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1 — 50 / 117
  1. added 2018-03-08
    Transcendental Paralogisms as Formal Fallacies - Kant’s Refutation of Pure Rational Psychology.Toni Kannisto - 2018 - Kant-Studien 109 (2):195-227.
    : According to Kant, the arguments of rational psychology are formal fallacies that he calls transcendental paralogisms. It remains heavily debated whether there actually is any formal error in the inferences Kant presents: according to Grier and Allison, they are deductively invalid syllogisms, whereas Bennett, Ameriks, and Van Cleve deny that they are formal fallacies. I advance an interpretation that reconciles these extremes: transcendental paralogisms are sound in general logic but constitute formal fallacies in transcendental logic. By formalising the paralogistic (...)
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  2. added 2018-01-03
    A crítica de Kant à subjetividade cartesiana.Marco Vinícius de Siqueira Côrtes - unknown - Dissertation, 2013
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  3. added 2018-01-03
    A crítica de Kant à subjetividade cartesiana.Marco Vinícius de Siqueira Côrtes - 2013 - Dissertation, UFPR, Brazil
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  4. added 2017-12-09
    Review of Béatrice Longuenesse "I, Me, Mine. Back to Kant and Back Again". [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - forthcoming - Philosophical Review 182 (1).
    review of Béatrice Longuenesse latest book on Kant and self-consciousness I, Me, Mine (Oxford 2017).
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  5. added 2017-10-30
    Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    What is it that makes a mental state conscious? Recent commentators have proposed that for Kant, consciousness results from differentiation: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is distinguished, by means of our conceptual capacities, from other states and/or things. I argue instead that Kant’s conception of state consciousness is sensory: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is accompanied by an inner sensation. Interpreting state consciousness as inner sensation reveals an underappreciated influence of Crusius on Kant’s view, (...)
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  6. added 2017-10-23
    Kant, the Philosophy of Mind, and Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy.Anil Gomes - 2017 - In Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In the first part of this chapter, I summarise some of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are addressed in Kant’s Critical writings. In the second part, I chart some of the ways in which that discussion influenced twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind and identify some of the themes which characterise Kantian approaches in the philosophy of mind.
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  7. added 2017-08-31
    A Gradual Reformation: Empirical Character and Causal Powers in Kant.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):662-683.
    According to Kant each person has an empirical character, which is ultimately grounded in one’s free choice. The popular Causal Laws interpretation of empirical character holds that it consists of the causal laws governing our psychology. I argue that this reading has difficulties explaining moral change, the ‘gradual reformation’ of our empirical character: Causal laws cannot change and hence cannot be gradually reformed. I propose an alternative Causal Powers interpretation of empirical character, where our empirical character consists of our mind’s (...)
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  8. added 2017-04-24
    Kant and the Simple Representation “I”.Luca Forgione - 2017 - International Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):173-194.
    The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. It (...)
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  9. added 2017-01-12
    Kant and the Mind.Andrew Brook - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    Kant made a number of highly original discoveries about the mind - about its ability to synthesise a single, coherent representation of self and world, about the unity it must have to do so, and about the mind's awareness of itself and the semantic apparatus it uses to achieve this awareness. The past fifty years have seen intense activity in research on human cognition. Even so, Kant's discoveries have not been superseded, and some of them have not even been assimilated (...)
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  10. added 2016-09-28
    Bundles, Selves, and Sceptical Realism in Udo Thiel’s The Early Modern Subject.Falk Wunderlich - 2016 - Kant-Studien 107 (3):545-553.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 3 Seiten: 545-553.
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  11. added 2016-09-27
    Is Locke’s Account of Personal Identity Really Subjectivist?Martin Lenz - 2016 - Kant-Studien 107 (3):526-535.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 3 Seiten: 526-535.
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  12. added 2016-09-27
    The Early Modern Subject Revisited – Responses to Barth, Lenz, Renz and Wunderlich.Udo Thiel - 2016 - Kant-Studien 107 (3):554-566.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 3 Seiten: 554-566.
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  13. added 2016-08-08
    Review: Corey Dyck's 'Kant and Rational Psychology'. [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - 2016 - Studi Kantiani 29:185-191.
  14. added 2016-08-02
    Apperception, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge in Kant.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Matthew Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Kant Handbook. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 139–61.
  15. added 2016-04-18
    Kant and the Problem of Self-Identification.Luca Forgione - 2015 - Organon F 22 (2):178-198.
    Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless selfascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents at least (...)
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  16. added 2016-02-08
    Kant ueber innere Erfahrung.Dina Emunds - 2007 - In Udo Kern (ed.), Was ist und was sein soll: Natur und Freiheit bei Immanuel Kant. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 189-205.
  17. added 2015-10-12
    Julian Wuerth, Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics Oxford University Press, 2014 Pp. Xvi + 349 ISBN 9780199587629 £50.00. [REVIEW]Spencer Paulson & Colin Marshall - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (3):512-516.
