Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):177-193 (2019)

Authors
Karl Schafer
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately just one instance of a much more general approach to philosophy – which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”.
Keywords Kant  Metaethics  Constitutivism  Practical Reason  Rational capacities  Kant's Moral Philosophy
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2019.1599049
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Natural Goodness.Philippa Foot - 2001 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Constructivism in Metaethics.Carla Bagnoli - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A System of Rational Faculties: Additive or Transformative?Karl Schafer - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):918-936.
Two Sorts of Constitutivism.Jeremy David Fix - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):1-20.
Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):661-686.
Constructivism in Metaethics.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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Kant: Critique of Practical Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.

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