The purpose of this article is to outline the geopolitical concepts of Aleksandr Dugin, the guru of Russian Eurasian geopolitics as a total ideology. After the collapse of the USSR, there was a rapid renaissance of geopolitics in Russia, which was an ideological attempt to rationalise the role and place of the post-Soviet Russian state in the post-Cold War international system. The dynamic development of geopolitics in Russia was also a way for the Russians to overcome the (...) post-imperial trauma and the post-Soviet identity crisis. Geopolitics was to define the global aspirations and goals of the Russian Federation, being the quintessence of postmodern Russian messianism and setting a new historical mission for this state. One of several geopolitical trends in Russia was neo-Eurasianism, whose main ideologist was Aleksandr Dugin. The Russian geopolitician has proceeded to formulate a total ideology based on geopolitics for Russia, which is to constitute an intellectually and conceptually attractive synthesis of all the universalist ideologies practised in this country throughout history. Dugin tries to integrate geopolitics with the metaphysics and philosophy of being, transforming it into a kind of ideocratic sacrum and ideological signpost for the contemporary Russian state. (shrink)

In the 16th century, Moscow proclaimed itself to be the the third Rome and discovered the special way or Russian Orthodox Messianism doctrine. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the idea of Russia's unique global historical role went beyond exclusively church discussions, and the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome acquired an important place in the structure of imperial ideology. Even after a break with the past, after the 1917 October Revolution, the country did not abandon the idea of (...) Messianism, which organically fitted into the structure of Soviet ideology. At the same time, reanimation of messianic moods was carried out here in the format of the doctrine of the World Republic of Soviets and/or World Revolution. Of course, some backbone elements of old Messianism underwent a significant transformation, which can hardly be called secularization. The purpose of this article is to show that the time 1917 mid-1930s may be described with the help of a peculiar dialectic, as the unity of a radical break with the past and the specifically manifested continuity with it. Subsequently, despite large-scale changes, the idea of the peculiarity of the Russian way, firstly in Soviet and then in Russian society, including the specific perception of its past, continued to remain an influential political brand. This kind of discourse should be considered highly archaic today; however, it does not become an attribute of the distant past, retaining the attractiveness and even acquiring state ideology. (shrink)

The task of this article is to clarify the appropriateness and adequacy of peace-making (confessional) rhetoric in the situation of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in particular, the meaningful correspondence of the concept of «peace» in its application or reading by the bearers of different worldview paradigms. The «russkii mir» cannot be translated either as «Russian peace» or as «Russian world». This is because the scope and content of these concepts are different. (...) Rus (Kyiv`s Rus) — a thousand-year-old princely state with its center in Kyiv, where the ancestors of modern Ukrainians lived, baptized by Prince Volodymyr in 988. Rus is not Russia. But Muscovy adopted the name Russia to derive its historiography from Rus. «Russkii mir» actually refutes the axiological principles laid down by ancient Rus’s civilization (freedom, dignity, partnership, co-creation, mutual responsibility). «Russkii mir» destroys peace in global or any local images, trying to grab the territory it decided to own. «Russkii mir» encroaches on world domination and therefore tries to impose its rules of the game on the world, which would reshape the world structure according to the wishes of the Russian dictators. For this, «russkii mir» uses any means and institutions as a tool: the army, weapons of mass destruction, atrocities, terror, lies, propaganda, the church and peace-making rhetoric. The goal is not to restore peace, but to establish the world domination of the Russian Empire in any of its variants (Muscovy, Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian Federation or Orthodox Civilization). Russian Orthodox Church plays a leading role in this — it uses religious rhetoric to formu- late a worldview model of the «russkii mir», consolidates the Russian population for a war of aggression, and justifies the atrocities of the Russian military with the sacred mission of restoring the Holy Rus’. Russian Orthodox Church justifies the «civilizing mission» of the Russian troops, actually calls to protect «our Common Russian Fatherland» by killing Ukrainians on the territo- ry of Ukraine. False messianism, manichaeism, paternalism, hatred of the civilized world that lives by democratic standards and respects the dignity and freedom of the individual, Russian arrogance, conceit, supremacy and egomania — this is what Russian Orthodoxy promotes with its religious rhetoric. Therefore, if we hear calls for «peace» from the bearer of the «russkii mir»’s worldview, it actually means a demand to come to terms with all their whims, to give up one’s own identity, one’s own world, one’s own life, if they do not fit into the concept of «russkii mir». (shrink)