  18. added 2015-09-20
    Kant and the I as Subject.Luca Forgione - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 117-128.
    In the last few years, various Kantian commentators have drawn attention on a number of features in the self-reference device of transcendental apperception having emerged from the contemporary debate on the irreducibility of self-ascription of thoughts in the first person. Known as I-thoughts, these have suggested a connection between some aspects of Kant’s philosophy and Wittgenstein’s philosophico-linguistic analysis of the grammatical rule of the term I. This paper would like to review some of such correspondences (§§ 1-3), avoiding any mechanical (...)
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  19. added 2015-08-31
    Review: Theil, Udo, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity From Descartes to Hume[REVIEW]Melissa Zinkin - 2013 - Review of Metaphysics 67 (1):193-195.
  20. added 2015-08-29
    Review: Klemme, Kants Philosophie des Subjekts: systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Selbstbewusstsein und Selbsterkenntnis.Eric Watkins - 1998 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (3):471-473.
  21. added 2015-08-27
    The Emptiness of the "I": Kant's Transcendental Deduction in "Glauben Und Wissen".Sally Sedgwick - 2005 - Hegel-Jahrbuch 7 (1):171-175.
  22. added 2015-08-26
    Kant's Theory of Ego as Existence Awareness.John A. Reuscher - 1975 - Man and World 8 (3):276-295.
  23. added 2015-08-24
    Kant's 'I' and Freud's Ego.Béatrice Longuenesse - forthcoming - In Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Proceedings of the 11th Kant Congress. De Gruyter.
  24. added 2015-08-24
    Kant and Freud on 'I'.Béatrice Longuenesse - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 299-320.
  25. added 2015-08-24
    Was weiss ich vom Ich? : Kants Lehre vom Faktum der reinen praktischen Vernunft, seine Neufassung der Paralogismen und die verborgenen Fortschritte der Kritischen Metaphysik im Jahre 1786.Bernd Ludwig - 2012 - In Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann & Bernd Ludwig (eds.), Sind Wir Bürger Zweier Welten?: Freiheit Und Moralische Verantwortung Im Transzendentalen Idealismus. Meiner.
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  26. added 2015-08-24
    Kant's "I Think" Versus Descartes' "I Am a Thing That Thinks".Béatrice Longuenesse - 2008 - In Daniel Garber & Béatrice Longuenesse (eds.), Kant and the Early Moderns. Princeton University Press. pp. 9--31.
  27. added 2015-08-24
    Kant on the Identity of Persons.Béatrice Longuenesse - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):149 - 167.
  28. added 2015-08-24
    Selbstbewusstsein und Bewusstsein des eigenen Körpers. Variationen über ein kantisches Thema.Béatrice Longuenesse - 2007 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 55 (6):859-875.
    Kants Unterscheidung zwischen Bewusstsein seiner selbst „als Subjekt” und Bewusstsein seiner selbst „als Objekt” ist in jüngster Zeit lebendig diskutiert worden. Der Artikel bietet eine Diskussion des üblichen Vorwurfs, dem zufolge Kant ignoriert, dass ich, als Subjekt, meiner selbst als eines physischen Objektes beziehungsweise eines lebendigen Körpers bewusst bin. Gegen Quassim Cassams Argument zu dieser These argumentiert der Artikel, dass Kants Begriff des Ichs eher im Lichte seiner Rolle bei der Einigung unserer Vorstellungen zu verstehen ist als im Lichte zeitgenössischer (...)
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  29. added 2015-08-24
    Drawing From the Sources of Reason: Reflective Self-Knowledge in Kant's First "Critique".Melissa Mcbay Merritt - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Kant advertises his Critique of Pure Reason as fulfilling reason's "most difficult" task: self-knowledge. As it is carried out in the Critique, this investigation is meant to be "scientific and fully illuminating"; for Kant, this means that it must follow a proper method. Commentators writing in English have tended to dismiss Kant's claim that the Critique is the scientific expression of reason's self-knowledge---either taking it to be sheer rhetoric, or worrying that it pollutes the Critique with an unfortunate residue of (...)
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  30. added 2015-08-22
    The Numerical Identity of the Self and its Objects in Kant's Transcendental Idealism.Pierre Keller - 1991 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    Kant's philosophy must be understood nonnaturalistically and anti-psychologistically. Self-consciousness must be interpreted as preceding the distinction between different persons. Kant departs from the traditional idea that I thoughts are always mediated by a certain specific I sense or conceptualization of oneself. At the same time the so-called paradoxes of self-consciousness are resolved. The possibility of a pre-personal self-consciousness is what links the way all objects are given to finite beings to the way they are conceptualized by those beings. It serves (...)
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  31. added 2015-08-21
    Kants Paralogismen.Rolf-Peter Horstmann - 1993 - Kant-Studien 84 (4):408-425.
