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Summary Moral constructivism is a distinctive position both in metaethics and normative ethics. In metaethics, moral constructivism holds that being the result of a suitable constructivist procedure (normally, a characterization of correct practical reasoning) constitutes the correctness of moral judgments, principles and values. Accordingly, normative principles and values are not something we discover through the use of theoretical reason, but a construction of human practical reason. The motivation for this position is to offer an explanation of the nature and origin of normative truths (against moral skepticism) without commitment to the idea that such truths correspond to an independent order of facts (against moral realism). In normative ethics, constructivism holds that principles and judgments within a given normative domain are justified because of the very fact that they would be the result of a suitable constructivist device or procedure. This last thesis is neutral regarding the nature of such principles and judgments, so that some authors who use constructivist devices as a way of justifying their preferred normative content remain silent regarding their metaethical commitments.
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  1. Autonomy and Objective Moral Constructivism: Rawls Versus Kleingeld & Willaschek.Alyssa R. Bernstein - forthcoming - Philosophia.
    Pauline Kleingeld and Marcus Willaschek, in a co-authored article, declare that their purportedly new interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s writings on autonomy reveals that his moral philosophy is neither realist nor constructivist. However, as I explain here, John Rawls already occupies the area of intellectual territory to which Kleingeld and Willaschek attempt to lay claim: Rawls interprets Kant’s moral philosophy as neither realist, as Kleingeld and Willaschek evidently construe this term, nor constructivist, as they evidently construe this term. Contra Kleingeld and (...)
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  2. Toward an Existentialist Metaethics: Beauvoir’s Groundwork.Daniela Dover & Jonathan Gingerich - forthcoming - In Berislav Marušić & Mark Schroeder (eds.), Analytic Existentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In her 1947 book _Toward an Ethics of Ambiguity_, Simone de Beauvoir sketches the outlines of a systematic existentialist ethical theory. This short and startlingly ambitious text purports to offer nothing less than a new way to meet the challenge of moral skepticism with a theory that at once grounds moral normativity and entails certain first-order moral norms. We argue that Beauvoir offers a distinctive and promising version of metaethical constructivism that deserves to be treated as a live option in (...)
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  3. Metaethics and Its Discontents: A Case Study of Korsgaard.Nadeem J. Z. Hussain & Nishi Shah - forthcoming - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Moral Constructivism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.
    The maturing of metaethics has been accompanied by widespread, but relatively unarticulated, discontent that mainstream metaethics is fundamentally on the wrong track. The malcontents we have in mind do not simply champion a competitor to the likes of noncognitivism or realism; they disapprove of the supposed presuppositions of the existing debate. Their aim is not to generate a new theory within metaethics, but to go beyond metaethics and to transcend the distinctions it draws between metaethics and normative ethics and between (...)
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  4. ‘Constructivism, Contractarianism and Basic Obligations: Kant and Gauthier’.Kenneth R. Westphal - forthcoming - In J.-C. Merle (ed.), Reading Kant’s Doctrine of Right.
    Gauthier’s contractarianism begins with an idea of a rational deliberator but ‘finds no basis for postulating a moral need for the justification of one’s actions to others. The role of agreement is to address each person’s demand that the constraints of society be justified to him, not a concern that he justify himself to his fellows’ (Gauther 1997, 134–5). He contrasts his view with Scanlon’s contractualism, according to which agreement with others is the core of morality and each agent has (...)
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  5. Response-Dependent Realism.Mark LeBar - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 465-83.
    Writers on metaethics divide over two conceptions of what moral realism comes to. The first of these —the “Modest” conception — commits to the truth-aptness of moral judgments. The second —the “Robust” conception — commits to the mind- or stance- or response-dependence of such judgments. In this paper I take up the relationship of response-dependent (RD) moral theories to these conceptions of realism. Some proponents of RD views see themselves as opponents of realism. On the Modest conception they are not, (...)
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  6. Alienation and the Metaphysics of Normativity: On the Quality of Our Relations with the World.Jack Samuel - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 26 (1).
    I argue that metaethicists should be concerned with two kinds of alienation that can result from theories of normativity: alienation between an agent and her reasons, and alienation between an agent and the concrete others with whom morality is principally concerned. A theory that cannot avoid alienation risks failing to make sense of central features of our experience of being agents, in whose lives normativity plays an important role. The twin threats of alienation establish two desiderata for theories of normativity; (...)
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  7. Toward a Post-Kantian Constructivism.Jack Samuel - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (53):1449–1484.
