Some decades ago in his intriguing book on Jonathan Edwards, Perry Miller used to great effect the device of supposing a two-fold biography of Edwards, an external one consisting of the historical record embracing the major events of his life and times, and an internal one aimed at an interpretation of the mind of Edwards and the development of his thought.

There is an undercurrent to be detected in Anselm's record of the meditative experience that issued in the Ontological Argument and, although it points to a profound and perennial problem in the interpretation of religion, this undercurrent has been largely ignored. The Argument, as is well known, moves entirely within the medium of reflective meaning focused on the idea of God and, unlike the cosmological arguments of later theologians, it makes no appeal whatever to a principle of causality or to (...) the discovery of a sufficient reason for finite existence. Anselm seems to have had his own sense of what one may call the unadulterated rationalism of the Argument when, in his own words, he wondered, ‘if perhaps it might be possible to find one single argument that for its proof required no other save itself, and that by itself would suffice to prove that God really exists’. Here we are entirely within that inner chamber of the mind so dear to the Augustinian tradition, a mind from which one is to exclude all thought save that of God. The task of the one who reflects is to penetrate the inner meaning of this thought in order to discover what it implies beyond what is evident on the surface. With such an eminently rational or logical aim occupying the centre of attention, it is quite understandable that the presence of another, and quite opposed, concern should have been overlooked - Anselm's concern, namely, to transcend, as it were, the medium of thought itself, and enter into the presence of God. The reason that this concern introduces a tension in the search for a proof is that the realization of presence would seem to render proof superfluous, while the inference in an argument - especially one moving towards existence – inevitably suggests, in some sense and to some degree, the absence of what is sought for. (shrink)

Despite the frivolous note implied in the popular expression, ‘The Greeks had a word for it’, the literal truth is that they did! Time and again we find reflected in the terminology developed by these ancient seekers after wisdom, an attention to important distinctions and a faithfulness to the details of actual experience which are truly remarkable. The Greek thinkers had, as every classical scholar and student of Greek philosophy knows, a finely developed philosophical language, one sensitive no less to (...) the unusual, pregnant experience than to the familiar details of ordinary life. (shrink)

John E. Smith; XI—Radical Empiricism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 65, Issue 1, 1 June 1965, Pages 205–218, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotel.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of EnlightenmentJohn E. SmithAvihu Zakai. Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. Pp. xvii + 348. Cloth, $49.95.Edwards's History of Redemption is the focus of this study by Avihu Zakai—Professor of History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The History is a (...) series of thirty sermons Edwards preached on Isaiah 51:8 "... my righteousness shall be forever... my salvation from generation to generation." For him, it was a "new method in divinity... thrown into the form of a history"—a narrative showing God's sovereignty in redemption "from the fall of man to the end of the world."Zakai gives a comprehensive account of Edwards's view of history meant to highlight his struggle against modern beliefs threatening Christian faith (308; passim). The discussion is not limited to history, but includes most of Edwards's writing from 1720-1750 with emphasis on his opposition to the Enlightenment. Zakai cannot interpret so many works with the accuracy needed; he repeats old errors such as opposing the "head" and "heart" in the Affections and minimizing Edwards's respect for "common morality" in the ethical writings. Zakai is right in saying that Edwards insisted on God's authority over the world and history, but he puts it in such absolutistic terms that he often seems to abandon historical analysis in favor of exhortation.Zakai's best contribution is in his search for the general framework of God's redemption of the "engine" driving history (120ff.; 213ff.). He finds the answer in "seasons" of revival such as the Great Awakening. This is true, but Edwards notes other special events like the Reformation that "promoted the work of redemption" (Works, 9. 272), but are not revivals in the usual sense. For Edwards, special events are of many kinds and are identified by interpretation based on God's Providence. As Miller claimed, interpretation is essential; without it we may have a chronicle of events, but no history. Zakai seems to underestimate this point and the many problems it poses.The book strikes me as one more attempt—George Marsden's recent book, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (New Haven, 2003), is another—to rescue Edwards from "profane" interpreters like Miller who saw that Edwards learned from the Enlightenment even though he challenged many of its ideas. In my view, Edwards can well take care of himself.John E. SmithYale UniversityCopyright © 2004 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

