Over the last decade or so, there has been a renewed interest in a view about properties known as quidditism. However, a review of the literature reveals that ‘quidditism’ is used to cover a range of distinct views. In this paper I explore the logical space of distinct types of quidditism. The first distinction noted is between quidditism as a thesis explicitly about property individuation and quidditism as a principle of unrestricted property recombination. The distinction recently drawn by Dustin Locke (...) between extravagant quidditism and austere quidditism is a distinction between quidditisms of the first type. It is then argued that austere quidditism may itself be further sub-divided into what I call ‘extremely austere quidditism’ and ‘moderately austere quidditism’. Moderately austere quidditism is argued to be preferable to extremely austere quidditism and further to be able to address many of the arguments leveled against quidditism in general. (shrink)

Einar Bohn has argued that principles of composition must be contingent if gunky objects and junky worlds are both metaphysically possible. This paper critically examines such a case for contingentism about composition. I argue that weak mereological universalism, the principle that any two objects compose something, is consistent with the metaphysical possibility of both gunky objects and junky worlds. I further argue that, contra A. J. Cotnoir, the weak mereological universalist can accept a plausible mereological remainder axiom. The proponent of (...) contingent composition will have to look elsewhere for an argument in favor of his position. (shrink)

Crispin Wright has argued that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident but non-co-extensive norms of assertoric practice and that this fact tends to inflate deflationary theories of truth. Wright’s inflationary argument has generated much discussion in the literature. By contrast, relatively little has been said about the claim that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident norms. This paper will examine that claim. Wright’s argument for the claim that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident norms is first clearly presented. It is (...) then suggested that the argument trades on an ambiguity in ‘justified’ and ‘warrantedly assertible’. Finally, it is argued that, once the ambiguity is removed, there is reason to reject the claim that truth and epistemic warrant are coincident norms of assertoric practice. One important result is that no epistemic theory of truth can satisfy what Wright takes to be a platitude about assertion. (shrink)

This work defends a modest version of metaphysical realism. The commitments of the view are spelled out and the strongest argument for it is presented. It is suggested that failure to find this argument persuasive frequently arises from either a failure to distinguish between trivial and nontrivial dependence of minds on minds or a tendency to equivocate between metaphysical and theoretical timelines. The notion of mind-dependence is then explored in more detail. It is argued that, while the metaphysical realist has (...) recourse to a sufficiently rich notion of mind-dependence, the notion of mind-dependence required by a rejection of metaphysical realism is far from clear. This further strengthens the case for metaphysical realism. (shrink)

Robert Black argues against quidditism on the grounds that the quidditist is either committed to proper-class many possible worlds and proper-class many possible fundamental properties or must adopt an unacceptably arbitrary restriction on the number of possible fundamental properties. In this paper, I examine Black’s cardinality argument against quidditism and argue that quidditists and non-quidditists alike have reason to reject a key premise of that argument. While it may be the case that the quidditist is committed to nomically indiscernible possible (...) worlds that mark distinctions that make no difference to the physicist, it does not appear that the cardinality of the class of possible worlds or the class of possible fundamental properties postulated by the quidditist is any more problematic than that postulated by the non-quidditist. (shrink)

This paper examines Parfit's argument that personal identity is not what matters, focusing on his case against reductionist theories of personal identity. I argue that Parfit's reasons for rejecting reductionist views do not take the physical criterion for personal identity seriously enough. I outline a thoroughly naturalistic version of the reductionist theory that, if true, would escape Parfit's criticism. Such a view would be a plausible candidate for a relation that would matter as much as, if not more than, the (...) non identity relation advocated by Parfit. (shrink)

A growing number of philosophers have argued against the orthodoxy that the correct principle of composition will be a metaphysically necessary truth. With contingentism about composition a seemingly viable option, it would appear that would‐be necessitarians shoulder the burden of proof. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the contingentist, too, has a significant burden. I argue that nonbrutal principles of composition satisfy a principle according to which facts about whether or not a collection composes supervene on noncomposition (...) facts that are spatiotemporally local to the collection. I further argue that the contingentist has reason to reject both brutal composition and the supervenience principle. This reveals a significant internal tension in the contingentist's position. Unless this tension can be resolved, there will be (defeasible) reason to prefer necessitarianism about composition. (shrink)

This paper argues that Lemmon-style proof systems (those that consist of only introduction and elimination inference rules) have several pedagogical benefits over Copi-style systems (those that make use of inference rules and equivalence rules). It is argued that Lemmon-style systems are easier to learn as they do not require memorizing as many rules, they do not require learning the subtle distinction between a rule of inference and a rule of replacement, and deriving material conditionals is more straightforward. Finally, it is (...) argued that the need for learning provisional assumptions in Lemmon-style rules is not a significant enough reason for choosing the Copi-style system. (shrink)

This paper argues that Lemmon-style proof systems (those that consist of only introduction and elimination inference rules) have several pedagogical benefits over Copi-style systems (those that make use of inference rules and equivalence rules). It is argued that Lemmon-style systems are easier to learn as they do not require memorizing as many rules, they do not require learning the subtle distinction between a rule of inference and a rule of replacement, and deriving material conditionals is more straightforward. Finally, it is (...) argued that the need for learning provisional assumptions in Lemmon-style rules is not a significant enough reason for choosing the Copi-style system. (shrink)