    The conventional wisdom regarding the aims and shortcomings of Kantian constructivism is mistaken. The aim of metaethical constructivism is not to provide a naturalistic account of the objectivity of normative facts by deriving substantive morality from a conception of agency so thin as to be uncontroversial (a task at which it is generally regarded to have failed). Its aim is to explain the “grip” that normative facts have on us—to avoid what I call the problem of normative alienation. So understood, (...)
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  8. Re-constructing Kant: Kant’s Teleological Moral Realism.Facundo Rodriguez - 2022 - Kant Yearbook 14 (1):71-95.
    It is common for constructivists to claim that Kant was the first philosopher to understand moral facts as ‘constructions of reason’. They think that Kant, just like the constructivist, proposes a procedure – the Categorical Imperative – from which the order of value can be ‘constructed’ and grounds the validity of this construction procedure not in some previous value but in its capacity to solve a practical problem, the problem of ‘free agency’. I here argue that this reading is misguided (...)
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  9. Review of Constructing Practical Reasons, by Andreas Müller. [REVIEW]Matthew Silverstein - 2022 - Mind (526):531-539.
  10. Andreas Müller, Constructing Practical Reasons: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. ISBN: 9780198754329. [REVIEW]Christopher Frugé - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):859-861.
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  11. The Right and the Wren.Christa Peterson & Jack Samuel - 2021 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 81-103.
    Metaethical constructivism aims to explain morality’s authority and relevance by basing it in agency, in a capacity of the creatures who are in fact morally bound. But constructivists have struggled to wring anything recognizably moral from an appropriately minimal conception of agency. Even if they could, basing our reasons in our individual agency seems to make other people reason-giving for us only indirectly. This paper argues for a constructivism based on a social conception of agency, on which our capacity to (...)
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  12. Revisiting the Social Origins of Human Morality: A Constructivist Perspective on the Nature of Moral Sense-Making.Andrés Segovia-Cuéllar - 2021 - Topoi 41 (2):313-325.
    A recent turn in the cognitive sciences has deepened the attention on embodied and situated dynamics for explaining different cognitive processes such as perception, emotion, and social cognition. This has fostered an extensive interest in the social and ‘intersubjective’ nature of moral behavior, especially from the perspective of enactivism. In this paper, I argue that embodied and situated perspectives, enactivism in particular, nonetheless require further improvements with regards to their analysis of the social nature of human morality. In brief, enactivist (...)
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  13. Constructing Practical Reasons.Andreas Müller - 2020 - Oxford, Vereinigtes Königreich: Oxford University Press.
    Some things are reasons for us to perform certain actions. That it will spare you great pain in the future, for example, is a reason for you to go to the dentist now, and that you are already late for work is a reason for you not to read the next article in the morning paper. Why are such considerations reasons for or against certain actions? Constructivism offers an intriguing answer to this question. Its basic idea is often encapsulated in (...)
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  14. Précis zu Constructing Practical Reasons.Andreas Müller - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (4):555-559.
  15. Repliken.Andreas Müller - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (4):572-576.
    Christine Tiefensee und Felix Koch formulieren in ihren Kommentaren eine Reihe interessanter Fragen und herausfordernder Einwände. Ich bin dankbar für die Gelegenheit, meine Überlegungen im Lichte ihrer Kritik zu präzisieren und zu verteidigen.
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  16. Kantian constructivism and the Reinhold–Sidgwick objection.Matthé Scholten - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):364-379.
    In this paper, I give a reconstruction of the so‐called Reinhold–Sidgwick objection and show that Korsgaard‐style Kantian constructivists are committed to two key premises of the underlying argument. According to the Reinhold–Sidgwick objection, the Kantian conception of autonomy entails the absurd conclusion that no one is ever morally responsible for a morally wrong action. My reconstruction of the underlying argument reveals that the objection depends on a third premise, which says that freedom is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. After (...)
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  17. El equlibrio reflexivo y la función de los ejemplos en la investigación moral.Santiago Truccone Borgogno - 2019 - Anuario Del Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales (Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba):687-709.
    Este trabajo pretende ser una reconstrucción de uno del equilibrio reflexivo. Proporcionaré un concepto, enunciaré sus elementos y describiré cada uno de sus pasos. Afirmaré que puede suscribirse al uso del equilibrio reflexivo no solo desde esquemas coherentistas sino también –contrariamente a lo tradicionalmente sostenido- fundacionalistas. Afirmaré también que ambos esquemas pueden ser sensibles a la experiencia moral humana y que, por tanto, ninguno de los dos representa, necesariamente, un modo viciado de hacer filosofía moral. Finalmente, dado que muchas investigaciones (...)