Some time in the 1950’s I was invited to address a meeting of the English Institute which took place at Columbia University and, while I have but a dim recollection of the topic, a point came up in the discussion which I still remember very well and it bears very closely on the subject of this essay. I had said something in my opening remarks about how technical recent philosophy had become and what a formidable language was growing up around (...) it. In the audience was Marjorie Hope Nicholson, the distinguished literary scholar and author of, among others, that delightful book about science and literature, Newton Demands the Muse. She took the occasion to tell us that in her student days she could read and profit from philosophical works—Locke, Bergson, James—and went on to say that in her opinion any intelligent person could read these authors and others without having, as we would now say, “majored” in philosophy. She added, however, that she found herself no longer able to read with much comprehension the writing of the philosophers of the time because of the remoteness of the issues from concrete experience and the esoteric language in which they were presented. What Nicholson was perceiving, perhaps without knowing the background, was the about-face in philosophy that was taking place at the time. Largely in response to the charge that philosophy, unlike science, was making no “progress,” many philosophers decided to limit philosophy to areas—logic, semantics, semiotics—in which it was believed that progress was possible. One result was the abandoning of all the undeniably vague and stubborn issues—God, the self, freedom and determinism, values and facts and the like —that resist solutions of a scientific sort. Unfortunately for philosophers, these are the matters that interest everyone most. (shrink)

No one acquainted with the odyssey of Hegel’s thought in America can fail to take note of the progress that has been made over the past twenty-five years in the study and interpretation of his writings. New texts, new translations, and, above all, penetrating commentaries, have led to a better and more accurate understanding of Hegel’s philosophy and at the same time have served to overcome prejudices, a priori opinions about what he must have said, and plain errors in construing (...) his basic ideas. Much of the work that has made this progress possible has been done by members of the Hegel Society and contributors to The Owl. (shrink)

Although Paton depends for his materials on virtually all of Kant's writings on moral philosophy, he makes the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten central to his analysis. This is a wise choice and one that is defensible since Paton has set for himself the task of elucidating the categorical imperative and it is in the Grundlegung that Kant sought to grasp the supreme principle of morality and its appearance to us as a categorical imperative. Despite the fact that, as the (...) author points out on many occasions, the Grundlegung neither stresses morality from the standpoint of action, nor does it deal in detail with many significant problems, it must nevertheless always be looked upon as central to Kant's ethics just because it does deal with the supreme principle as a categorical imperative. The seemingly more authoritative Critique of Practical Reason is more definitely concerned with the larger subject of reason in its practical employment and does not deal as directly with Paton's special concern as the Grundlegung does. (shrink)

Our topic suggests the existence of some uncertainty about the viability of natural theology, but it also invites a reassessment of the enterprise. The variety of current thinking in this area makes it difficult to find a single paradigm for structuring the discussion. The voices of such philosophers as Hartshorne, Kenny, Swinburne, Plantinga, Alston, and Joseph Owens, to mention but a few, do not form a chorus, even if they obviously share some of the same themes. The best procedure is (...) to set out from the traditional view about the aims and approaches of natural theology in an effort to determine whether this program can still be followed or whether some of its attendant problems may be cause for modifying it. (shrink)

