While research has focused on why certain entrepreneurs elect to create innovative solutions to social problems, very little is known about why some social entrepreneurs choose to scale their solutions while others do not. Research on scaling has generally focused on organizational characteristics often overlooking factors at the individual level that may affect scaling decisions. Drawing on the multidimensional construct of moral intensity, we propose a theoretical model of ethical decision making to explain why a social entrepreneur’s perception of moral (...) intensity of the social problem, coupled with their personal desire for control, can significantly influence scaling decisions. Specifically, we propose that higher levels of perceived moral intensity will positively influence the likelihood of scaling through open as opposed to closed modes in order to achieve greater speed and scope of social impact. However, we also propose this effect will be negatively moderated by a social entrepreneur’s higher levels of desire for control. Our model has implications for research and practice at the interface of ethics and social entrepreneurship. (shrink)

A comprehensive, critical evaluation of the ideas of the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, including a summary of his life.

Besides the well-known Aesthetics, Logic, Philosophy of the Practical, and the Vico and Hegel books, Croce is the author of about three dozen other philosophical works, one in a series of "Philosophical Essays," another in a series of "Miscellaneous Writings," and a third one in the 44-volume series on "Literary and Political History." As editor and quasi-publisher of his own books, Croce himself probably contributed to philosophers’ neglect of these less theoretical, less systematic works by giving to the first three (...) books mentioned above the editorial label of "Philosophy of Mind" and listing them before the others in the collected edition of his works. If one takes the trouble to read all his works, it becomes very difficult, however, to find a coherent structure in terms of which one can understand the somewhat different views one finds, as one might expect since they span a period of about 60 years; nor can one easily make sense of the various changes that Croce’s views underwent. The present book is a serious and important attempt to identify such structures and to reduce such changes to developments. (shrink)

Discussions in English of Benedetto Croce’s concept of the pure or logical concept are few in comparison with treatments of his aesthetics and theory of history. Yet an understanding of the Crocean concrete universal is a necessary prerequisite for a comprehension of his humanistic philosophy. With regard to Croce’s aesthetics, for instance, the autonomy of art depended upon his view of the relations that existed among the categories of thought and will; and his theory of history followed from his (...) definitions of pure concept and pseudoconcept. (shrink)

A sequel to a previous work on Croce's philosophy of history, the present volume contains the author's critique of pragmatic historiography. In Croce's own system, art, law, and religion had been originally differentiated along Hegelian lines. The influence of Pareto and of Marxism brought him to the realization of the autonomy of economics. His Filosofia della pratica put side by side all of these categories of action. For Croce the pure freedom that defines moral action, and the responsibility for evil (...) corresponding to the element of negativity in choosing, belong properly in the social realm. Bausola's interesting and timely book follows closely Croce's long struggle with this antinomy in his constant reworking of his analyses of culture.--A. M. (shrink)

Ernesto de Martino made a seminal contribution to the study of vernacular religions, producing innovative analyses of key concepts such as folklore, magic and ritual. His methodology stemmed from his training under the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce whilst his philosophical approach to anthropology borrowed from Marx and Gramsci.Widely celebrated in continental Europe, de Martino's contribution to the study of religion has not been fully understood in the Anglophone world though some of his works - Primitive Magic: the Psychic Powers (...) of Shamans and Sorcerers and The Land of Remorse: a Study of Southern Italian Tarantism - have been translated.This book presents a comprehensive overview of de Martino's work and the thinkers and theories which informed his writings. It assesses his contribution to the study of religions and the potential of his methodology for contemporary scholarship. (shrink)