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  18. It only takes two to tango: against grounding morality in interaction.Sem de Maagt - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2767-2783.
    Most Kantian constructivists try to ground universal duties of interpersonal morality in certain interactions between individuals, such as communication, argumentation, shared action or the second-person standpoint. The goal of this paper is to present these, which I refer to as arguments from the second-person perspective, with a dilemma: either the specific kind of interaction that is taken as a starting point of these arguments is inescapable, but in that case the argument does not justify a universal principle of interpersonal morality. (...)
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  19. Constructivism, intersubjectivity, provability, and triviality.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):515-527.
    Sharon Street defines her constructivism about practical reasons as the view that whether something is a reason to do a certain thing for a given agent depends on that agent’s normative point of view. However, Street has also maintained that there is a judgment about practical reasons which is true relative to every possible normative point of view, namely constructivism itself. I show that the latter thesis is inconsistent with Street’s own constructivism about epistemic reasons and discuss some consequences of (...)
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  20. Constructivism and the Problem of Normative Indeterminacy.Yair Levy - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (2):243-253.
    I describe a new problem for metaethical constructivism. The problem arises when agents make conflicting judgments, so that the constructivist is implausibly committed to denying they have any reason for any of the available options. The problem is illustrated primarily with reference to Sharon Street’s version of constructivism. Several possible solutions to the problem are explained and rejected.
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  21. Kant: constitutivism as capacities-first philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):177-193.
    Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant (...)
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  22. Towards a semantics for metanormative constructivism.Jeremy M. Schwartz & Joel D. Velasco - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3061-3076.
    The status of constructivism as a metaethical or metanormative theory is unclear partly due to the lack of a clear semantics for central normative terms such as ‘reason’ and ‘ought’. In a series of recent papers, Sharon Street has attempted to clarify the central commitments of constructivism by focusing on the idea of a practical point of view and what follows from it. We improve upon the informal understanding provided by Street and attempt to provide a semantics for ‘ought’. Our (...)
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  23. Should Environmental Ethicists Fear Moral Anti-Realism?Anne Schwenkenbecher & Michael Rubin - 2019 - Environmental Values 28 (4):405-427.
    Environmental ethicists have been arguing for decades that swift action to protect our natural environment is morally paramount, and that our concern for the environment should go beyond its importance for human welfare. It might be thought that the widespread acceptance of moral anti-realism would undermine the aims of environmental ethicists. One reason is that recent empirical studies purport to show that moral realists are more likely to act on the basis of their ethical convictions than anti-realists. In addition, it (...)
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  24. Formalism and constitutivism in Kantian practical philosophy.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):163-176.
    Constitutivists have tried to answer Enoch’s “schmagency” objection by arguing that Enoch fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency. Although these arguments are effective against some versions of the objection, I argue that they leave constitutivism vulnerable to an important worry; namely, that constitutivism leaves us alienated from the moral norms that it claims we must follow. In the first part of the paper, I try to make this vague concern more precise: in a nutshell, it seems that constitutivism cannot (...)
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  25. Rawlsian Constructivism and the Assumption of Disunity.Johan Brännmark & Eric Brandstedt - 2018 - Journal of Political Philosophy 27 (1):48-66.
  26. A Perfectionist Humean Constructivism.Dale Dorsey - 2018 - Ethics 128 (3):574-602.
    In this article, I articulate and explore a novel constructivist approach to metanormativity that is inspired by David Hume’s metaesthetics. This view, which I call perfectionist Humean constructivism, rejects the claim that practical reasons are constructed by each individual’s valuing attitudes, holding instead that they are constructed by humanity’s shared evaluative nature. I hold that this approach can plausibly respond to a persistent worry for extant versions of Humean constructivism without embracing the commitments of either a Kantian constructivism or a (...)
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  27. Constitutivism about Practical Reasons.Paul Katsafanas - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 367-394.
    This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of certain (...)
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  28. Ludic Constructivism: Or, Individual Life and the Fate of Humankind.Avery Kolers - 2018 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 13 (3-4):392-405.
    In The Grasshopper, Bernard Suits argues that the best life is the one whose essence is game-play. In fact, only through the concept of game-play can we understand how anything at all is worth doing. Yet this seems implausible: morality makes things worth doing independently of any game, and games are themselves subject to moral evaluation. So games must be logically posterior to morality. The current paper responds to these objections by developing the theory of Ludic Constructivism. Constructivist theories such (...)
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  29. What Should Theists Say about Constructivist Positions in Metaethics?Christian Miller - 2018 - In Kevin Jung (ed.), Religious Ethics and Constructivism: A Metaethical Inquiry. New York: Routledge. pp. 82-103.
