The early period Ismaili jurist Al-Qādî al-Nu'mān appears as an important figure in the formation of Ismaili jurisprudence. There is very little information about Kadı Nu'mân's family, childhood, education and intellectual environment. His full name is Abû Hanîfah Nu'man b. Muhammad b. Mansûr al-Qādî at-Tamîmî Al Qayrawānî. He was born around 290/903 (late 3rd (9th) century) into an educated family in Qayravan in North Africa. There are different opinions about the sect he belonged to when he was growing up. On (...) the other hand, it is difficult to say for certain whether Nu’mān received education in the Ismaili sect due to the understanding of taqiyya in the madhhab. However, it is understood from the basic jurisprudence texts Nu’mān wrote that he most likely did not receive a Sunni education. Historians refer to him as 'Qadi Nu’mān or Abu Hanifah al-Shi'i' in order not to confuse him with the imam of the Hanafi school. Qādî Nu’mān served at different levels of the Fatimid State. Around 313/925, he entered the service of the first Fatimid caliph, Mahdi (r. 909-934 CE/297-322 AH), as a copyist and secretary. During the reigns of the third caliph Mansur and the fourth Fatimid caliph Mu’izz (d. 365/975), Qādî Nu’mān first served as a judge in Tripoli and then in Mansouriya, the Fatimid capital. After the Fatimids conquered Egypt and the center of government was moved to Cairo, Qādî Nu’mān was appointed by the fourth caliph Mu’izz as the head of the appellate courts (maẓālim). Qadi Numans career was at the peak in the period of Caliph Muiz. Qādî Nu’mān worked as a judge in the Fatimid State for about twenty-six years and continued this duty until his death in 363 (973). After the fall of the Fatimid caliphate, there haven’t been any other Fatimid or Ismaili jurists. Qādî Nu’mān is considered by contemporary Ismaili writers as a figure who systematically transformed Ismaili fiqh into an independent sect of fiqh. It can be said that Ismaili fiqh was developed through his works in the Fatimid period. His works continued as the main references in the fiqh studies and after the Fatimid period. With the death of Qādî Nu’mān, the period of ijtihad in Ismaili fiqh and its the establishment phase of Ismaili fiqh came to an end; The sect, in which esoteric interpretations were at the forefront, emerged as a distinctive school of fiqh by discarding ambiguity. Qādî Nu’mān was a very productive writer. He wrote important works related to the field of furu al-fiqh and usûl al-fiqh. Among his works, Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib is undoubtedly one of the most important works in the early history of fiqh methodology. The work in question, which was originally written with the aim of rejecting the Sunni fiqh method, discusses the approaches of the Sunni schools of fiqh on ikhtilāf, taqlid, ijma, nazar, qiyas, istihsan, ijtihad and ra’y in a polemical manner. It reveals the differences of the Ismaili method from the Sunni method in terms of the sources on which the fiqh is based, the authority to make ijtihad and the theory of interpretation of the texts. Qādî Nu’mān examined the relationship between reason and revelation in general and the role of religious authority in comprehending and interpreting the texts while criticizing Sunni methods. Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib has the characteristics of the works of development period as a form. It is possible to observe the question-answer and dialectic form which can be seen in the works of the development period throughout the work in question. Qādî Nu’mān endeavoured to persuade his opponents with a dialectical and argumentative style. Again, he replied to the Sunnis, who were his interlocutors, with their own proofs. In addition to these, Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib has a unique feature in the matter of content. Because it is not very familiar to any Sunni handbook of usûl al-fiqh. It does not mention the hâss, âmm, ijma, qiyas, amir, nahy, alfaz bets, etc. The text is very similar to the Ahbari movement of the Jafari sect for it rejects all forms of ijtihad. It was written at a time when fiqh was not yet stable. Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib gives us crucial information about the development of different usûl and fiqh sources in the middle of the fourth century. However, what is interesting here is that the information he gives about Ismaili method and fiqh is very little compared to the one about Sunni method and fiqh. Much of it centered on Sunni thought and its rejection. However, his ultimate goal was to defend the Ismaili doctrine. (shrink)