Alma y estilo.--Jazz y espíritu.--Nietzsche y los valores vitales.--Henry de Montherlant; o, La vida peligrosa.--Para una teoría del personaje.--Bruno; o, La posesión de lo absoluto.--Para una caractereología argentina.--Esencia del pálpito criollo: el lancero.--La actitud filosófica.--Inmanencia y trascendencia.--Hermann Keyserling y la filosofía.--Saber en acto.--La aventura cartesiana.--El estetismo de Benedetto Croce.--José Ingenieros y la nueva generación.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:194 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and properly, in a consideration of Bradley, although it is a little like citing Bradley in his own behalf. In all, Mr. Saxena's book is carefully researched and judicious, selecting Bradley's chief metaphysical themes for explication and defence. As one slight criticism: Bradley's doctrine of truth is treated as coherence, which it indeed was on the level of reality; but he dealt with truth quite (...) differently in immediate experience and on the level of appearance (elaborating those levels in his Essays on Truth and Reality), and hia metaphysics would appear richer if those theories of truth were discussed and applied to their appropriate realms. It~J~ Ross Scripps College Filosofia e SLoria nel Pensiero Crociano. By Adriano Bausola. (Milano: SocietA editrici Vitae Pensiero, 1965. Pp. 280. Paper. L. 4~500.) Etica e Politica nel Pensiero dl Benedetto Croce. (Milano: SocietA editrici Vitae Pensiero, 1966. Pp. 265. Paper. L 3,500.) Theee two volumes examine respectively Croce's doctrines of the theoretic and of the practical spheres of experience and thus treat of many of the main tenets of Croce's entire philosophy. For within these spheres, Adriano Bausola critically discusses important views which occur in the areas of logic, gnoseology, theory of history, as well as in ethics, economic and political doctrine. The scope of Bausola's treatment is in accord with Croce's own approach to philosophy, since strictly speaking, neither the theoretic nor the practical sphere can be correctly understood in abstraction from the other. Moreover, in his treatment of Croce's view, Bausola frequently discusses the criticisms of other contemporary Italian Crocean critics,as for example, of Gentile, Guido Calogero and Ugo Spirito, and this method of exposition has the advantages of making Croce's own position clear and of giving us some idea of very recent Italian philosophy. According to Bausola, the essential character of Croce's philosophy is shown in his rejection of every view which admits of transcendent experience or of abstract ideas. Thus, Filosofia e Storia critically traces this rejection as it occurs throughout the theoretic sphere of experience and attempts to make explicit the "positive" Crocean doctrine which accompanies his denial of the transcendent and of the abstract. Here Bausola concludes that despite Croce's claim to the contrary, there is more than one "logical" reason for Croce's refutation of the transcendent. Among these reasons are Croce's view of the identity of subject and object, his refutation of every mediate cognitive process, of every inference, and of every experience which issupposed to be neither theoretic nor practical. Chapter i ol Filosofia c Storia discusses the foundation of Croce's philosophy which Bausola maintains should be described as "spiritualism" (spiritualismo) rather than as "idealism" (idealismo), since for Croce, reality is fundamentally "spirit" and not "pure thought." Chapters 11 and 111 treat specifically of epistemic problems, such as, the nature of philosophic or pure concepts and the judgments to which they give rise, the nature of scientific or pseudoconcepts and the relations between philosophy and science. Chapters IV and v treat of Croce's view of the nature of "the real" and of the relations between the categories---their autonomy and their unity. Here Bausola attempts to show that Croce's transcendental deduction of the four forms of experience (aesthetic, logical, economic and ethical) has failed and that his demonstration shows merely that the distinction between these forms are empirical. Chapter IV then discusses Croce's view of philosophy as history. The next three chapters present a critical analysis of Croce's doctrine of error which forms one of his most interesting contributions to philosophy. Here Bausola's task is not to consist of an explication of the central Crocean view on error, but rather of an examination of its "concrete" development and its validity. At the outset of his discussion, Bausola asks: Does error ever result from non-practical as well as from practical acts? BOOK REVIEWS 195 Does error invariably result from conscious volition? And Bausola tries to show contrary to Croce% view that there are instances of error which do not involve conscious volition, but that Croce% denial of such instances follows... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:96 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY La Controri]orma della Dialettica: Coscienza e storia nel neoidealismo italiano. By Francesco Valentini. (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1966.Pp. 154.Paper, L. 1,500.) This volume consists of a re-examination of the views of Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile, in the light of their respective positions in the history of philosophy. Valentini proposes that some important notions in the philosophies of Croce and Gentile ]ustify a Kantian interpretation (...) and thus constitute a counter-reformation with respect to some important assumptions in Hegel's doctrine. This proposal is especially interesting with regard to Croce, since it contradicts Croce's evaluation of his own position as representing a furtherance of the viable portions of Hegel's system, just as Hegel's system is supposed to represent a furtherance of Kant's view. Moreover, since Croce's evaluation follows from his general philosophic assumptions, Valentini's proposal attacks not only Croce's evaluation of his own position, but also his views on the nature of history and philosophy. According to Valentini, the views of Croce and Gentile agree in the abandonment of the "dogmatism" of Hegel and in a return to a transcendental philosophy which examines the conditions which make experience possible, rather than experience itself, in its concrete, historical development. (Gentile's view is supposed to be fundamentally