This article presents the understanding of Eurasianism as an expression of Russia’s essence in the works of N.S. Trubetskoi, P.P. Suvchinskii, P.N. Savitskii, and L.P. Karsavin. We use the cognitive category “historical collective individuality” for a more complete and deeper understanding of Eurasianism as a set of views and approaches, as well as a certain specialized social community of its representatives. The use of this category allows us to reveal Eurasianism as an area of ideas expressing the essence of Russia. (...) N.S. Trubetskoi considers Russian-Turanian unity to be just such an expression of that essence; for P.N. Savitskii, it is the circle of “European and Asiatic/Asian cultures”; for P.P. Suvchinskii, Russia’s great testament is the unification of the people and the intelligentsia under the “all-resolving dome of the Orthodox Church”; and for L.P. Karsavin, Russia’s essence consists in its development as a Eurasian subject or a collective person. In addition, the category of historical collective individuality allows us to reveal Eurasianism as a “gold reserve of life” for Eurasians in exile. Thus, the unity of metaphysics and life sought in Russian philosophy is achieved. We draw conclusions about the historicity of the Eurasianist collective individuality. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This is a slightly revised English translation of the third German edition of Bocheński.’s now near-classic introduction to Soviet philosophy. It still remains the best short introduction to the field and can be unhesitatingly recommended for all interested in learning something about philosophy in Soviet Russia. The body of the work is divided into two sections, one historical and the other systematic. The historical section presents both the Western and the Russian origins of dialectical materialism as well (...) as a discussion of the development and characteristics of Soviet philosophy. The systematic section explains and critically evaluates the content of diamat with emphasis on materialism and dialectics. This portion of the book, originally written in 1950, was revised in 1956. The reader should bear in mind that present-tense judgments refer to this latter date. While most of the material is still pertinent, some—for instance the emphasis on Stalin—is not. Newer material appears in the second of the two appendixes. (shrink)

_The purpose _is to study that period of evolution of Gogol’s position, in which his ideas of russian messianism are most clearly outlined ("Selected Passages" and "The Author’s Confession"). To delineate the forms of determining the influence of messianism on his negative assessments of the anthropology of the Early New Age and the Enlightenment. Realization of the specified purpose presupposes, first, the analysis of his way of interpreting humanism in the European classical philosophy, and, secondly, to clarify (...) the nature of his connection with the way of substantiating the idea of the Russian messianism. _Theoretical basis._ Our view of Gogol’s heritage is based on the conceptual positions of phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutics. _Originality._ It is revealed, that period of evolution of Gogol’s position, which most clearly outlines his ideas of russian messianism ("Selected Passages" and "The Author’s Confession"), his position on human nature and its calling is fundamentally different from the position of philosophy of Early New Age and the Enlightenment. If in the first case, it is a question of service to the russian empire, in the last one, it is a question of self-development of the person. Gogol’s dehumanization of those perceptions about the man that have occurred in European classical philosophy is a precondition in justification of russian messianism for him. One of its key factors is a narrow understanding of insight the ideas concerning the spiritual foundation of the world, namely – its reduction to the russian empire. _Conclusions._ Gogol’s philosophical doctrine of man is only partially described as belonging to the "philosophy of the heart". The disadvantage of this qualification is the impossibility of explaining the question of the origins in Gogol’s attempt to substantiate russian messianism. The article demonstrates that the deformation of the basic idea about the connectivity of man with the spiritual arche of the world is its substantive precondition for the philosophy of the Early New Age and the Enlightenment. Gogol narrows it down to the Russian Empire, which makes it impossible to positively delineate the orientations of the russian people. Therefore, his oeuvre during the work on "Selected Passages" and "The Author’s Confession" for future generations is a warning about the futility of a single russian path of development, isolated from European civilization. As the further development of russian thought and history proves, Gogol’s warning as a Ukrainian thinker really has not been heard. A vivid manifestation of this is the cave nationalism that we see today during the russian-Ukrainian war. (shrink)