Imāmiyya holds that the theory of imāmate must rely on scriptural evidence and designation and that the Imām, the successor to Muḥammad, is in charge of all political and religious issues. The authority of the Imām includes some religious and social duties such as executing the legal punishments, collecting almsgiving, sustaining social order and declaring holy war. The fulfillment of these duties requires actual leadership of the Imām or his deputy. With the beginning of the great occultation in 329/941, there (...) was an uncertainty among the Imāmiyya followers about who would uphold these responsibilities. In this period, Shīʿī ʿulamā began to undertake the duties of the Imām in order to overcome this uncertainty and to avoid the possible schism. In the beginning, this delegation of authority was limited to the religious sphere; but, later, its scope gradually became wider. This process of delegation of power, which covers a long process, needs to be examined in its various periods. In this study, this subject will be considered with special reference to the scholars of the fifth century of hijra (hijrī). An effort is made in this article to reveal how the issues of the Imām’s powers are discussed in the context of the problem of expanding or narrowing the authority of the scholars who played significant roles in systemization of Uṣūlī (rationalist) thought in the period after Shaykh al-Mufīd.Summary: In the issues of Imām/Caliphate which led to political division among Muslims after the Prophet Muḥammad, Imāmī Shīʿa opines that the Imāmate theory relies on scriptural evidence and designation. According to this theory, apart from scriptural evidence and designation, personal qualities such as immaculacy, knowledge, bravery, and vantage are found in Ali, Ḥasan, Ḥusayn and nine people from the lineage of Ḥusayn. The Imām as a successor to the Prophet Muḥammad is a person who has both religious and political power which includes implementation of punishments, collecting alms, ensuring justice, declaring holy war. For the Imāmī Shīʿa, there is a need for imām or his deputy who has absolute power to fulfill these duties.Imāmī Shīʿa, who held that the disappeared twelfth Imām would return back to restore justice in the world, had to confront various problems in finding solutions to some issues related to the existence of Imām himself, as well as theological issues during the period of great occultation. Particularly, the period of great occultation (329/941), in which the link with the Imām was severed completely, the Shīʿī community were uncertain on how to fulfill the responsibilities of the Imām probably due to the lack of religious sources. Shaykh al-Mufīd draws attention to the issue of khums (a one-fifth share of the spoils of war and of other specified forms of income). In this period of uncertainty, the Shiite scholars came into prominence in order to fill the gap and to prevent the social disorder. Referring to a tawqī‘ (rescript) from the Twelfth Imām, they claimed that they would take responsibility for the Twelfth Imām on his behalf. In the beginning, the delegation of the power was limited to the religious sphere. It was gradually extended to other spheres by the contribution of some scholars. It reached the largest dimension with the implementation of “wilāyat al-faqīh” theory.From that period until our times, the era when Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples lived can be considered as the beginning of this period. In the fifth century when Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples lived the delegation of power was limited to the religious sphere. In this article, how the scholars who played a role in the systematization of Uṣūlī thought dealt with the issue of the limits of the authority of Imām and how they defined the role of the Imāmī jurists (faqīh) will be examined.Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples were sometimes cautious on the issue of the delegation of the power of Imām. They, however, pointed out the role of the faqīh in the occultation period in order to overcome the uncertainty. As a matter of fact, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and al-Qādī Ibn al-Barrāj made significant contributions to the issues of collection and distribution of khums. However, Sallār al-Daylamī’s contribution to the subject is more crucial. He considered khums as the grace of God and believed that it can be allocated by taking into account the share of the Imām. They put forward the views that explained in details the role of the faqīh in the collection and distribution of alms. Even Ibn al-Barrāj opined that in the absence of Imām and his deputy alms are to be allocated to the Faqihs on the ground that they know better how to distribute it. Therefore, in the absence of Imām and his deputy, by suggesting that faqīh must be in charge of collecting and distributing alms, they proposed a remedy in an early period.On the issue of leading the Friday prayer (ṣalāt al-jum‘a), which is one of the social duties of Imām, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples considered the presence of the Imām or his deputy as a condition for a valid Friday prayer. In addition to this condition, Al-Ḥalabī, also added that a person who meets the necessary conditions