One of the important philosophical advantages stemming from study of the historical development of philosophical movements and traditions is the insight that comes from observing the logical out-working of a set of ideas over a period of time that far exceeds the lifetime of any individual thinker. An Aristotle or a Hegel may develop a philosophical mode of thought in an almost unbelievably comprehensive way, but no individual can grasp all the implications and ramifications of his philosophical vision, no matter (...) how monumental his powers may be. Many individuals, however, working over many years within the same framework of ideas can accomplish what no one of them alone could achieve. It is often said that philosophy is not an experimental science, and, in an obvious sense, this is true. But it is not entirely true. We can view the history of a tradition like Platonism, for example, or Augustinianism, as a vast experiment made by many thinkers with a set of ideas in which each thinker, building on what has gone before, seeks to develop further the basic premises of the position, proposing new logical alternatives, correcting errors, meeting objections, discovering further implications, and consolidating the results. In the case of a profound tradition, nothing less than this extended historical dialectic of ideas suffices to make plain what the basic position implies. Moreover, since climates of opinion change, the proponents of a given view will find that, in the course of time, new opponents appear, raising questions and posing problems that could not easily have been envisaged by the thinker who started the tradition. Sometimes these objections prove fatal and the tradition comes to an end; sometimes the objections are successfully overcome and the position finds new life and a more viable form of expression. The history of a tradition, therefore, is an indispensable resource for philosophical understanding. (shrink)

Before dealing directly with the content of Urban's thought, there remains to be singled out one of its general traits, a grasp of which is absolutely necessary for any understanding of his thought. From the beginning, Urban's philosophy has exhibited a refusal to accept any ultimate impasse in thought. His is the understanding or irenic type of view over against the one-sided or polemic type. For him, reason is always comprehensive enough to sustain differences of opinion, and it is able, (...) if one goes deeply enough, to show the relativity of all exclusive oppositions in philosophical thought. There is an almost Hegelian passion for synthesis in his dogged attempts to get beyond certain disagreements between philosophical positions. It was his wont to regard impasses in thought as futile in the precise sense that neither side is able to refute the other simply because there is a sense in which both are right and both are wrong. Many illustrations from the writings of what might be called this "transcending" approach can be given: in History he seeks to show the two-fold nature of sufficient reason as both logical and ontological and approves of Kant's attempt to establish a mediating position beyond both; in Valuation the attempt is made to get "beyond the dichotomy of 'appreciation' and 'description' "; in Intelligible the view is taken that logical values are neither "existent" nor "subsistent" but "simply valid" which view is said to be beyond special ontological prejudices; in Humanity Urban is concerned to show that the religious tradition of the West has been beyond the ultimate antithesis of pure deity or mere humanity and that an indissoluble relation between the two has always been acknowledged and accepted; the attempt to get "beyond" occupies, of course, the whole of Beyond, and need not be singled out for special attention at this juncture. These illustrations are only a few of many; in calling attention to this general trait, however, it must not be thought that anything more is intended than the emphasizing of a singularly important feature of Urban's thought. Such a trait, howsoever clearly understood, would still leave us far from an adequate comprehension of his idealism; but without taking it into account his views will often appear to lack sharpness and conviction. All that can be said is that these are some of the disadvantages of a harmonizing or transcending position. (shrink)

Despite the title, I do not intend to launch another expedition into the domain of epistemology. I wish instead to call attention to some problems which have arisen for philosophical theologians and philosophers of religion, as a result of two facts about the development of modern philosophy and its bearing on the analysis and interpretation of religious insight. Following these considerations, I shall propose in brief compass a programme for the future which I believe will prove fruitful for the philosophical (...) treatment of religious concerns. (shrink)

The popular belief that religion is the same everywhere or that all religions are ‘at bottom’ identical in essentials is a widespread falsehood that is saved from being completely worthless by the fact that religion does exhibit a universal or common structure wherever it appears. This structure is intimately related to the structure of human life in the world. The enduring pattern that enables us to understand religions widely separated in both time and space depends largely on the fact that (...) man and the process of human life in the world have their own structures which remain, despite the undeniable variety introduced by vast differences of culture, ethnic features, geographical location, climate etc. Structure means pattern or form; it is reality significantly organised. It can be grasped as that which endures above and beyond changing historical details. Because human life has a structure, we are able to understand the wrath of Achilles or sympathise with the love of Abélard for Héloïse although we are separated from both by centuries of time. (shrink)