The fact that this study of Russian dialectical materialism originally appeared before the demotion of Stalin should not be allowed to obscure its value as a source book in the development of dialectical materialism in the U.S.S.R. The author notes its limitations in the preface to the second edition and remedies the situation somewhat in a second appendix with an account of significant developments from 1950 to 1958. Each of the two major parts of the main text, the first (...) historical the second systematic, is marked by the author's capacity for terse and pointed analysis of his material.—R. H. K. (shrink)

The article examines the system-methodological and conceptual foundations of the psychological activity theory that arose in the Soviet Union under the influence of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. The author demonstrates the process of incorporation of Marxism-Leninism dogmas into the canonical form of the activity theory as a scientific knowledge that does not need any scientific confirmation. The pseudoscientific discourse that arose at the same time served to strengthen the position of the ideologists of the bureaucratic system, who found “objective (...) confirmations” of the truth of Marx’s teachings in the data of psychological science. The scientific community, subjected to ideological transformation, tried to defend itself from the destructive influence of ideology, giving rise to special forms of relations in the scientific and psychological environment, which led to the struggle and confrontation of scientific schools and groups. As a result of ideological expansion, psychological knowledge has become to some extent a tool for the bureaucratic system to overpower scientific dissent. That was clearly manifested in the discussion on the results of the Zagorsk experiment, in which an incorrect, partially falsified, attempt was made to prove the development of the human psyche of children born deaf and blind. The influence of ideology can also be traced in the confrontation of scientific schools in physics, genetics, biology and physiology. The article discusses prospects and new trends in the development of the activity theory after exclusion of the ideological concepts of Soviet socialism from its systemconceptual foundations. We observe the formation of new psychological concepts that reflect non-classical and post-non-classical forms of scientific rationality. Attempts are made to create and study the models of the psyche developed within the framework of the theory of organized complexity and the concepts of autopoietic self-organization and evolution. (shrink)

Ovaj rad je deo vece studije posvecene fenomenu ruskog mesijanizma koji je cesto smatran sustinski vaznim faktorom u interpretacijama istorije Rusije. U sredistu autorove paznje je nastanak ucenja o Moskvi kao?Trecem Rimu?. Detaljno je analizirana religijska osnova i istorijski kontekst formulisanja ove ideje u Poslanicama monaha Filoteja. Interpretaciji ove izvorne doktrine o?Trecem Rimu? posvecen je centralni deo rada jer su se na nju pozivale sve kasnije modifikacije ideje o mesijanskoj ulozi Rusije u svetskoj istoriji. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, (...) br. 179014. (shrink)

U drugom delu teksta o Filotejevoj doktrini o Moskvi kao?Trecem Rimu? autor se bavi njenom recepcijom u kasnijim periodima ruske intelektualne i politicke istorije. Iako u svom izvornom obliku to ucenje nije sadrzavalo imperijalnu, spoljno-politicku konotaciju, u radu su analizirane interpretacije ideje Treceg Rima koje su imale i znacajne politicke konsekvence. Na unutrasnjem planu ona je posluzila knezu Kurbskom za kritiku vlasti Ivana Groznog, kao i za odbacivanje crkvenih reformi patrijarha Nikona u literaturi Staroveraca. Ipak, obnova interesovanja za ideju Treceg (...) Rima karakterise ruski XIX vek u kome su vodjene diskusije o odnosu Rusije i Zapada. Slovenofilski kriticari reformi Petra Velikog u proslosti Moskovskog carstva nasli su potvrdu kulturne originalnosti i superiornosti Rusije. Autor naglasava razlike izmedju slovenofilske i panslovenske interpretacije ruskog mesijanizma. U zavrsnom delu rada mesijanska ideja dovodi se u vezu sa radjanjem nacionalizma u imperijalnom kontekstu. Na taj nacin, autor dovodi u pitanje rasirene interpretacije o njenim distinktivno ruskim karakteristikama. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 179014. (shrink)