    Constructivist positions in meta-ethics are on the rise in recent years. Similarly, there has been a flurry of activity amongst theistic philosophers examining the relationship between God and normative facts. But so far as I am aware, these two literatures have almost never intersected with each other. Constructivists have said very little about God, and theists working on religious ethics have said very little about constructivist views in meta-ethics. In this paper, I draw some connections between the two literatures, and (...)
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  30. Constitutivism about Reasons: Autonomy and Understanding.Karl Schafer - 2018 - In Francois Schroeter & Karen Jones (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Contemporary forms of Kantian constitutivism generally begin with a conception of agency on which the constitutive aim of agency is some form of autonomy or self-unification. This chapter argues for a re-orientation of the Kantian constitutivist project towards views that begin with a conception of rationality on which both theoretical and practical rationality aim at forms of understanding. In a slogan, then, understanding-first as opposed to autonomy-first constitutivism. Such a view gives the constitutivist new resources for explaining many classes of (...)
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  31. Nietzsche and contemporary metaethics.Alex Silk - 2018 - In Paul Katsafanas (ed.), Routledge Philosophical Minds: The Nietzschean Mind. Routledge.
    Recent decades have witnessed a flurry of interest in Nietzsche's metaethics — his views, if any, on metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological issues about normativity and normative language and judgment. Various authors have highlighted a tension between Nietzsche's metaethical views about value and his ardent endorsement of a particular evaluative perspective: Although Nietzsche makes apparently "antirealist" claims to the effect that there are no evaluative facts, he vehemently engages in evaluative discourse and enjoins the "free spirits" to create values. Nearly (...)
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  32. Constructivism About Reasons.Nicholas Southwood - 2018 - In D. Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    Given constructivism’s enduring popularity and appeal, it is perhaps something of a surprise that there remains considerable uncertainty among many philosophers about what constructivism is even supposed to be. My aim in this article is to make some progress on the question of how constructivism should be understood. I begin by saying something about what kind of theory constructivism is supposed to be. Next, I consider and reject both the standard proceduralist characterization of constructivism and also Sharon Street’s ingenious standpoint (...)
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  33. Constructivism and the normativity of practical reason.Nicholas Southwood - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford University Press.
    Constructivists hold that truths about practical reasons are to be explained in terms of truths about the correct exercise of practical reason (rather than vice versa). But what is the normative status of the correctness-defining standards of practical reason? The problem is that constructivism appears to presuppose the truth of two theses that seem hard to reconcile. First, for constructivism to be remotely plausible, the relevant standards must be genuinely (and not merely formally or minimally) normative. Second, to avoid circularity, (...)
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  34. Contractualism as Restricted Constructivism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):571-579.
    Metaethics is often dominated by both realist views according to which moral claims are made true by either non-natural or natural properties and by non-cognitivist views according to which these claims express desire-like attitudes. It is sometimes suggested that constructivism is a fourth alternative, but it has remained opaque just how it differs from the other views. To solve this problem, this article first describes a clear constructivist theory based on Crispin Wright’s anti-realism. It then outlines an argumentative strategy that (...)
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  35. The Varieties of Moral Improvement, or why Metaethical Constructivism must Explain Moral Progress.Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):17-38.
    Among the available metaethical views, it would seem that moral realism—in particular moral naturalism—must explain the possibility of moral progress. We see this in the oft-used argument from disagreement against various moral realist views. My suggestion in this paper is that, surprisingly, metaethical constructivism has at least as pressing a need to explain moral progress. I take moral progress to be, minimally, the opportunity to access and to act in light of moral facts of the matter, whether they are mind-independent (...)
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  36. Constructivism in metaethics.Carla Bagnoli - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Metaethical constructivism is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, they are not fixed by normative facts that are independent of what rational agents would agree to under some specified conditions of choice. The appeal of this view lies in the promise to explain how normative truths are objective and independent of our actual judgments, while also binding and authoritative for us. -/- Constructivism comes in several varieties, some of which claim a place within metaethics while others claim (...)
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  37. The Dilemma of Normative Supervenience: A Constructivist Solution.Carla Bagnoli - 2017 - In B. Brozek, Antonino Rotolo & J. Stelmach (eds.), Supervenience and Normativity. New York, Stati Uniti: pp. 105-122.
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  38. Kant in Metaethics: The Paradox of Moral Autonomy, Solved by Publicity.Carla Bagnoli - 2017 - In M. Altman (ed.), Kant Handbook. Palgrave. pp. 355-377.
