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  1. Kant and the Significance of Self-Consciousness.Matthew Boyle - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    Human beings who have mastered a natural language are self-conscious creatures: they can think, and indeed speak, about themselves in the first person. This dissertation is about the significance of this capacity: what it is and what difference it makes to our minds. My thesis is that the capacity for self-consciousness is essential to rationality, the thing that sets the minds of rational creatures apart from those of mere brutes. This, I argue, is what Kant was getting at in a (...)
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  2. Kant's 'I' and Freud's Ego.Béatrice Longuenesse - forthcoming - In Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Proceedings of the 11th Kant Congress. De Gruyter.
  3. Kant on Plants: Self-Activity, Representations, and the Analogy with Life.Tyke Nunez - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    Do plants represent according to Kant? This is closely connected to the question of whether he held plants are alive, because he explains life in terms of the faculty to act on one’s own representations. He also explains life as having an immaterial principle of self-motion, and as a body’s interaction with a supersensible soul. I argue that because of the way plants move themselves, Kant is committed to their being alive, to their having a supersensible ground of their self-activity, (...)
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  4. A System of Rational Faculties: Additive or Transformative?Karl Schafer - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    In this essay, I focus on two questions. First, what is Kant's understanding of the sense in which our faculties form a unified system? And, second, what are the implications of this for the metaphysical relationships between the faculties within this system? To consider these questions, I begin with a brief discussion of Longuenesse's groundbreaking work on the teleological unity of the understanding as the faculty for judgment. In doing so, I argue for a generalization of Longuenesse's account along two (...)
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  5. Practical Cognition and Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Evan Tiffany & Dai Heide (eds.), Kantian Freedom. Oxford University Press.
    Famously, in the second Critique , Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds to attribute freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. In this way, while we have no rational basis to make substantive assertions about things-in-themselves from a theoretical point of view, it is rational (in some sense) for us to believe that we are noumenally free from a practical one.
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  6. Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s Reappraisal.Marco Cavallaro - 2020 - In Iulian Apostolescu (ed.), The Subject(s) of Phenomenology. Rereading Husserl. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 107-133.
    In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Egosplitting. (...)
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  7. Kant on Cognizing Oneself as a Spontaneous Cognizer.Markus Kohl - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):395-412.
    I examine a range of issues concerning Kant's conception of cognitive spontaneity. I consider whether we can cognize or know ourselves as spontaneous cognizers, and why Kant seems to regard the notion of cognitive spontaneity as less problematic than the idea of moral spontaneity. As an organizing theme of my discussion, I use an apparent tension between the A-edition and the B-edition of the first Critique. Against common interpretations, I argue that in the B-edition Kant does not revoke his claim (...)
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  8. Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity Between Inner and Outer Sense.Yibin Liang - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (10):307-338.
    Does inner sense, like outer sense, provide inner sensations or, in other words, a sensory manifold of its own? Advocates of the disparity thesis on inner and outer sense claim that it does not. This interpretation, which is dominant in the preexisting literature, leads to several inconsistencies when applied to Kant’s doctrine of inner experience. Yet, while so, the parity thesis, which is the contrasting view, is also unable to provide a convincing interpretation of inner sensations. In this paper, I (...)
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  9. On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):35-104.
    Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.
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  10. Kant, the Transcendental Designation of I, and the Direct Reference Theory.Luca Forgione - 2019 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 34 (1): 31-49.
    The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of (...)
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  11. Eric Watkins . Kant on Persons and Agency Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018 Pp. Xii + 242, Hbk ISBN 9781107182455, £75.00. [REVIEW]Colin Marshall - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (2):327-333.
  12. The Mind's "I". [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):255-265.
  13. I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again. [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):107-111.
    review of Béatrice Longuenesse latest book on Kant and self-consciousness I, Me, Mine (Oxford 2017).
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  14. A Gradual Reformation: Empirical Character and Causal Powers in Kant.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):662-683.
    According to Kant each person has an empirical character, which is ultimately grounded in one’s free choice. The popular Causal Laws interpretation of empirical character holds that it consists of the causal laws governing our psychology. I argue that this reading has difficulties explaining moral change, the ‘gradual reformation’ of our empirical character: Causal laws cannot change and hence cannot be gradually reformed. I propose an alternative Causal Powers interpretation of empirical character, where our empirical character consists of our mind’s (...)
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  15. Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    What is it that makes a mental state conscious? Recent commentators have proposed that for Kant, consciousness results from differentiation: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is distinguished, by means of our conceptual capacities, from other states and/or things. I argue instead that Kant’s conception of state consciousness is sensory: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is accompanied by an inner sensation. Interpreting state consciousness as inner sensation reveals an underappreciated influence of Crusius on Kant’s view, (...)
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  16. Transcendental Paralogisms as Formal Fallacies - Kant’s Refutation of Pure Rational Psychology.Toni Kannisto - 2018 - Kant-Studien 109 (2):195-227.