Russians and Westerners access, process and communicate information in different ways. Whilst Westerners favour detailed analysis of subject matter, Russians tend to focus on certain components that are, in their view, significant. This disparity makes it difficult to achieve constructive dialogues between Western and Russian stakeholders contributing to cross-cultural communication problems. The author claims that the difference in the ways Russians and Westerners negotiate information is a significant cultural difference between Russia and West rather than an irritating (and in (...) principle amenable) lack of analytical skills on the Russian partners’ part. Understanding the reasons behind the Russian-specific approaches to dealing with information would be a positive step towards a more effective cross-cultural communication, important in business situations and essential in diplomacy. (shrink)

This article deals with women-centred prose texts of the 1990s and 2000s in Russia written by women, and focuses especially on generation narratives. By this term the author means fictional texts that explore generational relations within families, from the perspective of repressed experiences, feelings and attitudes in the Soviet period. The selected texts are interpreted as narrating and conceptualizing the consequences of patriarchal ideology for relations between mothers and daughters and for reconstructing connections between Soviet and post-Soviet (...) by revisiting and remembering especially the gaps and discontinuities between (female) generations. The cases discussed are Liudmila Petrushevskaia’s ‘povest’ Vremia noch [The Time: Night] (1991), Liudmila Ulitskaia’s novel Medeia i ee deti [Medea and her Children] (1996) and Elena Chizhova’s novel Vremia zhenshchin [The Time of Women] (2009). These novels reflect on the one hand the woman-centredness and novelty of representation in women’s prose writing in the post-Soviet period. On the other hand, the author suggests that they reflect the diverse methods of representing the Soviet era and experience through generation narratives. The texts reassess the past through intimate, tactile memories and perceptions, and their narration through generational plots draws attention to the process of working through, which needs to be done in contemporary Russia. The narratives touch upon the untold stories of those who suffered in silence or hid the family secrets from the officials, in order to save the family. The narration delves into the different layers of experience and memory, conceptualizing them in the form of multiple narrative perspectives constructing different generations and traditions. In this way they convey the ‘secrets’ hidden in the midst of everyday life routines and give voice to the often silent resistance of women towards patriarchal and repressive ideology. The new women’s prose of the 1980s–90s and the subsequent trend of women-centred narratives and generation narratives employ conceptual metaphors of reassessing, revisiting and remembering the cultural, experiential, and emotional aspects of the past, Soviet lives. (shrink)

Federal arrangements have been considered by some thinkers as a panacea for containing ethnic nationalism in the ethnically defined regions. This article challenges this view by arguing that federal institutions may enable ethnic nationalists in the ethnically defined regions to consolidate their power through the guarantees that they receive from the federal centre. Although the post-Soviet Russian leadership under Boris Yeltsin sought to use federalism as a tool for containing ethnic nationalism, Russia's this experiment with federalism demonstrates that (...) federalism may serve not to contain but to strengthen ethnic nationalism. Disillusioned with Yeltsin's failed use of federalism in containing ethnic nationalism, the overwhelming majority of the Russian people supported Vladimir Putin's anti-federalist reforms since 2000 which made federalism redundant in Russia. While undermining the basis for Western style democracy in Russia, Putin's centralism proved to be more effective than Yeltsin's federalism in containing ethnic nationalism. (shrink)

The notion of ‘philosophical culture’ can be defined as the totality of conditions of philosophical thought and theory. Among these conditions is an awareness of the historical background of the philosophical culture in question. This awareness, which plays an important cognitive and normative role, often takes the form of a relatively independent discipline: history of philosophy. Over the last decade, Russian historians of philosophy have been attempting to make the repressed past accessible to contemporary philosophy, often modifying their earlier, (...) Soviet work. This can be illustrated with a survey of late Soviet and post-Soviet literature on the Russian philosopher, Vladimir Solov’ëv. (shrink)

The notion of ‘philosophical culture’ can be defined as the totality of conditions of philosophical thought and theory. Among these conditions is an awareness of the historical background of the philosophical culture in question. This awareness, which plays an important cognitive and normative role, often takes the form of a relatively independent discipline: history of philosophy. Over the last decade, Russian historians of philosophy have been attempting to make the repressed past accessible to contemporary philosophy, often modifying their earlier, (...) Soviet work. This can be illustrated with a survey of late Soviet and post-Soviet literature on the Russian philosopher, Vladimir Solov’ëv. (shrink)