the same as Croce's, save that Gentile's conclusions are more radical and thus, according to Valentini, more deo structive.) However, according to Valentini, this return to an examination of the nature of consciousness represents a retrogression, not only historically, but also philosophically with respect to the empirical and historical portions of Hegel's philosophy. In Chapter I of Part I, Valentini begins his discussion of Croce's notion of spirit, by stating that Croce generally professed an antitheological and antimetaphysical attitude, but that his intended resolution of the religious and theological into the mundane is not always complete. Accordingly, Valentini believes that he has discovered two prejudices which derive from this incomplete resolution: the first is supposed to be a monistic prejudice, which means the attempt to reduce all aspects of reality to the same characteristic or structure; and the second--a bias towards "inwardness", which shows preference for everything which can be reduced to the autonomous operation of consciousness. Chapter II examines Croce's view of the nature of consciousness, as well as the subjective aspects of his views of historical judgment. The relations between the forms of experience, aesthetic, conceptual and practical are discussed and criticized according to the views of modem psychology. Croce's subjectivism is supposed to lie in his notion that all history is contemporary and is formed by a kind of cognitive construction of the past. Here Valentini maintains that Italian idealism has made a "subjective correction" of Hegel's philosophy of history. Chapter IH treats of the development of Croce's views on historicism and describes his attitude as being characteristic of anti-enlightenment doctrines of the nineteenth century. Chapter IV traces what Valentini believes to be a certain ambivalence in Croce's aesthetics, that is, a vacillation between two themes which are supposed to be present throughout Croce's philosophy--the idealist theme which emphasizes the nature of consciousness and the theme of historicism. The idealist aspect can be perceived in Croce's theory of intuition and above all, in certain romantic developments of his doctrine, such as, the vindication of the character of "cosmic totality" and in the notion of the "eternality" of artistic expression. The theme of historicism can be found in some corrections which Croce made in his theory of intuition, as well as in some judgments and literary preferences, which are not completely reconcilable with his theoretical formulations. The fifth and last chapter of Part I treats of Croce's ethical doctrine and generally distinguishes between the views of Croce and Hegel on this topic. The second part of Valentini's work discusses Gentile as a philosopher of consciousness and is divided into four chapters. The topic of Chapter I is the attitude which is presupposed by the philosophy of "actual" idealism. This philosophy demands an unshakable faith in an ideal, a mission to accomplish... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:194 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and properly, in a consideration of Bradley, although it is a little like citing Bradley in his own behalf. In all, Mr. Saxena's book is carefully researched and judicious, selecting Bradley's chief metaphysical themes for explication and defence. As one slight criticism: Bradley's doctrine of truth is treated as coherence, which it indeed was on the level of reality; but he dealt with truth quite (...) differently in immediate experience and on the level of appearance (elaborating those levels in his Essays on Truth and Reality), and hia metaphysics would appear richer if those theories of truth were discussed and applied to their appropriate realms. It~J~ Ross Scripps College Filosofia e SLoria nel Pensiero Crociano. By Adriano Bausola. (Milano: SocietA editrici Vitae Pensiero, 1965. Pp. 280. Paper. L. 4~500.) Etica e Politica nel Pensiero dl Benedetto Croce. (Milano: SocietA editrici Vitae Pensiero, 1966. Pp. 265. Paper. L 3,500.) Theee two volumes examine respectively Croce's doctrines of the theoretic and of the practical spheres of experience and thus treat of many of the main tenets of Croce's entire philosophy. For within these spheres, Adriano Bausola critically discusses important views which occur in the areas of logic, gnoseology, theory of history, as well as in ethics, economic and political doctrine. The scope of Bausola's treatment is in accord with Croce's own approach to philosophy, since strictly speaking, neither the theoretic nor the practical sphere can be correctly understood in abstraction from the other. Moreover, in his treatment of Croce's view, Bausola frequently discusses the criticisms of other contemporary Italian Crocean critics,as for example, of Gentile, Guido Calogero and Ugo Spirito, and this method of exposition has the advantages of making Croce's own position clear and of giving us some idea of very recent Italian philosophy. According to Bausola, the essential character of Croce's philosophy is shown in his rejection of every view which admits of transcendent experience or of abstract ideas. Thus, Filosofia e Storia critically traces this rejection as it occurs throughout the theoretic sphere of experience and attempts to make explicit the "positive" Crocean doctrine which accompanies his denial of the transcendent and of the abstract. Here Bausola concludes that despite Croce's claim to the contrary, there is more than one "logical" reason for Croce's refutation of the transcendent. Among these reasons are Croce's view of the identity of subject and object, his refutation of every mediate cognitive process, of every inference, and of every experience which issupposed to be neither theoretic nor practical. Chapter i ol Filosofia c Storia discusses the foundation of Croce's philosophy which Bausola maintains should be described as "spiritualism" (spiritualismo) rather than as "idealism" (idealismo), since for Croce, reality is fundamentally "spirit" and not "pure thought." Chapters 11 and 111 treat specifically of epistemic problems, such as, the nature of philosophic or pure concepts and the judgments to which they give rise, the nature of scientific or pseudoconcepts and the relations between philosophy and science. Chapters IV and v treat of Croce's view of the nature of "the real" and of the relations between the categories---their