    : According to Kant, the arguments of rational psychology are formal fallacies that he calls transcendental paralogisms. It remains heavily debated whether there actually is any formal error in the inferences Kant presents: according to Grier and Allison, they are deductively invalid syllogisms, whereas Bennett, Ameriks, and Van Cleve deny that they are formal fallacies. I advance an interpretation that reconciles these extremes: transcendental paralogisms are sound in general logic but constitute formal fallacies in transcendental logic. By formalising the paralogistic (...)
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  17. The Subject in Hegel’s Absolute Idea.Clinton Tolley - 2018 - Hegel Bulletin 1:1-31.
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  18. Can't Kant Cognize His Empirical Self? Or, a Problem for (Almost) Every Interpretation of the Refutation of Idealism.Andrew Chignell - 2017 - In Anil Gomes & Andrew Stephenson (eds.), Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 138-158.
    Kant seems to think of our own mental states or representations as the primary objects of inner sense. But does he think that these states also inhere in something? And, if so, is that something an empirical substance that is also cognized in inner sense? This chapter provides textual and philosophical grounds for thinking that, although Kant may agree with Hume that the self is not ‘given’ in inner sense exactly, he does think of the self as cognized through inner (...)
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  19. Kant and the Simple Representation “I”.Luca Forgione - 2017 - International Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):173-194.
    The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. It (...)
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  20. Kant, the Philosophy of Mind, and Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy.Anil Gomes - 2017 - In Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In the first part of this chapter, I summarise some of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are addressed in Kant’s Critical writings. In the second part, I chart some of the ways in which that discussion influenced twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind and identify some of the themes which characterise Kantian approaches in the philosophy of mind.
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  21. The Perpetual Peace Puzzle: Kant on Persons and States.Ben Holland - 2017 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 43 (6):599-620.
    Kant described the state as a ‘moral person’, and did so when dealing with international relations. For all the interest in his contribution to the theory of global politics, the locution according to which Kant characterized the state has received very little attention. When notice has been taken of it, the moral personality of the state has moved arguments in opposing directions. On one recent reading, when Kant called the state a moral person he intended to indicate that it possessed (...)
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  22. Kant on Consciousness, Obscure Representations and Cognitive Availability.Yibin Liang - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (4):345-368.
  23. Apperception, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge in Kant.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Matthew Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Kant Handbook. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 139–61.
  24. Corey W. Dyck, Kant and Rational Psychology Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014 Pp. 257 ISBN 9780199688296 £ 45.00. [REVIEW]Falk Wunderlich - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (1):159-161.
  25. The Virtues of Freedom: Selected Essays on Kant.Paul Guyer - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The essays collected in this volume by Paul Guyer, one of the world's foremost Kant scholars, explore Kant's attempt to develop a morality grounded on the intrinsic and unconditional value of the human freedom to set our own ends. When regulated by the principle that the freedom of all is equally valuable, the freedom to set our own ends -- what Kant calls "humanity" - becomes what he calls autonomy. These essays explore Kant's strategies for establishing the premise that freedom (...)
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  26. Is Locke’s Account of Personal Identity Really Subjectivist?Martin Lenz - 2016 - Kant-Studien 107 (3):526-535.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 3 Seiten: 526-535.
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  27. Review: Corey Dyck's 'Kant and Rational Psychology'. [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - 2016 - Studi Kantiani 29:185-191.
  28. The Early Modern Subject Revisited – Responses to Barth, Lenz, Renz and Wunderlich.Udo Thiel - 2016 - Kant-Studien 107 (3):554-566.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 3 Seiten: 554-566.
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  29. Bundles, Selves, and Sceptical Realism in Udo Thiel’s The Early Modern Subject.Falk Wunderlich - 2016 - Kant-Studien 107 (3):545-553.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 3 Seiten: 545-553.
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  30. Review: Corey W. Dyck, Kant and Rational Psychology. [REVIEW]Naomi Fisher - 2015 - Review of Metaphysics 68 (3):651-653.
  31. Kant and the Problem of Self-Identification.Luca Forgione - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (2):178-198.
    Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless selfascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents at least (...)
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  32. Julian Wuerth, Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics Oxford University Press, 2014 Pp. Xvi + 349 ISBN 9780199587629 £50.00. [REVIEW]Spencer Paulson & Colin Marshall - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (3):512-516.
  33. Replies.Patricia Kitcher - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (1):149-159.
  34. Consciousness and Personal Identity.Owen Ware & Donald C. Ainslie - 2014 - In Aaron Garrett (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 245-264.
    This paper offers an overview of consciousness and personal identity in eighteenth-century philosophy. Locke introduces the concept of persons as subjects of consciousness who also simultaneously recognize themselves as such subjects. Hume, however, argues that minds are nothing but bundles of perceptions, lacking intrinsic unity at a time or across time. Yet Hume thinks our emotional responses to one another mean that persons in everyday life are defined by their virtues, vices, bodily qualities, property, riches, and the like. Rousseau also (...)
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  35. The Nature of the ‘I Think’: Comments on Chapter 11 of Kant's Thinker.Falk Wunderlich - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (1):143-148.