In this paper, our analysis lays on two different levels. Firstly, we dis­cuss the central concepts of the early Russian structuralism within an epistemological framework focusing on the way in which linguistic knowledge is structured. In order to achieve this goal, we mobilize the concept of episteme developed by Michel Foucault in his works The Order of Things (1966) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969). This Foucauldian approach leads us to highlight a new epis­teme which is different from those (...) that Foucault described in the Order of Things. Secondly, we analyze the political and social impli­cations of this epistemological approach in the context of European and (post)colonial history. We highlight the material “action” of the linguistic knowledge under discussion. This second dimension of our approach is important insofar it represents a critic of the idea accord­ing to which the theoretical knowledge is separated from praxis. Our hypothesis is that the language constitutes a marker of particular so­cial interests, which are overdetermined by power relations. (shrink)

The present article deals with different Marxist theories on the Soviet experience, which emerged in post-Soviet Russophone Marxist or neo-Marxist scholarship (concurrently with some reference to Marxist traditions in other former Eastern Bloc countries). The article demonstrates that these theories – if we leave the remaining ‘Marxist-Leninists’ of the classical Soviet type aside and focus on critical, post-Soviet Marxism – may be classified as either ‘fundamentally rejectionist’ or ‘Thermidorian’. The former, in line with the seminal criticisms (...) of K. Kautsky and other early opponents of Lenin, reject the socialist nature of the October 1917 Revolution outright. The latter mostly define the Revolution as at least socialist-oriented, but further bifurcate into different varieties of the ‘state capitalism’ thesis with a number of theorists defining Stalinist societies as special varieties of post-revolutionary industrialism essentially different from orthodox capitalism. Most critical post-Soviet Marxists agree, however, that the main vector of Soviet-type regimes’ evolution indeed pointed towards increased class stratification. However, it should be remembered that Soviet-type bureaucracy was a class-in-the-making rather than a class-in-itself or a class-for-itself, and this point is further elaborated in the works of those theorists who prioritise the differences rather than similarities between Soviet-type industrialism and orthodox capitalism. (shrink)