can be also considered in leading Friday prayer. This addition by Ḥalabī was an important contribution to the solution of the problems encountered during the period of great occultation on both Friday prayer and delegation of Imām religious and political authorities to faqīh. On the other hand, Sallār, another disciple of Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, opposed the idea of the faqīh leading the Friday prayer in the absence of the Imām even when the necessary conditions are met. It can be said that this approach of Sallār led to the opinion of some Imāmis which considered Friday prayer unlawful in the absence of Imām. In the occultation period, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples showed a cautious attitude about the implementation of the punishments. They argued that only Imām could implement the punishments. However, the major step was taken by Shaykh Ṭūsī on the issue of who implements the punishments in the occultation period. He argued that the Imām’s designated the faqihs to implement the punishments. In addition to this subject, Shiite scholars discussed the issue of whether a Shiite officer under the reigning rule in the occultation period implemented the punishments. On this issue, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā compiled a treaty untitled Mas’ala fi’l-‘amal ma‘a’al-sulṭan. For him, the main criteria are whether such person has necessary responsibilities and qualifications. Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples also continued their master’s conciliatory attitude. In the final analysis, the contribution of Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples on the issue of who will undertake the duties and responsibilities of the Imām is crucial in the systematization of the idea of transferal of the power of the Imām to faqīh including political one. In fact, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s advice to take part in the existing administrations has been considered a way out for the scholars who want to establish relations with the authorities in the later periods. (shrink)

Fıkıh literatüründe sünnet önemli bir yere sahiptir. Çünkü fıkhın temeli Hz. Peygamber tarafından atılmış ve fıkhın gayesini en iyi bilen ve uygulayan kendisi olmuştur. Bu sebeple şer’î amelî konularda hüküm istinbatı için müctehid imamlar, Kur’an’dan sonra sünnete başvurmuşlardır. Bununla birlikte müctehid imamlar, Hz. Peygamber’den gelen rivayetlerin bazılarını kabul ve onlarla amel etmede görüş ayrılıkları yaşamışlardır. Görüş ayrılıklarının temelinde ise sünnetin ekseriyetini teşkil eden haber-i vâhid vardır. Çünkü haber-i vâhid yapısal açıdan yalan, yanlışlık ve vehm ihtimali bulundurması yanında doğruluğu zan ile (...) sabit olması sebebiyle özellikle Hanefî usûlcülerine göre bilgi ifade etmez. Bu yönüyle haberi vâhid, mütevâtir haber kadar kuvvetli ve bağlayıcı olmayıp zannî bir bilgi ifade eder. Bu doğrultuda haber-i vâhid, “bilgi gerektirmez, zan gerektirir” şeklinde ifade edilmiştir. Bu ifade bağlamında şöyle bir soru ortaya çıkmaktadır: Haber-i vâhid, bilgi ifade etmediği halde, onunla amel edilmesi mümkün müdür? Bu sorudan hareketle zan ifade eden haber-i vâhidin hücceti ve onunla amel edilmesinin mümkün olup olmadığını, mezheplerin haber-i vâhide yaklaşımlarının nasıl olduğunu ve bu durumun cenaze bahsine ilişkin hükümlere nasıl yansıdığını ortaya koymak amacıyla bu çalışma ele alınmıştır. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmanın konusu, haber-i vâhidin hücceti için mezheplerin ileri sürdüğü farklı şartlar ve bu şartların hükümlere -cenaze namazı özelinde- etkisi ile sınırlıdır. Yöntem olarak öncelikle kavramsal çerçevede haber-i vâhidi tanımlamak, bilgi değerini ortaya koymak ve mezheplerin onunla hücceti noktasında benimsedikleri şartları tespit etmek amacıyla ilgili mezheplerin usûl eserleri incelenmiştir. Daha sonra mezheplerin benimsediği bu usûlî yöntem, cenaze bahsindeki yerini belirlemek üzere ilgili mezheplerin fürû kitapları taranmıştır. Bu metottan hareketle mezheplerin usûlde benimsediği ilkenin fürû meselelerine nasıl yansıdığı, haber-î vâhidin zannî bilgi ifade etmesine rağmen onunla amel etmenin gerekçesi ve cenazeye ilişkin bazı hükümlerde mezheplerin farklı hüküm benimsemelerinin nedeni ortaya konulacaktır. (shrink)