    This chapter aims to situate Kant’s account of practical reason in metaethical debates. First, it explains the reasons why it is legitimate and instructive to discuss Kant’s relevance in contemporary metaethics, hence addressing some issues about the intended scope of metaethics and its relation to practical reason and psychology. Second, it defends an interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy, which avoids some paradoxes traditionally associated with self-legislation. Third, it shows that constructivism best captures Kant’s conception of practical reason and of (...)
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  39. Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2017 - In Diego Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York, USA: Routledge.
    According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that are sometimes associated with moral skepticism. (...)
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  40. Review of God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning. [REVIEW]Christian Miller - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1.
  41. Evolutionary Debunking Arguments, Explanatory Structure, and Anti-Realism.Karl Schafer - 2017 - In Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 66-85.
    In this essay, I distinguish two different epistemological strategies an anti-realist might pursue in developing an "evolutionary debunking" of moral realism. Then I argue that a moral realist can resist both of these strategies by calling into question the epistemological presuppositions on which they rest. Nonetheless, I conclude that these arguments point to a legitimate source of dissatisfaction about many forms of moral realism. I conclude by discussing the way forward that these conclusions indicate.
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  42. Vulnerability and the Incompleteness of Practical Reason.Carla Bagnoli - 2016 - In Christine Strahele (ed.), Vulnerability, Autonomy and Applied Ethics. London: Routledge. pp. 13-32.
    In this chapter, I examine the concept of vulnerability as a complex constitutive feature of human agency and argue that it is both a constraint on and a resource for practical reasoning. When discussed as an ontological feature of human agency, vulnerability is primarily understood as an aspect of embodiment, which is problematic in different respects. First, in relation to the situatedness of human agency, vulnerability indicates that human agents are subjected to contextual contingencies. Second, in relation to temporality, vulnerability (...)
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  43. Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat.Sorin Baiasu - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1185-1208.
    Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given (...)
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  44. Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem.Bagnoli Carla - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1229-1246.
    According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some progress in the debate (...)
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  45. Rawls on Kantian Constructivism.Nathaniel Jezzi - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (8).
    John Rawls’s 1980 Dewey Lectures are widely acknowledged to represent the locus classicus for contemporary discussions of moral constructivism. Nevertheless, few published works have engaged with the significant interpretive challenges one finds in these lectures, and those that have fail to offer a satisfactory reading of the view that Rawls presents there or the place the lectures occupy in the development of Rawls's thinking. Indeed, there is a surprising lack of consensus about how best to interpret the constructivism of these (...)
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  46. The Form of Practical Knowledge and Implicit Cognition: A Critique of Kantian Constitutivism.Amir Saemi - 2016 - Social Theory and Practice 42 (4):733-747.
    Moral realism faces two worries: How can we have knowledge of moral norms if they are independent of us, and why should we care about them if they are independent of rational activities they govern? Kantian constitutivism tackles both worries simultaneously by claiming that practical norms are constitutive principles of practical reason. In particular, on Stephen Engstrom’s account, willing involves making a practical judgment. To will well, and thus to have practical knowledge (i.e., knowledge of what is good), the content (...)
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  47. Carla Bagnoli , Constructivism in Ethics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013 Pp. 267 ISBN 9781107019218 $95.00. [REVIEW]Richard Dean - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (1):145-150.
    Book Reviews Richard Dean, Kantian Review, FirstView Article.
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  48. Katsafanas, Paul. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 267. $75.00. [REVIEW]Luca Ferrero - 2015 - Ethics 125 (3):883-888.
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  49. Konstruktywizm w metaetyce – perspektywa Arystotelesowska.Jacek Jaśtal - 2015 - Diametros 45:122-143.
    Recently, constructivism has become one of the most important movements in metaethics. According to metaethical constructivism, moral judgements do not refer to moral facts but are constructed as solutions to practical problems. At the same time this claim is not seen as incompatible with cognitive realism. A variant of metaethical constructivism, developed in opposition to the dominant Kantian branch, alludes to Aristotle’s practical philosophy. In this article I raise two issues. Firstly, I present a new version of the Aristotelian constructivism (...)
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  50. Does Morality Have a Point?Michel Meliopoulos - 2015 - Ethical Perspectives 22 (1):151-195.
    Proceeding from the assumption that moral discourse is best conceived of as a practice in the technical sense specified by John Rawls, this article discusses whether it is possible, adequate or even necessary to take up a legislative perspective on the constitutive rules of the said practice. There seem to be two principal legislative manoeuvres with respect to practices, namely rendering the practice under consideration compatible with a practice that is more important and evaluating the constitutive rules of the practice (...)
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