Straipsnyje analizuojamos Karsavino Eurazijos ir simfoninės asmenybės teorijos ir jų įtaka asmeniniam Karsavino likimui, jo sofiologinėms mesianistinėms nuostatoms. Aptariama svarbiausių filosofinių Karsavino idėjų genezė: gyvo religingumo ir bendrojo religinio fondo, gnostinės pleromos interpretacijos, Šv. Trejybės dialektika ir jos santykis su N. Kuziečio filosofija, simfoninės asmenybės teorija. Pagrindinis teiginys apie Karsavino ir Kuziečio filosofijų skirtumą yra pagrįstas kristologiniais Karsavino argumentais apie Kuziečio filosofijos nepakankamumą aiškinant Dievo kaip Possest eksplikacijos ir komplikacijos problematiką. Karsavinas, remdamasis ortodoksiniais kristologiniais teiginiais, simfoninės asmenybės bei ideokratijos teorija (...) bei tipologine, istoriosofine civilizacijų klasifikacija, pagrindžia kairiąją Eurazijos sąjūdžio ideologiją, kuri išliko aktuali ir šiandienos Rusijos politinei situacijai. Straipsnyje parodomos lietuviškosios filosofijos ir Karsavino samprotavimų paralelės ir keliamas klausimas dėl Eurazijos ideologijos nesvarstymo tarpukario Lietuvoje. Straipsnio pabaigoje grįžtama prie filosofinio Karsavino apsisprendimo, saikingų, asmeninių mesianistinių jo nuostatų ir sokratiško likimo tardymų, įkalinimo Abezės lageryje laikotarpiu. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: gyvasis religingumas, simfoninė asmenybė, panteizmas, gnoticizmas, mesianizmas. Historiosophical Messianism of L. Karsavin and the Idea of Eurasia Gintautas Mažeikis Summary The historiosophical and messianistic ideas of L. Karsavin and his ideology of left Eurasia were based on the theological and gnostic symbolism of the early 20th century, F. Schelling’s philosophy of Myth and Universality, Vl. Solovjov’s Philosophy of Universality, Mystics of Christology, the Orthodox understanding of Saint Trinity, typological theory of civilizations. At the beginning of his mediaeval researches Karsavin investigated sacral events in rural areas in the 17th–18th centuries, especially in Italy, magic activities and popular beliefs in Christian Saints, based on uncritical, natural, live religious feelings and spontaneous faith. He maintained live religious faith to be the background for the significance and utility of all canonical religious rules and churches. These ideas are similar to the French school of Annales and to the M. Bakhtin’s theory of Carnival issues of the Mediaeval tradition of laughter. However, Karsavin re lated his consideration of spontaneous hierophany to the gnostic tradition of Divine Pleroma. It is important to them in order to interpret the philosophy of Nicolaus Cusanus, especially his conception of God as Possest and a permanent and contradictory process of explicatio and complicatio. On the basis of Cusanus’ philosophy, Karsavin developed his personal idea of dialectics of Saint Trinity as a union of Divine personalities. Karsavin maintained that the conception of Cusanus is insufficient because Cusanus didn’t explain the role of Christ in the full reunification of sinful human beings with God. By Karsavin, Cusanus avoided pantheistic tendencies and therefore couldn’t develop the theory of divination of personality. On the contrary, Karsavin develops the idea of divination of oneself in his theory of Symphonic personality. Every personality is a form of free solution and responsibility, love and self-sacrifice. Therefore, the personality develops itself from an autonomous individual into the personality as a family, the personality as a nation, as a state, and finally the personality transforms into a cosmic human being, or Adam Kadmon. The hierarchic growth of personality, his ontology presupposes his essential responsibility for the development of nation, state, culture and civilization. It was the basis of Karsavin’s messianism. The nation or culture couldn’t be developed in the necessary direction, towards divinity, without creative and self-sacrificing activity of the individual. The hierarchical conception of the world personality presupposes the ideocratic form of government. The idea of the ideocratic power makes Karsavin’s political considerations similar to the Soviet system of power. Karsavin from 1925 until 1929 was the leader of the left wing of the Eurasia movement which was located in Paris. He initiated and supported a dialog with Bolsheviks’ representatives. However, Karsavin strongly criticized communism and Bolsheviks from the Orthodox point of view. Karsavin was a deep believer and couldn’t support the destruction of churches by the Soviet regime. However, today it is possible to say that Karsavin’s political visions are very similar to the modern Vl. Putins’ regime in contemporary Russia. Eurasia and Symphonic Personality ideas became important motives for Karsavin’s coming to Lithuania in 1928. However, after arrival he didn’t participate in any political movement and developed his civilization ideas, the conception of ideocratic power and Symphonic Personality there. In the Lithuanian period, he becomes closer to the Russian Orthodox tradition of Old Believers and its ideas of self-sacrifice to populace. Karsavin didn’t emigrate from Lithuania in the threat of Soviet occupation. On the contrary, he spread his ideas of Symphonic Personality, dialectics of Trinity, self-sacrificing after the War and even in the concentration camp in Abeze until his death in 1952. Keywords: live religions, Symphonic Personality, pantheism, gnosticism, messianism. -size: 11pt;">. (shrink)

This groundbreaking work by one of the world's foremost theoreticians of Russian literature, culture, and thought gives for the first time an extensive and detailed examination of the development of Russian thought during the late Soviet period. Countering the traditional view of an intellectual wilderness under the Soviet regime, Mikhail Epstein offers a systematic account of Russian thought in the second half of the 20th century. In doing so, he provides new insights into previously ignored (...) areas such as Russian liberalism, personalism, structuralism, neo-rationalism, and culturology. Epstein shows how Russian philosophy and culture has long been trapped in an intellectual prison of its own making as it sought to create its own utopia. However, he demonstrates that it is time to reappraise Russian philosophical thought and cultural theory, now freed from the bonds of totalitarianism. We are left with not only a new and exciting interpretation of Russian thought, but also an opportunity to rethink our own intellectual heritage. (shrink)