This paper continues the work begun by Crispin Wright of identifying, articulating, and explaining the relations between various realist-relevant axes that emerge when it is conceded that any predicate capable of satisfying a small range of platitudes is syntactically and semantically adequate to count as a truth predicate for a discourse. I argue that the fact that a given discourse satisfies the three realist-relevant axes that remain if evidence-transcendent truth and reference to evidence-transcendent facts are ruled out by Dummettian meaning-theoretic (...) considerations is not sufficient for what I have elsewhere called “modest metaphysical realism.” I conclude that mind-independence marks yet another realist-relevant axis and explore the relationships between the proposed mind-independence axis and the realist-relevant axes identified by Wright. (shrink)

The metaphysical realist asserts, while the metaphysical antirealist denies, that there are individuals that exist independently of the existence and workings of any mind or minds. I begin by distinguishing the thesis of metaphysical realism from other theses that are also called ' realism '. Of particular interest in this discussion is the relation between metaphysical realism and views such as moral realism and scientific realism. ; Metaphysical realism is commonly thought to be the default position in the debate since (...) it is prima facie supported by our commonsense intuitions concerning the nature of reality. I develop several arguments to show that, when we examine our intuitions in detail, metaphysical realism is not the entirely commonsensical view that it at first appears. I argue that if metaphysical realism is true, it is difficult to see how semantic and epistemic access to the mind-independent world is possible and that, even if we do have such access, it will be difficult to rule out very bizarre ontologies. While none of these arguments constitute a decisive objection to metaphysical realism, they do suggest that the metaphysical realist should say something in defense of his view. ;I then examine Peter van Inwagen's attempted defense of metaphysical realism. This defense takes the form of a series of arguments designed to show that metaphysical antirealism is incoherent because incompatible with the existence of objective truth. I argue that his criticisms do not constitute an adequate defense of metaphysical realism because certain forms of antirealism, if otherwise philosophically viable, plausibly escape. ;This leads to a discussion of the extent to which an antirealist metaphysic can be considered a viable philosophical view. In this context, I examine the views of Hilary Putnam and Paul Grice. While the versions of metaphysical antirealism presented face serious difficulties of their own, I argue that it is a matter of philosophical judgment which view, metaphysical realism or metaphysical antirealism, has the more severe problems. (shrink)

Jonathan Schaffer argues against a necessary connection between properties and laws. He takes this to be a question of what possible worlds we ought to countenance in our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. In doing so, he unfairly rigs the game in favor of contingentism. I argue that the necessitarian can resist Schaffer’s conclusion while accepting his key premise that our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. require a very wide range of things called ‘possible worlds’. However, the necessitarian (...) can and should insist that, in many cases, these worlds are not metaphysically possible. I will further argue that, having taken such a stance, the necessitarian has additional resources to respond to Schaffer’s other arguments against the view. (shrink)

In a recent article, Sam Page distinguishes four kinds of mind-dependence : ontological, causal, structural, and individuative. He argues that, despite the fact that the metaphysical realism/antirealism debate has been frequently characterized as a debate between those who accept and those who deny that the world is causally and/or structurally dependent on minds, many antirealists are primarily interested in defending the claim that the world is individuatively mind-dependent. In this article, I critically examine these differing senses of “ mind-dependence ” (...) highlighting ways in which they remain ambiguous and identifying various entailment relations between them. I argue that there is reason to believe that ontological dependence, structural dependence, and the only sort of individuative dependence that is relevant to the metaphysical debate are coextensive notions. As such, any argument that succeeds in establishing that it is incoherent to suppose that everything is ontologically and/or structurally dependent thereby establishes the incoherence of metaphysical antirealism. (shrink)

In _Truth and Objectivity_, Crispin Wright argues that the notion of superassertibility affords the antirealist (with respect to a given range of discourse) a viable alternative to the realist’s more robust notion of truth. Toward this end, he endeavors to prove that a superassertibility predicate can satisfy the traditional equivalence schema: it is true that P iff P. (Wright takes satisfaction of this schema to be a criterion of adequacy for any viable truth predicate.) In this paper, I will argue (...) that, not only does Wright’s attempt to prove that a superassertibility predicate satisfies the equivalence schema fail, an examination of its failure reveals a dilemma for the antirealist who would adopt superassertibility as a model of truth. (shrink)

Abstract Curiously missing in the vast literature on Hilary Putnam's so-called model-theoretic argument against semantic realism is any response from would-be proponents of what Putnam would call magical theories of reference. Such silence is surprising in light of the fact that such theories have occupied a significant position in the history of philosophy and the fact that there are still several prominent thinkers who would, no doubt, favor such a theory. This paper develops and examines various responses to Putnam's argument (...) on behalf of the proponent of a magical theory of reference. While Putnam's explicit replies to such responses to his argument seem to involve little more than name calling, I develop arguments that show that there are significant problems facing any would-be proponent of such a view. While magical theories of reference are far from the strawmen Putnam seems to take them to be, there are, I argue, genuine reasons for a semantic realist to prefer a non-magical theory of reference. (shrink)

R. M. Hare’s last book is a collection of his essays from the 1980s and 1990s. There is a unity and structure to this collection that is not entirely captured in Hare’s introductory remarks in the preface. The essays fall into three main categories. One group is purely theoretical, developing and motivating Hare’s moral theory, objective prescriptivism. A second group is polemical in nature and aimed at philosophers and philosophical methodologies hostile to objective prescriptivism. The third group applies Hare’s preferred (...) brand of moral reasoning to various contemporary moral issues including racism, urban planning, and moral problems relating to the medical sciences and business. Common unifying themes run throughout the essays including the role of maxims in moral reasoning and the requirement that rationally acceptable maxims be universalizable. While the theoretical essays are intended for the serious student or scholar of philosophy, most of the later essays are accessible to a wider audience. All are written in Hare’s enjoyable and charming prose. (shrink)