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  32. added 2015-08-19
    Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge.Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
    In this paper we (i) identify the notion of ‘essentially non-conceptual content’ by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a ‘minimalist’ solution to the problem of perceptual self-knowledge which is raised by Strong Externalism.
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  33. added 2015-08-19
    Review: Powell, Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness[REVIEW]Robert Hanna - 1992 - Review of Metaphysics 45 (3):631-633.
  34. added 2015-08-09
    CHAPTER 3: Cause, Object, and Self.Paul Guyer - 2009 - In Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume. Princeton University Press. pp. 124-160.
  35. added 2015-08-07
    Illusion and Fallacy in Kant’s First Paralogism.Michelle Gilmore Grier - 1993 - Kant-Studien 84 (3):257-282.
  36. added 2015-03-22
    Review: Corey W. Dyck, Kant and Rational Psychology. [REVIEW]Naomi Fisher - 2015 - Review of Metaphysics 68 (3):651-653.
  37. added 2015-01-03
    Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy.Allen W. Wood (ed.) - 1984 - Cornell University Press.
  38. added 2014-12-31
    Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
    I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption that all immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own present mental states is of one basic kind. I claim, on the contrary, that a satisfactory account of self-knowledge must recognize at least two fundamentally different kinds of self-knowledge: an active kind through which we know our own judgments, and a passive kind through which we know our sensations. I show that the former kind of self-knowledge is (...)
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  39. added 2014-12-30
    Time and the Sublime Self.Matthew Emory Pacholec - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (4):70-84.
    To bring the significance of Lyotard's reading of Kant's sublime into full relief, I will begin by considering some of the philosophical developments of Descartes and Hume as they relate to issues of subjectivity and consciousness. The thought of these two modern writers informs the critical philosophy of Kant. I will then explain the aesthetics of Kant and show how with the sublime there is a unique kind of time distinct from the common time of cognition. This aesthetic time destabilizes (...)
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  40. added 2014-11-30
    Kant's Immediatism, Pre-Critique.Julian Wuerth - 2006 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (4):489-532.
    Julian Wuerth - Kant's Immediatism, Pre-Critique - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 489-532 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Kant's Immediatism, Pre-Critique Julian Wuerth As the author of a copernican revolution in philosophy, Kant argues that philosophy begins with the study of the self. To grasp the scope and nature of knowledge in natural science, ethics, and aesthetics, we must first understand the self and its faculties of representation, pleasure, and desire, (...)
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  41. added 2014-10-13
    Kants Paralogismen.Dina Emundts, Stefanie Grüne & Ulrich Schlösser - 2006 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 54 (2):261-263.
  42. added 2014-10-13
    Die Paralogismen und die Widerlegung des Idealismus in Kants „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“.Dina Emundts - 2006 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 54 (2):295-309.
    Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit Kants Paralogismen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Im ersten Teil wird die These entwickelt, dass Kants Kritik an der rationalen Psychologie wesentlich auf der Behauptung beruht, dass etwas, das nur in der Zeit und nicht im Raum gegeben ist, nicht anhand des Begriffs der Substanz bestimmt werden kann. Im zweiten Teil wird gefragt, ob und wie das Ich als Begleitvorstellung wahrgenommen werden kann.
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  43. added 2014-09-26
    Practical Cognition and Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Evan Tiffany & Dai Heide (eds.), Kantian Freedom. Oxford University Press.
    Famously, in the second Critique , Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds to attribute freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. In this way, while we have no rational basis to make substantive assertions about things-in-themselves from a theoretical point of view, it is rational (in some sense) for us to believe that we are noumenally free from a practical one.
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  44. added 2014-08-28
    Two Uses of 'I' as Subject?Béatrice Longuenesse - 2012 - In Simon Prosser & François Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error through Misidentification.
  45. added 2014-07-13
    Kant's First Paralogism.Ian Proops - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):449–495.
    In “The Paralogisms of Pure Reason” Kant seeks to explain how rationalist philosophers could have arrived at the dogmatic conclusion that the self is a substance. His diagnosis has two components: first, the positing of “Transcendental Illusion”—a pervasive intellectual illusion that predisposes us to accept as sound certain unsound arguments for substantive theses about the nature of the self; second, the identification of the relevant fallacy we commit when we succumb to this illusion. This paper explains how these two elements (...)
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  46. added 2014-07-12
    Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind.Robert B. Pippin - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):449 - 475.
  47. added 2014-07-10
    First Person Illusions: Are They Descartes', or Kant's?Christopher Peacocke - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):247-275.
  48. added 2014-07-08
    Review: Bennett, Kant's Dialectic[REVIEW]Arthur Melnick - 1976 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (2):236-239.
  49. added 2014-07-03
    Kant's Real Self.Patricia Kitcher - 1984 - In Allen W. Wood (ed.), Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy. Cornell University Press. pp. 113--47.
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  50. added 2014-07-03
    Kant's Paralogisms.Patricia Kitcher - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):515-547.
1 — 50 / 117