A literary debate occurred during 1969 and 1970 as Soviet society stepped into the holistic transition to conservatism. In the debate process, liberals in the journal Novyi Mir interpreted Soviet patriotism based on cultural pluralism and censured Russian nationalists of the journal Molodaia Gvardiia for deviating from Lenin’s ideas on the nationality question and obscuring the demarcation between patriotism and Russian chauvinism. Conversely, nationalists in Molodaia Gvardiia emphasized their validity in reviving the Russian tradition to (...) defend the national culture from Western cultural penetration and responded that Western cosmopolitanism was the innate character behind the words of Novyi Mir. The contention gradually stirred up so much public attention that Soviet authorities decided to quiet down the contestation. Eventually, the editorial boards of Novyi Mir and Molodaia Gvardiia were reshuffled, although the Soviet authorities sheltered Molodaia Gvardiia to some degree. The result of the debate was affected by a combination of synthesized factors: the background of rising Russian nationalism, the ideological rhetoric of the debate, and the influences of the opinions of international media and officials toward either side. Whatever individual preferences the authorities had, the principles of the Era of Stagnation (Zastoi) were the guidelines in dealing with the debate. (shrink)

This paper concerns two themes: my personal experience of Russian philosophy and Russian philosophers on the one hand, and historicism on the other. My account of my limited experience of Russian philosophers and philosophy will be mainly autobiographical. My remarks about historicism will concern a single aspect of the philosophical consequences of the Soviet experience for Russian philosophy. When I come to Russia, I am always surprised by the degree of interest in a historical approach (...) to knowledge, an interest that, so far as I know, is unique to Russian philosophy. This difference in perspective as concerns the historical character of cognitive claims needs to be explained. It needs to be explained why contemporary Russian philosophers and contemporary Russian philosophy are so hospitable to a historical approach to knowledge, an approach which has always been rare, even unusual, elsewhere. My hypothesis, which I examine the paper, is that there is a deep link between contemporary Russian interest in a historical approach to knowledge and Soviet philosophy. In particular, there is a link to Marx, who is a historical thinker, and to pre-Soviet Russian philosophy, as distinguished from Marxism, which is basically a-historical. (shrink)

In the still highly politicized question of rupture or continuity between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, elements of continuity are not hard to find, nor should this be a surprise, since a new state arose in the same geographical space and made use of the economic, intellectual, and demographic resources inherited from the Russian Empire. At the same time, the Soviet Union could not have been more different than the Russian Empire. It rejected (...) a number of key elements of the sociopolitical project that underlay the nationalizing tsarist empire and introduced radically new political and social principles for organizing that space. In particular, the Bolsheviks purposefully engaged in dismantling the tsarist efforts to build a great ethnic-Russian nation to stand at the center of the Russian Empire’s nationalities policy. The irreversible disintegration of post-Soviet space into separate nationalizing states became possible only toward the end of the twentieth century. At the same time, the imperial nature of the modern post-Soviet Russian core permits us to say that the imperial logic has survived. This is where we can find an element of inescapable continuity. We present studies of “continuities” and “ruptures” in modern academic discourse and in an updated format, gravitating toward “empirically nuanced” tools for analyzing multiple historical temporalities. (shrink)

Although the Russian Academy has not been operating long enough to permit a categorical statement that it will act exactly as the Soviet Academy did, there is now enough information to justify stating that in its structure and stated functions it differs in no significant way from the Soviet Academy which it replaced. While it might well have been weakened, through a decline in its own prestige and through the weakening of the government under which it operates, (...) it is unlikely to be so weakened that it will allow either the democrats and rank-and-file research workers on the one hand, or the new bureaucratic arrangements on the other to get the better of it. While the desperate budgetary situation will almost certainly force the Russian Academy into considerable retrenchment in its research activities, it will continue to be a body of bureaucratically organised and experienced managers of science and will conduct itself accordingly. Those who believe that a high level of participation by the rank-and-file of the staff is essential in the management of science, will see that as a catastrophe for Russian science. Those who believe that particularly in times of stress, bureaucratic skill and experience are of great importance will see it as providing some hope of salvation. (shrink)

The author examines, historically and theoretically, issues related to the state and current tendencies of post-Soviet Russian philosophy. The accent falls on the meta-philosophical question, what is philosophy?, or as the Russians often say, what is philosophizing?. In the Russian case, this question has presently to be handled in a cultural context ridden with a sense of discontinuity following the Soviet collapse. The author sketches some concepts intended to shed light on the nature of the relation (...) between a philosophical culture and the wider socio-cultural context in which it is embedded. The model is applied to the case of post-Soviet philosophy in order to see if and to what extent the logic of Soviet philosophizing and its place in the Soviet socio-cultural order has affected current philosophical tendencies in Russia, above all at the meta-philosophical level. The author concludes with a summary and commentary of the views of A.S. Akhiezer. (shrink)

Rather paradoxically, the personal and intellectual roots of Sir Isaiah Berlin, an influential contributor to liberal political theory and Western political thought, stem from East-European autocra...