autonomy and their unity. Here Bausola attempts to show that Croce's transcendental deduction of the four forms of experience (aesthetic, logical, economic and ethical) has failed and that his demonstration shows merely that the distinction between these forms are empirical. Chapter IV then discusses Croce's view of philosophy as history. The next three chapters present a critical analysis of Croce's doctrine of error which forms one of his most interesting contributions to philosophy. Here Bausola's task is not to consist of an explication of the central Crocean view on error, but rather of an examination of its "concrete" development and its validity. At the outset of his discussion, Bausola asks: Does error ever result from non-practical as well as from practical acts? BOOK REVIEWS 195 Does error invariably result from conscious volition? And Bausola tries to show contrary to Croce% view that there are instances of error which do not involve conscious volition, but that Croce% denial of such instances follows... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:96 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY La Controri]orma della Dialettica: Coscienza e storia nel neoidealismo italiano. By Francesco Valentini. (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1966.Pp. 154.Paper, L. 1,500.) This volume consists of a re-examination of the views of Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile, in the light of their respective positions in the history of philosophy. Valentini proposes that some important notions in the philosophies of Croce and Gentile ]ustify a Kantian interpretation (...) and thus constitute a counter-reformation with respect to some important assumptions in Hegel's doctrine. This proposal is especially interesting with regard to Croce, since it contradicts Croce's evaluation of his own position as representing a furtherance of the viable portions of Hegel's system, just as Hegel's system is supposed to represent a furtherance of Kant's view. Moreover, since Croce's evaluation follows from his general philosophic assumptions, Valentini's proposal attacks not only Croce's evaluation of his own position, but also his views on the nature of history and philosophy. According to Valentini, the views of Croce and Gentile agree in the abandonment of the "dogmatism" of Hegel and in a return to a transcendental philosophy which examines the conditions which make experience possible, rather than experience itself, in its concrete, historical development. (Gentile's view is supposed to be fundamentally the same as Croce's, save that Gentile's conclusions are more radical and thus, according to Valentini, more deo structive.) However, according to Valentini, this return to an examination of the nature of consciousness represents a retrogression, not only historically, but also philosophically with respect to the empirical and historical portions of Hegel's philosophy. In Chapter I of Part I, Valentini begins his discussion of Croce's notion of spirit, by stating that Croce generally professed an antitheological and antimetaphysical attitude, but that his intended resolution of the religious and theological into the mundane is not always complete. Accordingly, Valentini believes that he has discovered two prejudices which derive from this incomplete resolution: the first is supposed to be a monistic prejudice, which means the attempt to reduce all aspects of reality to the same characteristic or structure; and the second--a bias towards "inwardness", which shows preference for everything which can be reduced to the autonomous operation of consciousness. Chapter II examines Croce's view of the nature of consciousness, as well as the subjective aspects of his views of historical judgment. The relations between the forms of experience, aesthetic, conceptual and practical are discussed and criticized according to the views of modem psychology. Croce's subjectivism is supposed to lie in his notion that all history is contemporary and is formed by a kind of cognitive construction of the past. Here Valentini maintains that Italian idealism has made a "subjective correction" of Hegel's philosophy of history. Chapter IH treats of the development of Croce's views on historicism and describes his attitude as being characteristic of anti-enlightenment doctrines of the nineteenth century. Chapter IV traces what Valentini believes to be a certain ambivalence in Croce's aesthetics, that is, a vacillation between two themes which are supposed to be present throughout Croce's philosophy--the idealist theme which emphasizes the nature of consciousness and the theme of historicism. The idealist aspect can be perceived in Croce's theory of intuition and above all, in certain romantic developments of his doctrine, such as, the vindication of the character of "cosmic totality" and in the notion of the "eternality" of artistic expression. The theme of historicism can be found in some corrections which Croce made in his theory of intuition, as well as in some judgments and literary preferences, which are not completely reconcilable with his theoretical formulations. The fifth and last chapter of Part I treats of Croce's ethical doctrine and generally distinguishes between the views of Croce and Hegel on this topic. The second part of Valentini's work discusses Gentile as a philosopher of consciousness and is divided into four chapters. The topic of Chapter I is the attitude which is presupposed by the philosophy of "actual" idealism. This philosophy demands an unshakable faith in an ideal, a mission to accomplish... (shrink)

1. 1901-1910 -- 2. 1911-1920 -- 3. 1921-1930 -- 4. 1931-1943 (2 v.).

First published in 2005, Economics and Social Interaction is a fresh attempt to overcome the traditional inability of economics to deal with interpersonal phenomena that occur within the sphere of markets and productive organizations. It makes use of traditional economic concepts for understanding interpersonal events, while venturing beyond those concepts to give a better account of personalised interactions. In contrast to other books, Economics and Social Interaction offers the reader a rigorous effort at extending economic analysis to a difficult field (...) in a consistent manner, sensitive to insights from other behavioural and social sciences. This collection represents an important contribution to a growing research agenda in the social sciences. (shrink)