We think of the Enlightenment as an era dominated by ideas of progress, production, and industry--not an era that favored the lax and indolent individual. But was the Enlightenment only about the unceasing improvement of self and society? The Pursuit of Laziness examines moral, political, and economic treatises of the period, and reveals that crucial eighteenth-century texts did find value in idleness and nonproductivity. Fleshing out Enlightenment thinking in the works of Denis Diderot, Joseph Joubert, Pierre de Marivaux, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, (...) and Jean-Siméon Chardin, this book explores idleness in all its guises, and illustrates that laziness existed, not as a vice of the wretched, but as an exemplar of modernity and a resistance to beliefs about virtue and utility. Whether in the dawdlings of Marivaux's journalist who delayed and procrastinated or in the subjects of Chardin's paintings who delighted in suspended, playful time, Pierre Saint-Amand shows how eighteenth-century works provided a strong argument for laziness. Rousseau abandoned his previous defense of labor to pursue reverie and botanical walks, Diderot emphasized a parasitic strategy of resisting work in order to liberate time, and Joubert's little-known posthumous Notebooks radically opposed the central philosophy of the Enlightenment in a quest to infinitely postpone work. Unsettling the stubborn view of the eighteenth century as an age of frenetic industriousness and labor, The Pursuit of Laziness plumbs the texts and images of the time and uncovers deliberate yearnings for slowness and recreation. Some images inside the book are unavailable due to digital copyright restrictions. (shrink)

Le succès européen de l’enquête de Roberto Saviano, Gomorra, sur les ramifications internationales de la Camorra napolitaine, a rappelé combien le phénomène mafieux dépasse largement le Mezzogiorno italien1. Quelque peu négligée depuis la fin des grandes tueries de Palerme au début des années 1990, la mafia ou toute forme de criminalité organisée...

For several centuries prior to the founding of the Theosophical Society in 1875, individual 'theosophers' in Britain and Europe were quietly in touch with one another all seekers of the inward way. Theosophic Correspondence (1792 1797) is a series of inspiring letters, personal and philosophic, exchanged during the climactic days of the French Revolution between Kirchberger, member of the Sovereign Council at Berne, Switzerland, and Saint-Martin, whom Kirchberger regarded as 'the most eminent writer . . . and most profound (...) of his age'. (shrink)

Il peut paraître singulier, pour une revue trimestrielle, de vouloir analyser l’actualité politique, alors que celle-ci change au jour le jour. Mais, dans ce débit à jets continus, il est des événements, parfois des détails, qui sont plus importants que d’autres ; il est des actes ou des faits que les historiens retiendront comme ayant marqué un moment, voire même leur...

Présente le parcours philosophique de Merleau-Ponty tant dans sa formation que dans ses objectifs. Ses références : Descartes, Leibniz, Gabriel Marcel. Ses concepts opératoires : le concret, l'incarnation, l'intentionnalité, les chiasmes.

Sarah is a young deaf woman in revolt, refusing to speak. She marries James, an orthophonist who works in a special school for the deaf. However, what gradually emerges in the course of their relationship is the latent suffering caused by what each of the partners isn't getting. James, tired of acting as Sarah's interpreter, frustrated by the limits of what they can share, shouts out:You want to be independent of me, you want to be a person in your own (...) right, you want people not to pity you … then you [must] learn to read my lips and you [must] learn to use that little mouth of yours for something besides eating and showing me you're better than hearing girls in bed! Come on! Read my lips? What am I saying? Say what I'm saying … You always have to be dependent on someone, and you always will for the rest of your life until you learn to speak. Now come on! I want you to speak to me. Let me hear it. Speak! Speak! Speak! …. (shrink)

Sarah is a young deaf woman in revolt, refusing to speak. She marries James, an orthophonist who works in a special school for the deaf. However, what gradually emerges in the course of their relationship is the latent suffering caused by what each of the partners isn't getting. James, tired of acting as Sarah's interpreter, frustrated by the limits of what they can share, shouts out:You want to be independent of me, you want to be a person in your own (...) right, you want people not to pity you … then you [must] learn to read my lips and you [must] learn to use that little mouth of yours for something besides eating and showing me you're better than hearing girls in bed! Come on! Read my lips? What am I saying? Say what I'm saying … You always have to be dependent on someone, and you always will for the rest of your life until you learn to speak. Now come on! I want you to speak to me. Let me hear it. Speak! Speak! Speak! …. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty s’est toujours intéressé aux rapports complexes entre christianisme, philosophie et théologie. Ses écrits, publiés ou inédits, opposent régulièrement « la nouveauté du christianisme » – comme expérience de l’homme, comme attitude religieuse, et jusque dans sa conception de Dieu – à une théologie dite « explicative », qui ne parviendrait pas à penser cette nouveauté, voire la trahirait. Accusée d’importer le Dieu des philosophes, cette théologie expliquerait Dieu et expliquerait par Dieu pour mieux se passer des mystères de l’homme, (...) des dimensions tragiques de sa condition, manquant ainsi paradoxalement une négativité qui est le lieu même où s’ouvre l’attitude religieuse. Dans cette confrontation originale, Merleau-Ponty transpose sa propre lutte contre certains philosophes et mobilise les axes essentiels de sa pensée : ses conceptions de l’homme et de l’être, une anthropologie de la chair perceptive et désirante, une ontologie de l’être inachevé et inépuisable. Merleau-Ponty was always interested in the complex relationship between christianity, philosophy and theology. His writings, published or unpublished, regularly contrast « the novelty of Christianity » — as experience of man, as religious attitude, and including its conception of God — with a so-called « explanatory » theology, which would not manage to think this novelty, might even betray it. Charged with importing the God of the philosophers, this theology would explain God and explain by God in order to bypass the mysteries of man, the tragic dimensions of its condition, thus paradoxically missing a negativity which is the very place where the religious attitude unfolds. In this original confrontation, Merleau-Ponty transposes his own fight against some philosophers and summons the essential axis of his thought : his conceptions of man and being, an anthropology of perceptive and desiring flesh, an ontology of unfinished and inexhaustible being. (shrink)