İslam hukukun temel ilkelerinin yazımında ve beyanında usûlcülerin yöntemleri farklıdır. Şîrâzî, fıkıh usûlünde birçok kitap telif etmiş, şöhreti yayılmış bir usûlcüdür. Bu çalışmada Şîrâzî’nin ve onun en önemli kitaplarından olan “el-Luma’ fî usûli’l-fıkh”ın tanıtımı yapılacak ardından yönteminin en belirleyici özellikleri ve kitabının içeriğini sunma yaklaşımı açıklanacaktır. Böylece uygulamalı bir şekilde mensup olduğu fıkhî ekolün ayırt edici özelliklerinin tesbiti yapılacaktır. Araştırmanın neticesinde Şîrâzî’nin mütekellim metodunu takip ettiği sonucuna varılmıştır. Eserinde fıkıh usûlünün bir dizi teriminin tanıtımına ve usûl kaidelerinin beyanına yer (...) vermesi, onları farklı kanıtlarla doğrulaması ve kaleme alması metodunun belirleyici özelliklerindendir. Şîrâzî, akli, nakli ve dilin delaleti olmak üzere farklı deliller kullanır. Selefin araştırdıkları konuları nakledip kapsamlı bir incelemeyle tartışmalı konuları aktarır. Furu’u fıkıh konularına veciz bir şekilde, sadece temel kaideleri açıklaması ve örnek olması açısından değinir. Eserinde fıkıh usûlü konularına ayrıntılı bir şekilde yer verir ancak kelamî konulara yer vermez. Şîrâzî’nin görüşlerinin kesin delillerle desteklenmesi fikrî bağımsızlığına işarettir. O, araştırmasında tarafsız ve bağımsızdır. Herhangi bir mezhep taassubu düşüncesi yoktur. İhtilaflı meselelerde muhaliflerin delillerini zikretmemesinden ötürü eleştirilmiştir. Eseri bazı meseleler hariç fıkıh usûlünün bütün konularını şamildir. Alanında faydalı ve ulemanın istifade ettiği bir eserdir. (shrink)

Dâwûd al-Qarisî (Dâvûd al-Karsî) was a versatile and prolific 18th century Ottoman scholar who studied in İstanbul and Egypt and then taught for long years in various centers of learning like Egypt, Cyprus, Karaman, and İstanbul. He held high esteem for Mehmed Efendi of Birgi (Imâm Birgivî/Birgili, d.1573), out of respect for whom, towards the end of his life, Karsî, like Birgivî, occupied himself with teaching in the town of Birgi, where he died in 1756 and was buried next to (...) Birgivî. Better known for his following works on Arabic language and rhetoric and on the prophetic traditions (hadith): Sharḥu uṣûli’l-ḥadîth li’l-Birgivî; Sharḥu’l-Ḳaṣîdati’n-nûniyya (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Şarḥu’l-Emsileti’l-mukhtalifa fi’ṣ-ṣarf (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Sharḥu’l-Binâʾ; Sharḥu’l-ʿAvâmil; and Sharḥu İzhâri’l-asrâr, Karsî has actually composed textbooks in quite different fields. Hence the hundreds of manuscript copies of his works in world libraries. Many of his works were also recurrently printed in the Ottoman period. One of the neglected aspects of Karsî is his identity as a logician. Although he authored ambitious and potent works in the field of logic, this aspect of him has not been subject to modern studies. Even his bibliography has not been established so far (with scattered manuscript copies of his works and incomplete catalogue entries). This article primarily and in a long research based on manuscript copies and bibliographic sources, identifies twelve works on logic that Karsî has authored. We have clarified the works that are frequently mistaken for each other, and, especially, have definitively established his authorship of a voluminous commentary on al-Kâtibî’s al-Shamsiyya, of which commentary a second manuscript copy has been identified and described together with the other copy. Next is handled his most famous work of logic, the Sharhu Îsâghûcî, which constitutes an important and assertive ring in the tradition of commentaries on Îsâghûcî. We describe in detail the nine manuscript copies of this work that have been identified in various libraries. The critical text of Karsî’s Sharhu Îsâghûcî, whose composition was finished on 5 March 1745, has been prepared based on the following four manuscripts: (1) MS Kayseri Raşid Efendi Kütüphanesi, No. 857, ff.1v-3v, dated 1746, that is, only one year after the composition of the work; (2) MS Bursa İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, No.794B, ff.96v-114v, dated 1755; (3) MS Millet Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri Efendi Arapça, No. 1752, ff.48v-58r, dated 1760; (4) MS Beyazıt Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Beyazıt, No. 3129, ff.41v-55v, dated 8 March 1772. While preparing the critical text, we have applied the Center for Islamic Studies (İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, İSAM)’s method of optional text choice. The critical text is preceded by a content analysis. Karsî is well aware of the preceding tradition of commentary on Îsâghûcî, and has composed his own commentary as a ‘simile’ or alternative to the commentary by Mollâ Fanârî which was famous and current in his own day. Karsî’s statement “the commentary in one day and one night” is a reference to Mollâ Fanârî who had stated that he started writing his commentary in the morning and finished it by the evening. Karsî, who spent long years in the Egyptian scholarly and cultural basin, adopted the religious-sciences-centered ‘instrumentalist’ understanding of logic that was dominant in the Egypt-Maghrib region. Therefore, no matter how famous they were, he criticized those theoretical, long, and detailed works of logic which mingled with philosophy; and defended and favored authoring functional and cogent logic texts that were beneficial, in terms of religious sciences, to the seekers of knowledge and the scholars. Therefore, in a manner not frequently encountered in other texts of its kind, he refers to the writings and views of Muhammad b. Yûsuf al-Sanûsî (d.1490), the great representative