This article proposes a generational approach to the study of the formation of the philosophical tradition. A philosophical generation is a powerful intellectual pattern with its own optics, sets o...

This paper addresses the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict in the context of the post-Soviet spatial order, approached in terms of Carl Schmitt’s theory of nomos and Giorgio Agamben’s theory of the state of exception. The ‘five-day war’ was the first instance of the violation by Russia of the integrity of the post-Soviet spatial order established in the Belovezha treaties of December 1991. While from the beginning of the postcommunist period Russia functioned as the restraining force in the post- (...) Soviet realm, the 2008 war has made further recourse to this function impossible, plunging the post-Soviet space into the condition of anomie, or the state of exception. This paper interprets this disruptive policy in the post-Soviet space as the continuation of the domestic political process of the ‘management of anomie,’ which has characterized the entire postcommunist period. In the conclusion, we address the implications of the transformation of the international order into the ethos of anomie for rethinking the ethical dimension of global politics.Keywords: Russia; Georgia; postcommunism; anomie; Giorgio Agamben; Walter Benjamin; Carl Schmitt. (shrink)

Based on materials collected during a fieldwork in Barnaul (Siberia, Russia) in 2001–2004, the article explores two provincial academic discourses that are focused on issues of Russian national identity. Ethnohistories of trauma address Russia’s current problems through the constant re-writing of the country’s past in order to demonstrate the non-Russian character of its national and state institutions. In the second discourse, ethno-vitalism, the struggle over constructing and interpreting the nation’s memory of the past is replaced with a similar (...) struggle over constructing and interpreting perceptions of the nation’s current experience. Produced by professional intelligentsia, these frameworks and discourses provide a useful link to understanding imaginary constructions of the national belonging in a situation where more positive ways of inventing traditions and imagining communities are unavailable or discredited. (shrink)

The Russian intelligentsia emerged and existed in diversity due to specific political and social conditions within Russian society. The intelligentsia was more than just a class or group of educated people. The present article is an attempt to give a retrospective interpretation of the Russian intelligentsia and its transformation into the Soviet one in the 1920s, when Vygotsky also was an engaged actor in different programmes. At that time the political was as sharp and critical as (...) the scientific, and science became an arena of radical political clashes and struggle. The contradictory historical atmosphere and the sincere wish of a new Soviet state to create a new society made it possible for young scholars to assume their positions in science very rapidly. (shrink)

This is a transcription of a debate on the concept of a person conducted in Moscow in 1983. David Bakhurst argues that Evald Ilyenkov's social constructivist conception of personhood, founded on Marx's thesis that the human essence is 'the ensemble of social relations', is either false or trivially true. F. T. Mikhailov, V. S. Bibler, V. A. Lektorsky and V. V. Davydov critically assess Bakhurst's arguments, elucidate and contextualize Ilyenkov's views, and defend, in contrasting ways, the claim that human individuals (...) are socially constituted beings. Issues discussed include: the concepts of activity and community and their relevance to the notions of mind and personhood; self-consciousness and its relation to personal identity; naturalism in Soviet thought. Translated from the Russian. (shrink)

This lecture presents the text of the speech about the ending of the Russian Revolution delivered by the author at the 2008 Elie Kedourie Memorial Lecture held at the British Academy. It addresses the problems for historians in determining the meaning and moral of a revolution. The lecture analogizes the French and Russian Revolution and suggests that the Russian Revolution and its historiography has always been to some extent in the shadow of the French.

In his pioneering new book Interpreting America, John Ryder makes available for the first time to English-speaking readers Russian views of the full range of American philosophical thought. Using his own accurate translations, he clearly reconstructs a chain of core ideas, emphasizes the most essential concepts of each writer's work, and gives a multidimensional reconstruction of the arguments of each author.