later. Drawing on German and French archives and other sources, we argue that these events illustrate the complexity of the motivations and tactics of the occupiers and the occupied. While Borel and his colleagues were genuine members of the Resistance, and those who arrested them were full participants in a brutal occupation, both (...) sides respected a bargain, of no small importance to the Vichy regime, that allowed the university to pursue its work if its members avoided overt acts of opposition. (shrink)

Emile Borel regards the Banach-Tarski Paradox as a reductio ad absurdum of the Axiom of Choice. Peter Forrest instead blames the assumption that physical space has a similar structure as the real numbers. This paper argues that Banach and Tarski's result is not paradoxical and that it merely illustrates a surprising feature of the continuum: dividing a spatial region into disjoint pieces need not preserve volume.

Preface to Volumes 1 and 2 Lorenz Krüger xv Introduction to Volume 1 Lorraine J. Daston 1 I Revolution 1 What Are Scientific Revolutions? Thomas S. Kuhn 7 2 Scientific Revolutions, Revolutions in Science, and a Probabilistic Revolution 1800-1930 I. Bernard Cohen 23 3 Was There a Probabilistic Revolution 1800-1930? Ian Hacking 45 II Concepts 4 The Slow Rise of Probabilism: Philosophical Arguments in the Nineteenth Century Lorenz Krüger 59 5 The Decline of the Laplacian Theory of Probability: A Study (...) of Stumpf, von Kries, and Meinong Andreas Kamlah 91 6 Fechner’s Indeterminism: From Freedom to Laws of Chance Michael Heidelberger 117 7 The Saint Petersburg Paradox 1713-1937 Gerard Jorland 157 8 Laplace and Thereafter: The Status of Probability Calculus in the Nineteenth Century Ivo Schneider 191 9 Emile Borel as a Probabilist Eberhard Knobloch 215 III Uncertainty 10 The Domestication of Risk: Mathematical Probability and Insurance 1650-1830 237 11 The Objectification of Observation: Measurement and Statistical Methods in the Nineteenth Century Zeno G. Swijtink 261 12 The Measurement of Uncertainty in Nineteenth-Century Social Science Stephen M. Stigler 287 IV Society 13 Rational Individuals versus Laws of Society: From Probability to Statistics Lorraine J. Daston 295 14 Decrire, Compter, Calculer: The Debate over Statistics during the Napoleonic Period Marie-Noelle Bourguet 305 15 Probability in Vital and Social Statistics: Quetelet, Farr, and the Bertillons Bernard-Pierre Lécuyer 317 16 Paupers and Numbers: The Statistical Argument for Social Reform in Britain during the Period of Industrialization Karl H. Metz 337 17 Lawless Society: Social Science and the Reinterpretation of Statistics in Germany, 1850-1880 Theodore M. Porter 351 18 Prussian Numbers 1860-1882 Ian Hacking 377 19 How Do Sums Count? On the Cultural Origins of Statistical Causality M. Norton Wise 395. (shrink)

Cet article analyse les débuts de la Revue du Mois, revue de culture générale à caractère scientifique créée en 1905 par le mathématicien Émile Borel. À une période où des périodiques de format similaire se multiplient, l’originalité de l’entreprise réside dans l’association d’articles présentant à un large public les enjeux des recherches récentes (en sciences exactes, expérimentales, mais aussi humaines), et de thèmes plus légers, comme des chroniques théâtrales et littéraires. En examinant la préparation des premiers numéros, l’article dévoile (...) les intentions et la mise en acte de ce projet. Il étudie notamment comment a été définie la ligne éditoriale, comment ambition scientifique et vocation généraliste ont pu coïncider, et comment la revue est parvenue à conquérir son public. (shrink)