of this logical school in the Egyptian-Maghrib region. Where there is divergence between the views of the ‘earlier scholars’ (mutaqaddimûn) like Ibn Sînâ and his followers and the ‘later scholars’ (muta’akhkhirûn), i.e., post-Fakhr al-dîn al-Râzî logicians, Karsî is careful to distance himself from partisanship, preferring sometimes the views of the earliers, other times those of the laters. For instance, on the eight conditions proposed for the realization of contradiction, he finds truth to be with al-Fârâbî, who proposed “unity in the predicative attribution” as the single condition for the realization of contradiction. Similarly, on the subject matter of Logic, he tried to reconcile the mutaqaddimûn’s notion of ‘second intelligibles’ with the muta’akhkhirûn’s notion of ‘apprehensional and declarational knowledge,’ suggesting that not much difference exists between the two, on the grounds that both notions are limited to the aspect of ‘known things that lead to the knowledge of unknown things.’ Karsî asserts that established and commonly used metaphors have, according to the verifying scholars, signification by correspondence (dalâlat al-mutâbaqah), adding also that it should not be ignored that such metaphors may change from society to society and from time to time. Karsî also endorses the earlier scholars’ position concerning the impossibility of quiddity (mâhiyya) being composed of two co-extensive parts, and emphasizes that credit should not be given to later scholars’ position who see it possible. According to the verifying scholars (muhaqqîqûn), it is possible to make definition (hadd) by mentioning only difference (fasl), in which case it becomes an imperfect definition (hadd nâqis). He is of the opinion that the definition of the proposition (qadiyya) in al-Taftâzânî’s Tahdhîb is clearer and more complete: “a proposition is an expression that bears the possibility of being true or false”. He states that in the division of proposition according to quantity what is taken into consideration is the subject (mawdû‘) in categorical propositions, and the temporal aspect of the antecedent (muqaddam) in hypothetical propositions. As for the unquantified, indefinite proposition (qadiyya muhmalah), Karsî assumes that if it is not about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a particular proposition (qadiyya juz’iyyah); but if it is about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a universal proposition (qadiyya kulliyyah). This being the general rule about the ambiguous (muhmal) propositions, he nevertheless contends that, because its subject (mawdû‘) is negated, it is preferable to consider a negative ambiguous (sâliba muhmalah) proposition like “human (insân) is not standing” to be a virtually/potentially universal negative (sâliba kulliyyâh) proposition. He states that a disjunctive hypothetical proposition (shartiyya al-munfasila) that is composed of more than two parts/units is only seemingly so, and that in reality it cannot be composed of more than two units. Syllogism (qiyâs), according to Karsî, is the ultimate purpose (al-maqsad al-aqsâ) and the most valuable subject-matter of the science of Logic. For him, the entire range of topics that are handled before this one are only prolegomena to it. This approach of Karsî clearly reveals how much the ‘demonstration (burhân)-centered’ approach of the founding figures of the Muslim tradition of logic like al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ has changed. al-Abharî, in his Îsâghûjî makes no mention of ‘conversion by contradiction’ (‘aks al-naqîd). Therefore, Karsî, too, in his commentary, does not touch upon the issue. However, in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd Karsî does handle the conversion by contradiction and its rules. Following the method of Îsâghûjî, in his commentary Karsî shortly touches on the four figures (shakl) of conjuctive syllogism (qiyâs iqtirânî) and their conditions, after which he passes to the first figure (shakl), which is considered ‘the balance of the sciences’ (mi‘yâr al-‘ulûm), explaining the four moods (darb) of it. In his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd, however, Karsî handles all the four figures (shakl) with all their related moods (darb), where he speaks of fife moods (darb) of the fourth figure (shakl). The topic of ‘modal propositions’ (al-muwajjahât) and of ‘modal syllogism’ (al-mukhtalitât), both of which do not take place in the Îsâghûjî, are not mentioned by Karsî as well, either in his commentary on Îsâghûjî or in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd. Karsî proposes that the certainties (yaqîniyyât), of which demonstration (burhân) is made, have seven, not six, divisions. After mentioning (1) axioms/first principles (awwaliyyât), (2) observata/sensuals (mushâhadât), (3) experta/empiricals (mujarrabât), (4) acumenalia (hadthiyyât), (5) testata (mutawâtirât), and (6) instictives (fitriyyât), that is, all the ‘propositions accompanied by their demonstrations,’ Karsî states that these six divisions, which do not need research and reflection (nazar), are called badîhiyyât (self-evidents), and constitute the foundations (usûl) of certainties (yaqîniyyât). As the seventh division he mentions (7) the nazariyyât (theoreticals), which are known via the badîhiyyât, end up in them, and therefore convey certainty (yaqîn). For Karsî, the nazariyyât/theoreticals, which constitute the seventh division of yaqîniyyât/certainties, are too numerous, and constitute the branches (far‘) of yaqîniyyât. Every time the concept of ‘Mughâlata’ (sophistry) comes forth in the traditional sections on the five arts usually appended to logic works, Karsî often gives examples from what he sees as extreme sûfî sayings, lamenting that these expressions are so widespread and held in esteem. He sometimes criticizes these expressions. However, it is observed that he does not reject tasawwuf in toto, but excludes from his criticism the mystical views and approaches of the truth-abiding (ahl al-haqq), shârî‘â-observant (mutasharri‘) leading sufis who have reached to the highest level of karâmah. (shrink)

The Prophet, whom Allah sent the whole universe and humanity as mercy, produced not only many judicial rules and practices regarding the relations of a person with Allah and other people in Islam but also uttered sentences about the explanation of holy book, Qur’an, and about how this book can be put into practice. The issue whether and how much these sentences of the prophet (hadith) and acts of the prophet (Sunnah) are binding have been discussed by both hadith methodologists (...) and fiqh methodologists; accordingly, a great many studies were produced. In hadith methodology, the discussions about Sunnah of the Prophet had their reflections in the studies of fiqh methodology; and especially Hanafi jurists propounded considerations about this issue. Hussein b. Ali al-Saymerî (d. 436/1045) one of these jurists, is the student of Muhammad b. Mûsa al-Khwârizmî (d. 403/1012), who is the student of Abû Bakr al-Jassâs (d. 370/980), who is an authority in Hanafi methodology. al-Saymerî, who adopted the method of al-Jassâs in fiqh methodology, systematically categorized several fundamental issues which were discussed and were related to fiqh methodology during his time; and he defended the views of Hanafi scholars about these issues primarily against Shâfiʿîs and several fiqh and kalam schools. While presenting the views and evidences of Hanafis, al-Saymerî initially applied for the views of founder imams of Hanafi sect such as Abû Hanîfa, Abû Yusuf and Muhammad al-Shaybânî; following these scholars, he greatly benefited from Hanafi scholars from Iraq region, such as Abu’l-Hasan al-Karkhî (d. 340/952) and his student, Abu Bakr al-Râzî al-Jassâs. When the relevant parts of his study is analysed, it is seen that the effect of al-Jassâs is especially noticeable. In this article, we will study the binding issue of the Sunnah of the Prophet within the context of al-Saymerî’s study, which has extant and is called Mesâilu’l-hilâf fi usûli’l-fiqh. We consider that the different attitude of al-Saymerî about the Sunnah of the Prophet from the other methodologists and hadith scholars and the underlying reasons of these differences are worth to be investigated and emphasized. (shrink)

Şiî tefsir geleneğinde isrâiliyyât meselesini ele alan yazar Hüseyin Zamur, ilk yedi asır özelinde bir değerlendirme yapmıştır. İlk bölümde isrâiliyyâtın İslâmî kaynaklara geçmesinin sebeplerine dair genel bir tablo çizdikten sonra meselenin Şîa açısından nasıl görüldüğünü resmetmeye çalışmıştır. Yazar, ikinci bölümde peygamberler ve kavimleriyle ilgili ilk yedi asırda telif edilmiş Şiî tefsirlere yansıyan isrâilî rivayetleri değerlendirirken üçüncü ve son bölümde ise başta yaratılış olmak üzere muhtelif meselelere dair nakledilen isrâilî rivayetlere değinmiştir. Burada söz konusu eser, önce genel olarak değerlendirildikten sonra özellikle (...) Şiî tefsir geleneğinde isrâiliyat eleştirisinin başlangıcına dair bir sorgulama yapmaması, Şiî/Ahbârî ekol ile Mu‘tezile’den etkilenen Usûlî ekolün arasını tam olarak ayırt etmemesi ve dolayısıyla Şîa’da isrâiliyyât eleştirisinin arka planındaki Mu‘tezilî etkiyi gözden kaçırması son olarak da Şiî tefsirleri isrâiliyyât açısından Ehl-i sünnet’le mukayese ederken genellikle aynı dönemdeki Sünnî eserlerle değil de daha geç dönemli tefsirlerle karşılaştırması gibi usûl ve esasa dair bazı noktalardan eleştirilmektedir. (shrink)

