The article defends Heidegger’s view that the main question of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is the question of being. It is also argued that Heidegger special understanding of the level and method of KrV deserves serious attention. Finally it is argued that Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of the KrV is best seen as representative of an hermeneutical conception of phenomenology.

The chapter examines Kant’s conceptions of consciousness and their relation to his views on psychology as a science. Kant does not develop a philosophy of mind as such, but through his reinterpretation of metaphysics he develops different notions of consciousness. The most central and specifically Kantian concept of consciousness is that of apperception. It is argued that ‘apperception’ is not to be understood as self-consciousness or self-awareness. Rather, apperception is a capacity to be aware of one’s spontaneous activities, and it (...) can be further analyzed as the ability to respond to rules and norms. Thus understood, ‘apperception’ plays a central role not only in Kant’s theoretical philosophy but also in his moral and aesthetic theory. ‘Inner sense’ is another central concept for Kant. In the first Critique and later works, Kant distinguishes between apperception and inner sense: inner sense is the consciousness of what takes place within the mind as opposed to apperception, which is the consciousness of one’s activities. These two concepts of consciousness, ‘inner sense’ and ‘apperception’, generate two very different questions about the relation between consciousness and nature. On the one hand, there is the question of how inner or mental nature is related to physical nature; on the other hand, there is the question of how spontaneity is related to the whole of nature, inner nature as well as outer. As we shall see, Kant’s answer to the first question is closely related to his pessimism regarding the status of psychology as a science. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that Kant is indebted to Aristotle not to Plato. In this paper we argue, however, that the following four central topics in Kantâ\texttrademarks philosophy must be recognized as having Platonic roots. 1. The idea that metaphysics is a system of synthetic apriori judgements and the idea that such judgments require pure intuition. 2. The idea that geometrical objects have a certain purposiveness. 3. The notion of dialectic. 4. The notion of ideas and their role in the (...) sphere of cognition and morality. (shrink)

This collection addresses metaphysical issues at the intersection between philosophy and science. A unique feature is the way in which it is guided both by history of philosophy, by interaction between philosophy and science, and by methodological awareness. In asking how metaphysics is possible in an age of science, the contributors draw on philosophical tools provided by three great thinkers who were fully conversant with and actively engaged with the sciences of their day: Kant, Husserl, and Frege. -/- Part I (...) sets out frameworks for scientifically informed metaphysics in accordance with the meta-metaphysics outlined by these three self-reflective philosophers. Part II explores the domain for co-existent metaphysics and science. Constraints on ambitious critical metaphysics are laid down in close consideration of logic, meta-theory, and specific conditions for science. Part III exemplifies the role of language and science in contemporary metaphysics. Quine’s pursuit of truth is analysed; Cantor’s absolute infinitude is reconstrued in modal terms; and sense is made of Weyl’s take on the relationship between mathematics and empirical aspects of physics. -/- With chapters by leading scholars, Metametaphysics and the Sciences is an in-depth resource for researchers and advanced students working within metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

The main purpose of this dissertation is to show how Kant's critical understanding of "apperception" emerged from systematic reasoning on the problem of cognition. I argue that my inquiry yields new insights into the meaning of "transcendental apperception" which resolve problems other interpreters have had with reconciling Kant's apparently vacillating and conflicting views on the self and the awareness thereof, show that Kant has a novel and radical conception of the self, and are pivotal for a proper understanding of Kant's (...) idealism. ;Chapter 1 focuses on Kant's pre-critical writings. I suggest how Kant's explicit dissatisfaction with the Dissertation , and his move toward transcendental idealism, follow from certain arguments which are well in accord with Kant's views on thought and judgment in Spitzfindigkeit . In Chapter 2, I discuss Kant's Reflexionen in the so-called silent decade. The focus is his understanding of "I", "inner sense" and "apperception" and their relation, in his different attempts to answer that and how pure representations relate to objects. Chapter 3 offers an interpretation of the A-deduction as well as a discussion of two premises on which the deduction rests, the distinction in principle between sensibility and understanding, the existence of a priori concepts. Chapter 4 is mainly devoted to an interpretation of the B-deduction. I show how my understanding of "transcendental apperception" resolves a number of problems. It also gives rise to an interesting and original philosophical conception of thought as an act irreducible to natural processes. In Ch. 5, I show how the Dialectic in general and the Paralogisms in particular, support my reading of "transcendental apperception" as well as provide arguments which are pivotal for the proper understanding of Kant's idealism. (shrink)