Pragmatism, taken not just as a philosophical movement but as a way of addressing problems, strongly influenced the debate on the foundations of probability during the first half of the twentieth century. Upholders of different interpretations of probability such as Hans Reichenbach, Ernest Nagel, Rudolf Carnap, Frank Ramsey, and Bruno de Finetti, acknowledged their debt towards pragmatist philosophers, including Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, Clarence Irving Lewis, William Dewey and Giovanni Vailati. In addition, scientist-philosophers like Ernst Mach, Ludwig Boltzmann, Henri (...) Poincaré, Pierre Duhem, and Karl Pearson, who heralded a conception of science and knowledge at large that was close to pragmatism, were very influential in that debate. Among the main interpretations of probability – frequentism, propensionism, logicism and subjectivism -, the latter is no doubt the closest to the pragmatist outlook. This paper concentrates on three representatives of the subjective theory, namely Frank Ramsey, Bruno de Finetti and Émile Borel. (shrink)

We discuss mathematical and physical arguments against continuity and in favor of discreteness, with particular emphasis on the ideas of Émile Borel.

L'article s'attache à dégager le fil rouge qui relie les réflexions de Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz sur les jeux de société à la théorie des jeux, telle qu'on la trouve dans l'ouvrage de John Von Neumann et Oskar Morgenstern. L'itinéraire décrit passe par les travaux de plusieurs mathématiciens du XVIIIe siècle sur différents jeux de hasard, pour aboutir aux recherches de quelques-uns des fondateurs des mathématiques modernes, comme Ernst Zermelo pour la théorie des ensembles et Émile Borel pour la théorie (...) des probabilités. Il montre comment une analyse mathématique des jeux de société a débouché sur l'élaboration d'une grille générale d'analyse des phénomènes sociaux. Son cheminement révèle, en outre, la longue parenthèse du XIXe siècle où ce programme s'est trouvé abandonné et esquisse, en conclusion, quelques hypothèses pour l'expliquer. (shrink)

Cet article analyse les débuts de la Revue du Mois, revue de culture générale à caractère scientifique créée en 1905 par le mathématicien Émile Borel. À une période où des périodiques de format similaire se multiplient, l’originalité de l’entreprise réside dans l’association d’articles présentant à un large public les enjeux des recherches récentes, et de thèmes plus légers, comme des chroniques théâtrales et littéraires. En examinant la préparation des premiers numéros, l’article dévoile les intentions et la mise en acte (...) de ce projet. Il étudie notamment comment a été définie la ligne éditoriale, comment ambition scientifique et vocation généraliste ont pu coïncider, et comment la revue est parvenue à conquérir son public. (shrink)

Cauchy’s contribution to the foundations of analysis is often viewed through the lens of developments that occurred some decades later, namely the formalisation of analysis on the basis of the epsilon-delta doctrine in the context of an Archimedean continuum. What does one see if one refrains from viewing Cauchy as if he had read Weierstrass already? One sees, with Felix Klein, a parallel thread for the development of analysis, in the context of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum. One sees, with Emile (...) Borel, the seeds of the theory of rates of growth of functions as developed by Paul du Bois-Reymond. One sees, with E. G. Björling, an infinitesimal definition of the criterion of uniform convergence. Cauchy’s foundational stance is hereby reconsidered. (shrink)

Probabilistic epistemology holds that probability is an essential ingredient of science and human knowledge at large, and that induction is a necessary constituent of the scientific method. Developed in some detail by a number of authors including Patrick Suppes, Richard Jeffrey and Brian Skyrms, this view has been embraced by so many, as to gradually become predominant. While probabilistic epistemology has been growing, awareness of its origins was somehow left behind. Probabilistic epistemology is usually seen as a product of the (...) encounter of logical empiricism with American pragmatism. Without denying the impact of such an encounter, it is argued that the probabilistic approach was already part of the European scenario before the dissolution of logical empiricism in the late 1930s. Notably, such an approach is not linked to a particular interpretation of probability, having been endorsed by upholders of different probability notions, including Janina Hosiasson, Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Bruno de Finetti, Harold Jeffreys, and Hans Reichenbach, to mention only those authors whose contribution is addressed here. The list could extend to the French probabilists Émile Borel and Maurice Fréchet, and others not considered in this survey. The work of so many authors operating at the four corners of Europe in the first decades of the 19th century reflects a European tradition in probabilistic epistemology, somewhat overshadowed in the literature by the attention paid to logical empiricism. (shrink)