Özet Şii-İmamiyye’nin usûlde Mu’tezilenin etkisinde kaldığı iddiaları, hicri dördüncü asırdan itibaren dile getirilmektedir. Buna karşılık usûlî düşüncenin ilk mümessili sayılan Şeyh Müfîd’den itibaren mezhep içinden yükselen sesler bu iddiaları şiddetle reddetmişlerdir. Biz bu çalışmada Mu’tezile kelamına sistematik hüviyet kazandıran ve yazdığı eserlerle Mu’tezile kelamının bugüne ulaşmasında büyük pay sahibi olan Kâdî Abdülcebbâr ile İmamiyye’nin kelam düşüncesinin istikrar bulmasında ve Şeyh Müfîd’le başlatılan usûlî yaklaşımın benimsenip yaygınlaşmasında büyük bir yeri olan Ebû Ca’fer et-Tûsî arasında adalet ilkesi üzerinden bir karşılaştırma yaparak, söz (...) konusu iddiaların ne kadar sübut bulduğunu tespit etmeye çalıştık. Kısmi farklı izahları bir kenara bırakırsak, adalet ilkesinin ispat ve yorumlanmasında iki kelamcı arasında kayda değer bir farklılığın olmadığı görülmektedir. Abstract The claim that the Shi’i Imamite thought is heavily influenced by the Mu’tazilite outlook has been alleged since the fouth century of hijra. However, beginning with Shaikh Mufid, the first representative of the Usuli branch of Shi’a, the Shi’is vehemently denied this allegation. In this article, this issue is dealt with by making a comparison between the idea of Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, the prominent Mu’tazilite scholar who made a major contribution to the consolidation of the schools’ theaching and that of al-Tusi, who also made a contrubitued to the integration of the Shi’ite kalam and the spreading of the usuli approach initiated by Shaikh Mufid. Leaving aside the differences in deatil, it seems that there is no noteworthy difference between their approcah to the issue of justice. Key Words: Qâdî Abd al-Jabbâr, Abû Ja’far al-Tûsî, Husn-Qubh, Divine Justice, Free Will. (shrink)

Haber-i vâhidin delil değeri problemi, 2. (8.) yüzyıldan itibaren kelamcılar (:Mutezile), fıkıhçılar ve hadisçiler arasında tartışılan ve hakkında kayda değer bir literatür ortaya çıkan usûlî konuların başında gelmektedir. Şeybânî (ö. 189/805), Şâfiî (ö. 204/820), İsâ b. Ebân (ö. 221/836) ve Buhârî (ö. 256/870) gibi sünnî ekolün tanınmış fıkıh ve hadis alimlerinin haber-i vâhid lehine ortaya koydukları çalışmalar bu noktada oldukça etkili olmuştur. Bu etkinin bir sonucu olarak başlangıçta haber-i vâhidi toptancı bir yaklaşımla reddeden Mutezili isimler, yerini zamanla Ebû Ali el-Cübbâî (...) (ö. 303/916) gibi başka bir delille desteklenmesi şartıyla kabul eden alimlere bırakmıştır. Cübbâî, muhtemelen Kitâbü’l-ahbâr isimli günümüze ulaşmayan çalışmasında, hem tek kişinin haberi anlamındaki haber-i vâhidin hücciyet delillerini tenkit etmiş hem de çeşitli delillerle kendi kişisel görüşünü temellendirmeye çalışmıştır. Onun bu tenkit ve görüşleri, 4. (10.) yüzyılın önemli Hanefi fakih ve usulcüsü Cessâs (ö. 370/981) tarafından usul ilminin kurucu metinlerinden el Fusûl’de üstü kapalı bir şekilde nakledilmiş ve eleştirel bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutulmuştur. Araştırmamızda Cübbâî’nin, haber-i vâhidin delil değeri, kabul şartları konusundaki eleştiri ve görüşleri ile Cessâs’ın ona verdiği cevaplar ve karşı eleştirileri ele alınmıştır. (shrink)

The contributors to the volume discuss various approaches to bioethical thinking and the political and institutional contexts of bioethics, addressing underlying concerns about the purposes of its practice.

Background Professional autonomy, which directly affects the quality of professional nursing in patient care, and cognitive flexibility, which is an important factor for adaptation to change and developing nursing roles, are important concepts for nursing. Research objectives This research was carried out to determine the effect of cognitive flexibility on attitudes towards professional autonomy in nurses. Research design This was a descriptive study. Participants and research context The research was conducted with 415 nurses working in a city hospital of a (...) province, meeting the inclusion criteria and agreeing to participate in the study. A questionnaire form, The Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI), and the Attitude Toward Professional Autonomy Scale for Nurses (APASN) were used to collect data. Ethical considerations Ethical approval was obtained from the university ethics committee before starting the study. Institutional permission was obtained from the city hospital where the study was conducted. Electronic informed consent was obtained from the nurses included in the study. Findings In the study, the mean CFI score was 80.62 ± 11.55 and the mean APASN score was 70.42 ± 18.79. There was a weak positive correlation (r = 0.270; p < 0.05) between CFI and APASN scores. Moreover, the effect of the CFI mean score on the APASN mean score was found to be statistically significant (β = 0.278; p < 0.001). Furthermore, CFI explains 7.7% of APASN. Conclusion In the study, nurses’ attitudes towards professional autonomy and cognitive flexibility scores were found to be at a good level. Cognitive flexibility has a positive effect on attitudes towards professional autonomy. Interventional studies that will increase the level of cognitive flexibility are recommended in the development of nurses' attitudes towards professional autonomy. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Rights and Goals Rules, Rights, and Utility Rights and Liberty.