    The article deals with Kant's theory of the self in Patricia Kitcher's Kant's Thinker in three respects: (1) I argue that it is doubtful whether accompanying representations with the as such yields a principle for the categories since it does not require any strong kind of connection between them. (2) I discuss textual evidence for and against Kitcher's attempt to make sense of Kant's claim that the requires the continued existence of cognizers per se. (3) I ask whether Kitcher's understanding (...)
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  36. Self-Knowledge in § 7 of the Transcendental Aesthetic.Ralf M. Bader - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 531-540.
    Kant's claim that time is a subjective form of intuition was first proposed in his Inaugural Dissertation. This view was immediately criticised by Schultz, Lambert and Mendelssohn. Their criticisms are based on the claim that representations change which implies that change is real. From the reality of change they then argue to the reality of time, which undermines its supposed status as a subjective form of intuition that only applies to appearances. Kant took these criticisms very seriously and attempted to (...)
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  37. A crítica de Kant à subjetividade cartesiana.Marco Vinícius de Siqueira Côrtes - 2013 - Dissertation, UFPR, Brazil
  38. Kant and the I as Subject.Luca Forgione - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 117-128.
    In the last few years, various Kantian commentators have drawn attention on a number of features in the self-reference device of transcendental apperception having emerged from the contemporary debate on the irreducibility of self-ascription of thoughts in the first person. Known as I-thoughts, these have suggested a connection between some aspects of Kant’s philosophy and Wittgenstein’s philosophico-linguistic analysis of the grammatical rule of the term I. This paper would like to review some of such correspondences (§§ 1-3), avoiding any mechanical (...)
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  39. Dass Ich bin: Zu Kants Begriff des reinen Existenzbewusstseins.Dietmar Heidemann - 2013 - In Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht. De Gruyter. pp. 153-164.
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  40. Kant and Freud on 'I'.Béatrice Longuenesse - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 299-320.
  41. Kant’s One Self and the Appearance/Thing-in-Itself Distinction.Colin Marshall - 2013 - Kant-Studien 104 (4):421-441.
    Kant’s transcendental idealism hinges on a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. The debate about how to understand this distinction has largely ignored the way that Kant applies this distinction to the self. I argue that this is a mistake, and that Kant’s acceptance of a single, unified self in both his theoretical and practical philosophy causes serious problems for the ‘two-world’ interpretation of his idealism.
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  42. Review: Theil, Udo, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity From Descartes to Hume[REVIEW]Melissa Zinkin - 2013 - Review of Metaphysics 67 (1):193-195.
  43. A Peculiar Intuition: Kant's Conceptualist Account of Perception.Nathan Bauer - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):215-237.
    Abstract Both parties in the active philosophical debate concerning the conceptual character of perception trace their roots back to Kant's account of sensible intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason. This striking fact can be attributed to Kant's tendency both to assert and to deny the involvement of our conceptual capacities in sensible intuition. He appears to waver between these two positions in different passages, and can thus seem thoroughly confused on this issue. But this is not, in fact, the (...)
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  44. El sustrato filosófico de la modernidad en la civilización occidental.Yvonne Le Meur - 2012 - Ingenium. Revista Electrónica de Pensamiento Moderno y Metodología En Historia de la Ideas 6 (6):155-178.
    Revisiting the successive steps that gave birth to the modern occidental subject and showing that it hasn't always existed in the way it does today is the aim of this work. Since the Pre-Socratic philosophers and Socrates, Plato and Saint Augustine, the gradual configuration of an inner space favors the formation of an autonomous subject, ontologically linked at birth. Its subsequent emancipation and transformation into a radical reflexivity during Modernity remains linked to the philosophy of Descartes, Locke, and Kant.
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  45. Two Uses of 'I' as Subject?Béatrice Longuenesse - 2012 - In Simon Prosser & François Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error through Misidentification.
  46. Was weiss ich vom Ich? : Kants Lehre vom Faktum der reinen praktischen Vernunft, seine Neufassung der Paralogismen und die verborgenen Fortschritte der Kritischen Metaphysik im Jahre 1786.Bernd Ludwig - 2012 - In Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann & Bernd Ludwig (eds.), Sind Wir Bürger Zweier Welten?: Freiheit Und Moralische Verantwortung Im Transzendentalen Idealismus. Meiner.
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  47. The Semantics of Self-Knowledge in the Refutation of Idealism.Greg Lynch - 2012 - Kant Studies Online (1).
  48. First Person Illusions: Are They Descartes', or Kant's?Christopher Peacocke - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):247-275.
  49. Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge.Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
    In this paper we (i) identify the notion of ‘essentially non-conceptual content’ by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a ‘minimalist’ solution to the problem of perceptual self-knowledge which is raised by Strong Externalism.
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  50. Causal Refutations of Idealism.Andrew Chignell - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):487-507.
    In the ‘Refutation of Idealism’ chapter of the first Critique, Kant argues that the conditions required for having certain kinds of mental episodes are sufficient to guarantee that there are ‘objects in space’ outside us. A perennially influential way of reading this compressed argument is as a kind of causal inference: in order for us to make justified judgements about the order of our inner states, those states must be caused by the successive states of objects in space outside us. (...)
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