Le Tableau naturel des rapports qui existent entre Dieu, l'homme et l'univers est un ouvrage fondamental pour ceux qui cherchent à comprendre les mystères de la Création. Pour Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, l'homme porte en lui-même la clé de tous les mystères. Se connaître soi-même est donc la condition primordiale pour accéder à la Connaissance. Les textes sacrés nous enseignent que l'histoire de l'humanité est liée à un drame en trois actes. Le premier est celui de l'âge d'or ; le (...) deuxième celui d'une chute douloureuse dans la matière ; le troisième, qui reste à venir, sera marqué par une rédemption, une réintégration dans le Divin. L'auteur de ce livre s'efforce de percer le sens ésotérique de ces trois étapes. Il montre aussi que l'impasse dans laquelle se trouve l'homme résulte de la confusion qui règne dans ses pensées. S'il nourrissait sa volonté à la chaleur de l'Amour divin, il accéderait à la régénération d'une manière naturelle, et l'humanité trouverait la Connaissance menant à la Paix Profonde. (shrink)

This paper explores the meaning attributed to the national group as an entry point into how boundaries between the in-group and the out-group are formed. To do so, it focuses on the representation of the past of the group, taken as a symbolic resource able to produce a raison d’être for national groups, and does so within a dialogical framework. Using the transcripts of the French parliamentary debates on immigration from 2006, it proposes a qualitative analysis of collective narratives of (...) the past along three axes: 1) what meaning do they give to the nation, 2) how is such a meaning produced, and 3) how do the stories told by different groups reply or relate to one another. By identifying the main narratives found in the data and how they relate to each other – within and between groups – it proposes to see collective memory as itself the product of symbolisation processes and, therefore, as a cultural tool especially powerful to produce meaning about the present. This paper also argues that collective memory is a situated construction negotiated with – or contested by – others, made possible by the presence of common historical benchmarks to which different meanings may however be attributed. Finally, it proposes to understand “immigration talk” as potentially the product of the identity questions faced by the national group, rather than the other way around. (shrink)

“To see is to imagine. And to imagine, is to see.”Perception and Imaginary in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accords such a phenomenological and ontological priority to perception that this privilege might lead him to minimize the importance of theimaginary in our relationship with the world. In fact, in the work published during his life, the theme of the imaginary does not occupy a large place, and its conceptual elaboration remains little visible. A reading of his posthumous publications and of his unpublished papers leads (...) to a more subtle landscape, inwhich the philosopher destabilizes our common oppositions between real and imaginary, as well as those between the imaginary and truth. From themanuscripts from the end of the 1940s on, Merleau-Ponty expands his inquiry into perception in two complementary directions: the intuition of a form of coextensivity between perceptive life and imaginary life, but also between perception and expression. These intuitions, never disavowed, would continueto deepen up through the late unpublished ontological works. They find a guiding thread in the contestation of Sartre’s separation between the real andthe imaginary, and they open out onto the outline of a complex link between truth, imagination, and expression. Merleau-Ponty pretended to approve of thework of The Imaginary all that which is actually moving beyond it, in the direction most opposite to this essay’s own aims: “To see is to imagine. And toimagine is to see.” This split with Sartre finds one of its pivots in the phenomenological characterization of vision as a surpassing of the observable, a surpassing that would touch on an essential dimension of being and of truth.“Vedere è immaginare. E immaginare, è vedere”.Percezione e immaginario in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accorda alla percezione una tale priorità, fenomenologica e ontologica, che questo privilegio potrebbe condurre a minimizzare l’importanzadell’immaginario nel nostro rapporto al mondo. Di fatto, nell’opera pubblicata in vita, il tema dell’immaginario non occupa un grande spazio, e la suaelaborazione concettuale resta poco visibile. La lettura delle pubblicazioni postume e degli inediti conduce a un disegno più sottile, che vede il filosofo destabilizzare le nostre comuni opposizioni fra reale e immaginario così come quelle fra immaginario e verità. A partire dai manoscritti della fine degli anniQuaranta, Merleau-Ponty allarga la sua indagine sulla percezione in due direzioni complementari: verso l’intuizione di una forma di co-estensività fravita percettiva e vita immaginaria, ma altresì fra percezione e espressione. Mai smentite, queste intuizioni vanno approfondendosi fino ai tardi inediti“ontologici”. Esse trovano un filo conduttore nella messa in causa della separazione operata da Sartre fra reale e immaginario, e sfociano nell’abbozzodi un legame complesso fra verità, immaginario e espressione. Merleau-Ponty finge di “ratificare” il lavoro de L’Immaginario, in realtà sorpassandolo nelladirezione il più possibile opposta allo sforzo compiuto da questo stesso saggio: «edere è immaginare. E immaginare è vedere». Questo distanziarsi da Sartretrova uno dei suoi “cardini” nella caratterizzazione fenomenologica della visione come superamento dell’osservabile, un superamento che riguarderebbeuna dimensione essenziale dell’essere come della verità. (shrink)