_Purpose._ The purpose of the article lies in studying the main socio-anthropological measurements of the problem of recognition represented primarily by the philosophy of recognition of Alex Honneth, which is actualized by the struggle of the Ukrainian people for their existence and national-cultural recognition. A consistent analysis of the communicative paradigm in contemporary philosophy led to the understanding of its transformation into the reality of the problem of recognition and the identification of the main forms of recognition in it, which (...) determine an individual’s perception of the social space as fair or unfair, where his dignity is disrespected. _Theoretical basis._ Turning to the works of Jurgen Habermas, Otfried Hoeffe, Ernst Tugendhat, Stefan Gosepath, and Thomas Rentsch made it possible to supplement the mainly procedural, theoretical-communicative way of philosophizing with a philosophical-anthropological, existential, contextual principle of awareness of recognition as a fundamental principle of justice and the understanding that the brutal, unjust destruction of the "living world" of a person and the state is synonymous with their physical destruction. The thesis of Francis Fukuyama about the relationship between the desire for recognition and human dignity inherent in human nature has acquired an important theoretical and methodological meaning. _Originality._ The article investigates the modern philosophical discourse of the problem of recognition in the socio-anthropological measurements, in the context of the relationship between recognition, the "living world" and justice, non-recognition, humiliation of human dignity, and injustice. And it was also found that the image of recognition represented by modern philosophical thought, as a horizon and condition of human existence, is based on the following components: justice, solidarity, dignity, and care. Exactly addressing the problem of recognition made it possible to answer the question about the anthropological-ontological, existential meaning of the desire of individuals, nations, and states for recognition and outline the ways of transforming recognition as a variant of "communicative utopia" into a real socio-cultural project. _Conclusions._ In contrast to justice, the theory of recognition comes from asymmetrical human relations, which, in the struggle for recognition, must become symmetrical. Although justice takes precedence over ethics of care and recognition, they are not actually in competition with each other, but belong to different but complementary dimensions of human existence. The perspective of philosophical understanding of the problem of recognition itself requires the deepening of its analysis with an existential-anthropological understanding rooted in a new, tragic life experience. Only under such conditions, it is possible to overcome the gap between often abstract philosophical reflections and real personal and social practices. (shrink)

Police killings of unarmed Black people have ignited a national and international response unlike any in decades. But differing from their civil rights-oriented predecessors, today’s activists do not think that the institutions and values of liberal democracy can eradicate structural racism. They draw instead on a Black radical tradition that, Terrence L. Johnson argues, derives its force from its unacknowledged ethical and religious dimensions. We Testify with Our Lives traces Black religion’s sustained influence from SNCC to the present, reconstructing a (...) radical lived ethics of freedom and justice. Johnson demonstrates that Black Power fundamentally contests liberalism’s abstract understanding of democracy, calling instead for new embodied frameworks to achieve human flourishing and dignity. Black bodies represent the primary form of resistance against violent and oppressive regimes of white supremacy and exploitation, and the individual and collective struggles of Black life bear witness to the dogged determination to cultivate beauty, rage, and joy. Considering the writings of Audre Lorde, Toni Cade Bambara, Stokely Carmichael, Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, and James Baldwin, We Testify with Our Lives makes its case through a new narrative of the evolution of Black radicalism from the civil rights movement through the Movement for Black Lives. It forges new insights into Black Power’s vital contributions to debates on ethics, transnational politics, democracy, political solidarity, and freedom—and its potent resources for the ongoing struggle to build democratic possibilities for all. (shrink)

Книга «Производительные силы и исторический процесс» из числа тех редких, но очень нужных исследований, которые пытаются выявить роль сквозных факторов исторического процесса и причины изменения этой роли. Книга посвящена исследованию развития от первобытности до современности мировых производительных сил как важнейшей составной части исторического процесса. Особое внимание уделено рассмотрению производственных революций (аграрной, промышленной и научно-технической). Прослежена также взаимосвязь производственного и других аспектов исторического процесса: политического, социального, этнического и духовного. Книга будет полезна не только специалистам в области социальной философии, исторической социологии и (...) теоретической истории, но также всем интересующимся проблемами теории исторического процесса или развития мирового хозяйства. Она способна помочь преподавателям, аспирантам и студентам и может быть использована в качестве учебного пособия для отдельных спецкурсов. (shrink)

Epitrepontes 353–355: κείνην λήψεται ταύτην [δʹγπεύξ[ομαι τ]ν νδον πολείπειν δ μως και νν χαριέντως κνενενκέναι δο κν τ μδι΄ μο ταντι κυκσθαι.